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INDIA



QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XXXIX No. 1 - 4

January-March 1983

39 LB

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NON-ALIGNMENT AND ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS

—By Julius K. Nyerere

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THE CONCEPT OF NON-ALIGNMENT

—By Leo Mates

DIPLOMACY BY CONFERENCE: PRINCIPLES,
GOALS AND PROBLEMS OF NAM

—By Chisepo J.J. Mphaisa

NEHRU AND NON-ALIGNMENT
—By A.K. Damodaran

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PROSPECTS FOR NON-ALIGNMENT:
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NOTES AND VIEWS

RT-01251

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INDIA QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XXXIX	January-	March 1	1983	No. 1
Non-Alignment and Its By Julius K. Nyerere	s Future	Prospects		1
THE CONCEPT OF NON-ALI By Leo Mates	GNMENT			6
DIPLOMACY BY CONFERENCE	CE.: PRINCII	les, Goal	S AND PROBLEM	5
of Nam By Chisepo J.J. Mphai	isa			23
NEHRU AND NON-ALIGNME By A.K. Damodaran	ENT			41
Prospects for Non-Align By Parvathi Vasudevan		ia's Role		50
and and a second of	NOTES AN	D VIEW	S	
INDO-AMERICAN RELATION	NS : CHANG	GING PERS	PECTIVES	
By Navin Sinha				63
REFLECTIONS ON INDIA'S E By B.D. Nagchaudhur	nvironmen and S. Bha	r Policy		71
	BOOK R	EVIEWS		
THE CONTROL OF OIL— By Munther S. Dajani	A Review and Mohai	Article nmed S. D	D aoudi	79
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICAT By Subrata Banerjee	ION COLONI	ALISM—A	Review Article	83

G	F	N	E	R	A	L

Political Theory	86
JOHN DUNN: Political Obligation in Its Historical Context: Essays in Political Theory	—Sobhanlal Datta Gupta
Disarmament	88
SYED JAFAR RAZA BILGRAMI: Salt II: A Balance of Ambivalences	-R.R. Subramanian
Communications	89
KRISHAN SONDHI: Problems of Communication in Developing Countries	—J.K. Doshi
FOREIGN POLICY	
Nepal	91
PIERS BLAIKIE, JOHN CAMERON AND DAVID SEDDON: Nepal in Crisis—Growth and Stagnation at the Periphery	-Navin Chandra Joshi
BENGT-ERIK BORGSTROM: The Patron and the Panca—Village Values and Panchayat Democracy in Nepal	-Shree Krishna Jha
Iraq	94
M.A. SALEEM KHAN: The Monarchic Iraq—A Political Study INDIA	-Mushirul Haq.
	The state of the s
	94
MANI KAMERKAR: British Paramountcy: British-Baroda Relations 1818-1848	—Parshotam Mehra
History MANI KAMERKAR: British Parama	

S.R. MEHROTRA: Towards India's Freedom and Partition	—Amba Prasad	
ALLEN HAYES MERRIAM: Gandhi Vs. Jinnah—The Debate Over the Partition of India	—D.P. Mishra	
DEVAVRAT PATHAK AND PRAVIN SHETH: Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel—From Civic to National Leadership	—S.L. Malhotra	
Military		102
K.C. PRAVAL: The Red Eagles—A History of the Fourth Division of India	—D.K. Palit	
A.K. CHATTERJI: Indian Navy's Submarine Arm	-P.R. Chari	
Indian Books of the Quarter By Ashok Jambhekar		106

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A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XXXIX	April-J	une 1983		No. 2
RESOURCE AVAILABILITY NIGERIA: THE IMPACT		IGN POLICY	CHANGE IN	
By Julius O. Ihonvbere				109
CHINA AND THE EMERGENO POWER GLOBAL PERCE		LADESH: RO	LE OF GREAT	
By J.N. Mahanty		••		137
Non-Alignment and the By P.R. Chari	e Nuclear	THREAT		159
by 1.K. Chair				139
New World Information By S.C. Parasher	ON 'ORDER	• •		173
1	NOTES AN	ND VIEWS		
Soviet Nuclear Policie	s in the 7	THIRD WOR	LD	
By K.D. Kapur	••	• •	••	183
RACISM IN CANADA: SOM By Prakash C. Jain	ME RECENT	Surveys	Market Street	193
	BOOK R	EVIEWS		
ROOTS OF INDIAN FOREIG	N Policy—	A Review A	Article	
By K.P. Karunakaran	••	••	••	199
Lessons From Japanese Article	ECONOMIC	DEVELOPME	NT—A Review	
By Brij Tankha				206

RHODA LOIS BLUMBERG and LEELA DWARAKI: India's Educated Women: Options and Constraints

-S.L. Sharma

NON-ALIGNMENT: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF INDIAN PUBLICATIONS—Ashok Jambhekar

230

THE INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, the publisher of the journal, is a non-government, non-profit and non-party organisation. It was founded in 1943 to encourage and facilitate the objective study of Indian and International Affairs. The Council, as such, does not express any opinion on any aspects of Indian and International Affairs. The opinions expressed in this journal are, therefore, those of the respective authors and reviewers not of the Council.

3

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INDIA QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Vol. XXXIX	July-Septemb	er 1983		No. 3
BH W CHRC			on de	
Bonn's Ostpolitik at By Jyotirmoy Bane		3?		233
TRANSITIONAL POLITIC SATTAR'S INTERIM PR	ESIDENCY	SH: A STUDY	OF	
By Shaukat Hassa	n		••	263
THE INDIAN NATIONAL NATIONS: PROLOGUE	E TO THE UNITED	ND THE LEAGUE NATIONS	OF	
By T.A. Keenleysid	e	***		281
THE EVOLUTION OF NO By Bimal Prasad	ON-ALIGNMENT			299
On Giving Substance By Tarlok Singh	E TO COLLECTIVE	Self-reliance	water to the	310
	NOTES AND	VIEWS		
Mno's I	authorat Media			
MNC'S IMPACT ON DE By N. Ade-Lawal	VELOPING COUNT	RIES	• •	317
GROWING REGIONALISM By Satya Narain M	IN SIKKIM: A N Iishra	OTE		331
	BOOK REVI	EWS		
The second second second	Topic Control of Special			
INDIA'S IMPERILLED FRO By T.S. Murty	ONTIERS—A Revie	w Article		338
THE "WHITE MUTINY" CONGRESS—A Review	AND GENESIS OF	Indian Nationa	AL	
By S.N. Jain	Market of Land		• • •	343

INDIA	
History	346
DAVID PAGE: Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-32.	Satya M. Rai
Political Theory and Political Developments	
J.S. BAINS and R.B. JAIN (Eds.): Perspectives in Political Theory: Essays in Honour of Frank	Partha Chatterjee
SUMANTA BANERJEE: In the Wake of Naxalbari: A History of the Naxalite Movement in India —Box	udhayan Chattopadhyay
V.K. ANAND: Conflict in Nagaland: A Study of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency	—B.K. Roy-Burman
Modernization and Social Change	354
DHIRENDRA K. VAJPEYI: Modernization and Social Change in India	—Nirmal Singh
SUDHA V. DESAI: Social Life in Maharashtra Under the Peshwas	-N.G. Bhaware
ARTHUR WESLEY HELWEG: Sikhs in England: The Development of a Migrant Community	—J.S. Gandhi
Economic Perspectives	365
CHARAN SINGH: Economic Nightmare of India: Its Cause and Cure	—H. Venkatasubbiah
ASHOK MITRA: The Share of Wages in National Income	—Uttam Gupta
ARVIND SHARMA: Hindu Scriptural Value System and the Economic Development of India	—Arun Sahay

Language Issues Digitized by Arya Samaj Found	ation Chennai and eG	Sangotri	369
N.K. PRASAD: The Language Issue in	India —R.K.	Dasgupta	
INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER			
By Ashok Jambhekar	•		372

46

54

365

THE INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, the publisher of the journal, is a non-government, non-profit and non-party organisation. It was founded in 1943 to encourage and facilitate the objective study of Indian and International Affairs. The Council, as such, does not express any opinion on any aspects of Indian and International Affairs. The opinions expressed in this journal are, therefore, those of the respective authors and reviewers, not of the Council.

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NON-ALIGNMENT AND ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS*

By Julius K. Nyerere

THE concept of non-alignment has never been officially defined. But its meaning and its implications in a polarised world were so clear in 1961 that 25 non-aligned nations found it worthwhile to meet and exchange views. The concept was also well enough understood to attract the hostility of the power blocs both before and after that meeting.

The nations attending the first non-aligned conference in Belgrade differed in size (although most were small) and in ideology and domestic policies. They differed also in the degree of their poverty and lack of resources, although all were poor and technically backward. What they had in common was a lack of commitment to either side of the Cold War which then (as now) dominated world affairs, and recent emergence from some form of external domination. These common factors were sufficient to give the group a distinctive outlook on problems of world peace and security, and a thoroughgoing opposition to "colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations."

Non-alignment represents an assertion by small and weak states that they have a right to freedom, that they are involved in world affairs as equal sovereign nations, and that they have the capacity to contribute to the search for world peace. The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement was also an assertion that the divide between the Super Powers and their respective allies was—and is—a conflict between competing desires for domination of the world. The Belgrade Conference gave an alternative vision by declaring that lasting peace can be achieved only on the basis of "a new order based on co-operation between nations, founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity."

Despite compromises forced on individual members by weakness and geo-political problems, the original concept of the Non-Aligned Movement continues to be the central guiding principle of the movement. The dangers and the attitudes which caused the first non-aligned conference to take place still exist, and are still prevalent, despite de-colonisation and new complexities in international relationships. On the lowest possible assessment of its usefulness, the Non-Aligned Movement provides a collective conscience—an alternative view of the world—which both super powers find it necessary to consider. Usually they attempt to propitiate it, or to muzzle it by the methodology of their actions or by other measures.

The latter include making it very difficult to maintain a really non-aligned posture. Almost every non-aligned state comes under diplomatic, political, or economic pressure to be "non-aligned on our side." For some countries

^{*}Reprinted from Uma Vasudev (Ed.), Issues Before Non-Alignment: Past and Present. Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 1983, pp. 29-34.

the pressures become overwhelming. Seven of the 25 nations which participated in the first Belgrade Conference, and six of those who joined later, now have some kind of military connection (other than short-term training schemes related to arms purchases) with one or the other of the Super

It is necessary to recognise that every one of these alliances or military connections marks a compromise for the Non-Aligned Movement as well as for the country concerned. All these states had publicly asserted their desire, and intention, to separate themselves from the Great Power conflict. The evidence suggests that most—if not all—the governments concerned would still like to do so; certainly their peoples generally resent any other arrangement. Even when they are from another non-aligned nation, foreign troops almost always become unpopular; when they represent a super power they are a constantly present reminder of national weakness.

Yet while they always represent a compromise for the concept of non-alignment, such military connections can have very different explanations. In some instances the arrangement was entered into because of a clear threat from the other super power, or from a surrogate which is both strong in its own right and able to depend upon super power backing. In some instances the arrangement represents unavoidable submission to the kind of "protection" offered by "Big Brother" to little brother. In both these cases, the non-aligned country was a victim, at best it was able only to choose with which of the super powers, it would make a deal. And if such a choice did exist, it would normally try to maximise its remaining area of freedom by gravitating towards the super power which was not an immediate threat to it—often the one farthest away.

When a country compromises its non-alignment under circumstances like these, all other members have reason to understand; which small country becomes the victim is often an accident of geography, and all know it might have been themselves. All that the Non-Aligned Movement can do is to give the victim country moral and political support as it endeavours to widen its room for manoeuvre until a return to full non-alignment becomes possible.

There are, however, cases where a country has compromised its non-aligned position as a result of what can only be called successful seduction. The bait is either an amount of economic assistance, or something less respectable—such as support for the government against its own people. In such instances the other non-aligned nations have greater excuse for criticism, but while an act of weakness can be condemned, it is the underlying weakness which is the real problem.

Yet whatever the reasons for super power military connections, the presence at non-aligned conferences of members involved in them will be used to discredit the conclusions of that conference. Any resolution critical of the West will be attributed to the presence of nations with Soviet links, and vice versa. Our failures are therefore a continuing source of embarrassment to our movement. It is clear that we all need to try to maintain or to

re-establish as quickly as possible, our independence of any military connection with a super power. And if any of us fail, it is legitimate for the non-aligned movement to question how and why it happened, not because there could be any prospect of excluding a member, but because we were all affected by the resultant reduction in our movement's credibility. It is possible also that the prospect of our questioning may help a nation at risk to withstand the blandishments, or even the threats, of a super power.

Blanket condemnation of military links by non-aligned nations, however, is not only unjust and unrealistic. It can be used very easily as a device to weaken, divide, or undermine the movement which has grown up. It is also a dangerously blinkered view of world realities.

A small nation's real freedom in international affairs can undoubtedly be restricted by close military connections with a super power. But economic dependence, and even economic weakness, can also inhibit a nation's ability to judge issues for itself and to speak accordingly.

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The effects of external economic domination are less obvious to the rest of the world, partly because the threat of starvation always seems less dangerous to the well-fed than the threat from a gun. More important, perhaps, is that economic dependence on the part of the non-aligned nations is taken for granted; virtually all non-aligned states are new countries which inherited dependent economies mostly geared to the western bloc. But the prevalence and the deep-rooted nature of external economic dependence does not reduce the reality of its implications.

Every non-aligned member has to think seriously before it gravely displeases a nation which controls a large part of its export trade or its domestic productive capacity. We have seen that, provided they have courage, non-aligned nations can still speak freely on international issues even if they have to import food, or are in foreign exchange difficulties. But they are—and governments have to be aware of it—wide open to being blackmailed. And quite apart from that possibility, the views of individual non-aligned states, and our movement as a whole, are much more easily disregarded when we are simultaneously in a condition of economic crisis, or when we have embarked on major development activities which require the participation of the countries currently being criticised.

The ultimate incompatibility of extreme poverty and economic dependence on the one side, and equal freedom for all sovereign nations on the other, lies behind the demand for a New International Economic Order, a demand which was first articulated in an organised form (although not under that title) at a non-aligned conference. Since the first meeting in Belgrade, but with increasing clarity and emphasis, non-aligned conferences have set out the goals, and the immediate objectives, of the Developing World on economic matters. Implementation is left to the Group of 77, which also includes other third world nations. It is because implementation of the principles requires technical capacity, and detailed negotiations, that many members feel an increasing need for a Group of 77 Permanent Technical

Secretariat, but do not see such a need for the Non-aligned Conference.

At this time of international economic crisis, the movement needs to give

At this time of international economic crisis, the instance greater political impetus to South-South economic co-operation, on a bilateral, regional, and multilateral basis. For South-South co-operation is something we can do for ourselves; it depends upon our own political will, and our own actions. Important as North-South negotiations undoubtedly are, their progress is not within our own control; there has recently been a marked absence of such progress. Through economic co-operation among ourselves, on the other hand, we can gradually increase our negotiating strength ready for more meaningful North-South discussions in the future. For the purpose of South-South co-operation is not a visionary isolationism; it is the expansion of our economies and a steady reduction in our dependence on developed economies so that we can become more equal, and less vulnerable, partners in the world economy. Dependence, whether it be economic or military, reduces the reality of our freedom. The purpose of non-alignment is to increase that reality.

There is other and related work for us to do at New Delhi. In particular there is still some unfinished anti-colonial business. Namibia is still occupied by South Africa; the Palestinian people still do not have a homeland. And apartheid has become even more oppressive, and more aggressive also. The Conference will consider these matters; it is unlikely to have much difficulty in reaching agreement.

More difficult for us is the emergence of colonialism or territorial expansionism by our own members; Western Sahara is one example. We have to find a means of dealing effectively with this and other kinds of problems. For disagreements and even quarrels between non-aligned states are perhaps inevitable; among other things, many of our countries inherited unclear or crazy boundaries. But it is essential that we should avoid giving any excuse or opportunity for our quarrels to be exploited in the interests of those who would like to destroy our movement.

This makes urgent a revival and strengthening of our commitment to working for peaceful solutions to all disputes among ourselves. If any of our larger objectives—increasing the freedom of our nations and the peace of the world—are to be promoted, we have to work together however difficult that sometimes becomes. We have to avoid the temptations of what may appear to be quick and popular "solutions" through armed conflict; in practice they are rarely quick, their popularity is frequently transient, and they are never final. And most of all, each non-aligned member has to avoid any attempt to "use" a Big Power in its own interest. Most of Africa was colonised by European powers with little difficulty because individual tribes tried to "use" the coloniser for their own purposes. We need to learn from that experience and apply it to our current differences.

For the Non-Aligned Movement is, in essence, the voice of small or economically weak nations which are demanding a place under the sun, and which are all seeking to increase the reality of their national independence by

association with others in a similar position. Its continuing importance in the world can be judged by the attempts which are made either to seize it, or to cause it to fragment. Intense diplomatic activity by the Super Powers and their major allies goes on before every non-aligned meeting; sometimes the diplomatic pressure is subtle, and sometimes not—but it is now a very present element preceding all our meetings.

We in the movement need to maximise the strength we have, and increase it in every way possible. We should continue to welcome as a new member any country which has decided to stand outside super power conflicts. We must avoid "witch-hunts" against existing members; we are an association of the weak and weakness is not the same as venality. What matters is that we all, separately and together, continue to struggle for the reality or the maximisation of that freedom which is legally ours.

The Non-Aligned Movement can become even more important as its members stand firmly together, and strengthen their economic and social links with each other and with non-member Third World countries. We can do these things. Our movement has an important function and an important future.

February 1983

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THE CONCEPT OF NON-ALIGNMENT*

By Leo Mates**

MOST efforts to define the concept of non-alignment were based on the analysis of the term itself. This assumes, even if unwittingly, the notion that the name of the movement was chosen after it was conceptually defined and with the greatest care taken to find the right world to describe it as completely as possible. This, however, did not happen, nor does it happen in most other cases of a similar nature.

International movements, organizations and other events or developments are given the name, which they thereafter carry and by which they are recognized from outside, like human beings who also receive their names before anybody could know how they would develop and without their being asked. The United Nations, as an international organization is an organism far from being united. Its name came to it from the war-time alliance, and reflected a state in international relations which did not apply to the post-war era of the United Nations as a world organization.

The Atlantic Alliance, and its organization NATO, includes Greece and Turkey, although they are much more remote from the Atlantic than, for instance, Czechoslovakia. The name was derived from the original war-time relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. It was also known as the Western alliance, although again Greece and Turkey are more to the east than three members of the Eastern Alliance, the DDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Warsaw Pact is not centred round Warsaw, but Moscow. It was named after the city where the founding conference took place. Its seat however is in Moscow. So both alliances, as well as other organizations connected more or less with them, did receive names which in no way are or could possibly be helpful in trying to discover their essence. But such things do happen also in the natural sciences. Let us remember that one of the most widespread elements on earth, oxygen received the wrong name, as it is not essential in the building of molecules of acids.

Non-alignment as a word describing certain policies and some countries was in usage long before the movement of the non-aligned countries came into being or the emergence of a coherent and persistent policy centering round it. There may have been an earlier use of the word relating to the concept as it was worked out by the non-aligned countries, but I found the earliest source in the *Times of India* of 30 September 1968. There, Krishna Menon in an interview remembered having used the term non-alignment for the first time in 1950.

^{*}Reprinted from Uma Vasudev (Ed.), Issues Before Non-Alignment: Past and Present. Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 1983, pp. 59-79.

^{**}Dr. Mates is Professor at the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

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The Belgrade Conference where the movement was founded was held in 1961, and it did use the term non-alignment indeed. But, if we do not accept 1961 as the beginning of the movement in a looser sense of the world, then the use of the term even in 1950 does not coincide with the earliest formulation of the ideas of non-alignment. Jawaharlal Nehru described his views of India's future foreign policy along non-aligned lines as early as in 1946 in his statement of 24 September of that year, but without using the word.

Howsoever we term it, the name, or rather the name-giving, is very loosely connected with the development of the movement of the non-aligned countries and their policies and actions. The first elements of non-alignment can be traced to the earliest post-war policies and to the reaction to the growing tensions of that new era. As in all similar cases, the concept-forming followed developments, but then the conceptual insight very soon began to spur the further evolution of policies.

It took more than fifteen years after the end of the war before the time was ripe for an international conference on a more or less well defined basis. There can be no doubt that the Belgrade Conference would not have been possible, or at least, would not have been the opening act for durable forms of co-operation within the movement, if there had not been some general consensus about the unifying concept. Nevertheless, one of the primary functions of the conference was the formulation of a common denominator as a basis for durable co-operation. Hence, the conference in 1961 had to accomplish the double task of defining the concept and giving impulse to actions based on that concept.

This recapitulation of the past appears to be necessary, because there are still cases of quasi-scientific analyses of the concept of non-alignment based on the interpretation of the word non-alignment. This practice leads to two types of misconceptions. First, the term is linguistically negative. Hence the notion that the non-aligned should stand aside, or even worse that they should be described as some kind of neutralists. Secondly, standing between the two alliances is presented either as the actual policy of the non-aligned, or as the only proper policy to be pursued by them.

Since the movement of the non-aligned does not follow either of these interpretations of its concept, it is accused of non-consistency with its own conceptual views. This of course is done quite without regard to the explict formulations of the final acts of the summit conferences of the movement. It would therefore be superfluous to expand on this rather simple-minded way of criticizing the non-aligned countries. But, there are other reasons for insisting on the correct approach to the definition of the concept of non-alignment.

In the first place, the term non-alignment may imply a limited understanding of the main purposes and objectives of the movement, as defined in the final documents of its summits. If the purposes of the movement were interpreted as merely to mean standing outside of alliances, this would justify views opposed to its efforts aiming at the general reappraisal of the existing

order in the world. Hence, instead of continuing endeavours towards establishing a new economic and political order, the movement could in reality become an auxiliary force of the centres of power in the prevailing system and order in the world.

This would reduce to insignificance the difference between the non-aligned countries and the neutrals, or of countries standing outside of alliances on different grounds. It is, however, quite obvious that neither countries like Switzerland, nor on the other side, Albania, can be considered as non-aligned in the sense in which non-alignment is understood within the movement of the non-aligned countries.

Without going further into the implications of a narrow understanding of the essence of the movement, and of the concept it had adopted in Belgrade as the guideline for its activities, let us only suggest the reason for the adoption of a label which is not adequate and does not fully express the raison d'etre and the purposes of the movement. Non-alignment developed out of a great number of separate and temporary efforts towards co-operation made by various countries, which later formed the nucleus of the movement. Nobody thought of giving a label to these sporadic co-operative enterprises. Since, however, the independent position taken by some countries during the war in Korea became particularly prominent in the public eye all over the world, but also within the mentioned countries, non-alignment appeared as the only proper term to describe that position.

Also, at the time of the convening of the Belgrade Conference, political tensions between the two Super Powers were particularly bad. Practically all negotiations were abruptly stopped after the incident with the U-2 reconnaissance flight over the Soviet Union on 1 May of 1960 the immediate result of which was the failure of the great power summit in Paris the same year in June, and the continuing high tension which prevailed until 1962. In this atmosphere and because it was already known in the world in, connection with political efforts to avoid war and to bring about co-operation between the antagonists, nobody concerned with the preparation for the Belgrade Conference had any doubt whatsoever about the advisability of using the label of non-alignment for the conference. Non-alignment was in real fact one of the basic points of departure of all the thinking which led to the conference; it dominated the debates and also the Declaration adopted unanimously at the end.

However, instead of trying to derive the meaning of non-alignment from the word itself; it would be better, if it is not the only rational thing, to analyze the basic documents spelling out its beliefs and purposes. The first document giving a rounded view and describing the concept of non-alignment was the Belgrade Declaration. This joint drafting of a common platform was the final act of the preparatory stages of the movement which had lasted about fifteen years. Therefore, the Belgrade Declaration cannot be regarded merely as a rather imperfect first attempt, or still less as a fortuituous product written on the spur of the moment. It was only Cairo, where

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the main features of the Conference were amply discussed, which had served as preparation. Even before the year 1961, leading statesmen had come together and exchanged views on world problems. Let us only, note the Tripartite Meeting on the island Brioni in June 1956 (Nehru, Nasser and Tito), and also the very important meeting during the opening stages of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York in September 1960 (Nehru, Nasser, Tito, plus Nkrumah and Soekarno).

Without taking the text of the Belgrade Declaration¹ as the final word on non-alignment, we cannot overlook it as the first considered expression of the common beliefs and basic aspirations of the assembled countries, which were also founders of the movement.

The point of deparature in the Declaration is the general attitude of criticism of the existing world order. In the introductory part of the Declaration "the transition from the old and existing order based on domination to a new order based on co-operation between nations, founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity" is given as the starting point of the whole thinking of the assembled leading statesmen.

The intention is clear that the whole text of this document should be read in the light of the above belief and aspiration about the necessity and the inevitability of fundamental changes in the world. These changes were not defined in terms of the narrow and dogmatic framework of any ideology. The text is broad enough to be accepted by all statesmen and people of good will. Besides, it does not presume to express a definitive formula concerning developments in the world, but leaves open the ways and means, as well as the concrete implementation of the given idea.

Next, the preamble takes note of the fact that "acute emergencies threatening world peace now exist," and also that "big power rivalry likely to result in a world conflagration cannot be excluded." Thus the document also reflects the realities of the moment when the conference was held, for it is well known that the years 1961 were indeed fraught with great problems and threats to peace.

The last part of that introduction deals with colonialism. The task is "to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations." This is followed by a plea for "peaceful co-existence in the world". So that fundamental changes in the whole world order, overcoming of great power rivalry and eliminating all forms of colonialism emerge as the fundamental thought on which the whole edifice of the Declaration is constructed. In fact, the main body of the Belgrade Declaration is a thoughtful and faithful elaboration of the premises given in the introduction.

The current problems of the world, and in particular the extraordinary and dangerous turn in American-Soviet relations were neither ignored, nor underestimated by the Belgrade Conference. It is however significant and should be specially noted, that the conference made a clear distinction between its fundamental and long-term pre-occupations and its reaction to current affairs. The problem of Soviet-American relations was presented

in a separate document, the Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace. Besides the essence of the Appeal was transmitted in the form of identical letters to J.F. Kennedy and to N.S. Khrushchev.

There can be no doubt that the assembled statesmen were aware, firstly, that they could not meet in such numbers without reacting to important current problems in the world, and secondly, that this should be done in a form that would be distinctly different from the expression of views and the definition of tasks and purposes directed towards long-term problems, which otherwise constituted the main purpose of their preoccupations.

The Declaration has three parts following the introduction mentioned earlier. The third part ends with a series of numbered paragraphs, in all 27, dealing with a selection of outstanding problems or tasks before the movement. Quite obviously, the conference did not think that any one of these items deserved a separate document, as was done for the American-Soviet confrontation, but that they must all be presented somehow as a part of the final document of the conference.

The Belgrade Conference, summarized all previous sporadic efforts made by countries which had worked in common, and also formulated a general platform to give meaning to the concept of non-alignment. It started with and kept as the centre of attention three fundamental world-wide and longterm problems: peace based on co-operation and not on domination, prosperity and social justice for all peoples and elimination of colonialism in all its forms. It reiterated the necessity of approaching all current issues in a way conducive to the attainment of these fundamental goals. The structure and contents of the final documents of the conference reflected faithfully therefore, the ideas expressed by Tito in his address as host of the conference. He underlined the necessity of consensus on all questions of a fundamental nature, pertaining to the main aims and purposes of the Non-Aligned Movement. In his view such issues could be solved if there was no unanimity among all participating countries. On the other hand, he warned that there were and would be current issues, in particular among neighbours, where unanimity may be difficult or impossible to attain. He thought that this should cause no undue concern, and described such issues as secondary in comparison with the main and fundamental issues.8

This survey of the final documents of the initial conference of the movement sheds more light on the concept of non-alignment, than could be derived from the analysis of the term itself. It shows that the raison d'etre of the movement, the main purpose, is, to change the main features of the world order and the whole system of international relations. This, of course, implies economic relations as well as political, and in particular the elimination of the use of force or the threat to use it.

By its composition, and by the advocacy of so drastic a change, the movement was clearly defined as an assembly of the Third World; again, not only of countries not belonging to alliances organized around the Super

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Powers, but also not belonging to the countries exercising economic domination directly or through the major companies belonging to them.

It is interesting to note that Julius Nyerere at the Ministerial Conference in Dar-es-Salam in 1970 used a telling way of emphasising this aspect of the movement; he likened it to a trade union organization of the world scene. His words, including this description of the movement, as well as his insistence on self-reliance and self-help have inspired ever since the non-aligned countries.

But there was never even the slightest doubt expressed in the summits, or in the documents adopted in the years that followed Belgrade, that being not aligned, standing outside of blocs and working for their removal, remains one of the corner-stones of the movement and one of the essential components of the concept of non-alignment. In reality no other attitude would be consistent. The great powers and the major powers even more, are the beneficiaries of the prevailing system and order; they dominate it, and are not interested in eliminating it. The only countries who are interested are the Third World countries suffering under it.

The meaning of non-alignment cannot be understood if it is taken out of its historical context. The word non-alignment may have been used by somebody even before the Second World War. We have no record of it, but even if the term had been used in earlier historical periods, it would and could not have had the same conceptual basis. The Second World War introduced such fundamental changes in the life of all humanity, and of all nations, that it would be thoughtless to apply to the concept cliches from before the war. This does not mean that nothing conceptual could be valid before and after the war, but only that it must be thoroughly examined in the light of the changed circumstances and conditions in the world.

Speaking of the post-war era, one thinks first of all about the development of new weapons of mass destruction, of the nuclear weapons and the delivery systems produced to give them practically unlimited range. This has had a deep and decisive effect on the prospects of war, and hence also of international relations. If war must end in utter and mutual destruction, then foreign policy must be essentially changed. Policy cannot any longer be pursued "by other means" as Clausewitz described the essence of war.¹⁰

One of the products of this fundamental change was the Cold War. It started as a product of thoughtlessness in the major centres of power in the world, in the belief that old-fashioned power-politics could be continued. In the past political pressure was applied on the assumption that, if opposed, it would be followed by the use of armed force and a declaration of war. Therefore, traditionally high tensions were an overture to war or to submission of the weaker without war.

After the introduction of nuclear weapons this scenario lost its validity. Even the weaker, before being wiped out had the capacity to inflict unprecedented damage to the initiator of a war. Soon this capacity to inflict damage turned into the capacity for total destruction. In these new circumstances

even substantial superiority no longer permitted pressure beyond the point of no return. High tension could not be followed by the ultimate argument of war, and therefore lost its sense, even if one accepts the perverted logic of using war as a continuation of policies. It is therefore justified to consider the very opening and even more the continuation of the Cold War as a sign of slowness to apprehened the lesson of the use of nuclear weapons in the post-war era. This new development in international relations is one of the main reasons for the search for a thorough reshaping of the world order. Non-alignment certainly springs also from this insight. Consequently, the political element in its platform becomes directly linked to this fundamental change marking the post-war era.

However, the advent of nuclear weapons is by far not the only fundamental and deep change occurring after 1945. The war initiated and brought to a full swing the movement against colonialism. With India in the lead, other nations followed, in Asia and elsewhere. Finally, what started as the reaction of a few colonies, turned into a general anti-colonial movement. The result was the emergence of dozens of newly liberated nations forming their new states on the ruins of colonial empires.

This immense and unprecedented world-wide anti-colonial revolution brought about two important changes in world relations. Firstly, the difference in the level of economic development between the newly liberated countries and the industrially developed ones became obvious and began to create difficulties for the less developed countries. Secondly, the inexorable spread of de-colonisation induced the former metropolitan powers and other industrially developed countries to impose upon the newly liberated countries un-equal relations based upon their advantages in development and in military power.

The difference in the level of development grew over the years in the colonial period, but was not present in international relations, since that remained an internal affair of the empires. With independence the former colonies obtained the right to stand independently on the world scene, but also had to suffer the disadvantages of their low level of economic development.

The industrially developed countries could afford to forgo the exercise of sovereign rights, because they could impose their will economically, by relying on higher industrial development, organization and technical knowledge.

The problem of the less developed countries emerged thus in world politics, as also in the preoccupations of the founders of the movement of the non-aligned. For they too fell into the category of less developed countries. They could not disregard a problem which was common to them all. This aspect was less analysed in the Belgrade Conference, than later, but it prompted the assembled statesmen to demand the convening of an economic conference, which ultimately did take place under the name of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference for Trade and Development).¹¹ It was by the

use of these methods of domination and imposing of unequal relations that the industrially developed countries began to compensate the formal loss of legal rights in the areas where they had had their colonial empires. This general trend was included for attention successively in the programme of the non-aligned countries under the term of neo-colonialism. It was, however foreshadowed in the Belgrade Declaration in reference to colonialism "in all its manifestations."¹²

Anti-colonialism did not only express solidarity with the peoples in colonies, but also stood for spreading all the aims of non-alignment. In the third part of the Belgrade Declaration this is explicitly stated. The assembled statesmen "are convinced that the emergence of newly liberated countries will further assist in narrowing of the area of bloc antagonisms and thus encourage all tendencies aimed to strengthening peace and promoting peaceful co-operation among independent and equal nations."¹³

There is no need to elaborate further on the thesis that the concept of non-alignment was a direct product of the special conditions in world affairs created by the momentous changes following the Second World War. As a matter of fact the main protagonists of the movement did not exist as independent states before the war. Even those which did exist, developed their independent status fully only after the upheavals of that war.

The emphasis on the specific conditions of the post-war era does not, however, imply that the values underlying the concept of non-alignment were new. These ideals and aspirations are ageless but the expression contemporary. Non-alignment is then a new, the newest, expression of the ideal of peace and co-operation among nations for equality and securing universal well-being.

In conclusion of this analysis of the historical place of non-alignment, one other consideration must not be omitted. For the first time after the war and the anti-colonial revolution the world has embraced all nations as participants in its affairs. This has given to politics a new, hitherto unknown global significance. This growth of the number of countries independently acting on the world scene demanded also a re-shaping of standards and forms of interaction which were developed in their modern form mostly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the active participation of a number of countries. These countries are now in the minority in the councils of the world. This has led to the growth of tendencies towards domination among the powerful and economically highly developed countries, particularly the Super Powers. The dramatic increase in the potential destructiveness of the consequences of a war itself became the basis for the development of new ideas. Among them, in the first place, stands the concept of non-alignment.

The newly liberated countries, as well as other less developed countries in the post-war period did experience in most cases the intensive political effects of the economic predicament caused by the differences in the level of development. It would, of course, be far fetched to reduce all political

upheavals and strains to direct effects of economic failures and difficulties, but it does not follow that serious economic troubles can come without

political consequences.

The dramatic evolution in the political field during the anti-colonial revolution caused rapidly growing political expectations. Although the liberation struggle was aimed at political liberation and freedom, nobody among the activists, and also in the wide mass of the people, thought of independence and freedom in poverty and destitution. It is human to dream of a better future in terms of total fulfilment—the reality of declining standards of living after liberation in former colonies, and increasing difficulties discontent and impatience.

It is so much easier to make profound political changes through a violent and brief effort than to obtain a rise in the standards of living by longer, sustained and strenuous endeavours and hard work. It is, therefore, not surprising that the momentous drive of the liberation struggle and the euphoria of victory and achievement under the pressure of newly experienced disappointments gave rise to disaffection and a propensity towards new and violent changes in the political field. This was particularly intensified with the gradual fading of the charisma of leading persons and groups.

In order to speed up economic development and to satisfy the growing dissatisfaction and impatience of the people, the leading groups and persons in the newly liberated countries, and in other less developed countries, had to improve the performances of the national economy. One method appeared quite obvious and necessary, that was the maximal mobilization of all material and human resources. This in almost all cases led to high degrees of centralisation and increasing state control over all economic activities.

The rapid growth of political disaffection in many countries, however, induced governments to introduce, even strengthen repressive measures. There is no point now in speculating whether these measures were justified, or the most efficient way to act, because in almost all cases the government had no means to bring about a quick and sufficiently impressive upturn of economic performance. There is also no sense in bewailing the rather inefficient methods and organization in most cases, since inefficiency is one of the very important characteristics of the less developed stage of a country. In other words, poor economic results after the war created increasing political difficulties in the countries of the Third World. If these signs of political instability did not appear in some of them soon after the war, that was in general because of the charismatic influence of their leaders.

This precarious situation, offering no way out of misery and political instability, led all the governments of the less developed countries to seek external economic support and assistance. In the first place they demanded an increase of technical assistance. But soon it became clear that this was not enough so it led to the demand for financial assistance on a large scale. This was followed by proposals concerning international commerce in the form of demands for special preferences and other facilities. We have to

note all this, because neither of these demands falls into the sphere of economic activities. The results expected from these enumerated measures are certainly economic in nature, but the methods of attaining them are political; those relating to the international scene become elements of world politics and of international political relations.

Though economic elements also figure in political relations among industrially developed countries, they do not play a role comparable in importance to the one between the less developed and the industrially developed countries in the North-South relations. Whilst it is possible to rely mainly on political agreement in solving controversies and reducing tensions within the Northern part of the world, in North-South relations economic matters must play a prominent role.

The essential and prominent role of economic matters in the internal political life of the less developed countries and in their relations externally is reflected also in their general outlook and in the definition of their political concepts. Hence, the concept of non-alignment would remain hollow without the economic component. A purely political platform would not secure stability and security for countries suffering in their political relations mostly from a lack of economic strength and viability.

With time the situation and the position of the countries of the Third World changed substantially. The problems of peace and tensions between the two Super Powers diminished with the opening of *detente*. The colonial problem lost its overwhelming weight as more and more colonies obtained independence. Only the economic predicament became greater from year to year. It increased with the number of newly independent countries, but also with the growing difference between the level of development of the North and the South. Finally, the overwhelming indebtedness of all the countries of the Third World created a new emergency, since most of them had no means to pay back their debts, and in some cases not even the current interest on the capital.

The growing importance of this one element in the totality of the platform of non-aligned countries induced them to focus on the issue of a new economic order. The concern with the new economic order is recent; it started in the first years of the decade of the seventies, but it is and was since Belgrade an element of the fundamental concept of non-alignment, although spelled out only in general terms in the first Declaration.

In defining the concept of non-alignment we cannot, therefore, overlook this particular feature. To aspire for the independence of a country in a world of comparably equally developed countries is a political aspiration and belongs to the sphere of world politics. We have seen, however, that in the world as it is now, including the new countries, peace, stability and the rule of law, cannot be attained without taking into account the differences in their economic development and all its consequences.

The concept of non-alignment developed from the premise that although international law considers all states equal, and gives them equal rights and

obligations, this legal principle cannot be applied without grave injustice, if no account is taken of the inequality in fact that exists among countries. The most important inequality is the gap dividing the industrially developed and the less developed countries. On the other hand, this does not mean that non-alignment seeks to introduce into international relations a new bias which hitherto did not exist. The principle of equality under the law must be preserved and is one of the immutable principles in all relations, including international relations. The specific nature of non-alignment is a product of the conditions existing now in the world.

We have seen that the concept of non-alignment has a limit in time regarding the past; it emerged and could emerge only after the Second World War. It has also a limit regarding the future. It is based on the prevailing unsatisfactory and exceptional condition in the world, it is resolved not to perpetuate it, but to overcome it. It strives to contribute to the elimination of economic differences making special provisions for the less developed necessary. This cannot be done in any other way but by political action, even if it means introducing temporary legal measures taking into account existing economic realities.

The limitations in time to the validity of the concept of non-alignment do not deprive the concept of constant features. Within the span of its validity, non-alignment must have a core of values that do not change. We have seen that it emerged out of a special situation developing after the Second World War, with profound and fateful changes affecting the whole of humanity. This does not mean that it is detached, or even in conflict with these fundamental values which have always inspired humanity.

We have seen that non-alignment was in fact a specific expression of the hopes and aspirations of humanity based on fundamental values, formulated in a way to correspond to actual conditions to the current moment in history. Since it is a specific, historically conditioned expression of fundamental values it must contain a core which is immutable as long as those conditions prevail which gave birth to the concept. In other words, it is a response to a necessity, a predicament, caused by greatly unequal development in all respects in the world as a whole, and bound to contain a constant essence responding to the situation.

At the same time, being a response to specific conditions, it must at all times, as long as it is valid, closely correspond to all the variations within that period. As much as the fundamental change producing the post-war world may have come abruptly, historically speaking, it is subject to mutations and variations. In particular the disappearance of the unequal conditions in international relations and general conditions in the world, cannot occur suddenly. It is bound to be the result of a process, which started almost simultaneously with the changes leading to inequality.

Although essentially conditions have remained unchanged since 1961, there have also been developments of considerable importance. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish among the features of non-alignment those

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which are durably valid, and those which are susceptible to change. In doing so one has to be careful not to succumb to the temptation of dogmatism, insisting on the immutability of every aspect, detail and shade of meaning of the original formulations of 1961. At the same time another error must not be committed; to subject the essential concepts to modifications and to disregard the basic values.

The right measure will be best found if the original concept is reduced to the most general terms still consonant with the fundamental historical circumstances. This would be in the first place the value of independence, or rather still more generally expressed, as self-determination at a time when the world is dominated by the confrontation of the Super Powers, and by the drastic differences in the levels of development with all its consequences.

Self-determination, of course, includes the right to independence and statehood of every nation, the freedom of choice in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, as well as internal arrangements. It includes anticolonialism; in so far as colonialism still is one of the major issues of world politics, it means a shift in emphasis to the right to non-interference from the substitution of post-colonial methods of domination. In view of the connection between self-determination and the existence of super powers and their confrontation it includes all specific postulates to serve the purpose of advancing self-determination, including the lessening of tensions and up to the elimination of the Cold War and confrontation altogether. Furthermore, it is directed to all forms of force or threat of the use of force, as well as armaments.

Furthermore, at a time when world politics and also the economy are dominated in general by a few powers, self-determination must include also mutual respect and dignity of all states, even if they are small and materially weak. It also must include the right to economic development and prosperity in the light of the immense and growing gap between the highly developed and the less developed countries. However, the most critical content of self-determination in the post-war era, in a world divided to a great extent between the areas of influence of the major powers, is the right of being outside of such influences. Not to be aligned must stand at the top of the list of practical interpretations of real self-determination.

Reviewing the historical conditions of the post-war era, and the changes characterizing it, it is clear that the non-aligned have not met merely to assert the right to be outside the major alliances, but to subscribe to a positive programme postulating fundamental changes. It is essential to remember this at all times while discussing non-alignment. But it is equally essential to understand that in given circumstances this programme cannot be carried out without standing free from the obligations imposed by these alliances.

Non-alignment then can be summarized to be a general political attitude of standing free from alliance obligations in order to strive for fundamental changes aiming at a world order without alliances and without dominance. Here we have come back to the formulations of the Belgrade Declaration,

i.e., of that part of it which presents the general views and aims of the movement. Hence, any departure from these essentials is likely to weaken, and possibly destroy the common basis of the unity of the movement.

Quite apart from essentials are specific practical formulations of positions and political tactics. Let us take some examples, first in the political sphere. The demand for complete world-wide disarmament, at a time when there was no meaningful dialogue between the Super Powers on disarmament, was replaced by the demand for substantial reductions of armaments in the period of the *detente*. In the first instance it appeared important to project the demand for disarmament into the centre of the political scene. Later, in view of the difficulties of the dialogue about armaments, as well as the reluctance of countries to take important strides towards disarmament, while still accepting negotiations, it was wise to express a more modest and practical goal.

The same can be said about economic issues. In the beginning, the emphasis was on technical assistance and financial aid, as well as facilities in trading. These were the main postulates reflecting the unfavourable and worsening position of the less developed countries in the world. Later, the demand for a New Economic Order was formulated, not only as a long term goal, but as a need of the instant. Here, contrary to what happened in the political sphere, further developments required passing from a narrow, tactical position to a more general and fundamental setting up of goals.

This reflected the widening of the economic predicament in the course of the last decades, so that by the beginning of the seventies the whole world entered a period of very serious, long lasting and deep-going economic troubles. Although since the beginning the non-aligned believed that the economic predicament of the less developed was only one aspect of a larger problem, the situation was not ripe for the presentation of the ambitious programme for reshaping the whole economic order.

Perhaps the most significant changes occurred with regard to anticolonialism. The gradual elimination of colonialism, as well as other developments led to less emphasis being placed on anti-colonialism, and more on the demand against neo-colonialism, i.e. all forms of domination continued or started after the withdrawal of colonial powers from practicing open colonialism. There can be no doubt, that in spite of great differences in form, the original position was fully preserved in this shift from direct anticolonialism to combating neo-colonialism.

The insistence of the majority of the participating countries in the movement on the preservation of the original positions of non-alignment does not imply a dogmatic adherence to every word said or written at the Belgrade Conference. They insist only on keeping intact the essential meaning of the concept of non-alignment, but accept the differences in tactics and the specific way of pursuing them in changing conditions.

The most delicate task is, in fact, to adapt to new conditions and circumstances, without giving away the essential content of the concept. In

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conclusion let us make this point in particular. There is grave danger in disregarding the central issue of standing apart from any connection with either of the two major alliances, or their centres. This would reduce the ability of the movement to adhere firmly and emphatically to the goal of changing the world system, reshaping it so as to eliminate domination, and to establish a reliable basis for friendly co-operation among all nations. From this follows, quite naturally, the necessity not to remain aligned, since the very nature of all alliances is inseparably connected with the prevailing order in the world. They have been established to secure advantages within the given order, not to change it.

There have been differences among the leading statesmen of the movement at all times. They have come to the surface in summit conferences. This is natural. One should not try to prevent or condemn these differences of opinion. The movement is a free assembly of countries bound together by essential and mostly long-term common interests and aspirations. Hence, there is no need to wonder that such visions of the future can and do give rise to different interpretations. As a matter of fact free debates in the conferences of the non-aligned have made it possible to move along with the times and adapt fundamental views and concepts to changing circumstances. Lately, the debate has touched on some very sensitive and essential features of the concept of non-alignment. This started during the preparations for the Sixth Summit, continued at the Summit and even after it. Nevertheless, the final documents at all conferences have been accepted by consensus.

It appears that the most important element in the above mentioned debate was the relationship with the one or the other super-power and the alliances assembled round them. Nobody, of course, advocated joining an alliance, establishing formalities or giving up the right to act independently. Nobody demanded such things with regard to one or more countries participating in the movement, or for the movement as a whole. Yet there were some differences which came close to these extreme positions; namely, one point debated in Havana at the Sixth Summit for instance was the advisability of accepting, perhaps even asking for assistance from an alliance in pursuing national aspirations and also of the goals of the movement as a whole

On the one side one heard the argument that the Soviet Union was friendly to some of the aspirations of the non-aligned, and a special relationship should develop on that basis. This argument disregarded the unco-operative attitude of the Soviet Union concerning economic assistance in the past and the efforts to bring about a new economic order, including the first step towards such an objective, a global debate on economic development and related problems. Furthermore, the support of Vietnam's action in Kampuchea, and of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, are additional instances of behaviour inconsistent with the tenets of non-alignment. In fact these factors have created in the movement problems connected with current

developments in the world. It is therefore hardly tenable to present the Soviet Union as friendly to the non-aligned in general, or close to the aims

and purposes of the movement.

This would be in itself a sufficient reason to question the reasonableness of special relations for the purpose of advancing the goals of the movement. Besides, the Soviet Union is locked in a confrontation with the United States, and its foreign policy is dominated by this rivalry. This is true of the United States as well. Hence, the movement is faced with the choice of accepting substantial support from one of the super powers, getting involved in the contest between them and becoming an element in the prevailing world systems, or not remaining aligned, nor be linked to either power, and strive to bring about a thorough reshaping of conditions in the world.

The dilemma can be presented also in another way: the movement has to decide to sacrifice or at least jeopardize its fundamental long-term goals at best for momentary advantages, or stand by its purposes and avoid involvement in the confrontation between East and West. This choice is, however, not limited to the shaping of relations with major powers, it arises even more frequently in connection with a great number of current problems in all regions of the world.

Coming to these issues of current significance, we must remember the distinction made by Tito in Belgrade between the fundamental problems of the movement and the current, or secondary problems. In the course of the last few years particularly, but also since the opening of the decade of the seventies, the movement has been ever more involved in current disputes. This is the result of the spreading of such disputes at a time when the overwhelming conflict between the Super Powers has somewhat receded. It also reflects the spreading of the movement over all continents, which brings it close to practically every local or regional conflict.

The distinction made by Tito is fully consonant with the general purposes of the movement as defined in 1961, but this does not mean that he implied, or that the Belgrade Conference was inclined to pass by significant clashes and disputes in the world, wherever they may occur. The Belgrade Declaration makes reference to a number of issues of that nature in the last part of the document. The choice is not between involving the movement in such issues, or ignoring them. The choice is much more one of degree and the nature of the involvement.

There is hardly a dispute in which the movement has been involved which could have been completely ignored. All these disputes relate to the fundamental pre-occupations on which non-alignment is based. Some disputes arise as a consequence of the struggle for independence, in particular the anti-colonial struggle. In other cases they relate to the breaching of peace and continuation of a war without making true efforts to settle the issue peacefully. The main reason for taking interest in such issues is that there can be no watertight compartments between fundamental and long-term problems and current disputes. Hence, the movement cannot pursue its

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fundamental goals while tolerating cases in which the fundamental rights of a country and its people are at stake, or when the recognition of national rights or peace in the world is denied.

If we re-read the Belgrade Declaration, we shall immediately find two characteristic traits. First, in all particular and current cases the Declaration remained strictly within the bounds indicated by the character of the movement. There was no effort made or intent displayed to enter into a matter and involve the movement in the practical solution of the problem. The moral support given in more generally formulated texts was still considered of great value and could be interpreted as the maximal possible contribution towards settlement.

Departing later from this model, the Declaration and other final documents of the conferences of the non-aligned countries, did involve the movement with practical solutions, but even so the only value of all this effort still rested on its moral weight, and nothing more in fact was achieved.

Furthermore, a clear distinction must be made between the movement acting as such, and the activities of the participating countries. If it is not advisable to involve the movement directly with current disputes, this does not prevent participating countries with particular national interests to involve themselves in a controversy or clash, even sending troops. The most recent instance is the sending of troops from some Arab countries to help Iraq in the war with Iran. Mentioning this case, quite naturally, does not mean giving support to or criticizing this action. Mention is made only to show clearly the difference between acts undertaken by single countries or groups of countries participating in the movement, and any act undertaken by it as a whole.

After all, by joining the movement, countries have not given away, or entrusted the movement with the conduct of their foreign relations. From the beginning it was clearly stated that there was no intention of creating another power-bloc or an alliance. On one occasion a highly placed Indian statesman in a meeting of the non-aligned said that these countries must remain non-aligned even in their mutual relations with one another.

Furthermore, the participating countries are also members of other international organizations and bodies with the purposes of settling international disputes. In the first place it is the United Nations, but there are also regional organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, etc. It is normal and proper for them to act within these organizations and pursue their national policies regarding current disputes with a more precisely and directly formulated interest and purpose.

The most important reason, however, for respecting strictly the purposes and the nature of the movement of the non-aligned countries, and the concept of non-alignment is the consideration of the supreme importance of unity. As a matter of fact, Tito's words in Belgrade on fundamental and current issues were prompted by his concern about unity, and he said so very clearly. To borrow once more the simile given by Nyerere in

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term e its Dar-es-Salam in 1970, it would be counter productive for the purposes of a "trade union" to split because of religious or other reasons which are not essential for its activities and aims.

It would be idle to try to keep the non-aligned together on the basis of affinities with the ideologies or the political systems in countries outside the movement, or by the sympathies they may have towards the one or the other super power. The only cementing element for the cohesion and unity of the movement of the non-aligned countries is and can only be the essential features of the concept of non-alignment as such. But this concept is understood to be subject to tactical adaptations to changing conditions, as was shown above, and should not be considered as a rigid dogma.

Wisdom and statemanship are not asserted by adhering to a dogma, still less by giving up purposefulness. The councils of the non-aligned will not, cannot and should not try to stave off a current and open debate on the everlasting search for the best course. It should avoid dogmatic rigidity which ignores changes in conditions, and an erratic drifting abandoning the guidelines agreed to in the beginning, which did serve and must serve in the future for all that holds the growing number of non-aligned countries together.

February

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DIPLOMACY BY CONFERENCE: PRINCIPLES, GOALS AND PROBLEMS OF NAM

By Chisepo J.J. Mphaisa*

I INTRODUCTION

THE concept of non-alignment is relatively difficult to define; the difficulty arises from the fact that "non-alignment" means different things to different people. Therefore, my search for an operational definition begins with a consideration of the role and significance of coalitions in the external behaviour of governments. In international affairs governments form coalitions in order to achieve certain commonly shared objectives. For example, a government might join a coalition (i) to obtain support from co-members on an existing policy and/or promises of support on future political actions, and (ii) to gain psychological satisfaction and/or status in given situations.

The longevity of a coalition arises from a combination of factors. George Liska observes that cohesiveness of a coalition rests largely on the intensity of external pressure on member governments' work.² Secondly, coalition cohesion depends on an alliance ideology which tends to provide the rational for particular political acts by member governments. Collective economic deprivation vis-a-vis former colonial powers seems to be the alliance ideology of non-aligned governments. This ideology conditions the values, attitudes, identities and goals of the leaders who subscribe to the doctrine of non-alignment.³ Attendance at international conferences somewhat reinforces their adherence to the alliance ideology and renews member governments' commitment to the movement.

Theoretical Perspectives

The foregoing observations lead on to an examination of definitions of the concept of non-alignment. Jansen has defined non-alignment as

... the desire and ability of an independent country, or more accurately, of a country that feels itself to be independent to follow an independent policy in foreign affairs; it is the desire and ability to make up its own mind to take its own decisions or not to take them, after judging each issue separately and honestly on its own merits.

This definition highlights the following operative words: desire, ability and independence in foreign policy calculations. These words imply that

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non-alignment is a unique phenomenon in the conduct of external relations of governments practising it. However, it seems that this definition is not only imprecise but lacks analytical utility.

First, Jansen tends to treat non-alignment and neutrality as synonymous concepts. Such a viewpoint is incorrect because neutrality means non-involvement in war. In times of war, neutrality is a legal status of states which demand certain rights of belligerents and which accept stipulated obligations towards those belligerents. Brecher adds that a neutral state accepts the fundamental obligation never to join an alliance which could involve it in war.⁵

The status of neutrality can be secured either voluntarily or by international treaties and agreements. Examples of voluntary choice include Finland and Switzerland. On the other hand, Austria and Laos had the status of permanent neutrality imposed on them by the Super Powers through multi-lateral agreements. Since the commitment to neutrality is independent of the wishes of the government of the day, Switzerland continues to stay clear of international conflets.

Equally problematic in Jansen's definition is the emphasis on the "freedom of choice" in foreign policy. Since the question of freedom of choice in external relations is not a prerogative of non-aligned governments, I suggest that all governments exercise, in varying degrees, some freedom of choice. The American and French Governments for instance, have been allies within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for a long time. However, the two governments have often disagreed on the tactics of how to deal with the Soviet military threat in Western Europe. But such disagreements have not inhibited co-operation in economic, technological and related fields. This example shows that the French Government, a non-member of the non-alignment movement, does still exercise its freedom of choice in its relations with the American and other governments.

A larger point arising from the above example is that all governments assess their overall costs, benefits and consequences of a particular course of action in international affairs. The only difference between the non-aligned and aligned governments is that the former tend to have stronger ideological utterances than the latter, especially on issues of militarist adventures. Consequently, it could be safely said that leaders that subscribe to the NAM tend to hold similar axiomatic identities and perceptions on the issue of foreign domination of all sorts. They often state their national interests, for instance, as (i) the preservation of their national freedom or security, and (ii) the socio-economic development of their countries. This means the political survival of their regimes in the face of perceived and/or actual domestic and foreign threats.

President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania provides the second definition of non-alignment:

The policy of non-alignment is the involvement in world affairs...very

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definite international policies of our own ...separate from and independent of those of either of the major power blocs...asserting the right of small, or militarily weaker nations to determine their own policies in their own interests and to have an influence on world affairs which accord with the right of all peoples to freedom and self-determination; therefore, expressing an out-right opposition to colonialism and international domination of one people by another.

Nyerere's definition, unlike that of Jansen, underscores the fact that non-alignment means non-participation in formal military pacts with a particular power: a refusal to take sides in any military line-up of Western and Eastern bloc countries. The emphasis on a government's refusal to enter into formal military pacts with great powers must not be exaggerated. Thus, I suggest that all governments are aligned, through diplomacy, with either the USSR or the USA. Such alignment is best illustrated by the voting behavioural patterns of militarily weak governments within the United Nations General Assembly. Take the case of Cuba, for instance.

The Government of Cuba claims to be a member of the Non-aligned Movement. Such claims notwithstanding, the Cuban Government has always voted with the Soviet Union at the United Nations. Secondly, Cuban troops were deployed in Angola to fight alongside MPLA troops during the 1976 civil war. Such troops' deployment was undertaken with the explicit political and financial support of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the presence of Cuban troops in Angola was more in the service of the Soviet Union's great power rivalry with the United States than in Cuba's global goals. In this regard, the Cuban Government acted, and continues to act as a proxy of the Soviet Union despite its rhetoric of being non-aligned. I hasten to add that the policy oscillations of newly independent states' governments between the Western and Eastern bloc are characteristic of pragmatic policy stances with or without explicit adherence to the ideals of the Non-aligned Movement. Consequently, the ideas of "desire," "ability," "independence" and "freedom of choice" must be considered more in relative and contextual than in absolute terms.

Need for Alternative Operational Definition

The summation of the preceding discussion is that the definitions of non-alignment by Jansen and Nyerere are inadequate towards helping the reader to understand the nature of the concept. This is because they exclusively focus on non-alignment as a policy. By so doing they tell very little about non-alignment as an international movement. The result is the need for an alternative operational definition of the concept. The starting point is the consideration of the NAM as a loose ad hoc coalition of governments which, on behalf of their people, make resolutions on certain international issues.

As Plischke has observed, the international conference is the medium through which inter-state relations are conducted, by peaceful adjustments around a discussion table. Leaders make their policy statements, exchange ideas, pass resolutions and issue generic communiques that are designed to hurt no one. Thus, I am concerned with what non-aligned governments, as collectivities do, how they do it and with what results. This is what I term "diplomacy by conference."

II PRINCIPLES AND GOALS OF NAM

The ultimate objective of the non-aligned governments is the redistribution of political and economic power in the international system. In their attempts to reform the distribution of political and economic power through the United Nations, the non-aligned governments are guided by several principles and goals.¹¹

The first is self-determination; the assumption being that the present international law has failed to provide adequate guarantees to people still under colonial rule. Thus, the non-aligned see the role of liberation movements against minority regimes, rather than international law, as the means by which the principle of self-determination can be upheld. The opposition to all forms of colonialism and imperialism has led the non-aligned to support liberation movements such as the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia. The second principle is the equality and sovereignty of governments; territorial integrity is integral to this principle. The emphasis on "equality" is a noble attempt to discard the misconception of racial superiority in inter-group relations across boundaries.

The third principle is non-aggression. This is a necessary condition for different peoples to realize their domestic goals, to uphold their interests and to live in harmony. Hence, the emphasis on disarmament is intended to achieve international peace. It is important to mention, however, that the concept of aggression is elusive. It defies precision in definition. The United Nations, for instance, has failed to determine what constitutes "defensive" and "offensive" acts among governments. The activities of the Israeli Government towards Arab Governments, and vice versa, are the case in point.

However, while all leaders agree on the necessity and desirability of "peace," they disagree on what constitutes "peace." The questions confronted here therefore are: What is peace? For whom and at what costs? For instance, the South African Government promulgated in the 1970s the policy of detente with Black African governments. This move was intended to ameliorate political tension and, ultimately, to bring about peace, stability and development in Southern Africa. Some Black African leaders quickly jumped onto the detente bandwagon but others did not. In view of the political conflict in the region, whose "peace" did the South African

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Government want to establish? Who was to benefit, and at what cost, in material and human terms?

The fourth principle advocated by the non-aligned is non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Leaders of non-aligned governments do not accept either political, diplomatic, economic, military or ideological forms of interference. Interestingly, this was one of the major props of the South African Government's policy towards Black African governments. It was also on this principle that the South African Government defied calls for domestic reform by the international community. There is another twist to the principle of non-interference; to the non-aligned the principle of self-determination means overt support for liberation movements whose ultimate objective is the overthrow of either de jure or de facto governments such as those in Southern Africa before the independence of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the principle of non-interference would restrain governments that would want to support liberation movements.

The apparent contradiction between the principles of non-interference and self-determination should not, however, surprise students of international affairs. Neither should it be considered the application of doublestandards as such. First, the adherence to one principle rather than the other is a function of leaders' perceptions, the situation and the circumstances of an event. This suggests that leaders only invoke a particular principle in order to give credence to their political actions. Second, the foreign policy of any given government is a prolongation of its domestic politics. Consequently, there is no act in foreign policy that can be considered non-interference because the ensuing interactions imply contacts of sorts.

The fifth principle of non-participation in military bloc politics, it was assumed would lead to peace, security and freedom of choice. By this principle, non-aligned leaders seek to mediate disputes between the major powers. However, this principle is questionable in this nuclear age; an age whose future hangs in the balance.

The sixth principle is peaceful settlement of international disputes. The assumption is that military solutions are worse than negotiated settlements. The fact is, however, that the uses of military force have not diminished among the developing states themselves in recent years. The ongoing Iran-Iraq War is clear testimony of this observation.

The last principle is international co-operation. Leaders insist on respect for a government's legitimacy on the basis of equality. This implies that even military governments, irrespective of how they came to power, are legitimate as long as the domestic population accepts them for lack of an alternative form of government; a troubling thought, indeed!

The goals that non-aligned governments seek to achieve in the international system are equally many and varied. The first is to strengthen their countries' political independence. This means working against all forms of foreign dependence in economic, socio-cultural, political, scientific and

intellectual fields. This is a noble goal because it potentially stands to increase co-operation among the non-aligned themselves. Ironically, the same leaders speak of broader international interdependence which, by definition, includes the Super Powers and the multinational corporations.

Adequate socio-economic development through self-reliance is the second important goal of the non-aligned. It is hoped that a new international economic order would be established through the exclusive control of domestic natural resources and through the changing of the terms of trade in their favour. However, this goal raises two immediate problems. While non-aligned governments stress the importance of self-reliance in socio-economic development they also want increased economic and technical assistance from essentially status quo western governments. This seems a contradiction in development policies. Secondly, the exclusive control over domestic natural resources and the change in the terms of trade are only possible for a few of the non-aligned states. This means that the extent to which any government can pursue the goal of self-reliance depends on the possession of scarce commodities with which to earn foreign exchange and to effectively bargain with consumer governments and transnational companies.

The third goal is the democratisation of international relations. This means participation in the decision-making processes of institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank through increased membership on boards of directors. By so doing the non-aligned hope to achieve proportionate representation.

The other important goal is to work for global peace and security through support for disarmament negotiations between the Soviet and American Governments. The calls for complete disarmament are made through the United Nations' General Assembly.

These principles and goals are largely those contained in the Charter of the United Nations. This implies that the NAM supports and complements the activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

ROLE OF CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY

Six conferences of non-aligned governments have been held since 1961. The first met in Belgrade in 1961 amidst fears of a nuclear confrontation between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. American military bases in Western Europe appeared to be a threat to the national security of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government in turn, made secret shipments of nuclear missiles to Cuba. These missiles would be used to counter-attack the United States in the event of an outright war between the two Super Powers.¹²

Thus, the newly independent non-aligned governments met to consider

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the implications of this conflict for world peace and to appeal to both Super-Powers to negotiate rather than resort to war. The conflict was of a relatively short duration; the American and Soviet Governments signed an agreement to prohibit nuclear testing in the atmosphere immediately following the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, the mutual realization of the destructiveness of nuclear war contributed more to the abatement of hostilities than the appeals by the non-aligned governments.

Non-aligned governments also called on the United Nations to convene a conference at which their socio-economic problems would be discussed and solutions sought. In part this call paved the way for the initial United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva in 1964. The justification for the call was that the developed countries had not adopted adequate means to meet the socio-economic difficulties of former colonial territories.¹⁵

Furthermore, they called for a drastic change in the terms of trade between the developed and developing states. They observed that status quo had created an unfavourable balance-of-payments for colonial territories. Besides, economic and technical assistance were not forthcoming to help in the nation-building tasks.

The question of unfavourable balance-of-payments requires an additional comment here. It is misleading to attribute this fact wholly to the developed countries. The non-aligned governments also must shoulder part of the blame because of the tendency to import more than they export. This is particularly true of non-oil producing states. Admittedly, such importations are made in order to satisfy ever-rising expectations and wants of their populations. However, the fact remains that unless domestic production of goods and services is increased importation of such goods and services becomes not only desirable but necessary. The immediate consequences are inadequate foreign exchange and increased external borrowing.

Finally, the leaders recognized the need for increased inter-governmental consultations. Such consultation would enable them to exchange vital information and views on questions of economic relations with the developed states. Secondly, the consultations would help them to adopt mutually supportive positions on the activities of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Overall, the advantage of increased consultations was to strengthen coalition diplomacy, which in the long run, would result in mutual responsiveness and issue saliency among the non-aligned leaders.

The second conference was held in Cairo in 1964; leaders reiterated their calls for complete disarmament, peaceful uses of atomic energy, prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests, the establishment of nuclear free zones, the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the abolition of all nuclear weapons programmes.

Here again, we see a contradiction between the peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes and the activities of some non-aligned governments. In recent years, it has been common knowledge that Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran,

Syria, Egypt, Somalia, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and many others have acquired sophisticated military hardware. Such shopping sprees, it is assumed, ensure domestic and regional stability. On the contrary, the acquisition of military hardware by relatively unstable governments potentially threatens rather than ensures international peace and security. Besides, commitment to non-alignment does not, of necessity, free a government from external political and military pressures. Cyprus and Lebanon are classic examples of the devastation of military hardware. More importantly, large expenditures on military hardware are at the expense of the cherished goal of socio-economic development. These observations notwithstanding, it is interesting to note that some leaders of non-aligned governments will still believe that the continuing armed races, technological advances in nuclear weapons production and their stockpiling threaten world peace.

The leaders also dealt with issues of cultural, scientific and educational co-operation and the consolidation of regional organizations in all fields. It was reasoned that international understanding and progress required the revival and rehabilitation of cultures; free expression of their identity and national character. This was a healthy development because knowledge, like a contagious disease, knows no territorial boundaries. Hence, the need for co-operative efforts in human development.

The other issues included the role of liberation movements in general and racial discrimination particularly in the Republic of South Africa. Non-aligned governments called for political and economic action and proposed specific measures for immediate implementation. One measure was the imposition of economic sanctions on South African goods. The second was a call on Western governments to stop their military equipment deliveries to South Africa. The third called for the severance of diplomatic relations with South Africa and the denial of aircraft and shipping facilities.

Relations between Black African governments and the South African regime cannot be fully understood without a consideration of the race factor. Unfortunately, only a few theories on the role of race in international affairs exist. Karl Deutsch, in viewing race from the perspective of communication theory, observes that a person's physical appearance has a meaning beyond itself for it serves as a sign which involves varied memories such as historic and cultural differences between peoples. Thus, White groups in South Africa seem quite keen to safeguard their moral and political ideals of racial superiority over non-White groups. It is these ideals that were and still are repugnant to non-aligned governments. Nyerere has summed up well the viewpoint of the non-aligned when he observed that South Africa was an independent state and that within its borders there could be no colonies to be granted independence. 18

To the South African regime, however, the creation of Bantustans was, and still is a way of compromising external demands for domestic reform. The regime in that country even went as far as suggesting that black governments ought to adopt "apartheid" policies of sorts. The implications of this

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suggestion are far-reaching and frightening and therefore, deserve further comment here.

All governments, especially those of the newly independent territories, are plagued with problems of domestic integration in the process of nation-building. The problems essentially arise from the diversity of social and/or linguistic groups. Governments, in an attempt to create a "we-feeling," allocate resources in a manner intended to forestall outcries which might set after regional political division if unmanaged. Thus, South Africa's suggestions for mini-apartheid policies in independent African states would undercut present policies of regional parity. Indeed if adopted, the suggestions would have undesirable repercussions on the future of Black Africa. "Separate linguistic development" would put an end to the careers of some tribal-oriented politicians. The resultant domestic strife would lead to civil wars, which would in their turn undermine the very unitary political fabric of independent African governments. Thus, it was only logical that African leaders treated the external behaviour of the South African leaders with the contempt it deserved.

Amplifying the point further, it may be said that, the relations between the South African and Black Africa's leaders, were conditioned by the race factor. The underlying issue concerned the distribution of political and economic power. The regime saw nothing necessarily wrong with the existing socio-economic and political order. Thus, the regime's ultimate goal has been one of survival on the basis of the present form and style of government. While the Blacks would have everything to gain from revolutionary changes, the contrary would be true for landed -and propertied-white groups. This seems to be the basis of White resistance against reform rather than the variable of race per se.

The non-aligned leaders, in support for radical domestic reforms in South Africa, have criticized and urged Western leaders to sever their diplomatic and economic links with the South African Government. The former, however, are not members of the Non-aligned Movement. As a result, they are not necessarily obliged to implement the resolutions passed by the non-aligned unless such resolutions did not conflict with their own objectives and goals in the international arena. Also there are non-aligned leaders who are reluctant to sever their economic links with the South African Government because such an action would be suicidal to their very politico-economic existence. Thus, while the pronouncements are loud and clear, the need for economic, technical, and military assistance draws some non-aligned governments closer to governments they find morally degenerate.

The third conference, which met in Lusaka in 1970, discussed issues including the need for peace, independence, development, co-operation and the democratization of international relations. The ensuing resolutions did not significantly differ from those of past conferences. For instance, non-aligned leaders resolved to adopt exclusive control over their natural

resources. The objective was to generate increased socio-economic development through self-reliance measures and co-operation among the non-aligned governments themselves. This resolution was significant because it provided the rationale for expropriating foreign property and assets of multinational corporations. At the same time, it ushered in "new" problems between host governments which were, and still are faced with the issue of paying prompt and adequate compensation to foreign companies. In addition, they face problems of inadequate technology, finance capital and professional personnel to reasonably run domestic industries. Indeed, some non-aligned governments have made quiet, but systematic, "about-turns" from exclusive control of their natural resources.

V. De Dubnic writes that the Brazilian Government had a foreign policy based on non-alignment. This policy was intended to equally deal with both Western and Eastern bloc governments. Unfortunately, the Brazilian Government neither attracted the much-needed finance capital nor did it promote increased commerce and trade. More importantly, the non-alignment stance in foreign policy did not lead to domestic, social, political and economic progress. This relative policy failure led the government to undertake specific measures such as the negotiation of the repayment of all foreign debts, the resumption of normal relations with French, American and Portuguese governments, and the initiation of economic negotiations with the West German and Swedish Governments. This policy ambivalence suggests that the main analytical problem is not one of discussing ideological leanings of particular governments but how they aspire to work with other governments, in what policy areas and at what socio-political and economic costs to the country.

The fourth conference was held in Algiers in 1973. The emphasis of the conference, as an extension of previous solidarity statements and calls for action on common problems, was on the necessity for self-reliance and increased economic co-operation in banking, finance, credit and monetary affairs. A resolution was passed to establish a solidarity fund which would assist governments that experienced economic difficulties as a result of the energy crisis. Support was given to OPEC, an organisation which has been very successful in the production and pricing controls over crude oil. This success, however, did create problems for those non-aligned that are non-oil producers. Efforts to negotiate differential prices on imported crude oil have continued to be futile.

In Colombo in 1976, the fifth conference discussed as usual the issues of raw materials, trade, finance, industrialization and international co-operation. On the issue of raw materials, the non-aligned leaders re-emphasized the need for economic cartels among commodity producer/exporter governments. They resolved to set up a common fund with which to finance buffer stocks of raw materials. This was to be implemented without delay.

On trade, they resolved to undertake joint action towards the industrialized countries through trade preferences in favour of the non-aligned and the SA

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creation of new trade flows among themselves. On finance, it was agreed to urge member governments to ratify the solidarity fund. They also felt that the International Monetary Fund system needed restructuring in order to prevent currency fluctuations. In an attempt to effect such change, they proposed the establishment of a joint bank which would ensure financial and monetary co-operation.

As regards industrialization, the conference decided to encourage the achievement of a 25 per cent share of total world trade by 2000 A.D. Furthermore, the United Nations was called upon to convene a special session to deal with the World's economic problems.

This conference appears to have been more specific on common problems than the previous four conferences. Specifically, selected non-aligned governments were assigned the tasks of co-ordination on raw materials, scientific and technological development, food and agriculture, fisheries, communications, tourism, sports, research and information, transnational co-operations, and international co-operations.

At the sixth conference which met in Havana in 1979, leaders reaffirmed the fundamental principles and goals of non-alignment, perhaps because of the fact that attempts were being made to question their efficacy. The economic part of the declaration emphasized the concept of self-reliance and the necessity of launching global negotiations as a beginning in the implementation of the "New International Economic Order" programmes.

As I write, the seventh conference is to be held in New Delhi, India, in March 1983. It is likely that the Conference agenda world comprise the "traditional" political and economic issues that have in the past occupied the minds of the leaders of the NAM. On the political front, the issue of a homeland for Palestinians would feature high on the agenda with respect to the Middle East. Since the "Camp David Accord" has been overtaken by recent developments, it is likely that President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt would join forces with Yasser Arafat. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and Soviet military presence in Afghanistan are also likely to be discussed by the conference. The Iraq-Iran War, which necessitated the switch of the Non-aligned Conference venue from Baghdad (Iraq) to New Delhi (India), would necessarly be discussed by the conference. The chance of a settlement of sorts of this war is likely especially now that both Iraq and Iran have shown signs of flexibility and preparedness to end this costly Venture. Two additional political issues which are expected to be taken up are Kampuchea and Namibia; territories whose peace settlement has so far eluded world statesmen.20

By far the most important issues on the agenda of the forthcoming conference will be of an economic nature. On this front, I expect conferees to reiterate the issues and strategies previously discussed by the Havana (Cuba) Conference in 1979.²¹ The leaders will assert that nothing less than the complete restructuring of current international economic relations will provide a durable solution for global problems. The guidelines likely to

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shape the assertions of leaders of the non-alignment movement might include the following:

- (i) the transfer of resources and technology to less-developed countries from the developed countries on a predictable basis;
- (ii) the division of labour in the world production system through improved access to the markets of the industrialised countries;
- (iii) the transfer of appropriate technology on favourable conditions and terms;
- (iv) the re-deployment of suitable industries from the industrialised countries to the less developed countries;
- (v) the harmonisation of substitutes and synthetics in the industrialised countries with the supply of natural products from the less developed
- (vi) the elimination of restrictive business practices and effective controls of the activities of transnational enterprises;
- (vii) the restructuring of international trade with a view to indexation;
- (viii) the improving of the terms of trade of the less developed countries;
 - (ix) the ensuring of equitable and remunerative prices of export raw materials in real terms;22
 - (x) the overhauling of the current global monetary arrangements by removing the dominant role of hard currencies in international reserves;23 and
 - (xi) the ensuring of parity between the less developed and developed countries in the decision-making processes of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Above all, I believe that the leaders would have serious discussions on the need for "South-South dialogue" on trade and/or collective self-reliance.24 Such discussions will naturally involve an exploration of possibilities of co-operation among the less developed countries in the industrial, trade, financial, and technical fields.

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING NAM

Each conference has passed several resolutions on a variety of issues. However, these, in and by themselves, tend to be largely declarations of intent and exhortations on individual non-aligned governments to implement them. Since there is no enforcement agency to check on whether each government carries out the resolutions, the conference decisions essentially remain inchoate ideas.

The above criticism of the NAM conferences notwithstanding, one has to partly consider the evolution of the movement in order to appreciate its ıde

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has e its operational difficulties and dilemmas. The history of the non-aligned movement is traceable to the post-World War II era. This period was marked by a proliferation of new states in Asia and Africa. A second important feature of the period was mutual distrust between the Western and Eastern bloc governments leading to the emergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact. This division of the World into two military blocs mainly began with Soviet economic and military ascendancy to world power and adventurism in Eastern Europe at the close of World War II.

By 1948, Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, East Germany and Romania came under Soviet influence. In the Far East, outer-Mongolia, North Korea, China and North Vietnam became communist states. As a response to Soviet military, aid and trade policies, the United States, Canada and Western Europe established NATO, followed by the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation and the Baghdad Pact. The ensuing rivalry initiated an increasing pressure on American and Soviet governments to induce other governments to join their respective military-diplomacy pacts.

Thus, the newly independent territories faced, at least, three related policy difficulties. The first was-How to give substance to and defend their political independence against Super Powers' pressures? The second was-How to reduce politico-military tension between the two Super Powers? Thirdly-How to benefit from the resulting relaxation of such politico-military tension? These were real policy difficulties to newly independent territories mainly for two reasons. Leaders of new territories viewed the formation of military pacts not as an act of deterrence but as a way of perpetuating their dependency relationship akin to the colonial era. Such relationships, it was reasoned, would relegate their governments to a situation of political, military and economic subservience towards the two major powers. Therefore, they sought to challenge the merits of the status quo. Secondly, leaders of new territories believed that the international arms race was a result of the ideological conflict between the two major powers rather than vice versa.25 Thus, they perceived their role as one of espousing the virtues of (i) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (iii) mutual non-aggression; (iv) equality and mutual benefit; and (v) peaceful co-existence, through arms control and disarmament.

The problems discussed called for a "new" foreign policy orientation among leaders of newly independent territories. Three options availed themselves to these leaders. The first option was to sign military treaties with the Eastern bloc, to sign military treaties with the Western bloc and to sign military treaties with neither the Western nor the Eastern bloc.

The third option is the one that was preferred to the other two because the leaders of newly independent territories hoped to become a balancing force between the two Super Powers. The assumption in this choice was that economic aid would come from both camps, that this policy stance would

free them from politico-military tension and, ultimately, ensure their

national security.26

Despite the adoption of the third policy option, most non-aligned governments tend to be more critical of Western than Eastern governments. Second, a number of them have signed treaties of "friendship" with either the American or Soviet governments. While such treaties are essentially nonmilitary in nature, they tend to have subtle military gurantees of military co-operation in the event of invasion. Cases in point are relations between the United States Government and some South American governments on the one hand, and the Soviet and the Indian governments on the other hand. Third, while most non-aligned governments bemoan the arms race between the Super Powers, they themselves continue to vigorously work towards regional military superiority over neighbouring states. As a result, collective resolve and action among the non-aligned tends to be nothing more than the issuance of general communiques which hurt no-one in the conduct of foreign policies of the movement.

These observations bring us down to a consideration of problems of the NAM. The first problem is that the movement is broad-based, embracing governments of all imaginable persuasions; the result is that differences range from political, socio-economic systems, race, religion, culture, levels of economic development to geographical locations. These differences create constraints on meaningful communication and mutual responsiveness among the Non-aligned. The apparent unity reflected in resolutions does not weaken this observation about the size of the movement.

The diversity among the non-aligned governments tends to constrain pragmatic unity. Nevertheless, there is some implicit advantage to the medium of conferences; each leader, imbued with and guided by different notions of national interest, works tirelessly to uphold his government's image or for the adoption of vague resolutions that are never really binding on member governments.

The second problem relates to constant disagreements between certain non-aligned states not only at conferences but also in their day-to-day relations. Such differences of opinion, and even overt physical conflicts tend to reduce the effectiveness of coalition diplomacy. For instance, a considerable divergence of opinion emerged during the Angolan Civil War. Different groups of non-aligned leaders upheld equally different approaches to the solution of the problem by supporting contending factions. These differences persisted until the Cuban troops carried the day.

Conflicts also exist between Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania on the political future of Western Sahara. Each government has made claims and counter-claims on that territory. Naturally, each of the three governments drew support from its own "constituency" within the non-aligned Movement.27 Other examples of clashes between the armed forces of individual non-aligned governments, or their friends in exile include Lebanon and Cyprus. Such events have repercussions for domestic and regional stability AISA

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as well as for coalition diplomatic cohesion. Furthermore, developments in the international situation, such as the current economic recession, tend to have a corrosive effect on coalition diplomacy. Consequently, it would be wishful thinking to expect non-aligned conferences to achieve very significant results.

Then again, lack of effective implementation of conference resolutions is another major problem. In 1975 for example, a ministerial conference of non-aligned countries, meeting in Lima, decided on the establishment of (i) a Solidarity Fund for economic and social development for non-aligned nations, (ii) a Council of Associations of developing countries' producersexporters of raw materials, and (iii) a Special Fund for the Financing of Buffer Stocks of Raw Materials and Primary Products Exported by the Developing Countries. Nonetheless, the Non-aligned Movement has lacked institutional, human and financial resources with which to implement such resolutions. Indeed, characteristic of the conferences are mere consistent calls for the transformation of economic and political relations between the major powers and the non-aligned governments as well as among the latter themselves. These calls notwithstanding, the voting behaviour at the United Nations has either been with the United States Government or the Soviet Government. Admittedly, this political behaviour is for a pragmatic purpose since the non-aligned states cannot ignore without being suicidal to actualized power politics in international affairs.

The fourth problem relates to the expectations and dispositions of leaders of major powers towards the Non-aligned. Often, these leaders tend to support resolutions that do not seem to contradict their own perceived national interests. Thus, they have always exercised their powers of veto against any resolutions they disagree with at the United Nations. This political behaviour raises a fundamental question as to whether non-aligned leaders can succeed to influence the major powers on matters of disarmament.

The other problem relates to the question of core leadership within the Non-aligned Movement. From the very beginning, leadership was provided by the likes of Nehru, Tito, Nasser, Nkrumah and many others. Their passing away is likely to create a leadership vacuum of sorts in the movement. They did command great respect among the non-aligned and by extension, contributed to cohesion without the movement. It is not suggested here that all the principled leadership of the non-aligned Movement is off the world-chess board. Rather, the point is that the movement has now reached a critical stage because of the death of most of its "founding fathers." Therefore, the movement is in the whirlwind of a leadership crisis although leaders such as Indira Gandhi, Fidel Castro, and Kenneth Kaunda are trying hard to keep it in one piece.

V CONCLUSIONS

This article has analysed the nature of past conferences of NAM with a view to highlighting problems of conference diplomacy. It demonstrates that the original principles and goals of the Movement need some modifications in order to be reasonably applicable in the contemporary international affairs. Secondly, the analysis shows that the resolutions of the Non-aligned Movement Conferences would remain declarations of intent until and unless new modes of doing things were devised. Presently, the Movement lacks a collective implementation machinery of conference resolutions let alone a monitoring agency. This is not to deny the roles of the Ministerial Conference of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-aligned Countries and similar organs in inter-state relations. However, these are ad hoc rather than permanent institutions akin to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Thus, they are largely incapable of articulating as well as regulating the actions of the Non-aligned Movement.

Since it is almost impossible for the movement to create an organ to operate on a permanent day-to-day basis, I suggest that the main focus of non-aligned governments must now be on economic-technological issues rather than on doctrinal declarations. The implementation strategy must closely involve diplomatic and/or foreign office personnel in post-conference activities. These professional officers would meet regularly to discuss intricate technical problems regarding resolutions with their counterparts from member governments. I believe that this activity would greatly complement the conferences by establishing viable action programmes, institutional, financial and human resources. In addition to routine activities, the professional diplomats would be afforded opportunities to learn about each other's governmental problems and the extent to which certain resolutions might or might not be implementable.

If the above suggestion is persuasive, then multilateral regional management teams would be best suited to deal with inter-state relations beyond the conference resolutions. Such management teams might work alongside and/or within regional co-operative efforts like the Southern African Development and Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The greatest challenge now is that the non-aligned governments, acting on behalf of their peoples must accept certain procedures for carrying out joint decisions which they will be prepared to implement. Such preparedness will, in turn, depend more on prudence and statesmanship in foreign policy than on mere revolutionary zeal, anti-capitalist and anti-colonial rhetoric of yester-years.

March 3, 1983.

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JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AND NON-ALIGNMENT

By A.K. Damodaran*

T is very rare in history that there is almost total identification between a political figure and a certain policy. The idea of non- alignment from power blocs, as distinct from the earlier concept of neutrality or the later pejorative phrase 'neutralism' is associated both in its origin and in its evolution with Jawaharlal Nehru along with three or four leaders. Tito, Nasser and Nkrumah are the men who share with Nehru the credit for anticipating the needs of the newly independent countries in a world dominated by very powerful systems. Among them, because of the nature of the Indian national movement and his personal ability to articulate embryonic ideas in a most attractive manner, Jawaharlal Nehru is particularly interesting. Tito was a creative genius with tremendous firmness of purpose, who was able to stand for independence of action in a tightly-knit organisation dominated by a great power with both present strength and past record. Nasser expressed at a moment of importance in the history of his country the need for complete sovereignty. Nkrumah emerged as the conscience of not only one nation, but a continent.

It is important to distinguish men like Nehru and Nasser from the greater, prophetic figures of the modern world. In this age of ideology, names like Lenin and Mao produce inevitable associations with a certain type of political organisation or a certain attitude towards the way the world should be reorganised. Gandhi belongs to this class of prophet leaders, men who dared everything and achieved against impossible odds. Jawaharlal Nehru, as he himself recognised in a rather well-known passage in *The Discovery of India* functioned at a less dramatic, more human level. He saw himself as a person given the job of translating his prophet's ideas into reality. This meant articulation, sophisticated explanations and compromise when direct attempts at persuasion failed on the many controversies that dog the path of the revolutionary agitator or the institution-builder after the revolutions and its excitements are over. In *The Discovery of India* Nehru quotes with unreserved approval a passage from Liddell Hart's *Strategy: The Indirect Approach:*

"History bears witness to the vital part that the 'prophets' have played in human progress—which is evidence of the ultimate practical value of expressing unreservedly the truth as one sees it. Yet it also becomes clear that the acceptance and spreading of that vision has always depended on another class of men—"leaders" who had to be philosophical strategists, striking a compromise between truth and men's receptivity to it. Their

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effect has often depended on their own limitations in perceiving the truth as on their practical wisdom in proclaiming it".

Nehru's self-perception was clear, unclouded by vanity or wishful thinking; he was the 'leader', the compromiser, the negotiator, the willing

instrument of the 'prophet'.

The relationship between Nehru and Gandhi is important in the understanding of the intellectual and moral basis of Indian nationalism in its last, most creative stage. It was not merely a reconciliation of opposites, even though there were divergences enough between the approach of the two men towards political philosophy, economic planning and the great problems of peace and war. During the thirty years of his association with Gandhi. Nehru learnt to speak in the older man's accents. It was, in fact, a deep influence which can be traced in the slow evolution of Nehru's ideas during the thirties and the forties. His impatience with violence, his rejection of some of the more 'violent' tenets of organised communism and his willingness to see the point of view of the other side in any discussion—these were all the result of his association with Gandhi. He had been articulate enough about what he felt to be the flaws of Gandhi's economic and political philosophy during the national movement. He was, however, always absolutely clear in his mind about the Mahatma's intuitive grasp of the essentials of any situation and his sureness of judgement in fashioning a response to the demands of that situation. At a deeper level, it is interesting to note that Gandhi, an actively practising Hindu, and Nehru, lukewarm in religious matters and an agnostic by conviction, found in the Indian tradition surprisingly similar lessons for our own times. Perhaps the personality of the Buddha provides the link. Nehru has again and again articulated his delighted surprise at the manner in which the Buddhist traditions of tolerance permeated Indian culture throughout the ages. Gandhiji, who re-interpreted the philosophy of the righteous war to form the basis of the ideology of non-violence, was also, perhaps, in his daily life, the most passionate advocate of tolerance in difficult, transitional times.

It would, however, be possible to over-estimate this connection. Both were strong, highly integrated personalities, who could not, in the very nature of things, accept the world views of each other without strain. There is no evidence that either made an attempt to do so. In what was, in fact, a genuinely secure and confident partnership between different types, these incongruities became of secondary importance. In the significance he attached to developments outside the borders of British India, in his involvement in the world decolonisation process and in his perception of the links between social change and political liberties, Nehru was a pioneer in Indian political activity. In these things, he was the teacher and on many occasions, Gandhi deferred to him. The origins of the Indian policy of non-alignment have been faithfully recorded in the speeches of Nehru and the documents of the Indian National Congress throughout the thirties. A study of these

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documents proves how inevitable a policy of non-alignment was after India became independent. There was no doubt from the very beginning in Nehru's mind that the essence of independence lay in the ability of the new Indian state to take decisions free from any external influence. It is fascinating to watch the foreshadowings of the future concept of non-alignment in a note written as early as 1927. Nehru reports to the All India Congress Committee. after attending the Brussels Conference against imperialism, that in a future war, India should be neutral. She had no shared interests with Britain. The idea of neutrality in an actual war is the beginning of the much more complex, sophisticated idea of non-involvement with other nations during times of peace. Many of the debates in the early 1950s, both within India

that total loyalty was necessary.

This basic emphasis on freedom of decision-making in the vital matters of defence, economic planning and foreign affairs was strengthened through the thirties by a growing sophistication in the nuances of international behaviour. The attractions of anti-fascism were not always identical; nor were the antipathies to fascism and imperialism. It was Nehru who evolved, over the years, a highly integrated approach towards these problems and educated the people of India, the members of the Congress Party and all young people in the country who did not necessarily belong to any party, in these subtleties. In the words of the poet, he was, "to us no more a person now, but a whole climate of opinion". It is this approach towards the need to fight fascism and imperialism at the same time which led to the dilemmas of the early war years. It was easy to adopt extremist positions of loyalism to the British, charmingly disguised as opposition to totalitarianism, and militant opposition extending to sabotage of the war effort, again attractively disguised as a struggle against imperialism and immediate self-determination. It was much more difficult to reduce each ideological and strategic policy to its bare essentials and to refuse to form conclusions until all the evidence was marshalled and all the arguments and counter-arguments assessed. This was the very real debate within the country and the nationalist movements, kept alive, in very difficult circumstances by Nehru's personal persistence. The failure of the Cripps Mission made the choice easier when Gandhiji made the call for a new national movement against the British.

It is not too fanciful to imagine that the elements of continuity and the absence of rancour could be traced to the personalities and policies of the two major leaders of the movement. Both were equally relevant; Gandhiji's refusal to compromise, coupled with this willingness to interrupt struggle by negotiation, when necessary, and to recognise all the time that in most human confrontations, the violence is as much internal as external, and Nehru's willingness to see the other point of view and adopt the reasonable middle path between superficially attractive extremist positions. These two elements were fused together in a single methodology of political action by the personal equation between Gandhi and Nehru. Many of the policies of independent India can be traced to this tradition of sophistication in negotiation, willingness to compromise when the realistic assessment of one's own forces made a compromise desirable and throughout the whole operation, a certain respect for other points of view, including those of one's antagonist. The Gandhian contribution to this fascinating political experience was not only non-violence, but also morality and good faith; Nehru's assets were information, sensitivity and awareness of the less well-known aspects of foreign policy issues, in other words, a certain breadth of vision, a magnitude of tolerance. Such a combination of attitudes finds it impossible to accept ideological differences as absolute and military confrontation as inevitable. Seen in the perspective of history, even total enmities seem partial. There is always the faint possibility of redemption in today's sinner; there is always the dismal chance that the saints of yesterday might be the villains of tomorrow.

This unique blend of realism and high ideals was tested to the limit at the moment of independence when partition of the sub-continent became inevitable. Here again, there was a graceful acceptance, in spite of all the doubts and reservations, of the inevitable, an acceptance of the second best in preference to the impossible best.

To complete the picture of the pre-independence Congress and its leader-ship, we have to take into account also the implications of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The world could never be the same again, either for the apostle of non-violence or for the votary of revolution, peaceful if possible, armed if necessary, but within the limits of decent behaviour. Such earlier concepts became slightly irrelevant in a world faced with the nuclear weapon. A great deal of Nehru's policy compulsion after independence could be traced to his hypersensitive reaction to the nuclear weapon. Added to the earlier, longer preoccupations with decolonisation and social justice, this became one of the cardinal factors influencing India's adoption of a non-aligned posture.

The special personal, almost subjective, element in the conceptualisation of non-alignment as the inevitable policy for an ex-colonial country, are important to any understanding of Jawaharlal Nehru's career as India's first Prime Minister and a world statesman. There are, however, other factors also which have to be mentioned to explain the limitations as much as the scope of India's foreign policy in the Nehru era. Firstly, we tend to forget that all new actors on the international scene try to distance themselves from existing power structures in self-defence, not merely strategically, but also politically and intellectually. This was true of the foreign policy of the new revolutionary government of the United States in the eighteenth century as articulated by Washington and Jefferson. "Habitual friendships and animosities" with a single country, they thought, were inconsistent with true sovereignty. Such assertions of independence by the new actors on the scene are looked on with disfavour by older actors who have a vested interest in

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the existing power arrangement. The Soviet Union, between the wars, was also a new actor on the international scene and underwent a similar experience. The world community after the second world war, to which India was admitted as one of the first dependent countries to achieve freedom, was a tightly-knit organisation centering round the United Nations Charter and the anxieties of the older empires to preserve the status-quo. This factor was almost immediately replaced by the new ideological antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union. India, as the classical colony and as the first major colony to attain independence, could not but evolve an independent policy. Nehru articulated it lucidly, but the factors were objective and inescapable. The other two elements, quite independent of the Indian experience, were the tide of anti-colonialism which swept away the older empires in their technical sense. The United Nations was, in one sense, irrelevant to this process. Countries like Indonesia and Egypt played an independent role in harnessing the anti-imperialist forces towards an organised effort within the UN structure. Finally, the nuclear arms race and the partition of India, which had not figured in the earlier groupings of Nehru towards a coherent political philosophy and an effective foreign policy for independent India, had to be taken into account.

It is necessary to recall these external factors to complete the picture, to delineate the environment in which Nehru's India functioned. Given this background, the evolution of non-alignment in the Indian policy is nothing short of miraculous in its inevitability, in its consistency and in its effectiveness. It is not necessary to go into a detailed study of all the steps in the evolution of this policy, but the decision to remain in the Commonwealth, but with a difference as a Republic, the active diplomatic initiatives in Korea and Indochina and the championship of Egypt during the Suez crisis are memorable milestones. Synchronised with these developments, was the continuous process of the development of an Afro-Asian personality which had its roots in the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 and culminated in Bandung in 1955. This was also the period when Indian policy became identified with the anti-colonial movement in Africa. As Prof. Ali Mazrui has noted, the decision to liberate Goa from Portugal by force when patient negotiations for more than a decade had failed, had a catalytic effect with African liberation movements. During these years, also the attitude of the two ideological groupings to non-alignment veered slowly from total misperception and suspicion towards accommodation and even reluctant admiration.

Critics of Nehru and Indian non-alignment usually pounce upon the episodes of Hungary and the India-China conflict to buttress their criticisms, personally of Nehru, and, ideologically, of non-alignment. Hungary, in fact, was an interesting example of India's lower sense of priorities in a situation which was not of the classical colonial imperial equation. This had contemporary, ideological overtones which ruled out a visceral reaction. There was also Nehru's awareness of the need for some internal security within

the confronting power blocs to avoid a nuclear disaster. The difference of emphasis in the almost simultaneous developments in Hungary and in Suez can be seen as being organically linked with the colonial aspects of the Suez episode. The ease with which Nehru was able to find a common language with Marshal Tito showed his freedom from any inhibitions in opposing official socialist solidarity when he thought it was justified. Yet another factor was a cool, realistic assessment of India's own ability to contribute effectively to solutions of problems. Inflated rhetoric without any serious intention to translate words into reality was repugnant to Nehru's cast of mind. There was yet another factor. Nehru never forgot the overriding needs of India's national interest in complicated situations. He was willing, with the accomplished assistance of Krishna Menon, to help untangle tangled hostilities when it was possible, and when the arena of conflict was not too remote but not too near the Indian borders. This should explain the difference of approach to Suez and Hungary and the activist diplomacy in the Far East.

The India-China conflict is, in fact, easier to assess. Being a compulsive communicator, Jawaharlal Nehru shared with his countrymen, and indeed with the world outside, the various dilemmas, mistakes, misperceptions and the generally unreal atmosphere which existed in our relations with China. These lent abundant ammunition to his critics; they continue to do so till today. What is forgotten, however, is not what happened during the conflict, but after it. India's refusal to abandon the path of non-alignment was ensured by Nehru's personal conviction at a very difficult moment. Very soon, however, his position was supported by the surprisingly clear endorsement of his position by the behaviour of both super powers. Both the United States and the Soviet Union continued a normal relationship with India after the border war. This would not have been possible if India had shifted her policy or her attitude a little too much towards the Western camp as indeed many of Nehru's domestic critics wanted. India's non-alignment survived the India-China conflict. In the subsequent year and half, Nehru resisted the temptation of hostility to China in matters unconnected with the strains in their bilateral relations.

The India-China conflict is, by any standard, a major episode in India's history as an independent nation. It distorted our developmental plans and hampered the rate of our progress. That it was not permitted to do more harm on the international plane, was due to Nehru's instinctive sureness of touch in these matters. The care with which he avoided over-identification with the West in the years after the conflict, while remaining an active and co-operative member of the Western economic system, was, in a less immediately relevant field, reflected in the refusal to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute when it erupted almost immediately after our difficulties with China. The gratuitous import of the ideological or national predilections of other countries however friendly, would be against the true spirit of non-alignment and perhaps one of Nehru's greatest achievements was the

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manner in which during the short period left to him after the Chinese tragedy, he was able to salvage with such resoluteness India's integrity.

There is one other significant aspect of India's non-alignment during the Nehru years, which is of continuing relevance even today. The post-Stalin changes in the Soviet Union helped in an innovative change in India's domestic economic planning. The mixed economy, the idea of permitting free enterprise dominated by state control from the commanding heights of the economy, was Nehru's highly individual discovery during the years after the first National Planning Committee was formed in 1938. The policy was strengthened by the willingness of the Soviet Union to help us in building a firm industrial base in the public sector.

It is now almost nineteen years since Jawaharlal Nehru passed away and it is surprising how many ingredients of his domestic and foreign policy have contemporary significance for India and the world; perhaps, more than the content of his policy, is the method of discussion, negotiation, compromise and refusal to admit defeat in negotiation even when differences appear to be irreconcilable, which characterises his approach, which is immediately relevant. This careful and patient technique of diplomacy and negotiation continue to be relevant both for India and the developing world during the eighties on both bilateral and multilateral issues like the North-South dialogue, the search for new international economic and information orders and the reconciliation of the need for growth and social justice within sovereign states. It is not necessary for us to claim for all the thoughts and words of Nehru any permanent validity. We are not engaged here in a hagiographic exercise. Nehru was an intelligent and competent man, very much the product of his times; an Indian nationalist influenced by the great social and intellectual movements of a world dominated by Europe during the period between the two world wars. His eminently reasonable and sane attitude has perhaps as much relevance today as Gandhiji's qualitatively different, original, sometimes startling prescriptions for the individual and society.

It would be useful from the point of view of possible continuity to have a quick look at some major international issues of today which are of direct interest to India. On the final elimination of colonialism and imperialism, on the eradication of racial discrimination, there is, of course, no scope for controversy. The older problems, the older enemies, the older difficulties remain and it is not surprising that the attitude of Nehru or any other first generation nationalist of the post-independence era would be of immediate validity in our strategy even today. These, however, are diminishing problems. In the new challenges of the contemporary world, the questions of disarmament and development, the international economic order and the extension of non-alignment to the economic and the technological planes, in these, Nehru, much more than most others among his contemporaries either in India or abroad continues to be most useful as pathfinder or even trend setter. Both these problems are now assuming cataclysmic dimensions.

Nuclear wars are being considered as winnable; there is detailed analysis made of the usefulness of limited wars. Much more so than at Belgrade when Nehru insisted upon the greater danger from the arms race than from vestigial colonialism, is the danger of a nuclear holocaust imminent. As a sensitive historian who experienced at first hand the impact of the worldwide depression of the thirties in the remotest villages of the United Provinces, he would have also been the first to caution us against sliding still further into another depression of horrendous magnitude. The inarticulate worries of millions of the deprived and the dispossessed who form the constituency of the non-aligned movement, would have been given classical expression in restrained, but eloquent prose by Jawaharlal Nehru if he was alive today. He was always a little more sensitive than others to such dangers, a little earlier to recognise "the cloud no bigger than a man's hand".

On the single most vital aspect of India's external relations, the relationship with her neighbours, the theory and practice of Nehru's foreign policy seems to be specifically relevant today. Even in the midst of bitter wrangles and confrontation with Pakistan, the vision of co-operation in South Asia on a non-hegemonistic basis was always present in Jawaharlal Nehru's vision of the future. On the other major question of relations with the super powers in an age of disturbed detente, Nehru's reaction to the cold war and his weariness about the shared assumptions of the two superpowers can still teach us many a lesson. As early as 1945, when he wrote *The Discovery of India*, Nehru was clear sighted enough to see the blemishes in the foreign policy strategies of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He never permitted himself to be identified in his sympathies with either super power exclusively even when they were only emerging super powers.

All this is not to say that the twists and turns of India's foreign policy in the ninth decade of the century continue to reflect precisely Jawaharlal Nehru's foreign policy motivations, prejudices and priorities. A whole political generation has grown up since his death and there is a new international situation today. There are bound to be many matters of detail in the policies of his successors which Nehru would not be particularly enamoured of; there are some aspects of his world view which have become dated and no longer compellingly significant. Given these facts, it is surprising to see how much Nehru's fundamentalist but non-chauvinist brand of nationalism, with its extension into an active foreign policy distant from and rejecting the influence of power blocs and its insistence on making one's own decision on every major development in the outside world, continues to be the best single prescription for India's foreign policy today.

The non-aligned movement today is not only respectable, but even fashionable. For a newly-independent country nowadays, to assume a subordinate treaty relationship with a major power is unthinkable. The charges of morality made against neutralism appear to be echoes of another age in this decade with its overwhelming sense of danger. Non-alignment is no longer the unpopular policy adopted by a few malcontents not prepared to accept

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onof of nis ger a cosy subordinate relationship with the powerful ones of the world. It is respectable. It is a success.

Among the papers discovered on Nehru's table after his death, was the famous quotation from Robert Frost about the many miles to go and the many promises to keep. Today, he would have recognised with a shock of pleased recognition the appositeness to non-alignment in the world of the eighties of another quotable quote from Frost:

"Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less travelled by,
And that has made all the difference"

For an immensely popular man, Nehru never lost the gift of solitude, the necessary capacity for loneliness in the crowd, without which personal greatness is always incomplete. He knew instinctively what Tagore meant when he spoke of Gandhi as the 'lonely traveller'. Tito, another great pioneer and nation-builder, was also unafraid of taking the road less travelled by. Today, when the lonely travellers have been joined by the multitude, it would be salutory to remember the problems and the excitements of the first generation.

PROSPECTS FOR NON-ALIGNMENT: INDIA'S ROLE

By PARVATHI VASUDEVAN*

Non-alignment is not a dinosaur. Never less than one-half and now almost two-thirds of the members of the United Nations Organization have styled their approach to external affairs as non-alignment. In the course of the last three decades and more, not one of the non-aligned nations has forsaken it in favour of alignment, not even in the most adverse of circumstances. On the other hand, there have been instances when some aligned countries have opted for oon-alignment. The non-aligned countries are no Rip Van Winkles either. Ever alert to the realities of international affairs, they constantly endeavour to effect changes in the international power balance. During the fifties and the sixties, they helped to bring about a change in the international security order in the face of a strident Cold War. Since the beginning of the seventies, they have been working for the setting up of a New International Order (NIO) in all its three major facets, viz., the economic (New International Economic Order), the technological (New International Technological Order) and the informational (New International Information Order).

Non-alignment, personal preferences notwithstanding, has certainly succeeded to some extent in shaping the international system as it appears today. As the driving force of the resource-rich as also the resource-scarce yet volatile regions of the le tiers monde, non-alignment has almost always evoked extreme reactions, ranging from outright condemantion to lofty praise. However, having to live with non-alignment, it is necessary to ask what course non-alignment would take in the hands of its powerless votaries in the years ahead against the hindsight of what it has achieved so far. This paper endeavours to examine at some length the success and continued relevance of non-alignment with the focus on India.

I ROLE OF PERCEPTIONS

Factors Contributing to Scepticism

The scepticism about the future of non-alignment is in essence borne out of an improper appreciation of its substance. The major factor that has contributed to the misunderstanding about non-alignment is the taxonomy surrounding the expression itself. Influenced by the analytical elegance of the balance of power theory in a bi-polar world and by the etymological aspect, many observers felt that the expression "non-alignment" is ambiguous and "umbrella-type" in meaning and negative in spirit. The first of a series of serious misunderstandings arises from the interchangeable

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use of the expression "neutrality" with non-alignment. But neutrality, which has its origin in international law, surfaces only during a period of overt conflict, creating in its train, distinct rights and obligations for exercise and observance by both the non-participants and belligerents. It is for this reason that neutrality, pure and simple, has become impracticable and untenable after the Second World War. Non-alignment, on the other hand, does not confer any right or obligation either on its adherents or on those outside its fold. It emerged at the end of World War II and flourished in particular at the height of the Cold War.

To add further to the confusion, expressions such as "non-involvement," "non-entanglement," "neutralization" and "passivity" have been erroneously used as synonyms of "non-alignment." At times prefixes have been added to "neutralism"/"neutrality"/"non-alignment" as if that would infuse into it a more cogent meaning. Egypt described its foreign policy as "positive" neutralism, Jordan called it "active" neutrality, Afghanistan referred to its approach as "one of equal friendship," Guinea styled its as "active, formal" neutralism, Malawi claimed that it followed "discretional" neutralism and India declared in January 1977 that it would pursue "genuine" non-alignment. But none of these adjectives helps one to appreciate the true content of non-alignment, even though they suggest that non-alignment could inter alia be genuine, discretional, active and positive!

Yet another important misconception about non-alignment is that it is regarded as equivalent to "equi-distance", presumably to be maintained between the two power blocs if not the two Super powers as the super managers of world affairs. But this is clearly not so. Essentially, non-alignment predicates judgement of issues contextually—with reference to time, environment and the national interests of the non-aligned as also on the merits of the issue at stake—rather than with exclusive reference to the Cold War. As such, non-aligned nations could at times act in a manner that would result in their moving closer to one superpower, if not against the other. Such eventualities do not necessarily mean that the non-aligned nations have committed a breach in their status as the non-aligned. Nor can their actions be regarded as any more expedient or opportunistic than aligned foreign policies are capable of being so. Besides, the non-aligned nations never consider non-alignment as sacrosanct and eternally valid. They maintain that if need be, as in extreme situations, they would even give up non-alignment.² Similarly, non-alignment either conceptually or in practise, does not subscribe to any definite moralistic or ideological principles, even though in its infancy anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and anti-imperialism provided a common platform—not an ideology—for the newly emergent nation states to come together.

There is yet another misimpression—that non-alignement abjures the use of force and tends to lay emphasis (as is evident from the frequent attempts on the part of the non-aligned nations in the past) on settlement of disputes through diplomatic means. It is true that negotiations and

diplomacy are often advocated in matters where the claims of the disputants are not very divergent.3 But over the years, maturing with experience, the non-aligned have not attempted to mediate or negotiate, especially when the contestants to disputes are relatively powerful neighbours from the same geographical region, as for example—India and China,4 or are members of the non-aligned community themselves, as for example—Iran and Iraq.5 While there are many instances where the non-aligned take the initiative and settle issues, they no longer consider it obligatory for them to solve/ settle each and every dispute arising either within their group or elsewhere. Nor does it imply that even when an issue becomes festering and difficult of resolution, they will refrain from the use of force. It is significant to note that the non-aligned nations insist on their right to be equally defenceprepared as any other self-respecting member of the international community would like to be. They however insist that there are no foreign armed forces on their territories nor the piling up of arms in and around their area. The non-aligned nations also do not advocate disarmament for its own sake; they do so in the belief that mankind's limited resources could be better used for rapid global socio-economic development which alone can ensure them decent living conditions. Pragmatism is undoubtedly an important factor, as much if not more, than idealism in the strategy of non-alignment.

Non-alignment thus is a foreign policy approach, a means to an end. While it does not provide a strong lever to influence the international system as a whole, it helps resist the application of unwelcome decisions, in particular those having a say on security matters. The self-protection that it affords safeguards the non-aligned from a total loss of independence that may be caused by the strategic and political interests pursued by the global powers. Non-alignment provides structural flexibility within the straight-jacket international set-up dictated by the Super Powers and helps lower international tensions. Non-alignment also epitomises the desire of nations to be treated "en par" with the older members of the international community and to impress upon the latter that the world would be an infinitely better place to live in through co-existence, compromise, adjustment and accommodation. The intrinsic values of non-alignment cannot thus be adequately captured without due regard to the circumstances of its operation and to the perceptions of its numerous adherents.

In the ultimate, non-alignment does not lend itself to any universally acceptable definition. But this by itself does not confer any disadvantage or loss of prestige, for, basically, no foreign policy is capable of a scientific and precise definition that would stand to any test other than that of the nebulous notion of national (self) interests.

Perceptions Arising Out of Operative Experiences

The operative experiences of the non-aligned nations through time suggest that the concept of non-alignment is a continuously evolving set of reactions

to situations as they emerge in the context of Super Power actions, actual or potential, rather than being motivated by any messianic zeal guided by any doctrinaire and defined principles of international relations theory. In fact, the evolution of the movement suggests that it has to remain a foreign policy approach for most nations, so long as there are wide differences in the economic well-being and political approaches vis-a-vis international realities between the Super Powers and other members of the international community.

Rigid bi-polarity and tense cold war conditions, whilst offering the most conducive atmosphere for non-alignment to be tested for its actual worth, also clearly indicated the uphill task that its adherents were confronted with. Obsessed and preoccupied with the task of securing the obedience of the emerging free nations by force if necessary, both the Super Poweres initially questioned the moral basis and modus operandi of non-alignment. Washington and Moscow viewed it as a camouflage and felt that it was only a matter of time for the non-aligned to discard it and openly embrace one or the other bloc. In their opinion, it was impossible for the new emerging nations to successfully combine a democratic polity with a socialist economy as India—the first of the non-aligned—had striven to pursue. Such aspersions only strengthened the convictions of the non-aligned to remain uncompromisingly committed to their own approach. The non-aligned, a majority of whom were subjected to colonialism did not relish the prospects of becoming faceless identities or mere proto-types once again. They therefore resisted the emerging global paradigm of only two poles of power-a paradigm which continues to be quite relevant even today with minor modifications.

Yet, by the mid-1950's, there was a gradual and contemporaneous metamorphosis in the strategies and actions of the Super Powers as also among the non-aligned nations themselves with regard io international relations. The non-aligned were the first to realize that political autonomy would be totally incomplete if it were not accompanied by a matching economic credibility and a sound defence-security approach. Undoubtedly, whilst they had to telescope their self-help activities they had also to willy-nilly diversify their sources of external assistance—economic, military and technological so as to reduce the impact of manipulative strings. Such designs could be successfully translated into meaningful actions because the Super Powers too no longer regarded allegiance in pure numbers; it went beyond the mere physical compliance to the capture of the "minds of men." In the process, the instruments of their action were widened. Aid which was once available exclusively for the allies was extended to others as well.

The Soviet Union was the first to redefine its approach to the non-aligned nations. It extended its hand of friendship by providing techno-economic and military-diplomatic help almost unconditionally. India was the first and chosen one for Moscow's effusiveness. This was reciprocated by New Delhi's ready willingness to accept such aid, even though it invited in the

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process embarrassing aspersions being cast on non-alignment. But it came at a time when the West, the United States in particular, quibbled over India's needs even while strengthening its economic and military ties with Pakistan. The Soviet assistance was comprehensive and emphasised the role in economic development of the strategic sectors—defence, heavy industry and petroleum—which enabled India to go ahead with its policy of creating a "socialistic pattern of society" where the state controlled the "commanding heights of the economy." Moscow clearly indicated that in keeping with its newly fashioned approach of "peaceful co-existence," its strategy vis-a-vis the non-aligned nations was to "live and let live."

This approach, while it fetched large dividends for the Soviet Union was also a great morale booster for, and a clear recognition, of non-alignment as a foreign policy approach. More importantly, it compelled in the process the Western nations to reflect and reformulate the basis of their relationship with the non-aligned nations? so as to ensure that the final tally would not be totally in favour of the left-bloc nations, even though the Cold War had been losing by then its momentum. Through the latter half of the fifties to around the mid-sixties the world witnessed both Super Powers vigorously vying with each other to extend full-scale economic support to the non-aligned countries. It is this sudden phenomenon that led political analysts to erroneously equate non-alignment with bi-alignment.8

With the emergence of *detente* and multi-polarity, several observers of international affairs visualized no role or only a diminished role for non-alignment. But the fact remains that *detente* covered only select aspects of international relations, for, at the strategic level, especially the nuclear, the Super Powers continued to be at the apex. Whilst there was a relative lowering of tensions and a broad agreement between Washington and Moscow *vis-a-vis* their role towards the underdeveloped Third World countries, the basic antagonism, mutual distrust and rivalry continued to be the operative factors of international politics.

The non-aligned also recognized that a shift in their own perceptions of international politics was urgently needed. Colonialism, the issue which mattered most at a time, had ceased to be the highest common factor of the movement. Economic issues such as the inequalities between nations and within nations calling for a more equitable distribution of scarce global and domestic resources occupied the centre-stage of their thinking. In this context, neither the United States nor the USSR were able to hold any attraction for the Third World countries for extended time-periods. This resulted in a significant development, viz., the institutionalization of non-alignment with India, Yugoslavia and Egypt pledging to follow "a collective approach to the economic challenges to non-alignment and peaceful co-existence." Efforts were made to expand the area of mutual cooperation: increase trade exchanges among themselves, pool technical and scientific experience and undertake joint endeavours to develop mutually

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nd lly beneficial patterns of trade and development.¹¹ The emphasis of non-alignment was slowly but steadily moving away from the dominant East-West divide of international relations to a possible North-South dialogue.

The growing awareness of their potential, indicating the objectives and policy parameters, were forcefully reiterated in the resolutions at the Fourth Summit of the Non-aligned Countries held at Algiers in September 1973. 12 The oil crisis of October 1973 and the related repercussions in international relations that immediately followed gave the developing-cum-non-aligned world the much-needed shot in the arm. It had shown that through a unity of purpose it was possible for the developing nations to cause some shift of real resources and strategic needs from the developed countries of the West. This was further heightened by the Declaration of the principle for a New International Economic Order adopted at the United Nations Special Session of Raw Materials in May 1974. 13

However, later developments and a more introspective and objective analysis would indicate that any slip in the emergent balance of power that was predicted in the early 1970's was only superficial, not even temporary. The reasons for this state of affairs are several, and though simple, are often overlooked. While the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the financial nerve-centre of the non-aligned, is the world's major source of crude oil and oil products, the Super Powers still continue to control the political power centres very much in their favour. This is facilitated by the fact that as of now the USSR is self-sufficient in energy sources while the United States and its allies could step up (i) conservation measures, (ii) offshore oil and reserves, and (iii) successfully scout around for alternative sources of energy thereby reducing their dependence on imported OPEC oil. There are also additional reasons for the continued dominance of the advanced industrial nations. These are (i) the accumulation of vast petrodollar resources through OPEC deposits in Western banks or of OPEC's investments in the Western financial and capital markets, (ii) the continuance of international trade patterns in favour of the North and against the resource-exporting Third World countries, and (iii) the desire to have technologically superior armaments from the West on the part of the non-aligned, and in particular by the OPEC members resulting in the trade in arms becoming an important lever in favour of the West.

Even as detente and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) have constituted broad and flexible parameters of intra-Super Power relationship, nothing has prevented the Super Powers from actively pursuing their desired objectives by encouraging the growth of "surrogate powers" or satellites in various regions of the world. This was clearly contradictory to their mutually agreed understanding of aligning their foreign policy approaches with the Third World aspirations. But this was in reality so, because it suited the Super Powers to overlook this fact since either Super Power wanted to deal with the other from a position of strength and continuously try to correct imbalances by manipulating local issues and by deploying their military

strength and missiles in various regions. The events in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the subsequent American plans for South West Asia are excellent pointers in this regard.

More pertinently, the contemporary realities do not leave much choice for the developing countries other than continuing to adhere to non-alignment. For, neither the affluent nations of the West nor the Soviet bloc would want to treat them as their allies, even vaguely assuming that the latter would be keen to join the alliance systems. Similarly, the efforts of the developing nations to avail of concessions in trade at GATT or to improve the volume of trade through the mechanisms evolved at both GATT and UNCTAD indicate that the affluent nations do not give in where their own commercial interests are involved. In addition, the West and East European Communist nations have their own regional groupings mainly for the purpose of trade. This has resulted in the present decade—ironically enough, described as the Third Development Decade (DD III)-for "development" to be lopsided. Proof of this is found when 100 of the 157 nations face hunger, disease and illiteracy. Yet, the market-oriented industrialized countries of the North account for 96 per cent of the world's spending on R & D-51 per cent of which is earmarked for defence with less than 1 per cent being devoted for tackling the problems of the South. More importantly, the nuclear programmes keep escalating, being indulged in by only 25 per cent of the world's population merely because they are singularly blessed with 80 per cent of the world's wealth.

It appears from all accounts that the decade of the eighties will witness the critical relationship between poverty and economic growth and between economic growth and arms growth interacting. The principal victims in this extremely disparate and highly unequal multi-polar confrontation would be the nations that continue to be below the poverty line.¹⁴

Yet, as the world moves on, the military-strategic equilibrium superimposed by the geo-political equations seems to claim the dominant place. As a consequence, regional balances, whether they are in Asia, Africa, Latin America or even Europe have become sensitive and precarious since the paramountcy of the Super Powers is only abridged and not wholly dislodged.

In these circumstances, non-alignment has a vital role to play. Rather than dangerously oversimplify and indulge in esoteric policy-modelling, the non-aligned should "en masse" work out a policy frame that will enhance their credibility and effectiveness based on realistic assumptions as also reliable inputs of information. They must impress the "haves" of the North that although in the past the use of aid was characterised by waste, incompetence and failure, there are still large funds that could be tapped and given, not merely on a monetary basis but also on a more humane and massive scale. The non-aligned must also call for a geographical and sectoral shifts in the lending pattern of the developed countries. Geographically, the shift should occur from the time-honoured second world countries and

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ind oral lly, the top Third World countries to nations which in the past have received least assistance or nothing at all. Sectorally, the lending patterns should move away from industrial infrastructure programmes to service programmes such as education, housing and health, to agriculture. The non-aligned on their own part need to skilfully bring to the notice of the developed world that its prosperity is accounted for by the developing countries almost to the tune of 50 per cent by their exports of a bulk of essential raw materials such as tin, natural rubber, manganese, tungsten, cobalt and of course oil. Against this the finding of a recent World Bank study predicts that trade in the traditionally manufactured goods would expand at double the rate of expansion in world output. If so, it is obligatory on the part of developed countries to effect equivalent portions of the surplus money from such trade to flow back directly or indirectly to the developing nations, along with the transfer of appropriate technologies from the developed countries.

II INDIA'S ROLE

This scenario calls for dynamism in India's approach to the practice of non-alignment. This is not merely because it has been the historical fact of being the pioneer of non-alignment, a special and responsible role to play but also by virtue of its present position as a "middle power" the ability to inject fresh blood into the Non-aligned Movement. India's economic progress and its potential clearly precludes it from either a client status or from eccupying a back-seat in the world. Politically and socially aware and economically and technologically better placed, it must accelerate its own contribution—financial, technical and manpower—to its less fortunate colleagues in the movement. This would in the process provide a link between the technologically advanced nations and the developing nations of the South. It is only when India fulfils these requirements that its contribution to the success of non-alignment would be complete.

Doubts are frequently raised regarding New Delhi's non-aligned credentials. The fact however remains that India has consistently refused to be a member of either a bilateral or multilateral security arrangement. Equally important is the fact that it has been moderate rather than extremist, deliberate rather than hasty, restrained rather than provocative and pacifist rather than war-like in approach to external affairs. As such India need not be unduly apologetic for whatever minor aberrations there are in its foreign policy; non-alignment should also serve its interests not that it alone should serve the cause of the non-aligned!

The motifs that were instrumental in India's choice of non-alignment continue to be as valid today as they were in the years that have gone by. If anything, the uncertain international scenario with its attendant implications for the sub-continent only reinforce the validity of non-alignment

for India. In this regard, it may be recalled that in the beginning of the 1970s a rearmed Pakistan with assured support from the United States and China felt encouraged to fight the Bangladesh War. The scenario for the 1980s, notwithstanding the Simla Agreement of 1972, appears at the moment somewhat similar to that of the early seventies. Pakistan is once again being equipped with the latest weaponry apparently to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union across the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders. And Pakistan's entry into the nuclear club from all accounts appears to be only a matter of time. In addition, Sino-US relations have grown from strength to strength. The United States it appears, is more keen in continuing to use in the coming years, its China card and to bestow on China "the most favoured nation status." Besides having extensive technological, military and economicco-operation, United States is in the process of effecting the sale of military (nuclear?) related technology to China, ensuring in the process a Sino-American quasi alliance. Still nearer home, it has been mentioned that the United States is negotiating with Bangladesh to have a naval base at Chittagong.16

Massive arms transfers characterize US relations with strategically situated West Asian countries-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Oman. Escalating military build-up, almost assuming interventionist postures by both the Super Powers, in the Indian Ocean is another worrying development. The Soviet Union is additionally guilty of being increasingly hostile, with its bases in South Yemen and Ethiopia apart from the several floating anchorages in the Indian Ocean Zone. The Russian influence, direct or indirect in Angola, Mazambique, Madagascar and more recently in Mauritius, has been pervasive. Proxy presence, surrogate authority and the principle of accommodation by offering "carrots" have become standard practices of the Super Powers to pursue their own ends. All these indicate that even if there are minor opportunities for intrusion they would be seized either by the Soviet Union or by China and/or the United States, thereby affecting the power configuration in the region. It also indicates that once one Super Power occupies an area, there is very little the other can do to dislodge the occupant apart from condemning and imposing economic sanctions. The current scene also suggests that however much goodwill New Delhi is able to generate towards the Super Powers, it cannot decisively influence the course of action already chartered by them. In other words, there are definite limitations with reference to the role that moral influence can exert vis-a-vis the Super Powers, especially if that influence is exercised by a single nonaligned country.17 The situations obviously call for unified and concerted action on the part of the non-aligned to see that no Super Power makes inroads into any country's territories either openly or discreetly by way of

The situation in the decade of the eighties has serious implications for India's foreign policy planners. Non-alignment if it has to be effective, must be backed by an adequate defence which in the contemporary world clearly

implies the acquisition of nuclear capabilities if not weaponry. Not to acquire that would weaken non-alignment since India would have to continue to rely on other nuclear nations for its protection. India's final decision on nuclear options would have to be based on the desire to strengthen non-alignment in the context of the nuclear developments in Pakistan, Taiwan and South Africa; China's fast developing second strike capability and the vertical proliferation indulged in by the recognized nuclear powers. In the meanwhile India will have to modernize its defence forces by securing arms and equipments from whatever possible source.

The last point merits some detailed examination because of India's experience; it has almost always first approached the West to fulfill its defence requirements but soon faced problems in this regard leaving no option other than having to rely on the Soviet Union. Now with only Pakistan as a buffer between India and the Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, the help that seems forthcoming from the United States seems minimal. In fact, the latter has indicated where its sympathy would lie in the event of a war in the sub-continent. The Soviet Union's words and deeds on the other hand have so far stood out in sharp contrast. Yet, India would like to diversify its sources of military assistance—a factor which can be best facilitated by pursuing non-alignment. Non-alignment in the 1980s is therefore likely to be characterized by the development of "core relationship" in which the security aspect would dominate.

However, security is a far more comprehensive subject to include the economic dimensions such as trade and transfer of technology apart from the military and political features. In terms of volume of trade, the West's contribution to that of the world is substantial, and intra-Western trade is also significantly high. Technologically, the West and Japan are far superior, especially in the fields of electronics and energy. Even India with its large and well-trained scientific personnel cannot be totally oblivious of the need to absorb the latest Western technologies. A foreign policy that could facilitate such a link is *prima facie* non-alignment.

Dependence need not necessarily be one-sided. It is in the interests of the developed nations to cultivate the non-aligned countries of the South so long as a large number of the latter are the suppliers of strategic primary commodities and also dot the waterways through which the flow of oil is maintained. Undoubtedly, while both the oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979 indicated that the West wriggled out of the uncomfortable situations with not much adverse effects on their economies and polity, the non-oil producing underdeveloped economies were nearly crippled, a situation which, if it were to occur again, cannot fail to have serious international repercussions. To protect the non-oil developing economies' interests, the West suould co-opt and accommodate non-aligned India which can in turn serve as a trustworthy conduit between the developed nations and the remaining nations of the world

Non-alignment alone can thus in the current framework of unequal global

power structure ensure a working relationship with both the Super Powers. But to be successful it is imperative that the non-aligned nations resolve their internal conflicts through negotiations and reasoning leaving no room whatsoever for the interventionist Super Powers to wedge themselves in. This sounds distant but can be achieved through, for instance, regionalisation of development finance, institutions and organizations for training as also the adaptation of appropriate technologies. More important is the need for providing softer and concessional terms to the poorest among the nonaligned. India without hesitation must give unconditional and substantial help. India's role, compulsorily one of leadership and dynamism, is imperative for the survival of non-alignment.

To wit, the challenges are many, the prospects grim, the time short, yet the need for non-alignment is enormous. Its continued relevance is best epitomised in the words of its founder-member, Jawaharlal Nehru, "if you give it up, there is no other policy for (the non-aligned) to adopt with the slightest advantage."20

January 1983.

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1 The designation "le tiers monde" includes the developing, underdeveloped and undeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, but excludes China, Japan and Asiatic Russia.

2 Algeria's former Prime Minister Ben Bella said: "We are aligned with nobody, not even non-alignment." Cited in M.S. Rajan, Non-alignment: India and the Future,

University of Mysore (Mysore, 1970), p. 15.

3 In an interview to the Ceylon Daily News (Colombo), Nehru said: "When there is a substantial difference in the strength of the two opposing forces, we in Asia with our limitations will not be able to influence the issue. But when the forces are fairly evenly matched, then it is possible to make our weight felt in the balance." See Times of India (Bombay), 2 April 1954.

4 However, it is the Colombo proposals submitted by non-aligned Sri Lanka, Burma, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia and Egypt, that formed the bed-rock of negotiations in the Sino-Indian border talks even as late as May 1982, almost two decades after the

1962 Border War.

5 The Iran-Iraq War indicates the limitations of non-aligned diplomacy when socioreligious extremism rather than politico-military questions are the issues at stake.

6 The West, particularly the United States, it appears, were extremely doubtful. But this was because the United States wrongly equated state enterprise with public enterprise and refused to concede the rationale which prompted most developing nations to opt for state enterprises. In reality, it can be argued that what the democratic West detested was the bureaucratic enterprise bound by inefficiencies and corruption and not state enterprises per se.

7 For detailed American assistance to non-aligned India during the Nehru period, see Parvathi Vasudevan, "Non-alignment and Indo-American Economic Relations: the Nehru Era," Indian Journal of American Studies Vol. 11, no. 1, January 1981.

8 See Frank Moraes, "Is Non-alignment Changing?," Indian Express (Bombay), 7 July 1969, and Selig Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbours," Foreign Affairs,

- 9 Compare the resolutions and speeches made by the various delegates to the First Non-aligned Summit held at Belgrade in September 1961, cited in Special Documentation Supplement to No. 464-65 of Review of International Affairs (Beograd), to those of the Second Non-aligned Summit held at Cairo in October 1964 and cited in Review of International Affairs (Beograd), November, 1964.
- 10 Alvin Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Non-aligned World, (Princeton, 1970), p. 217.
- 11 Ibid.

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- 13 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI) 9 May 1979, containing the demands in the form of a declaration on the establishment of a NIEO and 3202 (S-VI) 16 May 1974, containing the Programme of Action for the Establishment of the New Order.
- 14 According to the World Bank President, A.W. Clausen, the world is faced with at least 8 poles-four of these are accounted by centres of high industrialization, viz., West Europe, North America, Japan and Eastern Europe; the fifth by the capital surplus oil-exporting West Asian Countries, the sixth by the newly industrialising countries such as Korea, Malaysia, Brazil and Mexico, the seventh by the populous countries such as China, Indonesia, India and Pakistan, and the eight by the poverty-stricken countries of sub-Saharan Africa. While the first four are fairly well above the poveriy line, large sections of the population of the latter four poles are generally well below it. World Bank Press Release, 13 January 1982.
- 15 India in 1947 was described by Lord Mountbatten as a "ship on fire with ammunition in the hold." As of today India ranks 13th in industrial output and is the world's 9th largest economy by virtue of its over \$ 100 billion GNP. India's science and technology potential puts it within the world's top ten, its "visiting card" left at the nuclear club in May 1974 reflects only the tip of its nuclear scientific capacity. Militarily, while only 3 per cent of its GNP is earmarked it has the world's third largest standing army, fifth largest air force and eighth largest navy. India's defence establishments produce a range of items, from small arms to sophisticated support electronic items, anti-tank, antiaircraft and naval missiles, subsonic and supersonic planes too. Except for submarines and nuclear defence systems, India's efforts are comparable to China's capacity. India plans to be self-reliant by 1985. Further, among the Third World nations, India has produced highly trained and experienced diplomatic negotiators capable of dealing with even the most highly technical and complex legal issues of present-day diplomacy, from the Law of the Seas to Nuclear Control. There is, however, a very important rider for India to adhere to in order to continue to maintain the position, i.e., a total and stringent check on its population. See John W. Mellor (Ed), India: A Rising Middle Power (Colorado, 1979).
- 16 Lok Sabha Debates (New Delhi), 18 December 1981.
- 17 Parvathi Vasudevan, "The Afghan Crisis and Superpower Strategies: Implications for India's Foreign Policy," India Quarterly (New Delhi), Vol. 36, nos. 3 & 4, July-December 1980, pp. 285-295.
- 18 Beginning with 1959 the Soviet Union stepped up its defence assistance to India. In that year, the Soviet Union sold to the Border Roads Development Board AN-12 aircrafts and Mi-4 helicopters. In August 1962, India entered into an agreement whereby it would receive the MIG 21 aircrafts along with transfer of technology. This was in fact denied even to a fellow socialist country, viz., China, by the Soviet Union. In 1963, the Soviet Union agreed to supply surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and also stepped up the 1959 Agreement. In 1964, the then Defence Minister concluded an agreement that helped India acquire tanks. The Soviets also eased the burden of repayment by extending the five-year credit to ten years. In 1965, the Indian Navy was helped modernise by selling to it submarines, frigates and other miscellaneous vessels. In 1966, the Soviet Union helped the Indian Air Force by selling it fighter bombers. The army purchased T-55 medium tanks, 100mm. artillery, mobile radars etc. and the Navy acquired missile

boats and naval helicopters. As of now, the Soviet Union has ensured the production of MIG 25 domestically, as also to service all the aircrafts in India rather than have them sent to the Soviet Union. Indo-Soviet defence relations are clearly heightened by a "mutuality of strategic interests." See K. Subrahmanyam, in S.D. Sharma (Ed), Studies in Indo-Soviet Co-operation (New Delhi, 1981).

19 In fact, the New International Development Strategy for the 1980s and beyond, as suggested and agreed upon by the United Nations General Assembly (1979), specifies the following: national self-reliance in the Third World; demilitraization; increased share of Third World countries over food technology, energy resources; restructuring of international framework for trade; monetary and financial co-operation based on consultation and decision-making and regulation of the activities of transnational corporations. See UN General Assembly 34th Session, A/34/467.

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INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES

By the time that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Reagan met in Washington in August of this year, it was almost embarrassingly clear that they had reassessed their country's position vis-a-vis each other and the world—a reassessment that has led the two leaders to view each other in an altogether different light than was ever before apparent. There was every indication that both Gandhi and Reagan were making a concerted effort to bring new warmth to the US-Indian relationship—a relationship that has been languishing for more than a decade since President Nixon's 1971 "tilt" towards Pakistan and his unsuccessful attempt to use American naval forces to prevent India from separating Bangladesh from Pakistan.

The Reagan Administration has come to realize that by continuing a policy of indifference towards India, the United States could be on the verge of losing a very vital, if not lately recognized, thread in the tapestry of United States security interests. In terms of those interests, India is demographically and economically the most important state in the area of the Indian Ocean.

In an almost synchronous fashion, Indira Gandhi has also understood that India's non-aligned status was coming to be viewed by the world community as tilting more and more toward the Soviet Union—a view that could only lessen India's credibility among Third World nations and undermine the stability that it brings to the region.

Indo-American relations have always been extremely complex, despite some superficial goodwill from time to time between the two nations. That which has been at the crux of their incompatibility over the years has always been readily identifiable, but so many-faceted as to hinder the development of a truly amicable relationship. As almost everything in the world of people and politics, it boils down to a matter of perception and the inability or unwillingness of the leaders of the two largest democracies to view the world through each others eyes—the result being a kind of tunnel vision on both sides, devoid of insight and understanding into each others past experiences, national interests, philosophical approach, and national and international goals.

While obvious substantive differences in perception will undoubtedly remain a permanent fixture of the US-Indian relationship, the Reagan and Gandhi meeting in Washington was, nevertheless, based on a new awareness, i.e., that the more carefully they examine their own interests, the more advantageous it would be to be on good terms with each other.¹

CHANGING PERSPECTIVES

United State's Need for India

Reagan has become cognizant of the fact that the United States cannot

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single-handedly safeguard the entire world from the threat of Soviet adventurism. And, even if it were willing to, the area of South Asia would undoubtedly be the last place where the United States would even be able to amass American troops in any decisive number. Further, Reagan realizes that the United States does need India, the only stable power in the area with an independent capability in the strategic regions east of Israel and the Persian Gulf. The ramifications of a weak, divided, or Soviet-aligned India are mind-boggling when considering United States security interests in the area.²

India Aspires For Balanced Relationship with Super Powers

For her part, Indira Gandhi has become cognizant of the fact that India can pursue non-alignment—the cornerstone of Indian foreign policy since independence—only if the United States and the Soviet Union counterbalance each other strategically and regionally. On several occasions during her visit, Mrs. Gandhi indicated her country's desire to move towards a more balanced relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union. She also reiterated that India is not a satellite of the Soviet Union.

One indication of Gandhi playing down India's Soviet relationship is that India has begun diversifying its arms supplies. The Indian Prime Minister indicated for the first time during her visit that, she would be willing to accept a limited amount of weapons from the United States, though India did not go to the United States seeking a military alliance or a massive supply of arms. Diversification moves India another step away from the Soviet Union and comes despite an incredibly generous arms deal offer by the Soviets.

If one had to pinpoint the ideological framework upon which Reagan foreign policy decisions affecting India are based, it would probably be akin to "containment." The protection of American interests, the halting of Soviet expansion, and the regaining of military supremacy over the Soviet Union through massive rearmament programmes constitute the more salient features of Reagan's foreign policy guidelines.

Former Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, in his 19 March 1981 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated "that the Reagan Administration's Middle Eastern policy would centre around the development of the "strategic consensus" to oppose the Soviet Union in an area extending from Pakistan to Egypt, and including Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia."

DIFFERING REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

The security interests of the United States and India meet head-on in Southern Asia and differ drastically. The United States views security relationships in the region from a global perspective while India's perception of

the area emanates from a regional and national security stand-point. The result is a very basic and fundamental strategic conflict of interest. Nothing more clearly illustrates the two nations' incongruous assessment of security concerns in the region than the issue of Pakistan.

Pakistan as a Factor

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After World War II, United States' policy towards the Indian sub-continent contained an element of partiality favouring Pakistan. Reasons for this were obvious. During the Cold War era, the United States' desire to cultivate a close friendship with India had failed. Nehru's adamant adherence to neutrality and non-alignment irked the United States and what was viewed as a pro-communist India was denounced by the West. The United States search for an ally in the region led them to Pakistan.

With the Russian invasion into Afghanistan in 1979, come new incentives to protect regions of the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent from further Russian exploitation and expansion. The invasion, "...gave regional Security considerations a prominence unmatched since 1975." On the subcontinent, these intensified security considerations produced yet new links with Pakistan in the form of military and economic aid.

The Reagan Administration's strategy to contain Soviet adventurism is a fairly straightforward one of providing military and economic support to any country willing to join it in its efforts to counter Soviet influence. Within this context, it announced a \$3.18 billion arms and economic aid to Pakistan in 1981. The arms package proposed the sale of forty long-range F16 fighter bombers to Pakistan, the most modern, sensitive radar, as well as other military equipment including missiles, tanks, helicopters, howitzers, and armed personnel carriers. The rationale behind this sale of US top-of-the-line military equipment is, to give Pakistan the ability to handle "a range of limited cross-border threats from Soviet or Soviet-backed Afghan forces," and, by aligning the United States with Pakistan, "to keep the Soviets from thinking they can coerce, subvert or intimidate Pakistan with impunity." 10

Despite strong protests from India that massive arms sales to Pakistan would endanger Indian security, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, expressed the view that the arming of Pakistan "was neither an actual or intended threat to India." Speaking in New Delhi, she stated:

What you call rearming your neighbours in a fashion that imposes a new arms race on the sub-continent, we call helping Pakistan to have some confidence as it confronts the problems of refugees and the Soviet presence on its own border. 12

India's Sense of Vulnerability to Pakistan

Though members of the Reagan Administration may be dismayed by India's continued sense of vulnerability to Pakistan, they are nevertheless aware, that to India the threat is a very real one. And, this remains true despite the fact that India's military strength, since the last Indo-Pakistan war, has grown dramatically and that its large scale arms purchases and growth of military establishment have made it the fourth largest military

power in the world.18

India is forced to draw from its past; since the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars. During this period, the United States has consistently armed Pakistan and ignored India. Despite US assurances to India that weapons supplied to Pakistan would not be used against it, its only action after the Bangladesh war broke out was to institute an embargo against further arms shipments to Pakistan. And with this most recent sale of US arms to Pakistan, New Delhi is unaware of any restrictions placed on Pakistan in terms of which direction the arms can be fired. India claims that it presently has nothing in its arsenal to match the F-16s committed to Pakistan. Such advanced aircraft in the hands of its traditional adversary are perceived as posing a direct threat to Indian security. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the F-16's long-distance capacity enable it to be within range of every major industrial city, military installation, and nuclear facility in India.

Mrs. Gandhi is not receptive to the likelihood of an imminent confrontation between Pakistan and the Soviet Union or that United States military hardware in Pakistan will be utilized against Afghanistan. She perceives, that in all probability, India would be the target of these weapons regardless of whether or not that was the intent of the United States.¹⁵

While a stable Pakistan is envisaged as being advantageous to the security goals of both the United States and India, the best means by which this stability can be achieved is perceived differently in Washington and New Delhi. Most assuredly there is a consensus that Pakistan has the right to defend itself. And, the intent of United States arms to Pakistan is not one of destabilizing the area or creating security problems for India. 16

From the Indian perspective, a stable Pakistan can best be achieved on a more personal level of reconciliation, peaceful co-operation, and non-alignment. The Indian approach in which nations are signatory to no-war pacts or treaties of peaceful coexistence is perceived as carrying "...better chances of producing peace and stability than attempts by external major powers to maintain military balances between two states of unequal size and power potential."¹⁷

For India, American efforts to maintain military balance in the Third World between states with territorial or other political disputes tend to be both immoral and dangerous because they encourage arms race among

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nations that should be concentrating on economic development. In addition, these efforts make Third World nations dependent on great power military aid and political support in their regional struggle for security.¹⁸

Presently, serious efforts are being undertaken between India and Pakistan to realize a No-War-Pact. Earlier attempts were initiated to no avail by Prime Ministers Nehru and Shastri and date as far back as 1949. The current initiative to establish a pact of peaceful co-existence is promising if for no other reason than that, for the first time both India and Pakistan are devoting serious consideration to the possibility. 19

Whatever be the potential impact of arming Pakistan it is magnified considerably as Reagan continues to talk of the need to arm China as well. For India, this would mean encirclement by a Sino-Pakistan alliance drawing support from the United States.²⁰ From the reception Mrs. Gandhi received on her recent visit—the most elaborate of the Reagan Administration—and the cordiality of their talks, it is apparent that Reagan has come to recognize the foolhardiness of arming Pakistan and China without considering the impact of US relations with India. Clearly, the United States pursuance of security arrangements with Pakistan and China while ignoring India could only weaken India's role in the region and nudge it closer to the Sovieit Union.²¹

Reagan has thus begun to comprehend the feasibility and desirability of friendship and co-operation with both India and Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi reiterated several times during her visit that there was no reason for the United States not to pursue friendly bilateral relations with both countries, and that it was not necessary to befriend one to the exclusion of the other. This attitude, combined with Indo-Pakistan talks of no-war, may serve as a basis for an unprecedented trio of goodwill and co-operation between the United States, India, and Pakistan, much to the benefit of all.²²

Aside from heralding in a new chapter in United States-India relations, Gandhi's visit hoped to achieve an increase in multi-lateral aid, investments, science and technology. Though US co-operation in these areas will eventually be forthcoming, it was the settlement of the Tarapur nuclear fuel issue that provides the real proof that Reagan and Gandhi share a genuine desire for improved relations between their two countries.²³

NUCLEAR PERSPECTIVES

In August 1963, United States and India entered into a nuclear co-operation agreement to be effective for thirty years. Under the terms of this agreement, the two countries agreed to co-operate in the construction and operation of a civil atomic power station near Tarapur in Maharastra State in India. It was also agreed that, (i) the United States Atomic Energy Commission would sell to India all its requirements of enriched uranium for use as fuel at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, and (ii) that during the period

of the agreement, the United States would supply low enriched uranium to Tarapur.²⁴ Originally, the deliveries of nuclear fuel from the United States were to be made on demand. In 1978, however, the United States Congress by legislation made it mandatory for the purchasers of nuclear fuel supplies and components after September 1980, to accept more stringent safeguards including the opening up of all nuclear establishments for international inspection. For one reason or another, the shipment of United States fuel to Tarapur was repeatedly delayed. Eventually, when the delays in fuel supplies began causing serious problems in the running of the power station, the Indian Government sought assurances from the United States of uninterrupted and timely fuel supplies for the duration of the agreement. Informally, the United States gave India to understand that because of the 1978 legislation, continued fuel shipments would not be easily forthcoming.²⁵

The Reagan Administration's insistance that nations receiving American fuel shipments must confirm to the provisions of the United States Non-Proliferation Act is in complete accord with Reagan's Declaration of 17 July 1981, "that efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental foreign policy objective." Not surprisingly, the United States perceives nuclear proliferation to begin with India and that should India acquire nuclear weapons, then "Pakistan would both need and require the same. This would touch off a chain reaction to acquire nuclear capabilities around the world" Ironically, unless the United States designs its security arrangements with Pakistan with a great deal of care, the rearming of Pakistan may precipitate this very chain reaction. The more sophisticated the weaponry poured into Pakistan by the United States, the more likely the possibility that India would reactivate its nuclear weapons programme putting "Pakistan under nearly irresistable pressure to pursue the same route with great vigour." 28

It may be recalled that in the early sixties, shortly after China's first nuclear explosion, the Indian Government expressed interest in a deterrent to the development of nuclear weapons to be provided by the Super Powers. When this type of shield failed to materialize, India found reason to avoid limitations on its nuclear options. India's rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, "was the vehicle for maintaining a nuclear explosive option and honouring Nehru's teaching about resistance to external supervision." The United States hold on overdue fuel shipments to Tarapur was vigorously protested; the Government of India denounced it as "an unfair and coercive act that threatened India's economic health and denigrated India's long-standing opposition to nuclear weapons." 100 per powers.

Prior to Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the United States, the issue of American fuel to Tarapur seemed hopelessly deadlocked—Reagan seeking a settlement in line with the 1978 Non-Proliferation Treaty and India arguing that such domestic legislation could not be retroactively applied to and already ongoing and currently valid agreement, having the force of a treaty between the two nations.

As a result of discussions in New Delhi and Washington however, an agreement between Reagan and Mrs. Gandhi on the supply of nuclear fuel to Tarapur has been reached. While keeping the 1963 Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Co-operation between India and the United States intact in all other respects, the decision was reached that France, and not the United States, would henceforth supply all needed enriched uranium to the Tarapur plant. The supply of fuel to Tarapur from a country other than the United States is completely within the framework of the 1963 Accord. The solution worked out enables both the United States and India to survive this long-standing and serious rift. India has retained its own nuclear policy and has triumphed in its refusal to permit full-scope inspections, while the United States has the satisfaction of maintaining the sanctity of its non-proliferation legislation, despite India's failure to accept all of the safeguards outlined therein. The supply of nuclear policy and has triumphed in its refusal to permit full-scope inspections, while the United States has the satisfaction of maintaining the sanctity of its non-proliferation legislation, despite India's failure to accept all of the safeguards outlined therein.

Thus, the issues of Pakistan and Tarapur serve to demonstrate the fact that, both Reagan and Mrs. Gandhi have come to recognize that the interests of the United States and India converge. They also have come to realize that a policy of mutual co-operation, rather than benign neglect, should form the cornerstone of their future relationship. We should see more and more sensitivity on both sides with regard to policies that affect each other. Conflict would inevitably be there because the national interests of the two countries is so widely divergent. Nevertheless, there are strong new incentives for better understanding, appreciation and tolerance of each others position; every indication that an era of new perspectives has been ushered in.

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REFLECTION ON INDIA'S ENVIRONMENT POLICY

Political and scientific interest. The impact of technology has created an awareness for a clean environment and the need for maintaining harmony with nature. The policy therefore calls for an integrated inter-disciplinary approach to the environment. It involves a study of laws of nature and it seeks a relationship between national and international laws. Environment, according to the United Nations Declaration on Environment of 1972, gives man "physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social and spiritual growth." The Declaration further outlines the following goals: to attain "freedom in the world of nature;" to use "knowledge to build in collaboration with nature a better environment;" and to "defend and improve the human environment for the present and future generations...together with, and in harmony with the established and fundamental goals of peace and of worldwide economic and social development."²

Environment is the sum of social, biological, physical and chemical factors which comprise the surroundings of man. In the larger context, it includes the totality of cosmos of which the planet earth is a part. Our major concern in environment is however with the biosphere which supports life on earth.

Lack of discipline is the primary cause of the degradation of the environment. The attitude and actions of modern man towards environment have been one of exploitation. In modern times, economic exploitation of environment and dumping of waste has brought us into conflict with the laws of nature. Interference with the natural system have led to deterioration and instability of our environment. In the West, degradation is due to the stresses of over-development. In India, as in many other underdeveloped countries, problems of environment arise due to poverty and the consequently inadequate care devoted to the former. Added to this is the impact of a growing population; population creates greater demands on the environment and results in unplanned growth of towns and cities with adverse impact on all aspects. Failure to regulate the growth of population and human settlements would amount to lack of discipline. Rene Dubois and Barbara Ward point: ".... Is this not a precious home for all of us earthlings? Is it not worth our love? Does it not deserve all the inventiveness, courage and generosity of which we are capable to preserve it from degradation and destruction and, by doing so, to secure our own survival?"3

It would appear that with greater demands on our environment we need to develop an attitude which would provide, apart from economic moral, spiritual and physical growth. What we need then is an ecological thinking on all aspects of our national life; rapid changes in environment over the last several years has created an imperative need for man to develop an ecological understanding. Again Dubois points, "While the homo sapien has remained essentially the same from the genetic point of view, the

manifestations of his life and the structure of his societies are endlessly

changing."4

Therefore the problem of environment in India is a part of contemporary history and concerns evolution of man and society. Evolution, as stated by Julian Huxley, has entered the psycho-social phase which is based on accumulation of knowledge and organization of experience.⁵ "Evolution in this phase," he says, "is mainly cultural, not genetic; it is no longer focused solely on survival but is increasingly directed towards fulfilment and towards quality of achievement." 6

The question then is, how far and to what extent shall we permit changes in environment? What kind of evolution of our civilization will result with these changes? These questions are as important for a debate in India as elsewhere in the world.

Environment policy in India should thus take an integrative view of changes and the overall psycho-social development of man. An action-oriented scientific response is needed to stop the deterioration of the environment. It is often possible to improve an environment without unduly disturbing the ecological balance. For this purpose, manmade laws should be carefully analyzed so that there is no conflict with nature's laws.

Fortunately there is a world-wide environment consciousness to safeguard it. The presence of 133 nations in the United Nations Conference on Environment in 1972 highlighted this concern of mankind. Because of this consciousness, the world is fast moving towards international co-operation in this field. There is common concern between sovereign nations who comprehend the interdependence between the biosphere and technosphere. A new set of human values are emerging out of such awareness. Environment is now being viewed as a unified whole with nations as parts thereof.

NEED FOR A UNIFIED VIEW OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

To have a framework for environmental policy, it is essential to understand the unity and diversity of laws which govern nature's processes as well as human and social constraints. The essence of relationship between various components of environment is between the laws of nature and laws of society, their interdependence and, under best of circumstances their unity. In that sense environment is a continuous global entity which needs a unified view for observation and analysis There are diverse characteristics of environment in various geographical and ecological situations. For this purpose environment policy has to be diversified to meet local ecological requirements. Thus while we view environment policy as an unified analytical while, we also see the parts in the whole. This conception of environment policy is necessary if we wish to understand the relationship of nature's processes, to achieve the goals of environment policy and ecological balance.

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Einstein and Tagore have expressed unified views of nature's processes and their close linkage with the social processes. Lecturing at Harvard University in 1913, Tagore reiterated the fact of unbreakable continuity in physical laws of nature.

This principle of unity is the mystery of all mysteries. The existence of a duality at once raises a question in our minds, and we seek its solution in the One. When at last we find a relation between these two, and thereby see them as one in essence, we feel that we have come to the truth.

Again referring to the feeling of mystery needed to grasp the unity in nature and law he says:

Curiously enough there are men who lose that feeling of mystery, which is at the root of all our delights, when they discover the uniformity of law among the diversity of nature. As if gravitation is not more of a mystery than the fall of an apple, as if evolution from one scale of being to the other is not something which is even more shy of explanation than a succession of creation.⁸

The Indian environment is a part of and not separate from the global environment. Any national environmental policy would thus unavoidably be linked with the international policies and gloable situations. India's environment policy should thus be structured to take into account a unified view of the global environment. At the same time, the policy should meet requirements of the diversity of geographical areas and ecological regions, keeping harmony, rhythm and equilibrium with the whole gamut of environmental situations in the country.

INDIA'S ENVIRONMENT POLICY

Historical Perspective

Man's predominant attitude in the past has been harmony with the natural order. Laws of Manu, the Dharma Shastras and the Upanishads reflect this desire for harmony. In ancient India, writes Tagore, the forest and natural life gave a particular direction to man's living. Man was "in constant contact with the living growth of nature." He realised the "harmony between man' spirit and the spirit of the world;" he enlarged his consciousness by growing with his surroundings. Indeed this harmony between the spirit of man and that of nature promoted a peaceful and better kind of adaptation to the environment. The psycho-social adaptation from which stems the nature of man was of greater significance than the biological adaptation. As Rene Dubois explains: "In the final analysis not physical fitness to environmental conditions, nor comfort of body, nor even survival of the

human species suffice to encompass the richness of man's nature. Herein lies the inad quacy of the purely biological view of adaptation." Swami Vivekananda, a thinker and seer of India, makes a reference to the spiritual content of psycho-social adaption which is a richer form than other forms of adaptations. He says: "The lower types of humanity in all nations find pleasure in the resources while the cultured and the educated find it in thought, in philosophy, in arts and sciences. Spirituality is a still higher plane." 12

In ancient India then, man was concerned with the totality of existence.¹² To attain the goal of freedom and happiness, life was seen in unity with the eternal.¹³ In the modern context, Richard Falk of Princeton University proposes that "the creation of a new system of world order must draw its animating vision from the long and widespread affirmation that all men are part of a single human family."¹⁴ He, in fact, makes a strong plea for emulating the values of people in ancient India in relation to the environment.

Harmony with nature has been the predominant trait in the history of medieval India and in the Mughal times. The remarkable development of art and architecture in the latter period reflects harmony with nature. "It was a happy mingling of Muslim and Hindu art, traditions and elements," say some noted historians.¹⁵

Population Control Imperative for Any Future Policy

Population, human settlement, transportation, energy, resources and development are some important parameters that have a direct and indirect bearing on India's environment policy. Indeed these parameters have a common interrelationship and bearing on the overall policy. Increase or decrease in population has a resultant impact on human settlement, which in turn further affects energyuse and transportation systems needed for resource exploitation and economic development. It is like a cycle in nature and we have to take an overall view to maintain the ecological balance. More human population means more living organisms including indirectly their food which again involves growth of living organism of plants and animals. It has been estimated that the earth can support more than 30 billion people at almost starvation level of subsistence.16 What then would be the impact of increase of randomnest on environments and even on world climatology? For such reasons the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has advocated harmony between society and nature for the long-term survival of mankind.17,

We must also note the direct and indirect impact of population on environment leading to environmental stresses due to air and water pollution and degradation of land areas. We cannot ignore, at the same time, the visual pollution of nature and of cities and towns in India. Bertrand Russell emphasized the point of visual pollution stating that visiting places after

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an interval of some years showed the great deal of visual pollution and loss of scenery. 18

As we know in India population doubles every 25 to 30 years. The environmental stresses would thus also double if the population used per capita food and resources at the same level. However the demands on nature more than double as energy and resource uses per capita increase. For maintaining a better environment, control of population thus is an immediate national task. It would be easier to develop greater harmony between man and nature if more of nature is free from the impact of technology to absorb the impact of human activities.

The people of India have happily a great sense of partnership with nature. This instinct of harmony is important for formulating the environment policy of India. It may be fruitfully utilized in planning human settlements, transportation and energy requirements. Improvement in village settlements will keep better harmony with nature than planning urban settlements in look-a-like colonies. Transportation systems should include short-run systems used in villages in India, including bullock-carts and horses, as that would also avoid dependence on oil.

About thirty years ago, people in India travelled very little keeping themselves in specific geographical areas which were ecologically sound and which they loved. It is worthwhile to remind ourselves today of that philosophy. Rene Dubois, a leading biologist and one concerned with the problems of global ecology and human settlements, says that while visiting places "I remember the mood of places better than their precise features, because places evoke for me life situations rather than geographical sites."19 Indeed sometimes the disharmony of man with environment in modern times can be traced to too much movement and lack of intimate relationship with a certain geographical area. Relationship of population to habitat has been called a question of balance.20 Less population, less movement of people, and less technology for resource exploitation, would maintain this balance of nature better. Therefore economic development and population are seen more scientifically in ecological terms as indeed ecology has been described as an extension of economics.21 An ecological interpretation of economics is sustainable in terms of the laws of nature. These natural laws do not depend merely on concepts of exchange value or growth rate. In India particularly, an ecological outlook on economics and development is as opportune as it is scientific. Such an outlook can be in accord with human expectations.

The Club of Rome Report for the year 2000 states that we may have 7 billion people in the world by then, and if we strive for per capita GNP as high as in the United States the load on environment alone would be 10 times its present value.²² Such a level of environmental stress according to current indications may not be sustainable. In view of this, the Club of Rome suggests that economic growth should be limited. A need-based economy in India would enable a good distribution system as that would

help a useful balance with nature. Skilful uses of resources, recycling, conservation of resources and a philosophy of living which is part of our ethos and ancient culture, should enable us formulate an environment policy which ensures harmony and happiness.

Environmental Laws and Design for an Environmental Policy Act

Environment being an interrelated subject, as we have seen, laws are needed to safeguard and protect natural environments. The Constitution of India provides for environment rights and duties. It has also provided for enactment of legislation on environmental subjects. The central, state, and concurrent list of subjects on which legislation is made by the Parliament or state legislatures, have many subjects which would attract environmental concern. Some of these subjects in the state list are: noise control, land improvement, irrigation, town planning, slum clearance, housing schemes, pest control, smoke control, water pollution, forests, wild-life and recreation, etc. Already there are laws in many states on these subjects.

Many subjects of common interest to states and of national interest have central enactments, as for example, in the case of the Pesticide Act of 1968, Wild Life Act of 1972, Water Pollution Control Act of 1974 and the Prevention of Air Pollution and Control Act 1981. Other subjects of environmental interest in the central list of subjects are: regulation of industries in public interest, safety in mines, inter-state rivers, fishing, etc. Population control also calls for state and central enactments.

To be able to provide for an enactment of a general nature which would ensure maintenance of a wholesome human environment and which would provide for general policy objectives needed to safeguard and improve environments, an Environmental Policy Act is needed as has been drafted in some countries. Such an Act would provide for maintaining harmony with nature while making plans for social and economic development. It would also ensure that environmental impact assessment is made of planning activities, especially those which tend to change the ecological balance in areas concerning irrigation, power, dam building, mining, water reservoirs, desertification, forest conservation, conservation of exhaustible resources, heritage of mankind, heavy industries, etc. The Act would in the ultimate provide for improvement of environment. It would above all provide for the pursuit of knowledge about environment with the background of the heritage of India, which as Tagore says, makes for realisation and not merely the economic exploitation of environment.23 Further, it would enable the pursuit of the cultural heritage of India which in the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan is "a living tradition (which) influences our inner faculties, harmonizes our nature and lifts us to a higher level."24 More than anything else, it would facilitate international co-operation in environmental matters.

It may be of some interest to note, that the Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in the United States has set out the following as its purposes; to

declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the nation, and to establish a Council on Environmenal Quality.²⁵

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion we submit that environmental policy should be formulated with a unified integrated view; the relationship of various natural processes be taken care of for improvement and maintenance of a wholesome human environment. A sound environment policy for India should be based on unity of global and national life, and in conformity with our cultural heritage. Harmony with nature is the cornerstone of this policy and one must exploit nature to the detriment or depletion of its resources on which our life support system critically depends. To understand the economics of ecosystems is therefore necessary. Gandhiji may be more relevant today except that the scales are different; instead of the impact of foreign cloth which he objected to, it may today be the impact of oil for which national planning is needed to reduce consumption. This would only be possible if we take a total view of a society living in ecological balance with its environment and plan our human settlements, transport communication and trade according to our ethos and energy reserves.

There should also be a selective application of technology; it should increase knowledge and enlighten man; it should help environment policy to provide a new vision of life in towns, villages and cities. Cities should provide some attributes of village life, and villages should adapt attractions of cities to reduce urbanization of the national landspace. Population control sould be taken on a national scale for, expansion of population is a great burden on the carrying capacity of our environments.

Laws and institutions have to take note of the major tenets of our policyof freedom, knowledge, development and harmony. The Environmental Policy Act when enacted should endeavour to promote the above goals of the environment policy.

Goethe has rightly said that "we must earn again for ourselves what we have inherited." It becomes therefore a duty for all to maintain nature's ecological balance and preserve the environmental heritage of mankind while we seek progress of man and society in partnership with nature.

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THE CONTROL OF OIL

A Review Article

I ROLE OF PERCEPTIONS

AT a time when we have come to believe that oil as a universal commodity is "unique" and so its price need not be determined by the same course of action that characterizes other commodities, John M. Blair, former Chief Economist for the Sub-committee on Anti-trust and Monopoly, comes to inform us in his book*, that what is unique about oil is not its exclusive potential as an energy source but rather the structure of the industry that controls its production and marketing. After exhaustive research, Blair, described by former Michigan State University President, Walter Adams, as the "incurably curious scholar and the incorruptible public servant," concludes:

Through observance of complex formulae and mechanisms, production can be curtailed, variations in price eliminated, and competition substantially lessened without the need for collusive meetings and agreements or dependence upon a state of psychological awareness of rivals' probable actions.

If John Blair had not died tragically only a few days before the release of this book, he would have been able to witness the culmination of nearly four decades of struggle to expose the structure and practices of the corporate oil giants and their persistent efforts to establish dominance over our daily economic life. He would have also observed a change in the average American's state of mind, a serious questioning of the credo that "What is good for Exxon is good for America."

Blair says that the purpose of *The Control of Oil* is to provide the American public with the information needed to "support their government in its efforts to control an industry which has never yielded very nicely to the imposition of controls in the public interest." This purpose is superbly achieved, and not surprisingly, since the author had long ago impressed us his special competence in studies of the petroleum industry. His early works, notably the classic study *The Staff Report on the International Petroleum Cartel* (1952) and *Concentration of Economic Power* (1970), as well as his numerous articles and papers, are impressive attempts to shed light on the manner by which the corporate giants attempt to concentrate their economic power and the means they use to achieve their aims, such as sabotaging

^{*}John M. Blair: The Control of Oil (Pantheon Books, New York, 1976), pp. 441.

competition, wiping out smaller rivals, and at times enlisting government-

help to do so.

It was in September 1952, that the Federal Trade Commission's Report on the oil industry was published after being suppressed for a year. This carefully researched 378-page document vivisected the oil combine, maintaining that for nearly a quarter-century it had skillfully manipulated the world's supply of oil by exercising substantial control over production, prices, and distribution. The Report described, how, through concerted action, the oil companies managed to overcome the difficult obstacles that challenged their authority and control, acquiring virutally exclusive rights to the major oil fields of the world outside of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Mexico. It traced the interlocking directorships and/or joint ownerships through which the oil companies controlled exploration, production, transport, and marketing organizations in many parts of the world. It quoted certain basic agreements, obtained for the most part by the commission through subpoena, which showed the world-enveloping pattern of the cartel and its main guidelines. The Report challenged the major oil companies' claim that all international agreements to control markets and production had ended with the outbreak of the Second World War by offering evidence showing that, whether or not the agreements were legally binding after the war began, the signatories continued to abide by them. The only major shortcoming of the Report was its failure to touch deeply on the political power acquired by the oil companies through infiltration into national governments and to stress adequately the role played by the oil companies through their supporters and proteges in the Administration, legislative agencies, and control commissions to prevent government regulation of the industry. John Blair co-authored this classic study, which precipitated major antitrust action against the oil industry.

TT OIL COMBINES MANIPULATE SUPPLY

The Control of Oil is John Blair at his best. Here he gives a valuable insight into the ways and means by which the seven sisters-Exxon, Mobil, So-Cal, Texaco, Gulf, Shell, and British Petroleum-have managed to dominate and maintain their hegemony over the most powerful industry in the world. He describes how these giant corporations systematically stifled competition, eliminated potential competitors, and forced independent refiners, drillers and retailers out of the market so as to enjoy full control over oil pricing. With great candour, Blair exposes how the major oil companies exploited the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo in order to squeeze their small competitors.

In a vehement rebuttal of the companies' claim that they controlled only a relatively small percentage of the industry's total market, Blair explains how the oil companies engage in joint ventures which tend to eliminate competition and to promote an atmosphere of mutual confidence and cooperation. He traces the origins of the energy crisis and asserts that it could have been predicted and even avoided if American import restrictions had been lifted during the 1950s and 1960s in order not to exhaust domestic oil reserves. He feels that lack of real competitive conditions was the reason for the depletion of the nation's domestic oil reserves.

Blair addresses two timely major questions: how to arrest increasing US dependence on imported oil, and how to put the lid on the ever-increasing growth of the major oil companies. Further, he argues that, while conservation seems to be a way out of the energy-dependency dilemma, at least until energy alternatives to oil are developed, tight control of the major oil companies through effective regulation or comprehensive dissolution and divestiture will also be required. But government regulation of other utilities has fared poorly; consequently, Blair is not optimistic about its utility in the oil industry. The ownership approach is also discarded as unrealistic for the United States "at least for the foreseeable future." Nationalization contradicts American economic tradition. Furthermore, nationalization practices in other Western democracies such as Britain, France, and Italy fail to support the claim that nationalized enterprises are more sensitive to public needs and interests than private corporations.

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Blair's alternatives are not too startling. He suggests an infusion of genuine competition in the energy industry and proposes to bolster the antitrust statutes in order to encourage smaller, independent national producers and refiners. Divestiture actions, he argues, could "require the major oil companies to make a determination of whether they wish to stay in production, refining or marketing and then to divest themselves of their holdings in other areas." This is more easily said than done. With the oil companies comprising one of the most financially and politically powerful segments of the American industrial economy, it is very unlikely that anything could be done to drastically diminish their power. Even when when the Standard Oil trust was broken back in 1911 it was not long before the various "new" parts of the "old" company were working in unision again, co-ordinating their policies and looking after their mutual interests. Candidate Carter felt that it could and should be done. President Carter knew otherwise. In an unprecedented charge from the Presidential podium, Carter asserted on 13 October, 1977, that the oil companies were operating outside the free enterprise system. This blistering rhetorical offensive against the United States oil industry, in which he accused them of seeking the "biggest ripoff in American history," nevertheless failed to arouse national support for Carter's energy programme. Blair's prescriptions are on target, they too, fail to answer the compelling question: Who will hang the bell around the cat's neck? Didn't Blair realize that those who own, govern? The oil companies own, and through this financial link with the government they play a crucial role in shaping American foreign and domestic policies. So how does he expect the oil companies to be broken apart or forced to concentrate on one part of the business? Even if we come to realize that the present status of the oil industry is not in the public interest, how can the "action program for public policy" materialize to prevent what Blair describes as a "bad situation from becoming worse?" Is it not asking too much to expect a jury composed or the relatives and friends of the accused to

pronounce a guilty verdict?

The Control of Oil offers extensive documentation, superb analysis and a wealth of information. It will be enjoyed much more by those who already have some background on the oil industry; it hardly makes enjoyable reading for an undergraduate or a layman. Those who firmly believe that what is good for Exxon is good for America will need to take some tranquilizers before setting out to read this book. For those alarmed at the extent to which interest groups have influenced public policy, The Control of Oil offers more cause for alarm. By being so vocally critical of interest-group politics, Blair leans away from the American political philosophy of pluralism and challenges its adequacy as the most appropriate basis for the realization of the good life. His voice joins the voices of many other scholars who have appealed to facts to argue the case against pluralism, by calling attention to the monolithic reality behind the pluralistic facade. Blair joins with them to cast doubt on the central dogma of pluralism, the notion that individual freedom is likely to be extended when the government acts as a neutral umpire.

In our opinion, *The Control of Oil* takes its place as one of the most important and empirically detailed critique of the oil industry as an interest group till this date.

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A Review Article

THE transnational newsagencies, owners of mass media in the advanced capitalist countries and their paid spokesmen have reduced the entire concept of the new world information and communication order to freedom of the Press as against government-controlled media. If one cared to read only the two sections of the MacBride Commission's Report: Conclusions and Recommendations and Issues Requiring Further Study, one would discover that the issues involved are multi-dimensional.

Unfortunately, senior media-persons in the developing countries, including India, have fallen victim to this deliberate distortion of the basic issues. In the present study, the author Thomas McPhail points out in the very early stages that some of the industrially advanced capitalist countries are being compelled to think and act in a way similar to the developing nations. This is the result of the explosion in the technology of mass communication. It has rendered traditional geographical and political borders and barriers obsolete. The transnational data flow, processing, storage and retrieval, with the help of satellites and computers provide tremendous power to those who control this technology.

McPhail, being a Canadian, is very much aware of the impact of US media. He is thus able to bring to his study a certain amount of objectivity with regard to the problems facing the developing countries. He has a close look at the Canadian media system and its struggle against US cultural invasion. The statements he quotes have a very familiar ring. He comes to the conclusion that the "free flow" philosophy is born of the pressures of multinational corporate interests rather than national interests.

This is understandable. McPhail's presentation of the history of the origin of the concept of the free Press shows its relations to developing commercial and industrial interests in the nineteenth century. It was part of the free contract and open market system of emerging capitalism. It is only natural, therefore, that the multinational corporations which today are the organisers of the global economy, should also use information and communication as vital components of administration and control at the global level.

It is against this background that McPhail discusses a whole range of issues: Western development theories and mass communication concepts and their irrelevance to the realities in the developing countries; the major newsagencies, US information policy and the prospects and implications of the direct broadcasting system; the problem of the newcomers in finding a parking place for their communication satellites in the narrow spectrum

^{*}Thomas L. McPhail: Electronic Colonialism—The Future of International Broadcasting and Communication (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1981), 260p.

above the equator; the relationship between the New International Economic Order and the New World Information and Communication Order; the MacBride Commission Report and its origins and background, and the International Programme for Development of Communication; the relationship between the UNESCO and NWICO and the potential implications for the future of international broadcasting and communication. In the process McPhail provides a descriptive and analytical study of major institutions, individuals, conferences and vital issues.

The real question is what is news? This comes out very sharply in the summary of two key background papers of the MacBride Commission, one by Mustapha Masmoudi providing the view of the developing countries and the other by Elie Abel expressing a moderate US position. Masmoudie correctly points out that the freedom of information has been reduced to the freedom of the informing agent to provide whatever information it wants. Abel, sees a thin line between development news and propaganda, but admits this to be true as well of freedom of expression and disregard for responsible reporting, fair, accurate and respectful to foreign values and traditions.

McPhail points out that in-depth front page pieces on population, education, health care and other development issues are neglected even in the Western media. He quotes, Judith Hart, the British Minister for Overseas Development, to say that news is a commodity in the West, designed accordding to guidelines provided by market research, and thus reduced to "trivialisation and to an emphasis on sex, crime, entertainment and sensationalism." This, together with pressure from advertising, she admits, could result in ignoring "objective truth."

It is very clear that dependence on such news sources can and do influence value systems, structural patterns of power and social interaction. It is a subtle process often difficult to identify, leave alone quantify, in relation to specific messages. By failing to cover development news the media of the advanced capitalist countries create wrong impressions about the developing world. What is more it denies the developing countries the opportunity to learn from one another's experience.

McPhail rightly recognises the dangers of the direct broadcasting system as the epitome of cultural invasion, through unrestrained political propaganda and presentation of irrelevant values, thereby causing disorientation and loss of national identity. There is really very little one can do about it. The reality is that whatever technologies may be secured through various compromises would become totally ineffective by the next decade with the development of new technologies.

McPhail's study clearly reveals that we are on the threshold of a new colonial system, more powerful than political or economic or even military domination. Electronic colonialism creates a set of cultural, political, ideological and social values conducive to the acceptance of a dependent relationship. McPhail rightly points out: "Electronic colonialism of the 20th century

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is just as dreaded as mercantile colonialism of the 18th and 19th centuries." Actually it is worse, because its impact is often not realised. It works into the whole system. It is high time indeed that the developing countries became aware of the totality of the challenge of the fast emerging information society. Thomas McPhail's study is an eye opener.

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GENERAL

Political Theory

JOHAN DUNN: Political Obligation in the its Historical Context: Essays in Political Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1980, x, 355. p. £ 14.50.

JOHN Dunn's book, dealing with the question of political obligation in its historical context, is a mixed fare. Instead of analyzing the issue of political obligation historically, he has raised a lot of interesting problems centering on it. The book being a collection of essays., there is, however, no rational continuation of the central theme and the first impression that one gets after going through this rather bulky volume is that these are essays written in a reflective mood.

In the opening essay, "The Identity of the History of Ideas," the author apparently raises a very tricky question. He feels that a precise identification of a theoretical question raised by a philosopher is almost impossible, since there always remains a gap between what the philospher said, our understanding of his saying and, further, our communication of that understanding to others. Briefly, it would be difficult to arrive at an objective identification of a philosophical question; as Dunn argues, "Communicating what Locke said and understanding what Locke said both involve making comprehensible the utterance of Locke. It is here that the symmetry between understanding, explaining and giving an account of a philosophical claim becomes strongest. For any of these activities must necessarily include what are in effect abridgements of the other two activities and any of them which fails to do so may be in principle corrigible by either of the other two." (p.27)

Although placed later, the fifth essay entitled "Practising History and Social Science on 'realist' assumptions" is written almost in the same vein. Sceptical of any objectivity of knowledge, Dunn observes in a rather cynical fashion, "Do I know what I believe? Well, I certainly have a shrewder (as well as more extensive) general set of suspicions on the subject of what I believe than you have on the subject of what I believe." (p.106)

While the author has reservations against positivism, these are reminiscent of hackneyed positivist arguments. Every philosopher, knowingly or unknowingly, reflects on the social conditions of his time. Suggesting that precise identification of a philosopher's thought is far too complex would mean that man cannot understand his own history and thereby cannot transform history. That human life and ideas are subject to scientific investigation is now established by the school to which Dunn certainly does not belong.

Essays 3 and 4, dealing with the political theory of John Locke are illuminating in their analysis of how his theory of property has to be understood

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in terms of its conditional character which flows from consent and also in the refutation of the traditional belief that Locke was the spiritual father of American Revolution. The author is at his best in these two essays where evidence of thorough and extensive research on 17th Century English history has left its mark.

In essays 6 and 7, where Dunn discusses the developing politics of Ghana and Sri Lanka in the context of the question of political obligation, no new ground has been broken. The conclusion that the author draws is rather naive and this could be the suggestion of any liberal who has difficulty in understanding the direction of developmental politics in the Third World countries. As Dunn concludes, "If the holders of state power in Ghana or Sri Lanka wish their subjects authentically to acknowledge an obligation to obey their commands, they should serve their subjects to the best of their abilities.... Fear may be a tempting cut-piece surrogate for good government. But, despite Hobbes, it is not a passion to be reckoned on for any great length of time. When the governments of Ghana and Sri Lanka contrive fully to deserve their subjects' loyalty, they may be sure they will have it soon enough. If not, not." (pp. 204-205)

In essay 8 entitled "Democracy unretrieved, or the Political Theory of Professor Macpherson," Dunn cuts a sorry figure in his very poor critique of Macpherson's celebrated theory of maximalist notion of power. Without caring for any rational argument, Dunn doggedly refuses to agree with Macpherson that in the market society of capitalism all our powers are marketable and thereby transferable. In a rather casual way the author observes, "since many or perhaps most abilities which human beings do develop are not offered for sale indeed are not even perceived by their possessors as being potential commodities—it is hard to believe that the relationship between the ownership of the means of production and the efflorescence of human creativity can be as simple and transparent as Macpherson argues." (p.211) But Dunn does not really make any serious effort to prove why it is so "hard to believe." On the contrary, his poor assertions against Macpherson further strengthen the arguments of the author of *Democratic Theory*.

Dunn's essay on Macpherson was unnecessary. The following two essays were undesirable. In essay 9, "The Success and Failure of Modern Revolutions," Dunn reveals his very strong liberal bias against revolutionary transformation of society. Excepting making such oft-repeated observations found in any standard bourgeois text book as, "Modern revolutionary history begins with the storming of a prison, but in the subsequent century and three quarters it has given ample and evenhanded sustenance to the jailing trades," (p.224) combining thereby revolutions and counter-revolutions, Dunn expresses his cynicism about the prospects of any revolution in the 20th century. All revolutions, therefore, have been failures. These lamentations (really?) are not new. This is a very subtle way of confusing people's minds. Dunn does precisely the same thing.

The concluding essay (10) entitled "Political Obligations and Political Possibilities" is a flop. It leads us nowhere. After examining the various philosophical arguments concerning political obligation, Dunn reaches the rather unsavoury conclusion: "...the prospects for a theory of rational political obligation as this has generally been conceived are beyond hope, not because (as sometimes been supposed) there is nothing for such a theory to be about, but because there is so much that such a theory has to be about, (so much to which it has to do justice), if it is to stand a chance of proving valid." (p.299) An essay running up to about sixty pages was rather unnecessary for writing these concluding lines!

Overall, this book is hardly stimulating. The style is cynical, quite often repetitive and the general feeling is that, excepting one or two essays, the volume does not contribute much to our understanding of political theory.

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Disarmament

SYED JAFAR RAZA BILGRAMI: SALT II: A Balance of Ambivalances.
Intellectual Book Corner, New Delhi, 1981, viii, 179 p., Rs. 60.

THE second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) was signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna on 18 June, 1979. Unfortunately, to date, the Treaty remains unratified because its critics in the United States Senate visualised in it a Soviet strategic advantage. In any case, chances of its ratification were destroyed once the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979.

SALT II was to have taken effect in January 1981 and it would have placed a ceiling of 2250 on the *total number* of nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers). This would have meant a small reduction in the original number (2400) agreed to by Presidents Ford and Brezhnev at the Vladivostock Summit of October 1974.

Also, this treaty would have imposed an overall ceiling of 1200 on the total number of launchers with MIRVed warheads. Dr. Bilgrami's book has dealt with some of these issues in some detail and is a welcome addition in so far as it is a wholly Indian attempt by an Indian political scientist. To an Indian audience, most of the technological intricacies of the Central Strategic balance are often missed and the book would certainly go some way in educating them.

The author has given a researched and lucid explanation of some of the basic political facets of the arms race ensuing amongst the Super Powers. What is lacking however, is a clear explanation of the "doctrines" that

89

determine the use of strategic nuclear weapons. For instance the difference between "counterforce" and "countervalue" strategies might have been delineated. Also the Carter PD-59 doctrine on "limited nuclear war" might have been explicitly analyzed. "Limited nuclear war" as a thesis has eroded the SALT process. Technological refinements have been steadily taking place in the R & D establishments of both the Super Powers. Dr. Bilgrami has alluded to this in his present exercise, but he has failed to bring out how the original "deterrence" doctrine (evolved by McNamara in the sixties) has given way to newer theories influenced by sea changes in technological sophistication in electronics and satellite communication. It is not as if the Soviets were feared by opponents of SALT in the United States to have given strategic advantage, it was more the hypothetical "window of vulnerability" that Soviet "heavy" missiles with MIRVed warheads would pose to the fixed land-based Minuteman ICBMs of the United States.

In any case, the finer point that the Treaty Protocol (which would have expired in October 1981) banned the deployment and flight testing of the MX and cruise missiles (beyond a rang of 600 kms) has been brought out.

All in all the book merits praise.

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R.R. SUBRAMANIAN

Communications

KRISHAN SONDHI: Problems of Communication in Developing Countries, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1981, xvi, 272 p., Rs. 65.

THERE are several books, mostly American, dealing with the problems of development and communication in developing countries. Apparently writers of these books often equate development with per capita income, industrialization, proliferation of goods and services, democracy, modernization of attitudes and broadening of mental horizons. Often these writers attribute a positive role to media in realizing these objectives.

Sondhi shows his disenchantment with these foreign scholars and sets out in his book on a search for an indigenous wisdom, but unfortunately is not able to break much ground. However, if we ignore this failure of the author, we might well say he has tried to cover a wide span of topics relating to problems of communication in India and dealt with fair degree of success. Also we have to overlook the title of the book Problems of Communication in Developing Countries," his book barely goes beyond India.

While his range is wide he lacks in depth. Most of the time he only scratches the surface even in dealing with important topics as "Folk and Mass Media," "Decline in Theatre", etc. Not that his comments are not crisp and appropriate but they lack deep analysis. In style too, the book is uneven as the time gap between one chapter and the other seems considerable. Some of his chapters are very readable showing his best journalist "capabilities, but others suffer from cliches, jargon and make them painful reading. It appears "Romance of Winter and Lodi Garden Desecrated" were included in the book not because of their relevance but because the author found these handy.

Many of the chapters in this book, deal with current issues of communication in India, and the author's observations should be of interest to the students of the Indian communication scene. He covers a fairly vide canvas—from traditional media to transnational communication—but his treatment of the subject is more in the nature of a brief comment and less of a serious analysis. This could have been avoided if he had been selective in topics rather than including something of every thing. Despite these shortcomings, the book should prove a good introductory reading for one who wants to develop a broad understanding of media and communication particularly in India.

Again, the author seems to be overshadowed by the personality of late Vikram Sarabhai who had believed in using advance communication technology for the multi-faceted problems of India. But herein lies a contradiction; the author shares lots of euphoria about modern communication technology, but at the same time doubts its appropriateness in the Indian situation. He has a penchant for committees and seems to believe that many complicated issues in communication could be settled by setting up committees and commissions. At the same time he relies more on speculation than on research studies conducted in recent years.

Nevertheless, the author should be credited for raising and identifying issues in communication and in throwing up many suggestions. The book is also fairly well produced but suffers here and there from editorial lapses. I would like to conclude that its a book of mixed merit but makes useful reading. The price at Rs. 65.00 seems high, however inexpensive soft-cover editions are also available for fifteen rupees.

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J.K. Doshi

Foreign Policy

NEPAL

PIERS BLAIKIE, JOHN CAMERON AND DAVID SEDDON: Nepal in Crisis—Growth and Stagnation at the Periphery. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980, xvi, 311p., Rs. 80.

THE author's analysis shows that the crisis in Nepal is one of failure of productive organisations resulting in the under-development of the country. It is observed that an archaic tributary state, supporting a small aristocracy, situated in Kathmandu has been unable to change its fundamental structure. The failure to initiate or allow development of productive forces can be ascribed to a historical experience which has tragically constrained the possibilities of development. "The symptoms of the malaise in Nepal as a whole appear visibly in the form of erosion, landslips, and widespread deficiencies in diet, shelter, and clothing which have been little affected by the rhetoric of development, and in the burgeoning of a bureaucracy financed largely by foreign aid yet quite unable to confront and solve the real problems."

In its social and spatial structure, the bureaucracy reflects the inequalities prevalent in Nepalese society as a whole. But the perpetuation of privilege, patronage, discrimination, and regional inequality within the apparatus of state is particularly damaging to Nepal's prospects because of the fact that, in the absence of an open political structure and genuine popular participation, it is this apparatus that would have to conceive, plan and implement measures capable of preventing the coming crisis. There has been a large expansion of the bureaucracy in the last decade but its contribution to economic development has been just minimal.

The authors observe that as one of the least-developed countries in the world, with an economy already in serious difficulties, Nepal is in a weak position to demand great control over the new sectional and regional allocation of resources from foreign aid, and the indications are, in any case, that the ability of the Nepalese state machinery to handle such increased responsibility is at present insufficient. The unavoidable result, however, is the predominance of a piecemeal and uncoordinated series of projects and programmes accentuating and exacerbating the difficulties experienced even within the Nepalese bureaucracy itself in maintaining sufficient communication and co-operation between different departments.

The major stance taken by the authors is that the country is now in a period of crisis, a crisis which will be associated with an increasing inability to pay for imported commodities, with growing food shortages and consequently, with the development of widespread unrest in both rural and urban areas, which together will threaten the viability of the prevailing political system and even Nepal's position as an independent state. The book

therefore is quite provocative and will generate a thoroughgoing debate amongst the knowledgeable.

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NAVIN CHANDRA JOSHI

BENGT-ERIK BORGSTROM: The Patron and the Panca-Village Values and Panchayat Democracy in Nepal. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xv, 188p., Rs. 60.

THE politics of the Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal was of vital import and interest to the scholars in the West in the fifties and sixties. Obviously a series of research works on various aspects of the government and politics of Nepal were undertaken, especially in American universities under their area study programmes. By the seventies however, it seems, they had enough of the politics of this long-secluded land. It was now the anthropologists who found the Himalayan people and their ethnic variety, cultural heritage and social organisations rich and interesting from the point of view of their academic pursuits. As such, a number of anthropologists from far-fetched lands have already come out with standard works and a lot more are rubbing their shoulders with various forlorn tribes in their hutments in the Himalayas in order to squeeze out from them academic staple to enrich their descipline. Dr Borgstrom's book is representative of this trend. Trained in social anthropology, this Swedish scholar has selected a theme which is relevant and important for political scientists as well. His book is a micro-study of the Panchayat System of Nepal as it operates at its grass-roots level. The functioning of the lowest single unit of the Panchayat System at the village level, viz., that of the Kitini village situated in the southern part of the Kathmandu Valley, has been thoroughly investigated and critically examined against the backdrop of the existing social groups of the inhabitants and their socio-cultural systems.

The main focus of the study, in the words of the author himself, is to "spell out how the broad ideals of planned development as expressed by the ruling elite in the official ideology translate into local reality and how they themselves, changed in the process." This transformation, the author maintains, is effected by the kind of social structure that makes up the Nepalese society. (p. vii) Within this broad framework, the study mainly concentrates on three specific ideals of the Panchayat System viz, (i) the ideals of economic change leading to economic equality; (ii) the iedals of the involvement of every citizen in running the country; and (iii) the ideals of education and equal opportunities for all in the social sphere regardless of caste, creed or colour (p.x), and the various governmental measures to propagate and implement them especially at the village level.

Dr. Borgstrom has thus analysed the subject under five well-organised and scientifically divided chapters on the basis of considerable data at his command and given a brief summary or conclusion at the end of every chapter. The last chapter of the book is a broad generalization.

The first chapter depicts the ideals of development in the context of Nepal's history. In Chapter 2 Borgstrom has given an outline of Nepal and its history and discussed the ideals of planned development in this context. Chapter 3 deals with aspects of social organisation, as to how people interact, how they view themselves and others. The economic field with regard to the central government's ideals forms the subject matter of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is concerned with administration and the formal political processes and Chapter 6 sums up the findings of the other Chapters and also presents broad generalizations.

The author's style of presenting his thesis is impressive and his analysis and interpretations logical. Nevertheless, his observations are by and large nothing but commonplace knowledge for scholars living in this part of the world and some of his conclusions even lack convincing rationale. One may go whole hog with him in accepting the author's observations about Kitini that "the ideals of Panchayat Democracy seem not to have taken hold there. New form of social relations have not sprung up, and rituals in the form of everyday behaviour still express [sic] the values of household self-sufficiency, tempered by kin and to a lesser degree castes loyalties; all of these being set in a hierarchical system of castes which derives its precarious cohesion from the dominant socio-cultural system." (p.62) Nevertheless, one may question Dr Borgstrom's generalisations about Nepal's Panchayat Democracy as a whole and his emphatic assertion that "the ideals of Panchayat Democracy have failed to materialize as a result of the important role that personal relations play in the Kathmandu Valley," (p.173) and that "to realize the ideals there has to be a change in the structure of the society." (p.166) It seems Dr Borgstrom. suffers from the illusion that Nepal is nothing but Kitini writlarge and whatever he could discover in course of his study of that small village holds good for the whole of Nepal. This, however, does not rob his book of the tremendous importance it has for researchers and general readers interested to know more and more about this Himalayan Kingdom.

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IRAQ

M.A. SALEEM KHAN: The Monarchic Iraq—A Political Study. Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 1977, xi, 169p., Rs. 30.

THE history of the West Asian region has always been of great interest to students of contemporary politics. Among the West Asian countries, Iraq can truly claim to be the cradle of various world civilizations. Islamic history would never be complete without understanding Iraq. For some the land is sacred because in it rest some great personalities of Islam, and for others it shines because here converged the East and the West during the gloden age of Islam. Modern Iraq, like a phoenix, was born after the First World War from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire; in 1920 British mandate was proclaimed are it under the Hashemite dynasty. At that time, the country, in the words of the author, was like a deformed and diseased baby full of ailments and imbalances. (p. 33).

Iraq remained a monarchy till 1958 when the people changed its destiny. In the present study Saleem Khan has interpreted issues which shaped monarchic Iraq and also pushed it on the path which ultimately led to the declaration of a republic. The main issues which the author has discussed in the changing milieu of Iraq during the monarchy are political culture, nation-building, national identity, colonialism, political parties, tribal uprisings, urban protest, elite authoritarianism, military interventions, western support to the ruling elites and so on. The author has taken up issues dispassionately and substantiated them with appropriate footnotes and references which enable readers to see vividly the picture of monarchic Iraq.

The present work along with a good bibliography of Arabic and English books is the first in the series of monographs that the AMU Centre of West Asian Studies has proposed to bring out in the next few years. This reviewer welcoming the book only wishes that the Centre should have given greater care to proof reading: the long errata supplied with the book, however, does not make the readers any the wiser.

Jamia Milia Islamia, New Delhi.

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INDIA

History

MANI KAMERKAR: British Paramountey: British-Baroda Relations 1818-1848. Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1980, xiv, 253p., Rs. 96.

In reconstructing the political map of the 19th century Indian history, the role of British policy vis-a-vis the "native" states is of critical,

nay even crucial, importance. The classic if also semi-official accounts of how well-nigh independent, and ostensibly sovereign, rulers fell into the trap that some of the more powerful and prescient, Imperial pro-consuls such as Wellesley, Hastings and Dalhousie laid has been told by the late Sir William Lee-Warner. Its more critical and liberal version was spelt out by Edward Thompson nearly a half century later.2 Nor is that all. There are any number of other authors, and titles, that deal with the overall problem as well as specific case studies.

Among the larger, and more important, Indian states, Baroda occupied a significant position. This emanated both from its location on the west coast as well as the business acumen of its people. In the first half of the present century, thanks to the enlightened reign of Maharaja Savajirao, it was to acquire, along with Mysore, the enviable reputation of a progressive, well-administered state.

The present study deals with the thirty odd years spanning the rule of one of his predecessors, a namesake—Sayajirao Gaekwad. Hetookover as regent in June 1818—[the] formal accession was held on 5 Octobers 1819—and was to remain in the saddle until his death thirty years later, in December 1847.

These years witnessed some "crucial developments" in the relationship between Baroda and the Paramount Power-

the pattern of which had been laid during the last two decades. Most of the seeds of future conflict are to be found in the increasing claims of British paramountcy.

To the last day of the Raj, the doctrine of paramountcy remained undefined-indeed indefinable. More to the point, as early as 1806 Charles Metcalfe had written to the Court or Directors: "Sovereigns you are and as such must act." Less than fifteen years later, David Ochterlony's letter to Charles Metcalfe contains its first clear enunciation. It is the "realisation of its meaning" and Sayajirao's reaction to its "consequences" that fill the pages of this study.

Largely, as the chapter headings reveal, it is a tale of steady, and relentless, inroads on the Gaekwad's power and authority. There are "British encroachments" all along the line with the ruler progressively reduced to a "position without power." Needless to say, for most part, the formulation as well as execution of policy was dictated by the individual Residents or their understudies. Thus while a man like Clare, as Governor of Bombay, was disposed to be reasonable, his immediate successor Grant had, from the very outset, been "completely inimical" to all that his predecessor had done. Again, the work of (Resident) Williams, taken seriously ill in 1836, devolved on his assistant Malet and later his successor Sutherland. Both of them,

2 Edward Thompson, The Making of the Indian Princes (Oxford, 1943).

¹ William Lee-Warner, The Protected Princes of India (London, 1894) and The Native States of India (London, 1910).

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"imbued with strong ideas of British imperium', were "definitely hostile" to the Baroda ruler. They showed him scant courtesy and yet expected "undue respect" for themselves.

The end picture that emerges was at once grim, and grey. By 1840, the Gaekwad had been reduced to "a mere cipher." His sovereignty for what it was worth had been "steadily eroded," until towards the end he

found himself bereft of control over his subjects in matters of defence, finance, law and order, tributary rights and customary rights... In everything big and small he found himself circumscribed.

In sharp contrast, stood the Residents who as representatives of the Paramount Power "imposed" themselves on the Gaekwad in every way, interfering in all spheres of his administration. The existence of the subsidiary force testifed to their power and was a potent factor in giving added authority to their word and deeds. Worse, they knew of few if indeed any constraints:

Paramountcy combined with usage had conferred on the British Government a power which would be halted by its own discretion.

Dr Kamerkar's credentials are impressive. A practising historian from that part of the country, she has used an impressive array of primary source material to build up her story. Not only has she made use of the resources of the Baroda Record Office but also those of the Maharashtra Government, as well as the Archives of the India Office Library in London.

In a work of such sound scholarship one hates to pick holes and yet some are so glaring as to stare one straight in the face. How does one render Gaekwad? Both on the dust jacket as well as the body of the text, it is "Gaekwad" and yet in the preface it appears as "Gaikwad". The bibliography seeks with errors, at once of omission as well as commission. To list only a few taken at random: it is G.W. Forrest, not Forest; H.T. Prinsep, not Princep. The correct title of the latter's work is History of the Political and Military Transaciion of the Marquess of Hastings not Military Transaction in India during Hastings. Again, it is P.E. Roberts, not P.T. (Roberts). Owen's three works listed do not bear any dates of publication. William Lee-Warner appears twice: as W. Lee Warner and W. Warner. He is the same person. His work (under W. Warner), as indicated earlier (footnote 1), was published in 1894. To indicate "n.d." for its publication is to betray a colossal ignorance. "Monograms" on the dust jacket should read "monographs."

One hates to carp, and yet these lapses are the more regrettable insofar as the "Errata" at the end appears to be so innocent of all that has been listed here.

A lacunae that might be made up in a subsequent edition is the provision

of biographical sketches of all the important dramatis personae that flit through these pages. To retail the most obvious: Baji Rao, Balwantrao (Anandrao's illegitimate son), Fatehsingh, and among the English, Elphinstone, Carnac, Clare, Williams, Walker and Sutherland. A brief chronological breakdown of the period would be further helpful to the reader.

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PARSHOTAM MEHRA

Political Developments

S.R. MEHROTRA: Towards India's Freedom and Partition. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, vi, 322p., Rs. 60.

THE volume contains a collection of articles written by Professor S.R. Mehrotra, dealing with the political history of India during the period from the second half of the nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth. These, as the author himself says, were written at diffirent times and for different audiences. Some were written as far back as fifteen years ago but have, nevertheless, retained their ietrinsic historical value; the conclusions are as valid today as they were when these were written. A lot of documentary source-material is now available in print, more particularly in Mansergh's volumes on the Transfer of Power and in S. Gopal's Selected Works of Nehru. Some of this the author has seen, some he has not, but it speaks for Mehrotra's sound historical judgement that the basic trends of arguments and conclusions are not materially affected even after the publication of these works.

Mehrotra is the author of a masterly study of the emergence of nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first three chapters of the book under review, are largely based on this study, though not strictly limited in time to this work. He has deliberately avoided the many controversies connected with the career of a British civilian—A.O. Hume—the founder of the Indian National Congress and has given him the recogniton and which he richly deserves, despite the British bureaucrats' hatred of him or the marxist historian's criticism of his motives. There is no doubt that Hume was a good man, a sincere friend of India and of the rising middle classes of Indian society. His motives in establishing the Indian National Congress were to provide "a safety-valve" for the escape of the growing forces of revolt, generated by, as Hume said, Britain's own action. Certainly, Hume thought of the Congress as providing constitutional channels through which the surging tide of Indian aspirations may flow. But, as Mehrotra points out, he did not think of it merely as a safety-valve. In several of his

private letters, he has referred to the Congress as "the national movement", intended to weld India into a nation, and to secure home rule for it in half a century. In actual fact, Indian independence came half a century later.

In explaining the objectives and methods of the Indian National Congress for the first thirty years after it was founded in 1885, the author has summed up very succintly the distinction between the Moderates and the Extremists in the following sentences. Generally speaking the Moderates were upper middle-class men, elderly, well-to-do, liberally educated, anglicized, secular in outlook, conservative in political matters, influenced by British constitutionalism, apathetic and cautious. "In the same manner, extremists may be described as lower middle-class men, younger in age, not very well-to-do, not so liberally educated, less anglized, less secular in outlook, radical in political matters, influenced by European revolutionary ideas, energetic and bold".

About the Home Rule League agitation, Mehrotra thinks that it was a formidable challenge to British authority. There is perhpas an element of exaggeration in this assertion as also in his remark that Montagu's Declaration of 20 August 1917 was largely the result of the Home Rule agitation.

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The Chapter on "Gandhi and the Indian National Movement" is rather too sketchy to cover his vast and varied contribution to the national movement but the approach and the summing up is on sound lines.

The chapter on the "Growth of Legislative Councils from 1833 to 1935", taken together with the chapter on "Morley-Minto Reforms", shows remarkable insight into the constitutional history of India and is characterized by the same profound judgment as is evident throughout the other essays. Mehrotra could however have dealt with the separate electorates rather more elaborately. As it is, the treatment of this aspect is not adequate. The issues arising out of the Congress accepting office in the provinces in the scheme of provincial autonomy under the Act of 1935, have been well brought out. However, part of the chapter dealing with the period 1940-47 needs revision in the light of the documents which are now available.

The chapter entitled "Partition of India: Some Myths and Might-Have Beens," is a thought-provoking contribution in the volume and deserves to be widely read.

The treatment of the subject of princely states is an excellent analysis of the problem in historical perspective; Sardar Patal and Mountbatten emerge as statesmen of high order in tackling this problem.

The last chapter deals with the emerging trends in India's foreign policy prior to the attainment of independence. The focus is on World War II and the treatment is themetic rather than chronological, as it should be. It is a contribution in itself and offers scope for development into a separate and independent study.

Finally, one may state that, while one reads this book one is struck by the objectivity maintained throughout the volume and by the endeavour to substantiate any statement made. It is no doubt a work of profound scholarship and will be found useful by the students and scholars of Indian national movement and constitional development, as also others interested in knowing the march of events leading to Indian independence and partition.

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AMBA PRASAD

of India. Minerva Publications, Calcutta, 1980, viii, 183p., Rs. 60.

MERRIAM'S book is another addition to the evergrowing literature on the partition of India. According to the author, the work represents a wedding of his two major academic pursuits: Asia and communication. In his view no "westerner can claim to be more than half-educated who has not attempted to understand Asia—home to half of humanity." In regard to communication, his second academic interest, he has quoted J. Jeffary who lays down that "historical studies must, of necessity, investigate rhetoric, identify persuasive appeals and examine causative factors influencing men's minds, impelling them to act one way or another."

This is a new methodology with which the subject of partition is approached but no new ideas emerge out of it. The bulk of the work abounds in wearisome repetition of almost all that Mahatma Gandhi and Quaidti-Azam Jinnah had said and written on the subject of partition between 1937 and 1948. One, therefore, turns with relief to the last chapter on evaluation. In the debate, Jinnah's premise was that Muslims of India represented a nation totally distinct from the Hindus and were therefore, entitled to a soverign homeland. Gandhi refused to agree that difference in religion altered the common nationality, particularly of Indian Muslims who were merely converted Hindus. According to the author "the results of the debate warrant the conclusion that neither advocate won in the sense that neither man converted his opponent." The author does not enter into the causes of this failure. The reason for Gandhi's failure is obvious. He could have converted his opponent if Jinnah had been an ardent Muslim like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. States Louis Ficher: "Jinnah was not a devout Muslim. He drank alcohol and ate pork, which are un-Islamic acts. He seldom visited the mosque and knew no Arabic and little Urdu". Thus Gandhi was debating not with a devout Muslim but merely with a lawyer of the separatist class of Muslims and no one has ever succeeded in converting a lawyer in charge of his client's brief. Of course, consideration in Jinnah's case was not monetary but fulfilment of his ambition.

"At a second level of interpretation," says the author, "one might justifiably say that Jinnah clearly won the debate" because "Pakistan was created and that was his goal". As a matter of fact Merriam is obliged to declare

Jinnah the winner because he has restricted the scope of his investigation by excluding the British Government from the contest. It is impossible to do justice to the subject of partition by turning the triangular fight in to a duel between Gandhi and Jinnah. Pakistan was not won by the Quaidi-Azam in his debate with Gandhi. It was a gift to him from the British Government. In fact the case for partition was more forcefully argued by the Secretary of State than by Jinnah. It was Leopord Amery who had declared in the House of Commons that "in religious and social outlook, in historic tradition and culture, the difference between them (Muslims) and their Hindu fellow countrymen goes as deep, if not deeper, than any similar difference in Europe."

But within this limited scope the author has tried to avoid being partisan in his evaluation. On the third level of his analysis he says that "one could argue that Gandhi won the debate in the sense that his was the greater wisdom because partition, after all, did not solve the communal problems, it simply internationalized it." He refers to massive violence that followed the formation of Pakistan and has no hesitation in calling the whole thing as "folly of partition." Further, he says that, "Gandhi's instinct rebelled against the irrationality of Partition. He correctly perceived that the establishing of two antagonistic neighbours could endanger the future peace of Asia. He recognized that the strength and progress of any pluralistic society requires the subordination of religious differences to a sense of common purpose and brotherhood; Jinnah immediately acclaimed that truth, too, once he had achieved Pakistan." Jinnah may or may not have acclaimed the truth but after the formation of Pakistan he did declare that "religion, caste or creed...has nothing to do with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens of one State and that if the citizens of Pakistan kept that ideal in front of them then they would find that "Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslimis would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense... but in the political sense of the citizens of the States."

It is evident that Jinnah wanted Pakistan to be a secular democracy. His failure lies in the fact that today Pakistan is neither secular nor democratic.

Jabalpur

D.P. MISHRA

DEVAVRAT PATHAK AND PRAVIN SHETH: Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel—From Civic to National Leadership. Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1980, xi, 394p., Rs. 60.

THE book under review is a well-documented study of the formative eriod of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel by two political scientists, Professor Devavrat, the Vice-Chancellor of Saurashtra University, Rajkot and formerly Director and Professor of Political Science, School of Social

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Sciences, Ahmedabad and Pravin Sheth, Reader in Political Science at the Gujarat University. It is an intensive study of an important period (1917-1928) in the life of Sardar Patel when he was mainly engaged in creating conditions for "Swaraj" by fighting and working at the municipal level, for, according to Gandhiji who gave direction to the Sardar's struggle' "Swaraj is nothing but an extension of municipal government."

The work is broadly divided into four periods: (i) 1917-20, when Patel's confrontation with the arrogant and imperious British bureaucrats like Shillidy and Pratt, who presided over the administration of the Municipality, created a political stir among the people of Ahmedabad. The manner in which he dealt with these officers and brought them under the control of the Municipality, or got them removed, shows the qualities for which the Sardar came to be known later in life -iron will and skilful handling of the situation. During the second period (1920-22), he initiated Gandhi's programme of non-violent non-co-operation at the municipal level, bringing it into the mainstream of national life and reorienting the local body to nationalist goals. But when the Municipality was superseded and the elected committee replaced by a government nominated committee, the Sardar devoted himself (1922-1924) to organise the masses and generate in them political consciousness, this paid dividends, when the later democratic procedure was restored in 1924 as the nationalists under the leadership of Patel were returned to power in the Municipality and Patel was elected as its President. This was the fourth phase (1924-28) in his career as a leader of Municipality which brought out in full his constructive qualities. These activities, according to the authors, demonstrated his preference and penchiant for the politics of performance. The last chapter entitled "Review and Resume," identifies the measures taken by the municipality under the leadership of Patel to improve the sanitation, education and general civic life of the town. Special mention has been made of his concern for the poor and the steps taken by him to raise their standard of living; this has been summed up by the authors as Municipal Socialism.

However, the merit of the book does not lie only in bringing out the style of leadership of Sardar Patel or his contribution to urban development and the public life of Ahmedabad, or his emergence from civic to national leader, but also in revealing the impact of the Gandhian movements in an urban setting. It is, in fact, a micro study of the struggle for freedom. Chapters eight and nine, narrating the responses of the people of Ahmedabad to Gandhiji's programme of boycott of the government or government-aided schools and the struggle that followed between the nationalists and the bureaucracy, makes interesting reading. Further, the book throws light on the working of the municipalities in India under the British. It is a detailed, painstaking and well-documented study of urban development under the leadership of Sardar Patel. The authors have relied mainly on interviews with contemporaries of Patel; the records of the Ahmedabad Municipality; of dailies and weeklies such as the Times of India, the Bombay

Chronicle, Gujarat Samachar, Prajabandu, Navajivan, etc., for this study. The opening theme showing Patel's devotion to his duty as President of the Municipality, is dramatic. However at places the reading becomes heavy because of lengthy quotations from proceedings of the debates or of records of the municipality. Further, the authors' claim that this is taken up as an objective study of leadership in the context of the socio-political environment cannot be taken without reservation as any study of this kind cannot be free from the natural urge to raise the image of the leader. Again, the use of the term municipal socialism signifying concern for the poor looks odd especially when it is used by political scientists who know that socialism is a system of ownership and operation of the means of production and distribution by the community or the government as its agent rather than by private individuals and not merely "a concern for the poor".

Nevertheless the work is a very good attempt to understand Vallabhbhai's

leadership and the style of his functioning in a systematic manner.

Panjab University, Chandigarh. S.L. MALHOTRA

Military

K.C. PRAVAL: The Red Eagles—A History of the Fourth Division of India. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1982, xii, 447p., Rs. 125.

DURING the days of the North African campaign in the Second World War, it used to be said that if you walked into the bar of the famous Shepperd's Hotel in Cairo, the barman always asked you which Division you belonged to. If you answered "Fourth Indian", you got a free drink on the house. The story is probably apocryphal, but indicative nevertheless of the reclame that went with the sign of the Red Eagle (and not "Eagles" as, inexplicably, the book has been entitled). Those were heady days for the Indian Army, fighting alongside British, Australian and South African troops, against Italians and Germans.

The first 150 pages of this history deal with the 4th Division in the Middle East and Europe and is a condensation from Colonel Stepehen's earlier history. The greater part of the book, a continuation of the history after the war, narrates the Division's activities in the years following Independence—and sadly records the downward slide from greatness to temporary ignominy, followed luckily, by the restoration of fame as a fighting formation.

The first war against Pakistan (the Kashmir War of 1947-48) passed the Red Eagle by because the Division was busy with the Punjab Boundary Force, sorting out the chaos and the killings that attended the partition of the country. In the process 4th Division was temporarily broken up into

smaller component parts and thus ceased to exist as a field formation. It was not until January 1948 that the Division was reformed and made part of the order of battle of the Army in the Punjab.

The main part of the history can be divided into three sections, depicting the role played by it in three campaigns—the Chinese Offensive of 1962; the Indo-Pak war of 1965 and the operations in East Pakistan in 1971. It is the first of these, which constitutes the largest segment (150 pages), that records the sad downfall of this famous Division, which virtually collapsed during an ill-conceived and farcical campaign in Kameng, ending in the ignonimous rout from Se la—the nadir of Indian military history.

The author records in all its sordid detail the bungling and the bluster that placed Brigade 7 of the 4th Division in the predicament of an impossible tactical trap on Nam Ka Chu river, south of the Thag la ridge. (Brigade 7 incidentally, was the only part of the 4th Division that took part in the Kameng battles). That our tennous supply lines and our minimal preparations on the watershed of the high Himalayas would not stand up to an actual military offensive, was known and accepted in New Delhi—both at the government level and at Army Headquarters. The whole deployment to defend the high border had been undertaken based on an unjustified assurance by India's civil Intelligence Chief that the Chinese, however pushed, would not resort to an actual attack; and that the forward move to the watershed line would be mostly an exercise in crisis management, with possible patrol clashes as the only hostilities that need be expected.

Much has been written about the debacle that occurred in Kameng, most of it in self-justification by various levels of commanders—the Brigade, Divisional and Corps Commanders who were involved in the operation. A Divisional history written by an "outsider" could have produced a convincing and unbiased view of the mishandling of the situation and the series of reversals that led to the running away of the troops from Se la. The author does not quite achieve that—more's the pity. This is not only because his narrative has a number of inexplicable errors of topography, deployment and in the sequence of events; it is mainly because he enters into the fray with a chip on his shoulder—criticising government policy and higher direction of war, that too often becomes a sneer.

"Our leaders who had ... taken over the reins of government," he comments on p. 175, "were idealists, steeped in the creed of non-violence... some among them who believed in all sincerity that India could well do without an Army." Then again, in a pejorative context: "In their (Chinese) assessment of Indian reaction... they had enough contact with India's leaders to know how their minds worked." These are not words that should come from a professional scribe chronicling the story of an army formation. Alas, the author has wasted the opportunity of recording an objective view of an episode that still puzzles many regarding the enormity of the misappreciation and the mismanagement.

The story of 4th Division's part in the 1965 and 1971 operations are, in

contrast, objectively recorded and do much to restore the fame of this senior formation of the Indian Army.

New Delhi. D.K. PALIT

A.K. CHATTERJI: Indian Navy's Submarine Arm. Birla Institute of Scientific Research, New Delhi, 1982, 79p., Rs. 20.

THE author of this book, a former Chief of the Naval Staff, sets forth his thesis in the Preface. He suggests replacement of our eight Soviet "F" class submarines, after their phasing out, with slightly larger, indigenously constructed, diesel-electric boats. Six small nuclear boats should further equip the submarine arm to strengthen coastal defence. Capital costs of this programme are computed at Rs. 5,6000 crores (1982 prices) spread over fourteen years, i.e. Rs. 400 crores each year.

Admiral Chatterji traces submarine development down the ages. Dieselelectric power was harnessed early in this century, and retains utility for
submarine propulsion. Armed with nuclear missiles the submarine provides
the ultimate deterrent against nuclear war. The argument that submarines,
apart from a hunter-killer role, assist sea denial emphasises their importance
to the weaker naval power. Its disadvantages are: "...being submerged its
capacity for long range and precise perception of the scene around on the
surface ..." is limited. Nuclear-powered submarines indubitably have
unlimited submergence time. But, submarine crews need rotation after some
70 days, because photo-biological factors, prominently non-exposure to
natural light, create psychological disturbances. The armaments equipping
submarines now include anti-ship, anti-submarine, cruise and ballistic nuclear
missiles, apart from acoustic, radar-directed or wire-guided torpedoes.

The author describes the establishment of the submarine arm in India. British Chiefs of Naval Staff, who headed the Indian Navy till 1958, discouraged our efforts to acquire submarines. It was only after the Chinese aggression that a submarine arm was seriously considered. Admiral Chatterji's account of our efforts to acquire submarines is informative. The United States were unwilling to supply any. The British first offered obsolescent submarines and, then, wanted cash to build an Oberon class boat. With some reluctance the Indian Navy ultimately settled for Soviet "F" class boats. This decision, however, proved wise; Soviet submarines have greater range and station time, and are simpler to operate with back-up sub-systems insuring against malfunctioning. These features make the "F" class submarine more suited to Indian conditions than their comparable Western counterparts.

Chatterji also provides another informed-account of the Indian Navy's search for a small (1200-2000 ton) boat for providing anti-submarine capabilities against Pakistan. He is critical of the decision to procure two

diesel-electric HDW-1500 boats from West Germany, with a provision to manufacture two more indigenously. Small submarines, he believes, are unsuited for "maritime countries with responsibility for large ocean areas ..." To commence limited manufacturing of such boats, moreover, would fritter our scarce resources. The author would prefer India obtaining the 2650 ton Dutch Zwaardvis class diesel-electric submarines. Its advantages are roomier size, greater endurance, versatile armaments, and, most importantly, tear-drop shaped hull, ensuring silent running. Admiral Chatter-ji's main contention, however, is that India should acquire small (3000-4000 ton) nuclear submarines, armed with anti-ship missiles, primarily for an attack role. A force of 6 HDW-1500, 8 larger diesel-electric and 6 small nuclear attack submarines, alongwith a depot ship would, very adequately, serve India's submarine arm till the end of the century.

Of course, it is an overstated case for the submarine. Seapower has certain distinguishing attributes: its twin objectives are sea control and sea "denial". Seapower is visible, projectable and retractable; it therefore, provides many and variable uses in international relations. The submarine, by intrinsic nature, is not visible; communication problems make retraction difficult, and projection consequently problematical. *Ipso facto*, the submarine can best be configured within the naval forces to serve discrete national security ends. The author does not unfortunately place the submarine within any concept of India's maritime strategy or national security or perceived national interests. Naval forces, moreover, have to be intregrated within diplomatic approaches to such questions. The submarine must be integrated, therefore, within an overall Indian maritime strategy.

The costing exercise undertaken by the author to build the submarine arm recommended by him—5600 crores—can also be faulted, because prices of defence equipment are notoriously dependent upon political relationships. His plea for establishing naval design and engineering competence and undertaking power plant construction, particularly nuclear reactors for indigenous production of submarines, must however, be supported. Over the years, only lip service is being paid to the hallowed ideal of steadily indigenising our defence production sector.

Cavilling apart, the author has attempted a worthwhile exercise which should interest laymen and students of defence studies. One wishes more Defence Services Chief's would wield the pen after retirement, and share their perceptions with larger audiences.

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian Publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the Review Section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences—(Managing Editor).

BANERJEE, Sumanta. Family Planning Communication: A Critique of the Indian Programme, Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1979. XV, 210p., Rs. 40.

Case study of a few villages in the Saharanpur District of Uttar Pradesh based on a survey conducted by a team of social scientists and communication experts during 1973-74. The project, undertaken by the Centre for Development of Instructional Technology and sponsored by the Family Planning Foundation, assesses the impact of family planning films on the villages.

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL AND INDIAN CHAPTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL. Human Rights, Arms Build-Up and World Peace: Proceedings of International Seminar, New Delhi, 25 April 1982. World Peace Council Information Centre, Helsinki 1982. 48p. (Paper)

The seminar, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice D.A. Desai, discussed case studies on the violation of human rights in Pakistan, Turkey, Southern Africa, occupied Arab Territories, the Middle East and Latin America, presented by Zafar Ali Ujjan, Enis Coskum, Max Moabi of ANC, Hala Odeh, representing PLO, and Juan Cueva Jaramillo, a former Minister of Ecuador. The seminar recommended that in every country human rights commissions, investigation commissions and sub-committees should be set up and that legal assistance and defence should be made available against violations of human rights.

MALAVIYA, H.D. China: Double Face. Dutt & Co, New Delhi, 1983, 64p., Rs. 15. (Paper)

Through the pronouncements made by important Chinese leaders and quotations from $Renmin\ Ribao$ and $Hong\ Qi$, official organs of the Chinese Communist Party and China's Government, the author points out the sharp zig-zags in Chinese Policy.

MUKHERJI, Indra Nath. Towards Economic Integration in Asia: An Evaluation of Trade Expansion Programmes of Developing Countries in Asia and the Pacific. Vidya Vahini, New Delhi, 1978, xv, 232p., Rs. 60.

In the light of the resolution on economic co-operation among developing countries, adapted at the 28th Session of the UN General Assembly in December 1973, the author examines various stages in the evolution of regional economic co-operation in the ESCAP region. These culminated in the agreement establishing the Asian clearing Union (ACU) in December 1974 and the Bangkok Agreement in July 1975 which seeks, *interalia*, to establish a limited free trade area in the region. While discussing the salient features of the two schemes, the author also examines the possible exchange of benefits arising from their operation.

PRASAD, Anirudh. Presidential Government or Parliamentary Democracy. Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1981, 156p. Rs. 40.

The question whether India should switch from the parliamentary system of government to a presidential form attracted a national debate some time back. In this well-documented, academic and systematic study, the author evaluates different systems with special emphasis on parliamentary systems with monarchy and without monarchy.

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and presidential systems with checks and balances and without checks and balances by surveying and discussing basic tenets and features of the system of government, belonging to the four categories mentioned above, in the various countries. The author finally discusses the basic tenets of parliamentary system in India, reasons causing failure of the system, implications of changeover and suggests constitutional amendments to fit the Presidential System. Opinions expressed by M.C. Chagla, V.M. Tarkunde, Ashok Mitra and N.A. Palkhivala on the issue have been incorporated in the Appendix.

RAGHAVAN, G.N.S. Introducing India. 3rd Rev. Edn. Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, 1983, 130p. Rs. 35.

A history of the people of the land of the Indus focusing on the ethnic, religious and cultural variety, beginning from the period of advent of the Aryans. The first four chapters discuss Aryan, Non-Aryan synthesis; religious interaction with reference to Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism; assimilation of Hindu and Muslim cultures in the Mughal period; and the Western impact on reforms and nationalism. The fifth chapter discusses post-independence political, socio-economic and cultural developments. The last chapter is devoted to a discussion of India's foreign policy objectives and international role. The book was published first in 1976 entitled "Understanding India."

SIDDIQI, A.A. Rural Developments: Then and Now (SBI-AMU studies in Rural Development Series-1). Department of Economics, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, 39p. (Paper)

Reviews rural development policy from the beginning of the 20th Century to the present day, based on lecture delivered in 1982 by the author, a State Bank Professor of Rural Economics in the Aligarh Muslim University.

SINGH, Mahendra Prasad. Split in a Predominant Party: The Indian National Congress in 1969. Abhinav, New Delhi, 1981, xv, 319p., Rs. 95.

Ph.D. thesis examines the problem from two perspectives. First focusing at it as a macro phenomenon, a conceptual framework is developed to analyse-schism in political parties especially the Congress. Party schism in the analytical framework is explained as the outcome of interaction among three major factors: elite tensions within the party, changes in the level of social and political mobilization in larger society and institutionalization of the party system and the nature of the party concerned. The second perspective on party schism utilised is cast at the microleved; it seeks to analyse the various pressures on the decision of a segment of the Congress elites to align with one or the other of the two groups into which the Congress Party split in 1969. Analyses, with the help of a model of factional identification, the elite background pressures on the affiliation of the Congress Parliamentary Party (Fourth Lok Sabha) members with one of the two Congress splinters. The model postulates basically two sets of independent variables—personal background variables of party leaders and their constituency or district characteristics. The combined effect of these two broad sets of factors on patterns of factional alignmenment are also analysed.

VASUDEVAN NAIR, P.K. In Defence of Peace. New Litreature, New Delhi, 1982, 80p., Rs. 10. (Paper)

Former Chief Minister of Kerala writes on the role that Soviet foreign policy has played in shaping the world as it is today and the influence it has wielded on recent history. It highlights fundamental tenets of Soviet foreign policy, i.e. "to ensure lasting peace and to defend the right of the peoples to independence and social progress."

Vision of India: Selections from the Works of Rabindranath Tagore, Swami Vivekananda, Mahatma Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Jawaharlal Nehru. 2nd edn. Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, 1983. xi, 221p., Rs. 45

Collection of the thoughts of seven great Indians, who shaped nation's consciousness in their times and played significant roles in the regeneration and reintegration

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of its culture. It provides glimpses of Indian thought on diverse subjects in the hope that it will stimulate further explorations in Indian thought and cultural tradition. Sections have been made from their writings viz: Boundless Sky by Rabindranath Tagore; Discovery of India by Jawaharlal Nehru; Eastern Religions and Western Thought by S. Radhakrishnan; Collected Works of Mahatha Gandhi and Sri Aurobindo and addresses of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.

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RESOURCE AVAILABILITY AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE IN NIGERIA: THE IMPACT OF OIL

By Julius O. IHONVBERE*

Traditionally, attempts to study the foreign policy of underdeveloped cuntries have been fraught with problems. These problems arise from the domination of external relations by single individuals, the constantly changing nature of regimes and ideological orientations, the lack of consistency and the general constraints imposed by the peripheral location of underdeveloped countries in the international division of labour. This peripheral location and the consequent dependence of these states on the developed countries have imposed severe limitations on the formation of new alliances and the ability to fundamentally alter the direction or content of foreign policy actions without serious repercussions. But if the study is approached from the perspective of the political economy, the task becomes less of a problem.

The political economy approach to the study of foreign policy initiative and action will not only steer the analyst away from a mere description of events but will enable him to identify and understand the fundamental reasons why for instance, words outweigh actions, why changes are difficult to come by, the specific internal and external interests protected by certain foreign policy decisions and the reasons behind efforts to change or consolidate the location of a particular state in the international division of labour.

The primary aim of this paper is to analyze the nature of Nigeria's foreign policy since political independence in 1960 and demonstrate the chain of continuity through the various regimes and crises. Rather than examine the country's external relations in isolation, this paper intends to locate foreign policy initiatives and action in the socio-economic and political dynamics of Nigeria both as an oil exporting country and as a sub-imperial power.

The political economy approach will enable us to examine, in the case of Nigeria, at what point the availability of revenue yielding resource (s) began to change, extend or deepen the nature and pattern of external relations as evidenced in foreign policy declarations, initiatives and operations. Our major contention in this case is that despite the size and resources of the country, Nigeria's foreign policy has not changed since 1960 when it became politically independent. The foreign policy has no doubt witnessed a lot of action, declarations, conferences and monetary expenditures; the latter facilitated by the increased oil revenues following the 1973 OPEC oil price increases. But what has actually taken place can be described as "motion in a barber's chair."

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RESOURCE AVAILABILITY AND PUTATIVE POWER

It is important to examine the place of resource availability in Nigeria's foreign policy. Prior to 1973, other than in population terms Nigeria had pratically no other advantage over other African states. Its huge population of 63 million at independence certainly served to attract foreign investment, but the very conservative nature of the political leadership at that time did not help generate the need for special attention from the great powers. However, following the 1973 and subsequent oil price increases, the question of the role of resource availability and foreign policy change became important in analysing Nigerian foreign policy.

Traditionally, resource needs and imperialism were linked. It was argued that the reasons why some countries expanded or became imperialistic was the need to acquire more resources. This interpretation if left unqualified would leave one with the impression that resource-rich states would not be imperialistic. Thus, realists argued that because resources were important determinants of a nation's power nation-states will seek to enhance and

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maintain their power, i.e. maintain their supplies of resources.1

Dependency and underdevelopment literature unfortunately provides few insights into the international relations of underdeveloped and dependent states. However, implicit in the position of the approach is the contention that the underdeveloped institutions and structures, the backward mode(s) of production and thus the peripheral location of these societies in the world system makes them junior participants in the international system, the pawns of the developed countries, incapable of making significant moves in their own interests. This position further argues that a nation with limited resources is more likely to comply under stress and that the asymmetrical relationships inherent in the relations between the developed and under developed economies, provides the dominant actors with an effective weapon to use against the dependent states even without resort to military means. In support of this position Peter Blau has argued that:

By supplying services in demand to others, a person establishes power over them. If he regularly renders needed services they cannot readily obtain elsewhere, others become dependent on and obligated to him for these services and unless they can furnish other benefits to him that produce interdependence by making him equally dependent on them, their unilateral dependence obligates them to comply with his requests lest he cease to continue to meet their needs.³

The position above appears rather simplistic because it neglects the crucial part of the equation. It completely neglects the internal social structure that maintains and reproduces this so-called dependence, the internal class that benefits from the dependence and the nature of internal support the policy enjoys. More importantly, it neglects the room for independent action which

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cial hat hat licy the dependent state might enjoy even among other dependent states—and efforts, explict or otherwise, being made to alter or consolidate the system.

The real issue we wish to make clear here is that resource availability is only a basis for putative power. It only contributes to the power potential of the state but not its absolute power. Were this not the case perhaps Saudi Arabia, considering its vast oil resource would have been the greatest power in the world today. Available resources must be identified, tapped, refined, marketed and the revenues or gains used to create the basis for more wealth. Moreover, there are several ways of increasing the power of a state even without resource availability in the immediate instance. Through alliances, rapid military build up, external aid in return for strategic location beneficial to a larger power, rapid economic development and so on, a country can increase its influence and power. But above all these, is the emergence of a dominant class interested in creating a relatively powerful and independent basis of existence and participation in the world system. It is in fact, this situation that will condition the nature, direction and content of foreign policy initiative and action, the pattern of economic development and the world view that the population is encouraged to adopt.

In relation to Nigeria the resource issue has been the source of several myths concerning the power of the country. The incorporation of the area today into the capitalist world economy in the late eighteenth century marked the beginnings of a peripheral capitalist society. British colonialism arrested the natural process of state formation and development while it imposed new structures and institutions. It further undertook, directly and indirectly, the creation of a class configuration which was not only out of tune with the objective level of economic development but more importantly, was favourably disposed to the continued maintenance of the status-quo already under the domination of Western European capital, after political independence.

Thus, at independence in 1960, with a population of 63 million and an area of 357,000 sq. miles, the Nigerian power elite perceived the country as the greatest in Africa. Analysts of the Nigerian scene also neglected the historically determined location of the country in the international system and the origins of the power elite. Such analysts failed to examine the role of Nigeria as a semi-industrial power in the periphery and as a sub-imperial power in the sub-region. They also neglected or at least paid limited attention to the continued dependence of the Nigerian state on external trade, imported technology, food and expertise, the process of class formation and class struggle in the country and how these factors among others have influenced the content and direction of the country's foreign policy leading to over-extension of interests, a lot of motion but very limited action.

In 1960, Nigeria was essentially an exporter of agricultural raw materials. It relied exclusively on the West for technological, financial and political support to maintain internal stability and keep development projects affoat.

In turn, the country undertook to support Western policies in the African continent and on other international issues. The power elite, created through the activities of European finance capital and the Western Press, on the other hand, undertook to convince the leadership and public that the country was destined to lead Africa and the black world. The country was hailed as the cradle of democracy in Africa. The first Prime Minister was called "the golden voice of Africa" and in their pronouncements and writings the power elite developed this belief which in reality lacked a credible basis. For instance, the first Minister for Foreign Affairs declared:

...our country is the largest single unit in Africa... we are not going to abdicate the position in which God Almighty has placed us....The whole black continent is looking up to this country to liberate it from thraldom.⁴

The basis of this belief has changed over time—population, size, wealth, largest army in Africa, democraccy and now oil—but analysts of Nigerian foreign policy have continued to stress the leadership role of the country in Africa. To take a few examples, Gray Cowan echoed this idea of the manifest destiny of Nigeria to lead Africa when he stated that "Nigeria has been expected to assume a decisive role in African politics," while Olajide Aluko followed suit by declaring that "Nigeria cannot readily give up the bid to play a leading role in the OAU." The Nigerian Government also lent support to such interpretations when in the Second National Development Plan 1970-74 it declared:

The country is fortunate in having the resource potential in men and material and money to lay a solid foundation for a socio-economic revolution in Africa. The uncompromising objective of rising economic prosperity in Nigeria is the economic independence of the nation and the defeat of neo-colonialist forces in Africa.⁷

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Furthermore, in a speech to the nation on 1 October 1974, the Nigerian Head of State also emphasized the country's continental responsibility—

Our policy has been one of upholding the dignity of the African, safeguarding his interest and promoting his well being and protecting him from all forms of oppression and exploitation... The support which Nigeria gives for the struggle for human dignity and eradication of all racialism and colonialism in Africa, and our determination to pursue these goals will continue to be intensified until the whole of Africa is free from the stain of degradation.⁸

The curious aspect of this over-extended responsibility which the Nigerian power elite has imposed on itself becomes clear when it is realised that the

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country is underdeveloped in all respects. For the Nigerian state, this preoccupation with external issues provides a breathing space and diverts attention from pressing internal issues.

This belief that Nigeria is destined to lead Africa has now become stronger with the oil boom. Combined with a population of about 100 million, a standing army of about 200,000 and oil production (prior to the current glut) of about 2.2 million barrels per day, there is very little one can do to convince the Nigerian power elite that the country is still poor, underdeveloped and peripheral in the world economy. Table I provides some development indicators while Table II shows oil production for selected years since 1960. (Tables I and II are at the end of text).

With the oil boom providing the Nigerian state with huge revenues, the power elite has been able to buy its way into several activities in the international arena thus creating the impression that some dynamism exists in the direction of foreign policy initiation and action. But the nature of oil production and marketing on which the state is now absolutely dependent for revenues introduces a new and often neglected dimension into the relative power and independence of Nigeria. Though at independence, Nigeria was an exporter of primary products, by 1975 oil had become the sole source of foreign exchange earnings. Agriculture was neglected and military expenditure increased tremendously. The fact that the state was dependent on less than 6 per cent of the total number of workers in the modern sector increased the arrogance with which the Nigerian state spent the revenues from oil on all kinds of wasteful prestige projects which contributed very little to uplifting the standard of living in the country. But the oil sector in Nigeria is dominated by foreign oil companies especially in terms of technology, marketing information, prospecting capacity and ability to withstand the crises of the new international oil market. Table III (at end of text), shows oil and non-oil sector contributions to the national revenue. The danger inherent in this dependence on oil is evidenced not only in the fact that the Nigerian state is now dependent on the continued co-operation of a handful of workers but also on a handful of foreign oil companies. But the situation is very beneficial to the power elites: the oil companies handle all the risks and the state through the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNPC) collects the rent.

NIGERIA IN WEST AFRICA: A SUB-IMPERIAL POWER?

Four major principles guided Nigeria's policy towards its neighbours at independence in 1960. These were, the respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of every African state, equality of all states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and finally, the commitment to functional co-operation as a means of enhancing continental unity. It was in line with these principles that Nigeria joined the Organization for African Unity and embraced non-alignment. However, until the

outbreak of the civil war in 1967 Nigeria remained aloof of political and economic activities in the West African sub-region.

Several reasons have been advanced in an attempt to explain this situation of aloofness by the most populous nation in the region. The argument that the relative economic and military weakness of the other states in the region called for limited attention appears rather unacceptable in face of the reality of socio-economic conditions in Nigeria. Rather, the problems of unity and stability, coupled with a preoccupation with economic growth, were so enormous as to leave little time for the pro-Western and conservative government that replaced the colonial authority to have time for extensive external affairs. Moreover, unlike post-1973 regimes, resources available to the immediate post-independence government were severely limited in all respects. The limited breathing space available to the government of Tafawa Balewa was spent on dealing with Ghana—preventing the spread of Nkrumahism and socialism.

In the light of the situation just described, other than involvement in some inherited Anglo-West African organisations like the West African Examinations Council, Nigeria had very limited bilateral or multilateral relations with other states in the region particularly the Francophone states. It was not until the outbreak of civil war and the realisation that Nigeria's security could not be totally divorced from those of other regional states, that a more active interest began to be taken in West African affairs. This realization came primarily from the support given to the secessionist forces by the Francophone states in the region.

ECOWAS Initiates a Regional Community

One of the most "successful" manifestations of the country's foreign policy action in the region was the initiation and creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria was able to see this scheme through because of its renewed interest in the affairs of other regional states after the civil war in 1970. The Military Government was able to win the support or co-operation of other states because it was willing to use oil as a foreign policy weapon and was prepared to spend revenues from oil to achieve its foreign policy objectives. These actions were also made possible by the socio-economic crises which the rise in oil prices had created in other regional economies coupled with the desires of other states to take advantage of the benefits which Nigeria was likely to provide as the "core state" in the integration scheme.

Thus, it will be incorrect to perceive the formation of ECOWAS as an exclusively Nigerian affair and therefore a major success in the country's foreign policy goals as the government has repeated again and again. Moreover, it will be an oversight not to recognize the fact that other than possible diplomatic pride to Nigeria, other regional states are likely to benefit more from the integration scheme because it meets their perceptions and expected

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benefits than it does those of Nigeria. In relation to the first point, the major role of foreign capital which in any case is the only sector sufficiently organized and integrated to take full advantage of the removel of trade barriers cannot be overlooked. This major role is evidenced in the complete silence of the ECOWAS Treaty on the fate of extant and future foreign investment in the region and the influence of the Nigerian Chambers of Commerce in the whole affair. In relation to the second point, the continued membership of the Francophone states in their own West African Economic Community (CEAO), their peripheral support for ECOWAS protocols, their failure to meet financial obligations and the continued promulgation of nationalistic economic policies all go to demonstrate the fact that they still lack confidence in Nigeria and ECOWAS. One could also include the continued fear by the smaller states that Nigeria could end up dominating the regional economy and thus emerge as a "regional imperialist power." 9

It is therefore interesting to note that though the dominant power-elite that controlled the Nigerian state prior to the civil war had been opposed to integration on the grounds that the country had nothing to gain from the other relatively smaller and poorer states, the perception changed completely after 1970. The impact of the civil war, the realisation that the country was not as secure as it had been assumed, the role of France on the side of the secessionist forces and the initiative of the latter immediately after the civil war in Nigeria to create in the sub-region an exclusively Francophone economic community, pushed Nigeria to take immediate action. The general perception was that France was planning to create conditions for the isolation of Nigeria in the sub-region.

Thus, beginning in 1972 Nigeria began making moves to Togo in relation to the formation of an economic community that would embrace all the states in the region for the first time. By May 1973, Nigeria had virtually succeeded in achieving this objective and ECOWAS was born in 1975 embracing all the sixteen states in the sub-region. This established for the first time a regional community that cut across colonial, linguistic and cultural barriers, making provision for the harmonization of all economic, social, cultural and ultimately political spheres of activity. Most important was the fact that the Treaty was completely silent on the participation of foreign capital in the regional economy despite the outright domination of the economies by international finance capital. The only reference to foreign capital in the Treaty relates to the desire to employ the ECOWAS Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development to guarantee foreign investments in the region. This decision had nothing to do with a desire to regulate the participation of foreign capital in relation to local Participation, location, transfer of profits abroad, re-investment patterns, technology transfers, energy consumption and so on.

It appears rather surprising, in the context of the situation just described, that in a sub-region in which according to recent United Nations sources domination of production sectors is as high as 97.7 per cent in Niger,

87.4 per cent in Senegal, 80 per cent in the Ivory Coast, 87 per cent in the Gambia, 84.4 per cent in Sierra Leone, 65 per cent in Nigeria and 65 per cent in Ghana, 10 should take no steps to rectify this situation The reason for this is very simple. Except for Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands in a very limited sense, ECOWAS is nothing more than an agglomeration of neo-colonial branch plant economies inspired by a country with a very weak national bourgeoisie. The principal and immediate beneficiary of labour mobility, elimination of tariff barriers, mobility of production factors and so on, will be international finance capital. Perhaps in terms of prestige Nigeria might make some gains, but without a credible productive base, this can at best be tenous. Moreover if we take a look at the mechanisms employed by Nigeria to win the support of other states in the region to join ECOWAS, we find a mixture of bribery and indirect blackmail. Bribery in the sense that Nigeria suddenly became very generous to the Francophone states in terms of financial aid and unsolicited donations. Indirect blackmail in the sense that by bribing and winning the support of some major states in the sub-region, the relatively smaller, landlocked and poorer states had little choice but to join. Even some relatively developed states like Senegal, despite its opposition to ECOWAS and fear of possible domination by Nigeria, had little choice but to join the community. How did Nigeria bribe these states into joinning ECOWAS?

Nigeria virtually purchased its dominant position in the sub-region. Admittedly, countries like the Ivory Coast now see Nigeria as a market for their manufactures, while the landlocked states in the region saw ECOWAS as a way of avoiding the stultifying tariff barriers. The drought stricken Sahelian states also expected some financial assistance from Nigeria which had joined OPEC in 1971. The inability to translate available resources into a credible base that could serve long term interests meant that Nigeria had no choice but to take the route constantly taken by capital-surplus economies—financial contributions. Thus Nigeria took this wasteful path to establishing its influence in the region and continent through the hosting of all kinds of conferences, cultural festivals, jamborees and meetings. The country also employed soft loans, joint investments and donations. A few examples of this would suffice.

In pursuit of its aims, Nigeria constructed a highway linking Idi-Iroko in Nigeria to Porto-Novo in the Republic of Benin at a cost of N1.8 million to Nigeria. A N 2 million, 25 year interest free loan was also granted to Benin, while Nigeria agreed to take over 30 per cent of the equity and invest N 7.2 million in a joint cement project in the Republic of Benin. It also undertook to participate to the tune of N 20 million in a joint sugar project in Benin. This flagrant display of wealth between 1972 and 1975, when ECOWAS was formed, did not stop there. Nigeria donated printing machines worth N 42,000 to Benin and on foreign tips in the region, visit to Guinea, the Nigerian leader donated N 50,000 to the ruling party,

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N 20,000 was donated for cultural development in the Republic of Benin and N 5,000 was given to a horticultural and nutritional centre also in Benin. While electricity was scarce in Nigeria, a situation in which the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) experienced drastic reductions in manpower and industries, and reported that over 30 per cent of productive capacity was immobilized due to constant power cuts, the Nigerian Government undertook to supply Niger with electricity from its Kainji Dam at a maximum rate of 30,000 kilowatts.

The confidence Nigeria hoped to gain from ECOWAS has thus not materialized. The Francophone states continue to be very close to France and the French-sponsored West African Economic Community (CEAO). More importantly perhaps is the fact that it has become very clear to the Francophone states that Nigeria cannot replace France as an aid donor and military ally. The ECOWAS scheme, on which Nigeria had committed a lot of time and funds, was also unpopular at home, as the Nigerian public came to blame most of their ills—unemployment, crime, lack of housing, prostitution and inflation—on the influx of "ECOWAS citizens" following the agreement on labour mobility. In the light of this general perception it becomes difficult to see the initiation and formation of ECOWAS as a major foreign policy achievement as the Nigerian Government has always felt. More importantly, is the fact that ECOWAS in the long run, even if it benefits the Nigerian state, is currently under the firm grip of international finance capital. The alliance between the agents of the Nigerian state, represented by the Federal Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction and international capital represented by the Nigerian Chambers of Commerce, Trade and Industry, was clearly demonstrated in the nature of the activities, negotiations and trade offs that culminated in the formation of the economic community.

To take a few examples, the perception of the techno-comprador class that controls the Nigerian state is quite explicit in the view of the Federal Commissioner:

The reality of a community rests largely in the hands of what one might loosely describe as the agents of socio-economic activity—business, industrial and financial enterprises and institutions and their organised associations like the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and professional associations. If these agents of socio-economic activity do not exist, they have to be created, if they exist, they must be induced to function across national frontiers.¹¹

This was an undisguised argument in favour of international capital by the Nigerian state. This is because not only does it refuse to consider a possible role for the state but specifically fails to point out who the "agents of socio-economic" activity really are. In the case of Nigeria where such "agents" already exist, they must be induced to spread across the frontiers.

As we have pointed out earlier, the Nigerian economy is largely dominated by foreign capital which has relegated indigenous participation to the commercial sector of the economy. Thus, the state would be spending its resources in the effort to encourage so-called agents of socio-economic activities which in reality are foreign.

The foreign capital-dominated Chambers of Commerce cashed in on this open support for its location and role in the Nigerian political economy to move outside the national boundaries. In the words of the Chambers' President, the West African Chambers of Commerce, which was created on the instigation of the Nigerian Chambers, "went a long way towards preparing other West African governments to commit themselves to ECOWAS....The Federation, its corporate members and officials served as advisers in the negotiations which produced the ECOWAS Treaty." Thus, it would be right to argue that the comprador role of the Nigerian power elite prevented it from using ECOWAS as a base to advance its fundamental interests without making it secondary to a process of using its oil revenues to advance the interests of international capital. The comments of the Nigerian Head of State in relation to the formation of the West African Chambers of Commerce lends support to such a position. He declared:

May I express our great satisfaction with the bold initiative taken by the businessmen in our West African sub-region who have given practical demonstration of our hopes and aspirations by forming the Association of West African Chambers of Commerce. They deserve our fullest support.¹³

The group that was to receive this support was foreign capital, a sector which in fact deserves serious and extensive control and regulation if the region is to reap gains from the scheme.

The availability of oil resource and thus the revenues has enabled the Nigerian Government to move out of West African affairs while counting the formation of ECOWAS as a successful instance of foreign policy initiative and action.

In his address to the 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1980, the Nigerian President as the military leaders before him, declared:

Nigeria will no longer tolerate the provocations by South Africa or the dilatory tactics of its allies in the Western bloc with regard to self determination and majority rule for Namibia. We deeply deplore the collusion between South Africa and its Western allies which continues to deny the people of that territory their inalienable rights.¹⁴

This declaration was in fact only a restatement of the government's declared commitment to the total liberation of the African continent from

colonialism and all forms of neo-colonialism. This desire to liberate Africa and Africans also included a wider objective of contributing to the upliftment of the living standards of black people the world over.

Constraints to Attaining Sub-Regional Imperialism

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Without doubt this new foreign policy position, which was formulated and made very explicit in the seventies, cannot be divorced from the oil boom and the declining reliance on foreign aid to keep development projects afloat. But there were several constraints which clearly prevented the Nigerian power elite from pushing its objectives to the logical conclusion. The fact that the government was dependent on shaky revenues with which it wished to liberate the African continent, the sector producing this revenue is still dominated by foreign oil companies and since the power elite in charge of state policy is a technico-comprador bourgeois class, the necessity of good relations with Western countries was of primary importance. In the light of these constraints, Nigerian foreign policy towards Southern Africa has witnessed a lot of activities and financial contributions to liberation movements, but limited or no change. If one removes oil as a source of revenue, one finds very little to stand on in understanding the force behind the self-imposed leadership role of Nigeria in the struggles to liberate Southern Africa. It is also very doubtful if a country which is fully integrated into the world capitalist economy as a periphery can speak of the "total liberation" of other territories beyond its narrow understanding of the concept of liberation.

Given the underdeveloped nature of the Nigerian economy in comparison to South Africa, its acclaimed principal enemy in the continent, it is easy to understand why the liberation of Southern Africa has come to be interpreted as a financial responsibility, i.e. making generous donations to liberation movements and liberated territories. Nigeria cannot therefore afford to organize and execute a major assault militarily or economically against South Africa or the Western world on which it is heavily dependent. This is not to discount the various efforts by the Nigerian Government to impose sanctions against South Africa both unilaterally or otherwise. The crucial question here is, to what extent did oil contribute to invigorating the country's foreign policy towards Southern Africa?

Prior to the civil war in 1967, Nigeria's opposition to the minority regimes in Southern Africa was based on moral grounds. In fact, South Africa was invited to Nigeria's independence celebrations and trade sanctions against Rhodesia were not imposed until 1963. However, the civil war gave Nigeria a new basis for opposition—security. The moral, financial and material support which South Africa and Rhodesia provided for the secessionist forces forced the Nigerian leaders to realize that the existence of hostile regimes in the continent also posed a threat to its national security. The Federal Commissioner for External Affairs, in the period of the civil war,

along with the Federal Cabinet, strongly believed that the first bomb dropped on the capital by the rebel forces came from Rhodesia. Thus, after the war, the government decided to change its policy towards South Africa and other minority regimes by giving full support to the liberation movements. This new commitment has involved virtually every diplomatic and economic move short of direct military support for the liberation movements though the idea has been floated around from time to time. The crucial obstacle to such an action arises not only from the relative weakness of Nigeria compared to South Africa but also from the fact that in the event of a military confrontation between Nigeria and South Africa, the latter can count on the direct support of its Western allies. Whatever the obstacles to effective action in Southern Africa, it cannot be disputed that Nigeria's self-imposed leadership role in the region, its search for security in the sub-region and continent and so on were made possible by the oil boom.

Since the civil war, South Africans have been declared prohibited immigrants in Nigeria and a total trade embargo/boycott has been imposed. This has been extended over time to cover all areas of sports, culture and education. Direct bilateral aid mainly in the form of materials has also been extended to the liberation movements in Southern Africa; in 1972 for instance, the Nigerian Government contributed £ 126,000 to the OAU Liberation Committee's fund, in 1973 it contributed \$180,000. The traditional harassment of the leaders of liberation movements which was very common in the premilitary era has been stopped and the government has used all possible opportunities to denounes the minority regimes in Southern Africa.

An interesting aspect of Nigeria's foreign policy towards Southern Africa has to do with the somewhat contradictory support for armed struggle and peace initiatives at the same time. This position is evident in the country's support for the peace proposals of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations while at the same time providing moral, financial and material support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa. In a recent statement, the Executive President of Nigeria declared:

I...find it intolerable that the independence of Namibia continues to be bedeviled by the intransigence of South Africa.... I sincerely hope that the international Conference on sanctions against South Africa, which the United Nations in co-operation with the OAU plans to hold next year in Paris, will succeed in addressing this important matter as an effective alternative to the use of force by the United Nations to bring about the birth of a new society in South Africa. 15

In the same speech, the Nigerian leader went on to declare:

But sanctions alone will not destroy apartheid and racism in South Africa. They can however be used to support the armed struggle. That armed

struggle is now gathering momentum. If South Africa persists in its defiance of international will for fundamental changes in its policies, none of us has the right to deny the struggle of the South African nationalists full support. Certainly not Nigeria. We shall continue to assist, encourage and support that struggle with all our might and resources. 16

This rather contradictory posture informs the content and direction of Nigeria's foreign policy towards Southern Africa. It has enabled Nigeria to remain friends with both camps involved in the struggle in that region of the continent. While Nigeria has found it pertinent to pull some diplomatic strings in support of its initiatives in Southern Africa, it has been careful till date to select its policies in such a way as not to hurt its fundamental interests with the Western Powers. Practical actions like the 1978 withdrawal from the Commonwealth Games in protest against New Zealand's sporting contacts with South Africa, the withdrawal from the Davis Cup Tennis in protest against Israel, which also has links with South Africa, and the refusal to participate in the World Amateur Squash Championships and the Junior Tennis Championships at Wimbledon, all in protest against South Africa's participation, though significant have not made any serious demands on the Nigerian Government.

Finally, though the Nigerian Government has declared that the country was compiling information on enterprises which operated in South Africa and Nigeria at the same time, nothing concrete has come out of that declaration till date. To Such tough talk characterised the military era and has been adopted by the current civilian regime. As we have pointed out above, Nigeria has no alternative but to see the conflict in Southern Africa in racial terms, while neglecting the fundamental problems posed by international finance capital. It cannot present a fundamental challenge to South Africa because not only does it lack the military power to do so but also because its location in the international division of labour as a semi-periphery dominated by international capital inhibits it from doing so. Thus, at best, Nigeria can continue to increase its financial contributions in so far as oil maintains a good price in the international market. It is at this level that Nigeria confronts the major powers.

NIGERIA IN THE GLOBAL ARENA: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

At independence in 1960, the conservative government that captured political power in Nigeria was without inhibitions, pro-Western and totally anti-Communist. Though the country claimed to be non-aligned, it was difficult to define the ways in which non-alignment applied to Nigeria. It is not difficult to see that the pre-1966 Balewa Government had a distaste for non-alignment. It was prepared to sign a defence pact with Britain, its economic, cultural and political relations were pro-West and concrete attempts were made by the government to restrict the activities of the Eastern

bloc countries in Nigeria while at the same time discouraging Nigerians from travelling to communist countries for whatever reasons.

In order to comprehend the ideological basis for this pro-Western outlook of the Balewa Government, one has to look at the nature of the transition from colonialism to neo-colonial dependence on Britain and the West. Arising from the latter was the capture of political power by a conservative and aristocratic power elite which interpreted international politics in moralistic and legitimist terms. The colonial state, relations of production and accumulation, patterns of decision-making, institutions and values, were either fully preserved or slightly modified in the process of Nigerianisation. The domination of the economy by colonial capital, later joined by other Euro-American interests, remained intact. A grand strategy of incorporation was employed by international capital prior to and immediately after independence through limited Nigerianisation, partnerships and joint ventures with the state to rationalise the free existence and participation of foreign capital in the economy. This trend became so alarming following independence that a Nigerian senator was obliged to make this bitter observation:

The trend now is to call every company a Nigerian company. That is, somebody is appointed from the outside, a Nigerian, one foolish man, who is usually given a big salary so that they can call the company Nigerian. He has nothing to do with the company.¹⁸

It is therefore against this background that one must attempt to understand the pro-Western position of Nigeria's foreign policy prior to the military take-over in 1966.

Several examples to support the view that the pre-1966 foreign policy was pro-West may be quoted. The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact of 1960 was seen as an anti-Communist weapon. It was abrogated in 1963 due to widespread protest against it in the country. While no limit was placed on the Western diplomatic staff in Lagos or on their freedom of action and movement in the country, the staff of the Soviet Embassy was limited to ten and constantly checked to ensure conformity. The Balewa Government in Nigeria never considered the recognition of mainland China or Mongolia. Communist literature was banned in Nigeria and no financial or technical aid was sought or accepted from Eastern bloc countries. While Western diplomatic bodies were granted a hundred diplomatic car plates each, the Soviet embassy got five.

However, this situation was to be slightly altered during and after the civil war. The lukewarm support that the Federal Government received from the Western Powers and the direct support given to "Biafra" by France "showed Nigeria the way to the East."

The government realized that it was dangerous to rely solely on the West for all its economic and military transactions. In fact, Britain which was then

Nigeria's largest trading partner initially refused to aid the Federal Government until the Soviet Union agreed to supply urgently needed military materials to the former. The anger that Soviet assistance generated in the West further convinced the military leaders in Nigeria that economic interests were primary to Western calculations. Thus, the general agreement among Nigerian leaders was that the pro-Western policies of the Balewa Government must be reviewed.

Unfortunately, diversification of the, country's foreign policy could only be executed to a limited extent. The Nigerian power elite was still essentially comprador in nature. But the big difference which was to make diversification possible was oil and the revenues it brought to the government. This enabled the military rulers to rely more on their own resources, buy from whichever market they wished and upgrade themselves to the status of a sub-regional and continental super power. The fact that Nigeria had the largest population in Africa meant that it had a market which the West needed and so could afford to diversify its policies without much fear of alienating the Western powers. What are therefore the indicators of change in Nigeria's foreign policy? How fundamental has the change been?

Indicators of Change

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Perhaps the best way to demonstrate some of the changes in policies would be to contrast them where possible to the pre-military period. The most obvious indication has been the attempt to make the internal and external relations and decision-making in the country independent of foreign manipulation. For instance, when in 1969 the United States Ambassador to Nigeria pointed out to the military leaders that the Soviet Embassy had increased the number of its staff from 10 to 13 and demanded an explanation, the government replied that the number of diplomats it allowed into the country was entirely its own responsibility. Had this occurred under Balewa, the government would have thanked the Ambassador. In terms of makingits policies independent of foreign manipulation, very little has been achieveed. Internally, the Nigerian bourgeoisie has a very tenuous relation to productive activities. This bourgeoisie has been very content with its role as a commercial class; this has opened the way for foreign capital to dominate productive activities in the country. On the external front, the foreign policy has been characterised by a lot of action but very limited concrete achievements. The Western Powers have never been against the expenditure of huge sums of money by oil producing economies. Thus, it is difficult to see the extent to which the country's foreign policy has become independent of the international oil market and the maintenance of productive activities by foreign companies internally. The country's trade is still almost exclusively with the West, and the United States of America is still the largest market for Nigeria's oil which is now the sole source of revenue. Table IV shows the destination of Nigeria's exports; Table V, the sources of Nigeria's imports while Table VI, the destination of Nigeria's oil for a particular month. (All these tables at end of text).

Unlike in the pre-1966 period, when only Eastern bloc activities were condemned, the post-66 period witnessed the condemnation of whichever power was deemed to have violated international law. US activity in Vietnam and Cambodia received condemnation, the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was also roundly condemned. The tone of the language employed in condemning the minority regimes in Southern Africa and their Western allies became more radical while restrictions on contact between Nigerians and Eastern bloc citizens were abolished. In the military sphere. a very serious diversification took place. Prior to the civil war, the training and equipping of the Nigerian Armed Forces was exclusively a Western affair. But, noting the Western attitudes to the civil war, Nigeria entered into several bilateral economic, cultural and military aid agreements with the Eastern bloc countries. The Nigerian Air Force is now almost exclusively equipped by the Soviet Union. With the evident reluctance of the West, particularly Britain and the United States, to help with the building of an iron and steel complex, once again it was easy for Nigeria to turn to the Soviet Union. As Olajide Aluko has observed "in spite of all these, Nigeria's trade, economic and cultural links remain firmly with the West." In terms of diversifying Nigeria's foreign policy, the post-1966 period has witnessed efforts in this direction.

This diversification, coupled with the oil wealth, provided Nigeria with the required leverage with which to pull some diplomatic strings in support of its foreign policy initiatives. It also allowed the Nigerian leaders to undertake certain measures internally without much fear of sanctions from the Western powers. The constant threat to nationalize Western investments in Nigeria cannot be divorced from this perception. This threat was made very clear in the address of the last military Head of State to the Anti-Apartheid Conference in Lagos when he declared that Nigeria was:

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materials and markets but continue to help our enemies. Such enterprises must decide now to choose between us and our enemies and all that go with that choice. We have a festering sore on which these flies have landed and are feeding in full glare of the world. And when we move to destroy these flies, no one should complain. Foreign contractors who are known to have links with South Africa are already barred from taking part in tenders of any kind....An economic intelligence unit has been set up to ensure successful implementation of this policy.²⁰

In spite of such tough talk, the Nigerian leaders are fully aware that any economic action taken by them is likely to hurt the country more than any Western economy. The economic sanctions against South Africa have had little effect because it was never dependent on Nigeria for anything. But

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Nigeria has been able to take some concrete actions against Britain over Southern Africa especially on Zimbabwe. Instances of this include the Federal Government's action against Barclays Bank because of the latter's links with South Africa, the nationalisation of British Petroleum as a means of forcing the hands of Britain over the Zimbabwean affair and the refusal to award some government contracts to British firms. These actions have not affected Nigeria's relations with Britain in any significant respect. But what should concern any observer is: Why did Nigeria pick on Britain alone over Southern Africa?

The answer to this question is not difficult if we note the pattern of the socalled nationalisations. The Nigerian Government, in the first place realized that only Britain could force the hands of the minority regime in South Africa. However, while the actions were being taken, the Nigerian Government was careful to pay full compensation in order not to jeopardise its trade relations with Britain. For instance, it agreed to pay N 71 million in oil to the British Government for the nationalization of British Petroleum. The British Government, other than being satisfied with the compensations, was also careful not to take actions that would lead to the loss of its most lucrative market in the African continent. British investments in Nigeria in 1971, totalled N 3,000 million, its exports to Nigeria in 1980 alone stood at N 2.2 billion against Nigeria's paltry exports to the tune of N 300 million. The United States have increased its investments in the oil sector, and other than being Nigeria's largest market for oil, in 1971, it had \$1.500 million invested in Nigeria. The Soviet Union, which had increased its influence in the country following the civil war, also won a major contract for the construction of Nigeria's iron and steel industry. Countries such as Japan, Brazil, France and Italy have also won major contracts in the construction sector in agriculture or the services. They have also cornered various sections of the vast Nigerian market. These facts among others, coupled with the fact that Nigeria now had enough money to spend on imports, allowed for accommodation of pronouncements which would never have come from Nigeria in the First Republic.

The new-Nigerian foreign policy became characterized by very radical pronouncements on major controversial international issues and a desire to contribute very generously to liberation movements all over the continent. More importantly, in contrast to the pre-military era, the new foreign policy witnessed an open desire to intensify relations with the Eastern bloc countries. On the issue of external intervention in Africa and the cry raised by the West over the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and other areas, Nigeria's Lt. General Obasanjo had this to say:

Unless we wish to indulge in self-deception by avoiding unpalatable truths, we should recognize the recent intervention by certain ex-colonial European powers in Central Africa for what it really was. Simply put, it is a most naked and unshamed attempt to determine what Africa's

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true and collective interests should be. We reject the notion that Africa's interests or collective security needs can be discussed or determined by Western nations.... To the extent that any African country can be considered by the West to have "gone communist," it was as a direct result of the failure of Western policies. The fact of the matter is that Africa was colonized by Western powers and not the Soviets. In the struggle for independence and freedom, the only source of effective support was the Eastern bloc countries. The Soviets were therefore invited into Africa for a purpose and that purpose was to liberate the countries to which they were invited from centuries of cruelty, degradation, oppression and exploitation.²¹

Commenting specifically on the issue of the Cuban presence in Africa, the Nigerian leader took his audience at the Organisation of African Unity by surprise when he declared:

In every case where Cuba's intervention was established they intervened as a consequence of the failure of Western policies and on behalf of legitimate African interests. We have no right to condemn the Cubans, nor the countries which felt they needed Cuban assistance to consolidate their sovereignty or territorial integrity.²²

As pointed out earlier, this increasing radicalism on the part of Nigerian leaders was made possible only by two bargaining advantages which bought them accommodation from the Western nations—the oil revenues and the largest market in the continent which the West needed. The Nigerian leaders were however very careful not to over stretch these advantages so as not to attract sanctions which might lay bare the fragile foundations of the newforeign policy.

The same tough talk was addressed to France by the military leaders who had served as field officers during the Nigerian Civil War and were quite familiar with French support for the "Biafran" forces. While receiving the outgoing French Ambassador in 1977, Nigeria's General Obasanjo said:

...the time had come when France should lay more emphasis on her foreign policy formulation and executing the political aspirations of Africans over French economic interests...the activities of the French Government in Africa since 1960, through the Nigerian Civil War and up to now, showed sharp conflicts between the economic interests of France and the political aspirations of Black Africa. The time has come for France to reduce her pre-occupation with economic considerations which run counter to the interests of Africa by ensuring that events like those of the past do not occur again.²³

The rather strong position towards Western Powers was not mellowed in

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any way when the Nigerian External Affairs Commissioner declared in 1976 that "Nigeria would not be deterred from assuming its historical responsibility because of the interests of foreign powers." The Commissioner went on to assert that "Nigeria's new foreign policy abhors any form of confrontation with any super powers, big or small but if challenged by any foreign power on matters of interest to the nation, Nigeria would stand its ground and would not flinch." The current civilian Executive President reinforced this assertion in 1980 when he visited the United States and declared that;

...oil has become a weapon in international politics. I am on record as saying that we shall use all weapons at our disposal, including oil if it becomes unavoidable, to pursue and fight for the interests of Nigeria.²⁵

While it is true that the increasing agitation by intellectuals, the influence of public opinion, the nature of the international system and personality factors have all contributed to the initiation of this new Nigerian foreign policy, there is no doubt that the ability to talk tough with limited consequences and back up the tough talk with financial contributions to the OAU and liberation movements have been made possible by oil wealth. It was this oil wealth that enabled Nigeria to initiate and see through the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); it has also enabled Nigeria to write off a large chunk of the Community's expenses other than contributing 32 per cent of the Community's budget annually. The oil wealth and the direction and content of the new foreign policy, has increased Nigeria's influence in the OAU. Thus following Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC), Nigeria was able to convince the OAU that it must negotiate with the EEC as a collective unit.26 The new foreign policy has also witnessed a diversification or widening of relations with countries in the "Third World."

The widening of relations, referred to above, is evidenced in the military relations with the Western and Eastern bloc countries, the exchange of visits with leaders all over the world and the accommodation of countries ideologically opposed to that professed by the Nigerian power elite. But since the country is heavily reliant on international investment, it has to create a suitable climate attractive to those who wish to invest. It is in this regard that Nigeria, despite its oil wealth and huge population finds it difficult to transcend the tough talk and financial contributions to liberation movements in Southern Africa. Thus, while the Nigerian leaders have been able to widen the area of economic partnership, it has in fact not adopted any new revolutionary approach to its foreign policy. The leaders have been careful to realize that any drastic action could scare off foreign investors and hurt the country more than the enemy. This could spell danger for a country heavily dependent on imports like Nigeria. In the twentieth

independence anniversary speech, the new civilian President declared to the nation:

Our monthly import bill which stood at a level of about six hundred million Naira at the beginning of this administration (October 1979) now stands at an average of one billion Naira per month. With our policy of liberalising restrictions on import, this figure is likely to rise in months ahead.²⁷

With such a policy in mind, it can be seen that Nigeria cannot be expected in the near future to take concrete action, military or economic, in support of its foreign policy actions beyond withdrawal from sporting competitions and tough talk at international conferences. The Director of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs has observed that "there is a limit to the retaliatory acts Nigeria can take against industrialized countries for violating her national interest because she needs the transfer of technology."28 More important than the transfer of technology, which can be purchased from within the "Third World," is the fragile level of internal cohesion which cannot withstand any external crisis. This lack of internal unity is made worse by the peripheral location of Nigeria in the international division of labour which is reproduced by the internal elites who are content to serve as agents to international capital. This means that they cannot be expected to move beyond peripheral attacks on major issues at least to the extent that they do not have to make major military commitments. The oil wealth provides a very good cover for this illusionary radicalism.

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion one may say, that this paper has attempted to draw attention to some new directions in Nigeria's foreign policy and to identify the extent to which oil has influenced this "new" policy. The attempt to play the sub-regional and continental super power role has been identified and it has been argued that this desire to be concerned with the issues affecting other countries in the continent emerged from two sources. The desire to rectify the problems of security which arose during the civil war and the new oil wealth which allowed Nigeria to translate its desires into concrete actions evidenced in the diversification of its external relations, the initiation and formation of ECOWAS and increasing support to liberation movements. It is also argued that oil wealth and the huge population have had to be employed cautiously due to the dependence of the country on Western markets for the sale of its oil, the domination of this singular revenue source by foreign oil companies, the lack of internal unity and the desire not to create a situation that would demand concrete military commitments. Irrespective of these, the new "radicalism" evidenced in the foreign policy pronouncements of the Nigerian leaders, demonstrate a major shift from the pre-military period.

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The "major shift" referred to above does not suggest a major change in the content and direction of Nigeria's foreign policy. Though the leadership has been consistent in its support for the liberation movements and its commitment to schemes such as ECOWAS, the fundamental ideological content of its actions have not changed. Nigerian leaders have seized every opportunity to re-state its foreign policy objectives and while limited attention has been paid to pressing internal problems, the continental and global responsibilities of the country have been emphasized over and over. For instance, in his New Year Broadcast in 1979, General Obasanjo found time to address the following:

Our foreign policy of focusing on Africa without ignoring our interest in other parts of the world has yielded dividends in the past year. In concert with other African brothers, we have played our modest part in restoring peace between some warring neighbours in Africa and in encouraging others who might have gone to war to adopt reconcilliatory postures.... (We) have not relented our efforts towards hastening the pace of liberation in Southern Africa. While we continue to give full support and co-operation to any fresh initiatives which seek to achieve our purpose in Southern Africa without further bloodshed, we shall continue also to strengthen the hands of the liberation movements and the Frontline States in every way we can.²⁹

While no one doubts the commitments of the Nigerian Government, the position above has been formulated in such a way as not to hurt any one involved in the conflict.

The government has also pursued its global commitments with vigour. During his visit to the United States in 1980, the new civilian President declared that Nigerians believed that "so long as one inch of African territory is occupied territory, we remain in bondage, and wherever a black or African is oppressed, we share the indignity.... Nigeria shall work relentlessly to uphold the dignity of the black race anywhere in the world." In the President's address to the Black Caucus in the United States he stressed that "it is honourable, imperative and within the real self interest for United States Black entrepreneurs to invest in Nigeria."

Finally, the possibility for a deepening of the content and directions of Nigeria's foreign policy still exists. Perhaps as the oil dries up or as the Western markets discover new energy sources among other possibilities, Nigeria will begin to experience regional and continental challenges to its power. It might then be forced to employ its military power in order to restore its prestige and safeguard its interests. As the conflict in Southern could develop and if this happens, Nigeria cannot refuse considering the prosperity could intensify the desire to consolidate Nigeria's involvement

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in external issues, but the level of internal unity and the strength and readiness of the army for such external engagements will determine the extent to which the government would push such an involvement. Defence expenditures increased from N 370,253,689 million in 1972/73 to N 1,166. 699,42 million in 1975/76. But whatever Nigeria's foreign policy may look like in the next decade would depend not only on the perception of the leadership in the country but also on the level of internal mobilization and stability that is generated. Considering the fact that the prospects for oil in the international market is currently not encouraging, the time is running out for Nigeria to utilise its oil wealth in creating a solid internal basis for its foreign policy actions. On the whole, there have been new developments and issues in the content and directions of Nigeria's foreign policy since the fall of the First Republic in 1966, but no fundamental change has occurred.

August 1982.

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nerce erian Vorld onial state. The nationalist movement that emerged after the war and the strategy of foreign capital, aimed at winning the support of the indigenous elite, led to the incorporation of some Nigerians into the Chambers. By 1969, nine years after political independence, Nigerian companies, mainly commercial or trading enterprises, constituted about 25 per cent of the Chambers' membership. At the end of the civil war in 1970, seventeen of the thirty members of the national excutive were Nigerians. But the important standing committees and trade groups remained firmly in the hands of foreign enterprises leaving the small businessman and tourism committees to Nigerians. The Organisation of Nigerian Indigenous Businessmen broke off from the Chambers in 1970 in protest against its domination by foreign interests. It is importants to note that this indigenous group did not get the support of the Nigerian state. It therefore remained weak and outcompeted in the national market.

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TABLE I NIGERIA SOME DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

Official Name: Federal Republic of Nigeria. Capital: Lagos (Tobe changed to Abudja)

Area: 923,768 sq. km.

Annual Population Growth Rate: 2.5-3 per cent

GDP: \$24 billion (1976)

Annual Growth Rate: 10 per cent GNP Per Capita: \$ 560 (1979)

National Currency: Naira (N) (NI-US\$1.65)

Population: 80.6 million (1976)

Principal Exports: Oil 95 per cent; Cocoa 5 per cent.

Life Expectancy at Birth: 48 (1978)

Adult Literacy %: 25 (1970)

Food Import Bill: 1.56 billion (1980)

For more development indicators on Nigeria, see World Development Report' 1981 (The World Bank, Washington D.C.).

TABLE II
OIL PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA—1960-1981 (Selected Years)

Year	Barrels Per Day
1960	17,000
1961	46,000
1965	275,000
1966	420,000
1968	1.1 million
1969	
1970	540,000
1971	2.1 million
1972	1.53 million
1973	1.82 million
1974	2.3 million
1975	2.3 million
1976	1.81 million
1977	2.0 million
1978	2.25 million
1979	1.45 million
1980	2.4 million
1981 (January)	2.06 million
1981 (February)	2.09 million
1981 (March)	1.94 million
1981 (April)	1.86 million
1981 (May)	1.62 million
1981 (June)	1.16 million
1981 (July)	1.4 million
1981 (August)	0.77 million
	0.64 million

Source: Compiled by author from various sources—Central Bank Of Nigeria, Nigeria Trade Journal and Africa Confidential.

TABLE III

PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION TO FEDRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE:
OIL AND NON-OIL SOURCES 1970/71 TO 1975/76.

Fiscal Year	Total Revenue	Oil Revenue	Non-Oil Revenue
1970-1	100	27.4	72.6
1971-2	100	50.2	49.8
1972-3	100	40.9	59.1
1973-4	100	62.0	38.0
1774-5	100	84.4	15.6
1975-6	100	95.0	5:0

Source: Teresa Turner, "Two Refineries: A Comparative Study of Technology Transfer to the Nigerian Refining Industry," World Development (Elmsford, N.Y.), Vol. 5, no 3, 1977. p.243 The contribution from the oil sector has remained constant since 1976. Oil is now described in official circles as the country's main source of foreign exchange earnings.

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TABLE IV

DESTINATION OF NIGERIA'S EXPORTS* BY REGIONAL GROUPINGS 1960-1972 (f.o.b.)

Year	Eastern Europe	E.E.C.	Japan	United Kingdon	ı U.S.A.	West Africa	Others	Total
Value (N-	million)							
1960	1.3	102.8	5.1	161.4	31.8	2.2	34.8	339.4
1961	1.2	115.9	6.6	153.1	38.2	2.9	29.5	347.4
1962	3.4	113.3	3.0	138.4	36.2	9.2	33.7	337.2
1963	2.9	138.6	4.7	147.6	34.8	11.2	38.8	378.6
1964	10.1	153.2	5.1	161.4	28.6	14.9	56.1	429.4
1965	17.5	186.4	6.3	203.0	52.4	10.6	60.2	536.4
1966	14.2	201.0	8.5	211.7	45.2	11.1	76.1	567.8
1967	14.3	197.4	12.4	144.2	37.9	7.2	70.2	483.6
1968	19.1	150.8	7.4	121.9	35.0	12.7	75.3	422.2
1969	22.7	226.0	6.0	175.6	80.2	9.3	116.6	636.4
1970	31.7	327.6	6.8	250.4	101.6	7.2	160.1	885.4
1971	44.3	499.8	18.6	278.8	223.5	26.8	201.4	1,293.2
1972	25.6	539.0	55.2	300.9	299.6	29.8	183.9	1,434.0
Percentage	es							
1960	0.4	30.2	1.5	47.6	9.4	0.6	10.3	100.00
1961	0.3	33.4	1.9	44.1	11.0	0.8	8.5	100.00
1962	1.0	33.6	0.9	41.0	10.7	2.7	10.0	100.00
1963	0.8	36.6	1.2	39.0	9.2	3.0	10.0	100.00
1964	2.4	35.7	1.2	37.6	6.7	3.5	13.1	100.00
1965	3.3	34.8	1.2	37.8	9.8	2.0	11.2	100.00
1966	2.5	35.4	1.5	37.3	8.0	2.0	13.4	100.00
1967	3.0	40.8	2.6	29.8	7.8	1.5	14.5	100.00
1968	4.5	35.7	1.8	28.9	8.3		17.8	100.00
1969	3.6	35.5	0.9	27.6	12.6	3.0	18.3	100.00
1970	3.6	37.0	0.8	28.3	11.5			100.00
1971	3.4	38.6	1.4	21.6	17.3	0.8	18.1	100.00
1972	1.8	37.6	3.8	21.0	20.9	2.1	15.6 12.8	100.00

^{*}Includes Re-exports

Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, December, 1973. Federal Office of Statistics, Review of External Trade, 1972.

Quoted from Folayan Ojo, "Economic Integration: The Nigerian Experience" Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 8, 1976, p. 289. This pattern of trade has not chunged since 1973. With the increase in oil prices, Nigeria now exports only oil and as shown in Table VI, the market is in the West.

TABLE V SOURCES OF NIGERIA'S IMPORTS BY REGIONAL GROUPINGS, 1960-1972 (c.i.f.)

Year	Eastern Europe	E.E.C.	Japan	United Kingdon	n U.S.A.	West Africa	Others	Total
Value (N-1	Million)							
1960	8.6	84.3	55.6	182.8	23.2	1.3	76.0	431.8
1961	10.9	88.7	61.6	170.6	23.8	1.5	87.9	445.0
1962	12.1	78.5	49.7	147.7	29.9	0.8	87.3	406.0
1963	14.0	90.0	53.8	141.6	35.8	1.2	78.8	415.2
1964	15.1	117.6	61.6	157.4	57.8	2.2	95.7	507.4
1965	14.6	136.5	51.2	170.1	66.2	1.6	110.4	550.6
1966	14.2	135.6	28.6	152.5	83.0	2.4	96.3	512.6
1967	16.7	115.0	37.5	129.2	55.7	2.5	90.6	447.2
1968	19.1	106.6	14.3	119.7	44.6	3.8	77.1	385.2
1969	19.1	125.4	18.9	172.7	58.5	2.8	100.0	497.4
1970	34.2	202.8	47.4	232.0	109.6	3.3	127.1	756.4
1971	43.6	271.6	89.7	344.1	151.4	3.1	175.5	1,079.0
1972	25.4	299.0	98.2	291.9	103.1	3.1	169.8	990.6
Percentages								
1960	2.0	19.5	12.9	42.0		0.2	17.6	100.0
1961	2.4	19.3	13.8	42.9	5.4	0.3	17.6	100.0
1962	3.0	19.9	12.2	38.3	5.3	0.3	19.8	100.0 100.0
1963	3.4	21.7	13.0	36.4	7.4	0.2	21.5	100.0
1964	3.0	23.1		34.1	8.5	0.3	18.9	100.0
1965	2.7	24.7	12.0	31.0	11.3	0.4	20.1	100.0
1966	2.8	26.4	9.3	30.9	12.0	0.3	18.8	100.0
1967	3.7		5.6	29.7	16.2	0.5	20.3	100.0
1968	4.8	25.6	8.3	28.7	12.5	0.6	20.3	100.0
1969	3.8	27.6	3.7	31.0	11.5	1.0	20.0	100.0
1970	4.0	25.2	3.8	34.7		0.6	16.9	100.0
1971	4.0	26.7	6.3	30.7	14.5		16.2	100.0
1972	2.6	25.2	8.4	31.9	14.0	0.3	17.2	100.0
	2.0	30.2	9.9	29.5	10.4	0.3	17.2	100.0

Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, December, 1973. Federal Office of Statistics, Review of External Trade, 1972.

Quoted from, Afolayan Ojo, "Economic Integration: The Nigerian Experience" Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 8, 1976 p. 289

TABLE VI

PRODUCTION AND DESTINATION OF NIGERIAN OIL FOR A TYPICAL MONTH—JUNE 1979

Total Production: 72,371,002 barrels at 2,412,367 barrels per day,

Companies	Country of Origin	Capacity %	
Shell-BP	Holland/UK	56.6%	
Gulf	USA	16.2%	
Mobil	USA	11.1%	
Agip/Phillips	Italy/USA	10.0%	
Elf	France	3.1%	
Texaco	USA	2.2%	
Pan Ocean	USA	0.3%	
Tenneco	USA	0.2%	
NNPC	Nigeria	0.4%	

Source: Compiled by author from various issues of Nigeria Trade Journal, Lagos.

Distribution %

USA	42.4%
Netherlands	12.3%
West Germany	10.9%
UK	10.3%
Bahamas	4.9%
Italy	4.0%
France	3.9%
Holland	2.8%

Source: Nigeria Trade Journal, Vol. 27, no. 2, 1980, p. 50

CHINA AND THE EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH: ROLE OF GREAT POWER GLOBAL PERCEPTIONS

By J.N. MAHANTY*

China's attitude to the Bangladesh Question has evoked a great deal of interest among China watchers. Its professed aim to end exploitation all over the world while extending assistance to West Pakistani exploiters expectedly provoked both academics and activists. Here an attempt is made to examine China's strategic thinking on a vital region, that is South Asia, and the real-politik that pushes into irrelevance the revolutionary pledges. China's failure to forestall the birth of Bangladesh forced it initially to fabricate a fake rationale and finally to reverse, through quick recognition, a hostile population into a friendly nation. History ends where politics begins; history, however, explains the present South Asian political scenario—the emerging triangle of China-Pakistan-Bangladesh, favourably disposed to the United States, while fetching sustenance from an anti-Indian prejudice.

I EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH

THE birth of Bangladesh in 1971 was an eventful development in the Indian sub-continent. Pakistan's subsequent disintegration was neither an unexpected phenomenon nor was it an accident in history. In fact, it was implicit in the very nature of the formation of Pakistan together with the incompatibilities between the two wings in terms of culture, language, social composition and the politico-economic set-up. Though the causes of the disintegration of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh were inherent in the state structure of Pakistan when it came into existence in 1947, it was only in 1971 that the configuration of certain forces within and without occurred that resulted in dismemberment. The crisis that overwhelmed united Pakistan in 1971 was inter-woven with a number of issues like the involvement of foreign powers, military aggression, secession and self-determination. And on all such issues the great powers had adopted different postures.

Role of Big Powers

South Asia on the eve of the Bangladesh Crisis was "an area of intense diplomatic activity and conflicting alignment." Big Powers like the United States, Soviet Union and China somehow directly or indirectly were caught

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up in this fray, along with the two regional powers-India and Pakistan. So far as the role of the major powers was concerned, they perceived the situation in terms of their national and strategic interests. As a result, they had to reassess their policy towards Asia in general and South Aisa in particular, and each responded differently. Their varying attitudes towards the crisis was the logical outcome of the then "power structure" in South Asia and the nature of their political interaction in it. Here it is important to note that one cannot ignore the role of these powers in the final break-up of Pakistan which led to the emergence of Bangladesh. Had these powers sincerely co-ordinated among themselves and had they persuaded the Yahya regime to bring about a peaceful solution to the problem, the disintegration of Pakistan perhaps would not have occurred and the crisis might not have drifted towards war. But their analysis of, and response to the crisis situation, was determined more by the need to maintain a favourable power configuration advantageous to their interests than with any genuine concern for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

In the late sixties and early seventies, China, having suffered a great setback because of its "self-imposed isolation" during the Cultural Revolution, had been trying to project a good image in Asia and abroad. Its political interactions with Third World countries began to increase with the growing emphasis on pragmatism by Chinese policy-makers. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had been engaged in dominating South Asian politics. Obviously, China could not reconcile to any attempt designed to increase the Soviet sphere of influence, particularly in a contiguous region. The move for Brezhnev's "collective security system" in Asia, followed by Kosygin's proposal for regional economic co-operation between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, accentuated China's irritation's. China perceived Soviet strategy as being directed against its desired role, and denounced the "collective security system" as "an anti-China military alliance which Brezhnev had picked up from the garbage heap of the notorious warmonger Dulles."2 The regional co-operation proposal was described as "nothing but a trap for setting up a military ring of encirclement against China and for political control and economic plunder of Asian countries."3

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While there was a rapid deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, China's relations with America were steadily improving. America which had been China's enemy number one in the fifties and sixties turned to being its friend in the early seventies with the rapidly changing world situation and Mao's view of world order. For China "Soviet social-imperialism" became more dangerous than "US imperialism." For both of them, Soviet Union was the main rival. In order to counteract the Soviet sphere of influence they needed each other. Hence, the United States which had been following a policy of containment of Communist China gradually found it irrelevant and, instead, tried to open a new dialogue for normalizing relations. Under the so-called "Nixon" or "Guam" Doctrine, the United States started

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providing China opportunities to fill in the possible void around its periphery in the wake of the American plan of reducing its presence in Asia. Their realistic assessment of mutual interests in a changing world situation and the necessity of expediency dictated them to accommodate their interests. In the early 70s, Sino-American relationship was marked by growing "detente" between them, and Nixon's new China policy at that time exhibited a great interest in rapprochment with China on the basis of their commonality of interests—anti-Soviet motivation. Hence, there was the need of re-adjustment of their policies. Moreover, the foreign policies of the two countries were guided more by power considerations where strategic interests got precedence over long-standing ideological reservations.

The Soviet Union was the first major power to take a stand on the Bangladesh Crisis. In a letter to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan on 2 April 1971, the Soviet President Podgorny appealed for a political settlement of the crisis by peaceful means and urged to take "most immediate measures so as to put an end to bloodshed and repression against the population of East Pakistan." Referring to "humanitarian principles," Podgorny stated that he was guided by the "Declaration of Human Rights." As it appeared, Soviet Union's main concern for "the entire people of Pakistan" (as mentioned in Podgorny's letter), shared its endeavour for an amicable settlement of the issue and in fact Soviet Union did not desire the disintegration of Pakistan.

In contrast to the Soviet Union's stand on the crisis, US response was slow and the Nixon Administration was quite reluctant to take any public stand; the result was firm criticism from the Congress. The United States refrained from condemning the Yahya regime for its military atrocities on the innocent people of East Pakistan and, instead, characterized the happenings as the internal affairs of Pakistan. A careful observation of this stance is indicative of the new American line on China. This softline was probably promoted by the impending rapprochment with China—the main ally of Pakistan.

It is now well-known that Pakistan acted as the go-between in initiating the dialogue between Washington and Beijing that ultimately led to Nixon's visit to China. This finds corroboration in Henry Kissinger's autobiographical account of events during the period in his book, White House Years. He deftly depicts the dilemma that the United States faced at that juncture. "We faced a dilemma. The United States could not condone a brutal military repression in which thousands of civilians were killed and from which millions fled to India for safety. There was no doubt about the strong-arm tactics of the Pakistani military. But Pakistan was our sole channel to China; once it was closed off it would take months to make alternative arrangements." He added: "We wanted to stay aloof from this if we could, as did Britain. We even received reports of West Pakistani suspicions that we might favour an independent East Pakistan, but neither the British nor we wished to be made scapegoats for the country's break-up. We had

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few means to affect the situation. We had, moreover, every incentive to maintain Pakistan's goodwill. It was our crucial link to Beijing; and Pakistan was one of China's closest allies." Thus, for the cause of protecting or safeguarding Beijing's interests in Pakistan, "the possibility of supporting India's claims on behalf of the Bangladesh Liberation Movement was necessarily ruled out."

Things took a dramatic turn with Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in July 1971 and subsequent dramatic announcement by Nixon of his own forthcoming visit at the invitation of the Chinese Government in the following year. On 9 August 1971, with the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in New Delhi, it was evident that in case Pakistan launched aggression on India, Moscow would not be expected to remain neutral and would certainly take sides with India. To add up, Nixon's pro-Yahya attitude persisted throughout the crisis and there were clear indications that America would not come to India's help in case Pakistan was supported by China in a war with India. 11 The Soviet Union, at the outset, took a balanced attitude of criticising the Yahya Government's repressive policy and, simultaneously, insisted that Yahya should find a peaceful settlement of the dispute within the constitutional framework of Pakistan. But later, in view of the Pakistan Government's tough policy on the issue and other significant developments in the sub-continent, the Soviets gave up their original stand. There was a change in policy as it was found that the crisis was about to drift towards war; the Soviets came to be more favourably inclined to India. The factors that might have changed the Soviet stand could be the Pakistani delegation's visit to China during the crisis in November and the United States' refusal to put pressure on the Yahya Government for a political settlement.

China and the Bangladesh Question

The most important factor contributing to China's foreign policy objectives towards Pakistan was strategic and geo-political interest. Pakistan's geographical position served the Chinese purpose of providing a deterrent to India. What is more important in this connection is that the geographical separation of East and West Pakistan, with India as the divider, increased Pakistan's reliance on China to protect the eastern wing. So far as China was concerned, it had a vested interest in keeping Pakistan's two wings within one political unit so long as it had a policy of retaining its influence in Pakistan to counteract India's influence in Pakistan. East Pakistan provided a strategic link for the Chinese to sustain their political influence in Pakistan. Hence, during the Bangladesh Crisis, the Chinese realized, more than others, the strategic and diplomatic importance of keeping Pakistan as their ally. So, taking its national interest into consideration, China extended its full support for safeguarding Pakistani integrity and independence several times throughout the 1960s.

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However, the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan which resulted in the Indo-Pak War and the birth of Bangladesh put China into a dilemma. It now had only two alternatives. Either it had to support the ruling military regime of Pakistan led by Yahya Khan or the East Bengalis who were fighting for self-determination. Ideologically, though China was not in favour of suppressing a liberation movement, supporting the cause of Bengalis would result in hampering relations with Pakistan and helping Soviet designs.

The Chinese therefore, in the beginning were quite reticent in making comments on the upheaval in East Pakistan. It considered it to be an internal affair of Pakistan, and as a champion of "Panchsheel" was obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. But on 6 April 1971, it reacted sharply by sending a protest note to the Indian Government regarding a demonstration organised by some Indian citizens outside the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi in protest against the use of Chinese arms by the Pakistani Army in Bangladesh and refuelling facilities provided by Beijing for Pakistani planes flying troops to Bangladesh. In this note, China criticised the "participants" for having "slandered" China by accusing it helping the Pakistani Government in its war against the freedom-loving people of the country. Also, China accused India of "flagrantly interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs and conniving a provocation" against the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi. 12

The first specific Chinese reaction to the Bangladesh Crisis came on 11 April 1971; the People's Daily carried a commentary on it denouncing India, the United States and the Soviet Union for allegedly interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan. This article indicated Beijing's position on the side of Yahya Khan in his move against the East Bengali struggle for freedom. It characterized the situation as an internal affair and that no country had the right to interfere. In the event, the Chinese Government would resolutely support the Pakistani Government against "foreign aggression and interference." It pointed out also that the two Super Powers were working in close co-ordination with the Indian reactionaries, who were crudely interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan. 13 Soon after this article, stating the official Chinese line, Zhou Enlai personally wrote to Yahya Khan to make his country's position more explicit. This letter¹⁴ reiterated the Chinese attitude towards the East Pakistan Crisis. What was significant was that this message of Zhou Enlai came more than six months prior to the outbreak of the war itself. A close analysis of this shows that Zhou Enlai assured the Government of Pakistan of China's support.

Tracing back their good neighbourly relations, Zhou Enlai stressed that "the unification of Pakistan and the unity of the people of East and West Pakistan were the basic guarantees for Pakistan to attain prosperity and strength." Secondly, characterizing the struggle in East Pakistan as a separtatist movement, he went on to say, that it was an act of a "handful Zhou maintained that the general masses of East Pakistan had nothing to

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do with this handful of persons. Thirdly, he criticised India for "gross interference" in the domestic affairs of Pakistan and added that "the Soviet Union and the United States are doing the same one after the other." Fourthly, Zhou Enlai clearly mentioned that the happening in Pakistan was an "internal affair of Pakistan" and so far as its solution was concerned, "it can only be settled by the Pakistani people themselves and which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever." In the last paragraph, Zhou Enlai pledged his support to the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence and also assured that it would firmly support Pakistan, if it was attacked by the "Indian expansionists." Beijing also made it clear that its support was not entirely limited to words, for in May 1971, it offered Pakistan an additional \$20 million economic aid. 15 Thus, at a time when foreign aid to the Pak Consortium had been suspended, Beijing provided aid to Pakistan to help it tide over the impending economic crisis and foster speedy economic development. And more significant was that these events coincided with the news of Zhou's proposed visit to Pakistan before the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1971. However, the visit was cancelled since the situation in East Pakistan plunged to a point of no return.

It was also realazed that Beijing's intention obviously was to continue its campaign against India and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, these accusations made by the Chinese leadership did not have the desired impact on East Bengal; even the pro-Beijing elements there found the Chinese position rather ridiculous. In telegrams to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the pro-Beijing National Awamy Party leader, Maulana Bhashani, expressed surprise at the support despite Pakistani atrocities on unarmed people and refuted the charge of Indian interference. He reminded that "the ideology of socialism was to fight against oppression, and if the Chinese Government do not protest against the brutal atrocities committed on the oppressed people of Bangladesh by the military junta with the help of vested interests of West Pakistan, the world may think you are no friend of the oppressed people." However, these attempts to denigrate the Chinese stand did not in any way change their (Chinese) attitude towards the crisis.

In the midst of the crisis, when India signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the Soviet Union, China maintained a discreet silence. Later, when the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proposed a discussion with Chinese leaders on this issue, Beijing did not even acknowledge the letter.

The arrival of an official Pakistani delegation, under the leadership of Bhutto, in Beijing in November 1971, marked the second stage of Sino-Pak relations after the Bangladesh Crisis. The Acting Chinese Foreign Minister, Ji Pengfei, in his welcome speech to the high-powered Pakistani delegation, reaffirmed China's position that had been conveyed in Zhou's

letter to Yahya Khan in April. In a statement made at a luncheon given in honour of the visiting Pakistani delegation, Ji Pengfei asked Pakistan to seek a "reasonable settlement" of the East Pakistan issue. It paid tributes to the Pakistani people for their "unremitting struggle against foreign aggressors, interventionists and domestic secessionists." It denounced India of "crudely interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs and carrying out subversive activities and military threats against Pakistan by continuing to exploit the East Pakistan Question." Referring to the Soviet Union, Pengfei accused the Soviet leaders of "truculently exerting pressure on Pakistan by exploiting the tensions in the sub-continent in a wild attempt to achieve their ulterior motives." Further he said, "Our Pakistani friends may rest assured that should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese Government and people, as always, will resolutely support the Pakistani Government and people in their just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence."17 Surprisingly enough, China avoided criticism against the role of the United States in the crisis, though in the letter to Yahya Khan in April, Zhou Enlai had denounced its role. The omission of America in Ji Pengfei's speech was due to the significance of the forthcoming diplomatic Nixon visit to China. The Chinese attitude was probably determined by developments in Indo-Soviet relations, especially its translation into practical terms of the Treaty of August 1971.18

In the meantime, the massive exodus of refugees from East Pakistan into Indian territory created problems for India itself; the failure of any suitable settlement of the problem forced India to join the struggle against West Pakistan. In the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 19 November 1971, commenting on the refugee problem faced by India, Fu Hao backed the Pakistani Government, condemning India for exploiting the issue in order to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs and obstruct the return of the East Pakistani refugees to their country. 19

War between India and Pakistan broke out on 3 December 1971; subsequently China's policy formulations were more pronounced in the United Nations. For China, it was its first crisis in the United Nations since it became its member. China opposed all resolutions which did not strongly condemn the Indian Government's "aggressive acts" and voted in favour of resolutions recommending ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. On 4 December 1971, China presented a draft resolution calling for ceasefire, withdrawal of troops and condemnation of "Indian aggression." Later however, in view of indifferent support from the members of the security Council, it was not put to vote. On 5 December 1971 in the Security Council, the Chinese representative voted against a USSR draft resolution calling for political settlement in East Pakistan. The Chinese representative, tive of Bangladesh to present its case, sternly pointed that, "this is stark interference in Pakistan's internal affairs and tramples on the UN Charter

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with which all countries upholding justice cannot agree."²² On 6 December 1971, the Security Council decided to refer the question of the deteriorating situation that had led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan to the General Assembly. Soon after, a resolution was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December and another by the Security Council on 21 December.²³ Both the resolutions called for an immediate end to the war and withdrawal of troops on both sides. Though China voted for both the resolutions, its representative to the UN Security Council was annoyed by the failure of resolutions to take note of "Indian aggression" and make a call supporting Pakistan.²⁴

In the meantime, on 6 December 1971, the People's Daily revealed one of Beijing's concerns when it compared the Indian military action to set un an independent Bangladesh to the Japanese establishment of "Manchukuo" in the 1930s.25 The Indo-Pak War came to an end on 16 December 1971 with the surrender of the West Pakistan military troops. On the following day, Islamabad reciprocated India's decision for ceasefire. On the eve of this Indo-Pak ceasefire, China assured its support to the Pak Government and people in their struggle against aggression, division and subversion. It maintained: "We not only are doing this politically, but will continue to give them material assistance."26 It also castigated the Soviet Government for aggravating the conflict between India and Pakistan, "setting Asians to fight Asians."27 Commenting on the fall of Dacca to the combined India-Mukti Bahini military force, Zhou Enlai remarked that "the fall of Dacca is definitely not a so-called 'milestone' towards victory for the Indian aggressors but the starting point of endless strife on the Asian sub-continent and of their defeat."28

Thus, China championed the stand of Pakistan-that the East Bengal Crisis was an internal affair and not a liberation struggle. Besides, China made use of the UN platform to denigrate India and the Soviet Union for their role in the crisis. It is, however, not clear whether China along with its moral support also offered military assistance. The benefit of doubt accrues from the mutually contradictory disclosures made by General Yahya Khan, then President of Pakistan and Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State of the United States. General Yahya Khan, in an interview in January 1979 to the Urdu Digest, a Lahore monthly said, that China had only pledged its moral support. He further disclosed that a Chinese delegation had visited Pakistan before the war and had forewarned that in the event of civil war, Pakistan would not receive any military assistance from China.29 On the contrary, Henry Kissinger's revelation gives the impression that China had assured all-out support to Pakistan. To quote him: "Zhou insisted that China would not be indifferent if India attacked Pakistan. He even asked me to convey this expression of Chinese support to Yahya."30 r

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II CHINA'S ROLE IN THE UN

The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state, despite Chinese opposition, proved to be a setback to China's global image and its influence in South Asian politics. The setback was serious because the creation of Bangladesh was a tangible victory for Soviet diplomacy in the region and it heralded the pre-eminence of India in South Asia. Unlike China, the Soviet Union and India recognized East Pakistani discontent against the West Pakistani ruling military clique and their demand for separate statehood as the manifestation of the right to self-determination. Both, in accordance with the common principle of supporting liberation struggles, extended moral and physical support to East Pakistan. Furthermore, the instability which preceded the emergence of Bangladesh largely helped to bring the already well-established Indo-Soviet Friendship to a better footing with the signing in 1971 of the famous Treaty of friendship and Co-operation. Consequently, the situation in South Asia was completely adverse to China's logistic and ideological interests, in the sense that the "number one enemy"-the Soviet Union-considerably increased its influence in the region and, secondly, India, its hostile neighbour, augmented its power potentials.

Such changes in the power structure of South Asia posed serious problems to Chinese foreign policy-makers. On the one hand, by not lending support to the Bengali nationalist struggle they had considerably tarnished their image among the peoples of the Afro-Asian world. Besides, they had left the stage completely to India and the Soviet Union. The Chinese thus were put in a serious predicament being required to synthesize the dual problems, namely, reassuring their ideological affinity with the Afro-Asian people and containing India and Soviet Union for logistic and political reasons. Unable to resolve the dilemma initially, Chinese actions showed that the containment of India and the Soviet Union predominated China's perspective on Bangladesh. They continued to support Pakistan and opposed the very existence of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation to further their national interest. In course of time, when the situation in the sub-continent had stabilized on one hand, and on the other Bangladesh came to be recognized by other nations, China gradually tried to normalize relations and through various displomatic means, tried to counteract the Indian and Soviet presence Sence sence. Such a shifting attitude was clear when Bangladesh's membership issue came up before the United Nations.

China played a very crucial role. Being secured with the veto power, hat it always paid greater attention to the interests of Pakistan in the United Nations debates while using the Bangladesh issue to harass Soviet unsolved till 10 June 1974, the day the Security Council passed a resolution

in favour of Bangladesh's admission into the United Nations as China refrained form using its veto power. The interim period of two and a half years was marked by intense debates in the United Nations.

China's Determined Efforts to Prevent Bangla Entry

Despite Bangladesh's overtures to China in the beginning to forge friendly relations; the latter betrayed an indifferent attitude. This was evident from the fact that the Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Abdus Samad's letter to Zhou Enlai was totally ignored. In this letter, Abdus Samad indicated his country's desire to have good neighbourly relations with China as with any other country, and expressed the hope that China would reciprocate "the sincere feelings of the people and the Government of Bangladesh." This letter was of much significance because the Government of Bangladesh, overriding the strong reservations about China nourished by its people, had made a gesture for the establishment of harmonious relations. The latent motive behind the appeal might have been the question of Bangladesh's future membership in the UN, which depended entirely on China's support.

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The Security Council in a meeting on 10 August 1972 discussed Bangladesh's application for UN membership. In view of China's opposition to the issue, a vote was taken on whether to include the membership issue on the agenda. China voted negatively;³³ Huang Hua firmly opposed the Security Council's consideration of Bangladesh's application for membership on legal grounds. He, on the basis of the 1949 Geneva Convention, Security Council Resolution 307 (1971), General Assambly Resolution 2793 (XXVI) and Article 4 of the Charter, flatly stated that Bangladesh was not qualified for membership "under the present circumstances." The reason for Chinese opposition to the Security Council resolution, as stated by Huang Hua, was:

In the opinion of the Chinese delegation, the application of 'Bangladesh' for membership in the United Nations should in no way be considered in deviation from the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council last year.³⁴

Clarifying his point further on the implementation of relevant UN resolutions adopted last year, Huang Hua stated:

With the active encouragement and energetic support of the Soviet social imperialism, the Indian Government brazenly launched a large-scale war of aggression against Pakistan and seriously undermined the peace on the South Asian sub-continent. On 7 December last year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2793 which explicitly 'calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of their armed

forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders.' On 21 December, the Security Council adopted Resolution 307. Apart from reiterating the demand for troops' withdrawal by the two parties, the resolution in its operative paragraph 3 'calls upon all those concerned to take all measures necessary to preserve human life and for the observance of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and to apply in full their provisions as regarding the protection of the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilian population.' The Geneva Convention of 1949 referred to in this connection stipulates in article 118 in explicit terms: 'Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.'35

Referring to the above resolutions passed by the General Assembly and the Security Council in December 1971, the Chinese representative argued that these had not yet been implemented by the Governments of India and Bangladesh. He also accused India for failure to withdraw its troops from Bangladesh and to repatriate prisoners of war. Finally, the Chinese representative put certain conditions for the consideration of Bangladesh's application for UN membership.

Only when the relevant UN resolution have been truly implemented and only after a resonable settlement of the issues between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and 'Bangladesh' has been achieved, can the Security Council consider 'Bangladesh's' application for membership.³⁶

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A fortnight later, on 25 August 1972, the issue of Bangladesh's membership came before the Security Council through a joint draft resolution sponsored by India, the Soviet Union, Britain and Yugoslavia. China exercised its veto against it since Bangladesh had failed to implement earlier UN decisions. On the same day, the Security Council rejected a Chinese draft resolution seeking to bloc immediate UN membership for Bangladesh.³⁷ While vetoing the resolution, the Chinese representative, Huang Hua, put forth his own argument.³⁸ He said:

Taking into consideration the specific condition and situation in which 'Bangladesh' came into being, it is quite obvious that the question of 'Bangladesh's' application for membership in the United Nations can in no way be examined in deviation from the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council concerning last year's war of aggression on the South Asian sub-continent.³⁹

After the Chinese vetoed Bangladesh's entry into the United Nations on 28 August 1972, prospects for improving relations came to be even more the Chinese use of veto was acclaimed. In China the People's Daily

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editorial entitled "Uphold Principles, Promote Justice," commented that by "categorically vetoing the draft resolution put forward by the Soviet Union, India and others, the Chinese delegation was faithfully carrying out its sacred duty."40 On the other hand, in Bangladesh people reacted sharply to the Chinese veto. 41 Despite the Bangladesh Prime Minister's request to China to support the issue of his country's admission,42 China did not change its stand. Previously, on 12 August 1972, while addressing a press conference in Dacca, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Abdus Samad, termed the Chinese objection to admitting his country to the United Nations as a "game of interested countries" to confuse issues on Bangladesh; he further remarked that, "China, while objecting to Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations did not have eligibility in mind but some other ulterior political motive."43 On 27 August 1972, in reaction to the Chinese exercise of veto in the Security Council, Samad said, "China was playing the role of a big power in blocking the entry of Bangladesh into the United Nations."44

China's Tone Against Bangladesh Softens

However as time passed, China's tone advocating against Bangladesh's admission seemed to have softened. On 30 October 1972, while speaking on the issue of Indo-Pakistan in the UN General Assembly at its 27th session, the head of the Chinese delegation, Qiao Guanhua, expressed friendly sentiments for the people of Bangladesh. He, however, made clear that China would not retreat from its earlier stand against the immediate admission of Bangladesh to the UN. He attacked the Soviet Union's role in the Indian sub-continent; Qiao said that while the relevant resolutions of the UN remained unimplemented, the Soviet Government and its followers raised the question of admission. "This is definitely not aimed at helping 'Bangladesh', but at forcing China to use the veto maintaining and aggravating the tensions among the parties concerned," he added. He further clarified China's position,

China's stand for postponing the consideration of the question does not mean that we are fundamentally opposed to the admission of 'Bangladesh' into the United Nations. China cherishes friendly sentiments for the people of East Bengal and has no prejudice against Mujibur Rahman. We stand for postponing the consideration of this question in order to promote a reconciliation among the parties concerned and the implementation of the United Nations resolutions which are of immediate concern.⁴⁶

Examination of the above statement of Qiao Guanhua raises certain speculations. First, China's use of veto against the consideration of the issue of Bangladesh's entry was a passing phenomenon. Secondly, China

wanted to reaffirm its friendship for Pakistan by expressing concern over the fate of the Pakistani prisoners of war (POW). Moreover, by acting in the United Nations China helped Pakistan in the repatriation of POW's through pressure tactics on Bangladesh. Also, China effectively used the occasion to castigate the Soviet Union in an open international forum.

As the Security Council failed to take any decision because of China's veto, many member states brought the matter for consideration before the General Assembly on 29 November 1972. Two draft resolutions were submitted—one, sponsored by Yugoslavia and 22 others expressing the desire that Bangladesh be admitted to the United Nations at an early date and the other 116-power drafting resolution reiterating that the parties concerned make all possible efforts to reach a fair settlement of pending issues. The latter called for the repatriation of POW's in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 307 (1971). The Chinese representative, Huang Hua, while speaking on the two draft resolutions, argued:

Pending the implementation of these resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council and a reasonable settlement of the issues between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and 'Bangladesh', Bangladesh is not qualified for membership in the United Nations. This principled stand of the Chinese delegation is in full accord with the spirit of the United Nations Charter. It has been clear-cut and consistent.⁴⁸

After a prolonged discussion of the issue, it was decided that the two draft resolutions be adopted together without debate and without a vote. Such a procedure, the President of the General Assembly observed, gave expression to the consensus of the Assembly which was in favour of the admission of Bangladesh and was also in favour of the implementation of the Security Council resolution. While expressing satisfaction over the adoption of these resolutions, the Chinese representative said:

The Chinese delegation hopes the parties concerned will truly and speedily implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council in the spirit of the decision made at this plenary meeting and thus make it possible for 'Bangladesh' to be admitted to membership of the United Nations at an early date.⁴⁹

The Chinese representative, however, did not miss the opportunity of accusing the Soviet Union once more. Soviet Union, he said, was using the question "as a means of political blackmail" and hindering the imple-

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mentation of the "relevant" UN resolutions, thus aggravating tensions in the South Asian sub-continent. He added:

If the Soviet Government should cling to its obdurate course and try to force the Security Council to vote against on the question before the relevant United Nations resolutions are implemented, in violation of the spirit of the decision made at this rostrum that in order to defend the principles of the United Nations Charter and the interests of the entire people on the South Asian sub-continent, the Chinese delegation will be forced to firmly oppose it again.⁵⁰

It would not be out of place to mention here that despite China's strong opposition to the entry of Bangladesh into the United Nations, the latter had maintained a flexible policy towards it. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Bangladesh Prime Minister, understanding China's compulsions took a very lenient view of the whole issue. Though he regretted China vetoeing Bangladesh's entry into the United Nations, he is reported to have said:

We do not want to maintain hostility with our neighbour China. We have nothing against the biggest country in the world.⁵¹

China as well, now tried to soft-peddle its earlier rigidity by harping upon the POW issue. Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, said: "China was ready to recognize 'Bangladesh' if the Dacca Administration would honour the UN resolution, return the Pakistani POW's, and develop 'genuine independent status." ⁵²

Delhi Agreement Facilitates Playing Down of Chinese Hostility

The situation on the Indian sub-continent took a healthy turn with the signing of the New Delhi Agreement on 28 August 1973, between India and Pakistan, to tackle the problems relating to the repatriation of civilians and POWs detained in India since the 1971 war. It is significant that China welcomed this agreement and wished for its speedy implementation. The Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei said it had created "favourable conditions for detente in the South Asian region and the normalization of relations among the parties concerned." Still, China was sceptic about its implementation. It is pertinent to mention here that the Pakistani President, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was concerned about the remaining 195 POW's who were to be tried by the Dacca Administration on charges of genocide and other crimes against humanity. On 2 October 1973, Qiao Guanhua's speech at the 28th UN General Assembly revealed China's sympathetic attitude towards the Pakistani concern over the 195 prisoners of war. Qiao said:

This agreement has come much too late but its ultimate conclusion is

to be welcomed. The agreement reached is on paper and there would have to be a process before it can be turned into reality. Complications may yet arise. The Chinese Government holds that the question of admitting Bangladesh into the United Nations can be considered once the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council are implemented without qualification.⁵⁴

The New Delhi Agreement was followed by Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh, which obviously created a favourable political atmosphere for Bangladesh to expect good results in the Sino-Bangladesh relations. Other outstanding issues were settled when a "Tripartite Pact" was concluded between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in April 1974. All these speedy developments in the sub-continent paved the way for China to further play down its hostility without any embarrassment to its foreign policy. And seizing the opportunity on 12 May 1974, the Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, while welcoming the Pakistani Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto in Beijing, commented:

The Chinese Government welcomes these developments. It is our hope that the countries of the sub-continent will live in friendship in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual respect for sovereignty.... We are ready to develop good neighbourly relations with the countries of the sub-continent on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and further enhance our traditional friendship with their people. The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the people of South Asia in this struggle against hegemonism and expansionism. 55

Subsequently, on 10 June 1974, when the Bangladesh membership issue came up again in the Security Council debate, China refrained from vetoing the move; Bangladesh was thus admitted to the United Nations. The Chinese representative, Zhuang Yan, expressing his satisfaction over the implementation of the "relevant resolution" and over the agreement with the concerted efforts of the parties, made it clear that China was now in a position to consider the membership issue of Bangladesh and was hopeful that Bangladesh would "make a positive contribution towards upholding the basic principles of the UN Charter." He further said:

In August 1972, the Chinese delegation was opposed to the consideration of the question of admission of Bangladesh to membership in the United Nations before the relevant United Nations resolutions were implemented... [But this] did not mean that we were fundamentally opposed to the admission of Bangladesh into the United Nations. The Chinese people cherish friendly sentiments for the people of Bangladesh. China stood for postponing the consideration of this question for the very purpose of upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter

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and defending the interests of the people on the South Asian subcontinent so as to promote a reconciliation between the parties concerned on the sub-continent free from Super Power interference from outside and bring about the full implementation of the relevant UN resolutions, thus leading to the normalization of relations between the countries on the sub-continent.⁵⁷

III APPRAISAL

Having analyzed China's role in the inevitable emergence of Bangladesh, it would not be out of place to put the issue here in the perspective of China's perceptions of the global reality and the power configuration in the Indian sub-continent which over-rode all Marxist ideological commitments to self-determination and national integration. The concepts of national liberation movements and the right of self-determination of oppressed nationalities hold an important place in the Marxist paradigm. However, there is controversy as to whether national liberation struggles should invariably be supported, and whether such movements do not always enhance revolutionary consciousness. If in a specific historical situation the independence of a subject nation is likely to hinder the proletarian cause there or elsewhere, what should be done? These and other relevant issues have been well theorized by the early Marxist revolutionaries and theoreticians like Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Preobrazhensky, Bukharin and others. The views of Lenin, however, have been the most accepted.

Lenin, in his writings, clarified the concept of the national liberation movement and defined the attitudes of Marxist groups and governments to such a movement. In a pamphlet "The Rights of Nations to Self-Determination," he gives a clear exposure to his thoughts.

If we want to grasp the meaning of self-determination of nations, not by juggling with legal definitions, or "inventing" abstract definitions, but by examining the historico-economic conditions of the national movement, we must inevitably reach the conclusion that the self-determination of these nations means political separation . . . from alien national bodies and the formation of an independent national state. ⁵⁸

He added, "self-determination of a nation," in the "Marxist programme, cannot, from a historico-economic point of view, have any other meaning than political self-determination, state independence and the formation of a national state." In another place Lenin has again reiterated,

The right of nations to self-determination implies exclusively the right to independence in the political sense, the right to political separation from the oppressor nation. Specifically, this demand for political

democracy implies complete freedom to agitate for secession and for a referendum on secession by the seceding nation. This demand, therefore, is not the equivalent of a demand for separation, and the formation of small states. It implies only consistent expression of struggle against all national oppression.⁶⁰

Elaborating still further, Bukharin and Preobrazhensky remarked that the exercise of the right to self-determination arises "when in any state the people of one nation possess all rights and the people of another nation possess only a part of these rights; when one nation, the weaker nation has been forcibly united to a stronger nation; when the stronger nation has against the will of the weaker nation imposed upon the latter a foreign tongue, foreign customs, etc; when the people of the weaker nation are not allowed to lead their own lives—than we have what is termed oppression of a subject nationality, we have national enslavement.⁶¹

From the above statements it is evident that under the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism whenever a cry for liberation is made by a community under "national enslavement," it is a progressive act that needs to be supported irrespective of which class is leading the vanguard. Here, the debate between Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin is illuminating. In the context of Poland, Rosa Luxemburg questioned the validity of Lenin's thesis. She argued that as the Polish nationalist movement was led by the bourgeoisie, supporting it would result in strengthening the control of this class and thereby jeopardize the opportunity of the Polish proletariat. Lenin in his refutation pointed out that "in so far as the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation fight the oppressor, we are always in every case, and more strongly than any one else, in favour, for we are the staunchest and the most consistent enemies of oppression The bourgeois nationalism of any oppressed nation has a general democratic content that is directed against oppression, and it is this content that we unconditionally support." 62

The above exposition makes it clear that any fight against opression is regarded by Lenin as a progressive step in history. He, however, makes a distinction between the demand for regional autonomy and the battle of a people in bondage. Lenin was not in favour of regional autonomy which did not have any historical foundation, that is, having the basic constituents of a nationality. Besides, he expressed certain reservations about national liberation—i.e. when a subject nation's economy, polity and society were not viable to exist independently. In such a situation, he thought that a small nationality should be given enough autonomy for their cultural and moral development within the multination state framework. 63

In the light of Lenin's dictum, the people of East Bengal were under national enslavement" within the state structure of Pakistan. Since the 1950s, calculated attempts had been made to impose Urdu language to curb the development of Bengali language and culture. Bengalis were subjected to discrimination in every sphere, leading to their utter

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impoverishment. If the East Bengalis then, rightly, demanded autonomy of culture, end to economic exploitation and an equitable representation in the Armed Forces, as well as the Bureaucracy, why did not the progressive rulers of China feel it necessary to extend their moral support, if not physical? The answer should be sought in China's perception of the global reality, and the power configuration in the Indian sub-continent. It is clear that in the late 60's and early 70's, Soviet "social imperialism" came to be the major contradiction to China, and to resolve it, China, in pursuance of Mao's thesis of tactical handling of contradictions, aligned with the secondary contradiction, i.e. the United States.

It was an identity of interests in the changed international situation that united China and the US to contain Soviet influence wherever possible. It was geo-political consideration that led China to perceive India as an important obstacle to its interests, particularly in South Asia. And the same perception pushed China to friendship with the exploiting, army-backed regimes of Pakistan.

With this power configuration, China was called upon to take a stand on the East Bengali nationalist struggle. A favourable response would have meant directly aiding the process of weakening of Pakistan and that, too, by co-operating with India and the Soviet Union both of which were more inclined to the East Bengali sentiments. Consequently, when China's national interest stood on an antithetical plane to East Bengali nationalism, it naturally opposed the movement under the pretext of the hallowed principle of respect for national integrity and state sovereignty. Did not China sacrifice the same principles when it supported the Eritrean Liberation Front?

Chinese opposition to the East Bengali aspirations did not, however, halt the historically inevitable; it proved, on the contrary, to be a severe setback to China's foreign policy objectives. The emergence of Bangladesh indicated the expansion of Soviet influence and the increase of India's power potentials. Also, world opinion being largely sympathetic to the sufferings of the people of East Bengal, China's apathy to it did much damage to its radical image.

Taking resort to the United Nations platform, China tried to redeem its image and make the best of the otherwise disadvantageous power equation in the Indian sub-continent. It delayed the entry of Bangladesh to the world organization on groups of various resolutions passed by the august body but which had remained unimplemented. In the deliberations, it evinced a keen desire for peaceful settlement of disputes and upheld the sanctity of the world organization. Besides, it tried to explain its antagonism to Bangladesh by harping on its oft-repeated commitment to the cause of national integrity.

When the post-war problems were resolved and China withdrew its veto to pave the way for Bangladesh's entry into the United Nations, the general anticipation was that Chinese recognition would be forthcoming. Then again, while Bangladesh repeatedly expressed its desire for diplomatic relations with

China, the latter reciprocated with only friendly sentiments. The major obstacle to China's recognition and diplomatic relations was the presence of Mujib at the helm of power. China had earlier called him an "agent" of India and the Soviet Union, and now it proved embarrassing for China to formally recognize his government.

Dramatic changes in Dacca—the assassination of Mujib, the installation as well as overthrow of Khondaker Mushtaque Ahmed, the accession of Major General Zia-ur Rahman to power—provided China the opportune moment not only to recognize Bangladesh, but to initiate an intimate relationship with that country. The new power elite, led by Zia-ur Rahman, nourished a strong anti-Indian feeling which China tried to exploit. Besides, Zia's avowed commitment to Islam enabled him to consolidate the relationship with Pakistan, which his predecessor Khondaker Mushtaque Ahmed had initiated, and this acted as an additional impetus for China to forge friendly ties with Dacca.

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¹ G.W. Choudhury, "The Emergence of Bangladesh and the South Asian Triangle," in The Yearbook of World Affairs 1973 (London, Institute of World Affairs), p. 62.

² Beijing Review, 4 July 1969, p. 22.

³ Ibid., 18 July 1969, p. 23.

⁴ For full text of President Podgorny's message, see "Message from N.V. Podgorny to the President of Pakistan," Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Columbus, Ohio), Vol, 23, no. 14, 4 May 1971, pp. 35-36.

⁵ For an elaboration of this point and the Soviet attitude towards the crisis, see Vijay Sen Budhraj, "Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh," Asian Survey (Berkeley), Vol. 13, no. 5, May 1973, pp. 482-95.

⁶ Nixon's "tilt" towards Pakistan and his partisan attitude towards the crisis drew stubborn criticisms from within the Congress and outside of it. Senator Edward Kennedy, Sub-Committee on Refugees, put the matter on the agenda of Congress and by May 1971 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out a resolution that would have made any government (Pakistan) using military assistance against its own people (East Pakistan) "immediately ineligible for further assistance." Key advisers to Robert McNamara of the World Bank were being pressurized by many American leaders and groups to embargo all aid except that for the rehabilitation of refugees from East Pakistan. See Wayne Wilcox, The Emergence of Bangladesh: Problems and Opportunities for a Redefined American Policy in South Asia (Washington, 1973), p. 31. Also, the Senior Review Group recommended that if China intervened in an India-Pakistan war, the United States should extend military assistance to India and coordinate its actions with the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

⁷ Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (New Delhi, 1979), p. 854.

⁹ Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India-Pakistan-Bangladesh (London, 1975), p. 157.

Articla December 1985. 10 Article IX of the Indo-Soviet Treaty says: "In the event of either being subjected to an attack."

Partner shall immediately enter into attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Partner shall immediately enter into mutual contracting Partner shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threats and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries."

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- 11 This was revealed during Kissinger's summer consultations in New Delhi about which Jagdish Bhagwati, a careful observer, states, "In case of war with Pakistan, Kissinger is supposed to have said, China would come in and India would not get any American help as she had in the Sino-Indian War of 1962." See *Daedalus* (Cambridge), Vol. 101, no. 9, Fall 1972, p. 33.
- 12 Beijing Review, 16 April 1971, p. 3.
- 13 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
- 14 For the text of Zhou Enlai's letter to Yahya Khan see, The Dawn (Karachi), 13 April 1971.
- 15 William J. Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability Amidst Discontinuity," China Quarterly (London), No. 63, September 1975, p. 483.
- 16 News Review on China (IDSA), April 1971, p. 22; Also see Nigel Harris, The Mandate of Heaven: Marx and Mao in Modern China (London, 1978), p. 257.
- 17 Beijing Review, 12 November 1971, p. 5.
- 18 Mustafa Zubeida, "The 1971 Crisis in Pakistan: India, the Soviet Union and China," Pacific Community (Tokyo), Vol. 3, no. 3, April 1972, p. 510.
- 19 Ibid., 26 November 1971, p. 20.
- 20 For the text of the draft resolution see, "Documents \$\sigma | 10421 China Draft Resolution," Security Council Official Records (SCOR), 26th Year Supplement for October, November and December 1971, U.N., N.Y., 1972, p. 92. Also Beijing Review, 10 December 1971, p. 10. On the same day a vote was taken on the draft resolution submitted by the United States. Under the proposed draft the Council would have called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of armed personnel, etc. The Council failed to adopt this resolution because of the negative vote of a permanent member. The vote was 11 in favour (Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, Italy, Japan, Nicargua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, US), 2 against (Poland and USSR) and 2 absentions (France, United Kingdom). SCOR, Document No. \$\sigma | 10416|4\$, December 1971. See also SCOR \$\sigma | 1971 | 1606, 4 December 1971, pp. 86-91.
- 21 SCOR, Document S/PV 1607/5 December 1971. On 5 December 1971, the Council voted on the USSR draft resolution. The vote was two in favour (Poland, USSR), to one against (China), with 12 abstentions (Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, France, Italy, Japan, Nicargua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Kingdom, US). On the same day the Council also had failed to adopt an eight power draft resolution sponsored by Argentina and others because of the negative vote of a permanent member. The vote was 11 in favour, to 2 against (Poland, USSR), with 2 abstentions (France, United Kingdom). See SCOR S/PV 1607, 5 December 1971, p. 126.
- 22 Xinhua Selected News Items (Hong Kong), 13 December 1971, p. 14.
- 23 The resolution which was co-sponsored by 34-member states was debated on 7 December in the General Assembly. This resolution called upon India and Pakistan to cease fire immediately and withdraw their forces to their own side of the border. The Assembly acted by adopting the 34-power revised resolution by a vote of 104 in favour, India, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR), with 10 abstentions (Afghanistan, Chile, Denmark, France, Malawi, Nepal, Oman, Senegal, Singapore, United Kingdom). General Assembly Resolution 2793 (XXVI). For details see, GAOR adopted a resolution sponsored by Argentina and others. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (Poland, USSR). See UN no. 1, January 1972.
- 24 Beijing Review, 16 December 1971, pp. 7-8.
- 25 Ibid., 10 December 1971, pp. 7-8.

- 26 Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, 16 December 1971, see Beijing Review, 17 December 1971.
- 28 Beijing Review, 24 December 1971, p. 9.
- 29 The Statesman (New Delhi), 15 January 1979.
- 30 Henry Kissinger, n. 7, p. 862.
- 31 People's Republic of China became the permanent member of the United Nations in October 1971 replacing Taiwan (Republic of China).
- 32 Hindustan Standard (Calcutta), 25 January 1972.
- 33 However, it was adopted in the Council by a vote of 11 in favour (Argentina, Belgium, France, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, Yugoslavia), 1 against (China) and 3 not participating (Guinea, Somalia and Sudan). UN Document S/PV 1658, 10 August 1972.
- 34 Beijing Review, 18 August 1972, p. 12.
- 35 Ibid.

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- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Resolution S/10768, 25 August 1972. The voting pattern was 3 in favour (China, Guinea, Sudan), 3 against (India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia), and 9 abstentions (Argentina, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, United Kingdom, United States of America). Thus, the proposal could not be adopted as it failed to get the necessary 9 affirmative votes. UN Document S/PV 1660, 25 August 1972.
- 38 Ibid. The voting pattern on this resolution was 11 in favour (Argentina, Belgium, France, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America and Yugoslavia), 1 against (China) and 3 abstentions (Guinea, Somalia, Sudan). The draft resolution could not accordingly be adopted.
- 39 Beijing Review, 1 September 1972, p. 6.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 A massive anti-China rally of an estimated 50,000 people was organized in Dacca on 10 September 1972 in protest against the use of the Chinese veto in the Security Council. It was reported that the people shouted anti-China slogans like "Down with Chinese Imperialism" and pledged to resist the "Sino-American collusion" against the hard-won Bangladesh independence. Syed Nazrul Islam, the acting President, while addressing the rally warned the people against international conspiracies spearheaded by China to undo the freedom of Bangladesh. The Hindu (Madras), 11 September 1972. Maulana Bhasani denounced the Chinese use of veto saying that "hope of any friendship between Bangladesh and China has been frustrated by the Chinese activities in the Security Council." The Statesman (New Delhi), 1 September 1972.
- 42 Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman was reported to have sent special letters to the Heads of Government of all member countries of the Security Council requesting them to support Bangladesh's candidature for UN membership. In a letter to Zhou Enlai, the Bangladesh Prime Minister reportedly referred to the bonds of friendship that had existed between the peoples of the two countries since ages. He was also reported to have mentioned his trips to Beijing and the efforts of the former Pakistan Prime Minister Hussain Shahid Suhrawardy for maintaining good relations with China. The Bangladesh
- Observer (Dacca), 11 August 1972.
- 43 The Statesman, 13 August 1972. 44 Abdus Samad briefed newsmen at the Calcutta airport on 27 August 1972 while he was on his way to Iraq and Yugoslavia. The Statesman, 28 August 1972.
- 45 Beijing Review, 13 October 1972, p. 6.
- 47 UN Document A/PV 2093, 29 November 1972.
- 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.

- 51 This was stated by Mujibur Rahman at Chandpur in a public meeting on 18 February 1973. Hindustan Standard, 19 February 1973
- 52 According to Radio Pakistan, 12 November 1972, the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai was reported to have made this statement while speaking to a group of foreign journalists in Beijing on 11 November 1972. The Hindu (Madras), 13 November 1972. 53 News From Xinhua News Agency (London), 31 August 1973, p. 13.

54 UN Doc. A|PV 2137, 2 October 1973; Also see Beijing Review, 5 October 1973, p. 14.

55 Beijing Review, 17 May 1974, p. 7.

56 Ibid., 21 June 1974, p. 4.

57 Ibid.

58 V.I. Lenin, "The Rights of Nations to Self-Determination," Collected Works (Moscow, 1964), Vol. 20, p. 397.

59 Ibid., p. 400.

- 60 V.I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," Collected Works, Vol. 22, p. 146.
- 61 Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky, The ABC of Communism (Hammondsworth, 1969). p. 242.

62 V.I. Lenin, n. 58, pp. 411-12.

63 For elaboration of this formulation, see Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, pp. 427-28.

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By P.R. CHARI*

Have words lost all their meaning and have men's minds lost all anchorage? For this surely is the way to madness, ond the great men who control our destinies are dangerous self-centred lunatics, who are so full of their conceit and pride of power that they will rather rain death and destruction all over the world than give up their petty opinions and think and act aright.¹

-Jawaharlal Nehru

A symbiotic relationship between disarmament and non-alignment was established within its basic premise. Responding to cold war pressures, non-alignment sought national security through non-involvement with military alliances, suggesting a consequential disillusionment with force as an instrument of diplomacy. The underlying linkages between the non-aligned movement's search for an equitable egalitarian world order and disarmament are, however, apparent. Nehru recognized that:

Disarmament ultimately depends on far-reaching changes in the political and economic structure of the world, leading to a removal of the basic causes of war. So long as this is not done, the conflicts continue and lead to wars.²

Proceeding towards the New International Economic Order, and establishing socially just societies, could alone remove these fundamental causes of conflict. No contradiction, therefore, obtains between the non-aligned struggle for peace and the larger struggles for egalitarianism in the international system. Indeed, the inherently reformist character of non-alignment and its "legitimate trade unionist" role³ are reflected therein.

At the first non-aligned summit meeting (Belgrade, 1961), the three main documents were concerned with peace and discouragement of aggression. The conference called upon the Great Powers to conduct disarmament talks under UN auspices and conclude a treaty on "general and complete" disarmament. Greater realism has accrued over the years, and it is now recognized that total disarmament must be sought in incremental stages with the emphasis being placed on nuclear disarmament. Hence, later resolutions adopted at non-aligned summits and other conferences have called for banning of nuclear tests, destroying existing stockpiles, regional de-nuclearior threaten use of nuclear weapon powers that they would not use

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The emphasis on nuclear disarmament was reaffirmed at the First Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly. The Declaration noted:

...effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken.⁵

The Indian proposal at the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly called for a binding convention on non-use of nuclear weapons; freeze and stoppage of further production of nuclear weapons/fissionable materials, immediate suspension of all nuclear weapons tests, negotiations for reaching a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and a public education programme, through the United Nations, highlighting the danger of nuclear war. Regrettably, the Second Special Session could not even draw up a consensus document, and the Indian delegation had to disassociate itself from the report prepared. More unfortunately, non-aligned countries could not unite at this Session, revealing both a lack of purpose within the movement, and successful efforts by great powers to sow dissensions in their ranks. This failure, however, is unsurprising for there has been a "conspicuous absence of any non-aligned initiative in the last ten years on the question of disarmament...it had very little to contribute directly to the strategy of detente or its realisation."

It bears reiteration that nuclear weapons introduce an entirely new dimension into warfare. The fuller implications of this axiomatic truth often eludes the understanding of statesmen, military leaders and strategic thinkers. The capability of nuclear weapons to wreak enormous destruction, in extremely short time-frames, and the ineffectiveness of defence against them,

however, need greater appreciation.

The SALT II agreement, which still awaits ratification by the US Senate, permits the super powers to have land-based missiles (ICBMs) with a maximum of 10 warheads, and submarine-based missiles (SLBMs) with a maximum of 14 warheads. Currently deployed US Minuteman III ICMBs have 350 kt. warheads. Soviet SS-18 ICBMs have 500 kt warheads, US Trident C-4 SLBMs have 100 kt. warheads, and Soviet SS-N-8 SLBMs have 200 kt. warheads. The atomic bombs dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki had explosive powers of only 13 kt. and 22 kt., which caused an estimated 200,000 and 100,000 deaths respectively by 1950. Estimates of fatalities/destruction depend upon variable factors like size of city, distribution of population, weapon yield, height of burst, ground zero location,

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civil defence preparedness and so on. A 100 kt. low air-burst over the centre of an european city however, is estimated to cause immediately around 500,000 deaths. But, a similar attack upon Bombay, Cairo or Hong Kong might kill a million people. These casualties would occur due to primary effects of nuclear weapons—blast, heat and initial radiation. Secondary radiation, affecting downwind inhabitants, would add to casualties, which in turn, would increase with collateral damage to essential services like water, electricity, communications, hospitals, and so on. There remain many imponderables in even estimating the likely effects of nuclear war, but an authoritative study holds that, "The effects of a nuclear war that cannot be calculated are at least as important as those for which calculations are attempted," as, for instance, "...the possibility of a long downward economic spiral before viability is attained, the possibility of political disintegration (anarchy or regionalization), the possibility of major epidemics, and the possibility of irreversible ecological changes." 10

These examples illustrate the incapacity of nuclear weapons to achieve territorial gains, since the territory sought would be obliterated. Moreover, the attacker risks annihilation in a nuclear duel. Nuclear exchanges, therefore, seem excepted from the Clausewitzian dictum: "...war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means." Beliefs do exist that nuclear war can further state interests. Clausewitz admitted that warfare approached its abstract form as the conduct of war, and motives therefore, became more violent. But, he was clear that:

War can never be separated from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.¹¹

No nuclear war has ever been fought; hence, nuclear war-fighting scenarios lie in the sphere of abstraction. Instances of threat of use of nuclear weapons however, are known. The Soviet Union threatened China during the Ussuri Clashes (1969). The United States used this threat more frequently—Berlin Crisis (1948), Korean War (1953), and Quemoy-Matsu Crisis (1958), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and Fourth Arab-Israeli War (1973). Nuclear threats against non-nuclear adversaries might be countered by operations of the international system. But, nuclear threats against nuclear adversaries can bring the world to a precipice, as the Cuban Missile Crisis revealed. Nuclear wars and not to fight them.

Simply expressed, strategic doctrine adumbrates that the certainty of "mutual assured destruction" establishes nuclear deterrence between nuclear pre-emptive (first) strike by the adversary and remain thereafter capable of

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inflicting "unacceptable damage" on the adversary in a retaliatory (second) strike. The key to nuclear deterrence lies in the capability of nuclear weapons to survive the initial attack. The question which arises, as a consequence, is what level of "unacceptable damage" suffices to deter the initial, pre-emptive, first strike. Assuming that leaderships in nuclear countries are rational, it would seem that "unacceptable damage" might be admitted at lower, rather than higher, levels of nuclear destruction. It has indeed been urged that:

...there is an enormous gulf between what political leaders think about nuclear weapons and what is assumed in complex calculations of relative 'advantage' in simulated strategic warfare....In the real world of real political thinkers...a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder....¹²

Again,

...it became clear that nuclear deterrence was extremely stable when the destruction capacity of the weaker power reached a low level of megadeaths, indeed even a single megadeath. Such a level is attainable with a relatively small number of thermonuclear weapons. Neither superiority nor parity were necessary any longer. Deterrence resulted from what Nixon calls 'sufficiency'..."¹³

The "sufficiency" thesis postulates that, after attaining a state of "mutually assured destruction," further accumulation of nuclear arms and their sophistication serves neither military nor political purposes.

Still, the nuclear arms race, in quantitative and qualitative terms, continues and constitutes the most persistent threat to world peace. These need consideration in further detail.

Arms races are defined as "the product of two or more parties who, perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, increase or improve their armaments at a rapid rate," and further, "compete in terms of quantity (men, weapons) and/or quality (men, weapons, organization, doctrine, deployment)." Total warheads now deployed by the nuclear power number between 37,000 to 50,000. Their megatonnage ranges between 110,000 and 200,000 MT, providing more than 3 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on earth. The SALT parleys have, so far, only frozen the number of strategic delivery vehicles in super power armouries. No agreements inhibit the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, which include artillery shells, air-deliverable bombs and a plethora of medium (1000 km.) range rockets/missiles.

Multiplication of nuclear weapons increases the danger of their being used by accident, miscalculation, misperception, or other form of inadvertence. The super powers continually stress the effectiveness of their existing

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C³I (command, control, communications and intelligence) measures. Such arrangements cannot, however, be infallible; a statistical probability always exists that an unintended nuclear exchange could occur. This probability increases with the number of nuclear weapons deployed, simultaneously increasing the number of decision-making centres that could release these weapons. The US Department of Defence, for instance, has listed thirty-two serious accidents involving nuclear weapons of various types, over the 1950-1980 period. Deployment of more nuclear weapons heightens the possibilities of more and perhaps more serious accidents in future.

Few details, in fact, are known about C³I arrangements in China and the Soviet Union,¹¹ especially how authority to release nuclear weapons is stratified. In the United States, reliance is placed on Permissive Action Links (PAL), described as "a code-system and a family of devices integral or attached to nuclear weapons which have been developed to reduce the probability of an unauthorized detonation." Communications hardware is constantly upgraded to provide additional reliability. Operational plans are contained in the Single Integrated Operating Procedure (SIOP). An established chain of command exists, with the President at its apex. In UK, ultimate authority to use nuclear weapons vests in the British Prime Minister, though consultation procedures with NATO allies are visualised. France is free of such obligations. Authority seems vested in the Presid nt, while there exist detailed war plans for use of nuclear weapons.

It bears mention that two agreements were reached during the SALT negotiations to specifically "reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war," and "improve the USA-USSR direct communications link." It has also been authoritatively admitted that:

The very existence of nuclear-weapons systems, even under the most sophisticated command-and-control procedures, obviously is a source of constant danger. Despite the most elaborate precautions, it is conceivable that technical malfunction, or human failure, a misinterpreted incident, or unauthorised action, could trigger a nuclear disaster or nuclear war.18

A further danger arises from a dichotomy of objectives inherent in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. C³I arrangements must be totally secure if nuclear war is to be avoided and deterrence is to succeed. But C³I arrangements must be "hair trigger" responsive to political direction to strengthen adversary beliefs in the credibility of one's nuclear resolve, viz, that a nuclear weapons attack would immediately follow impermissible conduct. This confusion of objectives is further confounded by a paradox within the strike" capabilities by one nuclear power leads to the adversary veering towards a "launch-on-warning" disposition of nuclear forces to ensure their safety. Such a posture is, inherently, unstable and adds to existing dangers

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of inadvertent nuclear exchange. How secure, therefore, are existing C3I arrangements made by the nuclear weapon powers?

Further, the constant sophistication of nuclear arms in terms of warhead numbers, survivability, accuracy and so on characterises the more dangerous, but insidious, qualitative nuclear arms race. A Western lead in weapons technology, propelling the qualitative nuclear arms race, might initially be appreciated. As George Kennan perceptively observed:

It was we who first produced and tested such a device; we who were the first to raise its destructiveness to a new level with the hydrogen bombs; we who introduced the multiple warhead; we who have declined every proposal for the renunciation of the principle of "first use"; and we alone, so help us God, who have used the weapon in anger against other..."¹⁹

He might have added manoeuvrable warheads, mobile missiles, antisatellite satellites, et al.

The precise danger from qualitative improvements of nuclear weaponry stems from its potential threat to nuclear stability. We have noticed that nuclear deterrence could be stable at lower, rather than higher, levels of nuclear destruction. However, the search for superiority rather than parity, in essence, the search for "first strike" capability proceeds from a variety of reasons, which need better appreciation. First, the nuclear weapons industry intermeshes with the politico-economic structure of—prominently—the Super Powers.²⁰ A military-industrial complex in the United States, and a military-bureaucratic complex in the Soviet Union are recognized; their self-interests dictate onward propulsion of the nuclear arms race. So deeply entrenched are such "complexes" that, unless national governments are able to ignore or curb them, the relentless upgradation of nuclear arsenals cannot be reversed. Second, nuclear doctrine is recognized to serve as the handmaid of nuclear technology. Plausible strategic theories provide intellectual grist to the qualitative nuclear arms race. Some examples would suffice:

(a) The theory that intuitive cognition of nuclear superiority/inferiority influences political behaviour is widespread. Kissinger's exclamation that nuclear superiority was meaningless is well-known. Brezezinski, however, said that:

I don't consider nuclear superiority to be politically meaningless. The perception by others or by oneself of someone else having nuclear superiority can influence political behaviour. It can induce some countries to act in a fashion that sometimes has been described as 'Finlandization.' And it can impose self-imposed restraint.... In other words, it has the potential for political exploitation:...²¹

This thesis has been extended to argue that nuclear superiority restores

credibility in third countries that deterrence would extend to their protection.²² The nuclear arms race is thereby provided a political rationale.

(b) Deterrence requires adversary perceptions to be reassured regarding one's military capabilities/political will to use nuclear weapons and that retaliatory nuclear attach would assuredly entail his annihilation. The credibility of nuclear attack/riposte, therefore, is urged to be the key to nuclear deterrence, which justifies the search for more sophisticated, esoteric and invulnerable nuclear weapons. The resultant paradox can be presented thus, "...if you wish to deter away the fear that nuclear weapons will be used, you have to appear to be prepared to use them in certain circumstances. But if you do so, and the enemy answers back—as he has the capability to do and has clearly said he would-you are very much worse off than if you had not done so, if indeed you can be said to be there at all."23 The search for credibility resembles the search for the will o' the wisp-but with infinitely more dangerous consequences.

(c) The reality that nuclear weapons—a residual force—can only serve to prevent wars, and not to fight them, seems alien to military and political thinking. Witness, the strenuous efforts, therefore, to construct scenarios wherein nuclear weapons become useable. Terms like "flexible response," "limited war," "controlled strategic exchange," "counterforce," "protracted nuclear war," "demonstrative strikes" and so on have gained entry into nuclear parlance. The Achilles heel of such theorization, recognizably, is that no guarantee exists that limited/controlled attack would not escalate to all-out counter-attack. Not so well-recognized unfortunately, are the other related issues-how such wars would be initiated, fought, or terminated. That nuclear war-fighting theories have been advanced by eminent personages like Herman Kahn, Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger must cause concern. Greater concern should, however, be caused by the technological assessment that:

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The impact of even a "small" or "limited" nuclear attack would be enormous. A review of calculations...of major counterforce attacks... found that...the number of deaths might be as high as 20 million. Moreover, the uncertainties are such that no government could predict with any confidence what the results of a limited attack or counter-attack would be even if there was no further escalation.24

That this flawed doctrine spurs the qualitative arms race is apparent. The precise dangers of qualitatively superior weapon systems to atomic peace might peace might be categorised, since much deliberate obfuscation obtains here. It needs pointing out that:

(a) Arming of nuclear missiles with multiple warheads extends the qualitive arms tative arms race.

(b) Cruise missiles can be launched from land, aircraft, ships or submari-They can be armed with either conventional or nuclear warheads.

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Indubitably, they add to "offensive" capabilities and render defence against them difficult, which is "stabilizing" in the grammar of nuclear semantics. But, they would also complicate verification/arms control problems. The same issue arises with SS-20, triple-warhead, intermediate (4,000 km.) range missiles deployed in East Europe by the Soviet Union. It is mobile, and can be converted into an intercontinental (9,600) range missile by addition of a booster rocket, compounding verification difficulties.

(c) The MX, which the United States would be deploying in "dense pack" mode, heightens fears of its acquiring a "first strike" capability, because MX would be relatively invulnerable to pre-emptive attack, and the extreme accuracy of its warheads would permit successful pre-emptive attacks upon Soviet missile silos.

(d) Anti-satellite vehicles and "directed energy" weapons are potentially very destabilizing, because they threaten the "national technical means" (basically satellite reconnaissance systems) upon which verification arrangements within existing arms control agreements, like SALT I and SALT II, are premised.

(e) The real danger from the neutron bomb arises from the subtle, perhaps unconscious, impression that is sought to be conveyed that it might be used as a battlefield weapon like conventional arms.

(f) "Mini-nukes", small nuclear weapons with yields around 1 kt., threaten to blur the "firebreak" or distinction maintained between nuclear and conventional weapons. Cognizant of this danger the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom have declared that they would not deploy such weapons for the time being.²⁵ It needs pointing out, however, that advances in weapons technology are swiftly blurring the earlier distinctions possible between strategic, theatre and tactical nuclear weapons, which forebode greater difficulties in negotiating future arms control agreements.

The dangers to peace from the quantitative and qualitative nuclear arms race are evident. Of equal significance are certain intermeshed factors, which need consideration.

First, the geo-strategic situation of the super powers is not symmetrical, which colours their nuclear doctrine, weapons acquisition policies, training and related matter. The Soviet Union is a continental power, flanked by antagonistic nuclear powers. This explains the Soviet emphasis on land-based missiles and air-defence measures. Soviet attention to its land forces is also explicable by its apparent need to retain political control over East Europe and contain Chinese expansionism after suffering the ravages of a nuclear attack. 26 The United States, on the other hand, is a maritime power. It has, therefore, traditionally emphasized its navy, which explains the value it places on its submarine-based undersea deterrent. Despite having friendly neighbours, alliance obligations towards its NATO partners seriously constrain the United States. Consequently, strategic perceptions of the super powers are not congruent, which reveals the futility of seeking precise equivalences in deployed weapon systems during arms control negotiations.

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ne ise Second, and more seriously, basic differences obtain between Soviet and American perceptions of nuclear deterrence and war-fighting. Nor is this surprising, because historical experience largely colours strategic thinking. American/Soviet beliefs of each other's nuclear perceptions derive, moreover, from an amalgam of predispositions, illusions, myths and images, for instance, American beliefs that the Soviets can accept enormous casualtities, that they believe nuclear weapons are utilisable for war-fighting, that they possess a first-strike capability against US ICBMs.²⁷ and so on highlight the obtaining mis-match between perceptions and realities. There is no evidence, however, of any consultative processes to ensure congruence of perceptions between the super powers about war-fighting, demonstrations, warnings and signals. This raises grave doubts whether these nuances of nuclear posturing would be correctly interpreted by the adversary super power during a crisis. Misinterpretation, however, could herald the apocalypse.

Third, all strategic thinking, is founded on the basic assumption of rational behaviour by national leaderships. Can irrationality, however, be ruled out? It was Winston Churchill who in 1955...made a "formidable admission" as he himself called it:

The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dugout. That is a blank.

The most disturbing defect today, in the prevalent thinking on nuclear strategy, is the cavalier disregard for this "blank." Further, rational conduct by national leaderships in crises is predicated upon these personages being physically and mentally well, being provided all relevant information and being able to examine issues calmly, unaffected by such factors as stress or emotion. Examples of national leaders suffering from serious illness or disability whilst being called upon to take crucial decisions are not unknown. And, a condition resembling the "fog of war" often obtains within political decision-making processes during crisis situations, with available information being confused, unclear and contradictory. The possibility, therefore of irrational conduct is considerable. Nuclear crises situations, however, demand perfect rationality throughout by the two adversaries, constituting a strategist's dream, but making impossible demands on forture

The non-aligned countries have been cognizant of these threats to world peace and stability. Greater efforts towards nuclear disarmament seem necessary considering the heightening dangers of nuclear war. These efforts disarmament disarmament and those designed to generally encourage the disarmament cause.

Among the particular measures of nuclear disarmament are:

1) Catalysing the Nuclear Dialogue: As obtaining presently arms control

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and disarmament negotiations focus almost exclusively upon force/weapons reductions. We have noticed the dearth of information about existing command and control arrangements, and the serious doubts obtaining about their efficacy. Neither is there any assurance that serious asymmetries do not exist between the super powers, regarding their nuclear doctrines and their approaches to deterrence. The non-aligned movement could focus on these grave issues and the consequent need for a dialogue between the super powers on these questions, so that concrete assurances are provided to the world in this regard.

2) Diverting R & D Effort: Global expenditure on military R & D has been estimated at \$35,000 million in 1980, engaging some 500,000 scientists and engineers, comprising around 20 per cent of the numbers available. The super powers account for 85 per cent of the total expenditure. Technology governs doctrine, and "bargaining chips" at arms control negotiations convert into weapons deployment options. Military R & D also creates instability, especially through radical breakthroughs in weapons technology. Despite its increasing importance, however, military R & D has not stirred any great debate. The non-aligned movement must focus upon the need to redeploy resources/personnel devoted to military R & D, preferably into frontier areas like new energy sources, exploration of scabed/outers pace, pollution control, combating ecological degradation and so on, that are advantageous to humanity.

3) Positive and Negative Guarantees: UN General Assembly Resolution 1953 (XVI) of November 1961 declared use of nuclear weapons to be violatory of the UN charter and a crime against mankind and civilization. Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968, however, is the only instance of a positive guarantee being provided, viz., assistance, protection against nuclear threat. The US, USSR and UK recognized therein that the Security Council must take immediate action if a non-nuclear weapon power, party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was subjected to nuclear aggression or threat. This assurance is unsatisfactory: it provided for only consultation processes, and applies only to non-nuclear signatories of the NPT; more importantly, France and China do not subscribe to this resolution.

"Negative" guarantees, viz., non-use of nuclear weapons and threats have different versions. These range from absolute non-use to no-first-use to non-use against non-nuclear adversaries entering security aliances, nuclear-free zones or agreements prohibiting nuclear weapons emplacement on their territories. The General Assembly requested the nuclear powers in 1976 to provide non-use guarantees to non-nuclear powers "which are not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of the nuclear powers." China provided this assurance at the First Special Session; the Soviet Union concurred at the Second Special Session. The remaining nuclear powers have yet to agree in unqualified and unequivocal terms. ³² Closely related to such assurances are no-first-use pledges, which considerably reduce the risk of nuclear war. This guarantee was given by China after its earliest nuclear

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explosion in 1964, and by the Soviet Union at the Second Special Session. Again, the Western nuclear powers have not agreed.³³ The non-aligned movement might, therefore, make efforts to secure these guarantees in clear terms from the Western nuclear powers in the interests of world peace and stability.

4) Cessation of Nuclear Testing: The subsisting Partial Test Ban Treaty—entered into by US, USSR and UK, apart from over 100 non-nuclear powers—remains incomplete for two reasons. First, France and China have not joined; second, the Treaty does not inhibit underground testing. Cognizant of these limitations, the super powers negotiated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) prohibiting nuclear explosions over 150 kt., and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) prohibiting PNEs over 150 kt. Both treaties, regrettably, still await ratification by the US Senate. The non-aligned movement should press for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as it would significantly restrain the qualitative nuclear arms race. Whereas weapons designers can indubitably use computer simulation methods to avoid weapons testing, the reliability of such nuclear weapons cannot be satisfactorily ensured. Besides, further sophistication of such weapon systems would be affected.³⁴

5) Ceilings and Reductions: The quantitative nuclear arms race, we have noticed, has obvious dangers: further additions to existing arsenals, which have vast "overkill" capabilities, compound these dangers. The need obtains, therefore, for a "freeze" on existing inventories, followed by cutbacks in stockpiles. How such cutbacks might be effected should be negotiated. The verification question also arises; here it needs consideration whether the International Atomic Energy Agency can devise safeguards, utilising surveillance and containment techniques of a non-intrusive nature, to monitor mothballed warheads and weapon systems. These questions require immediate and sustained attention by the non-aligned movement.

Among more general measures are the following:

1) Stimulating Public Awarenesss. It would be evident that an awakened public consciousness is needed to counter the entrenched vested interests propelling the nuclear arms race. Moreover, the questions delineating the nuclear threat cannot be left to elite determination, but must be debated in the public domain. Non-aligned countries might set the lead by introducing disarmament lessons in schools and encouraging disarmament studies/research in colleges. The question how greater media efforts might be mobilized to influence public opinion in nuclear weapon states and the developed world is equally important, and requires more serious consideration by the movement

2) Research and Dissemination. Traditionally, great secretiveness surrounds nuclear issues. The need to establish an apex research centre, has long been felt. Apart from stimulating public awareness, this centre could assist non-aligned countries in disarmament negotiations. Studies on

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nuclear crises, advances in weapons technology and their implications for arms control, military R & D efforts, fallacious presentation of military balances and so on require urgent attention. Moreover, the centre could work out concrete suggestions for moving towards nuclear disarmament, and to present the hard questions evaded by the leaderships of nuclear powers.

3) Marching for Peace. Cutting across political beliefs and comprising broad sections of students, churchmen, ecologists and concerned citizens, the peace movements on both sides of the Altantic have obvious significance. A universalization of the demand for nuclear disarmament would exert psychological pressures upon governments and "complexes" to decelerate the spiralling arms race. Therefore, media efforts by the non-aligned movement and its research centre, mooted above, could fruitfully intermesh with the Peace Movements; so could academic and disarmament bodies already existing in the non-aligned countries. Financial support for the Peace Movements might also be considered through UN institutions.

It needs appreciation that progress towards nuclear disarmament would be slow. The inestimable Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of aspyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and bacteriological methods of warfare, was ratified by Japan in 1970, and only signed by the United States in 1976. But, there are rays of hope; first, the thesis that defence expenditure stimulates economic development has finally been discarded. The UN report on Disarmament and Development held that.

...the world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It can not do both.³⁹

Second, the appreciation that defence and social welfare expenditures compete for available resources has increased, and is being publicly debated in developed countries. Third, questions of emplacing nuclear missiles, reducing their numbers, and locating atomic power stations have become issues of the common weal in public consciousness. The Peace Movement spearheads this awakened consciousness.

Our argument, in essence, is that, despite the inability of nuclear weapons to serve plainly discernible political purposes, and despite their patent dangers to humanity, beliefs in the practicability of nuclear conflict obtain for a variety of unconvincing reasons. The consequential quantitative and qualitative arms race at one level, and geo-strategic, doctrinal and psychological factors at another level, exponentially increase the nuclear threat. In this milieu, the failure of the non-aligned countries to sink their difference and unify their efforts on the nuclear disarmament issue is unfortunate. Greater coordination on this vital question would imbue the

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non-aligned movement with a meaningful sense of purpose; searching for solutions to these difficult issues would also, perhaps, achieve greater unity within the movement. Along with a longer appreciation of the growing threats of nuclear weapons, therefore, the non-aligned movement must take cognizance of the emerging peace forces in the world.

March 1983

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NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER

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By S.C. PARASHER*

WARS begin in the minds of men," proclaims the UNESCO Constitution and it is for the minds of men that the protagonists of the Cold War are engaged in a relentless battle through ideology, sieved news and slanted mass media programmes. Democracy needs informed citizens; but the super powers, citizens so informed that they should be imbued with only their image of the world. The aim is to win friends, wean away waverers, produce partisans and destroy enemy positions and strongholds. Information in such a context ceases to be neutral or objective. It becomes an inescapable instrument of bloc politics and psychological warfare.

The Cold War is a war by any definition though its strategy and tactics may vary in accordance with the perceptions of its combatants. Hobbes had described it in a graphic manner. "War consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting," he observed in Leviathan, "but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend in battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the nature of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary." And what happens in such conditions? "No culture of the earth... no arts, no letters, no society and which is the worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death. And the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."

The world today suffers from this Hobbesian prophecy. Fear grips the two super powers and they are deeply suspicious of each other, Fear of communist Russia has become an American obsession and of capitalist powers encirclement, the Russian. Out of this fear they overreact and are making all efforts to extend their areas of security by arming themselves with satellites, nuclear and other sophisticated weapons; by treaties, agreements and secret understandings; and, by undermining the position of each other by deft manipulation of information.

Former colonies gained their independence in this surcharged international atmosphere. Imperial exploitation had left them poor, ignorant, under-developed. After freedom, they are faced with tremendous tasks of modernization and nation building. They need peace for development and a new international economic order to obtain a just reward for their honest labour. But blocs poised against each other like gladiators spoiling for a fight need partisans and not independent nations intent on their self-improvement. From colonies, they are now being reduced to second class

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citizens who are expected to serve the economic and strategic interests of the two blocs. Their policy of arming neighbours forces these developing countries to divert their scarce resources from development to defence. The non-aligned movement therefore is the collective call of these nations to be left alone.

The East-West conflict is like a millstone round the neck of the South. Exploitation by the North even after imperialism has receded, continues unabated; only the form and methods have changed. It is necessary to create a general awareness amongst the non-aligned of this economic reality and also the will for change before a dent can be made in existing international economic arrangements. The Colombo Summit held in 1976 declared therefore that, "A new international order in matters of information and mass media is as important as a new international economic order." The Mac-Bride Commission also noted:

The building of a New World Information Order is intimately bound up with the aspirations to establish a New International Economic Order. Some consider this latter to be a pre-condition of the transformations which should be brought about in communications as in other fields, educational, scientific and social.

Information at present is the world monopoly of a few transnational companies operating in the West. They are: the Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI) of the United States; Agence France Press (AFP) of France and Reuters of England. They together transmit more than 300,000 words daily out of which less than a quarter concern the Third World, while it has more than two-third of the world's population. And even this meagre coverage is devoted to bad news—disasters, calamities, coups, catastrophies, famines and internal strife. Their achievements and heroic efforts to ameliorate the peoples' lot is seldom noticed, their failures become instant news.

The representatives of these agencies measure events from their interested angles. If Arabs raise oil prices they are pushing the world towards conflict. If they buy expensive weapons of war from them they are wise to raise their defence capability. Egypt under Nasser stood on a dangerous precipice; under Sadat, it became a model of reason and foresight. Zia is a Casabianca holding on to the burning deck while Afghanistan is in flames. Arafat is an adventurer. Begin, a nice fellow, given sometimes to odd pranks like Sabra and Chatila where some hundreds of innocent men, women and children were butchered in cold blood. Human rights are remembered in Poland, forgotten in South Africa and slurred over in Pakistan. India's scientific expedition to Antarctica is pooh-poohed but US and UK control of its vast areas is indispensable to the future of science. These are but a few specimens of "objective reporting" so dear to these western journalists who have fanned out in the world to do their bit for their country. They

are, indeed, the dipomats of the twentieth century sent abroad to tell lies to their home audiences.

It is not to suggest bad faith on their part, or, that they are inveterate falsifiers of news. They are, in general, average human beings with ordinary sensibilities and perceptions. They are given assignments which they wish to carry out as best as they can. It is however their background which makes all the difference. They come from the affluent and highly industrialized West (and its colonial tradition) to totally different cultures struggling with appalling poverty. They find these countries in need of foreign aid and imported industrial and technological know-how, with elites who are generally west-oriented with a craze for foreign goods and styles of living. This creates a certain ego pattern in these journalists which blinds them to the efforts made towards development, social uplift, the fight against medieval practices and the regeneration of the human spirit. It is easier to create drama out of human misery than in the efforts made for its removal. Failures make better news. Moreover news for them is a commercial product for sale in their country and disaster stories have a ready market there. They do not think that they have been assigned to fulfil the objectives of the UN Charter of the UNESCO Constitution which lays down "unrestricted pursuit of objective truth in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge." They are seldom conscious while going about their jobs that their countries have jointly undertaken, "to develop and increase the means of communication between their peoples...for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives." These and similar obligations entered into by their own states remain buried for them in international archives.

The transnationals find a favourable soil in the elites of the third world countries. Because of their earlier colonial connection they are bred in the same language, ideas, values and have now developed new links-intellectual, commercial, financial—with western countries. They act as their protagonists and echo their views on the New World Information Order. While their governments speak on the subject with one voice in international forums, they try to confuse issues at home. Transnational news agencies are interlocked with other transnational enterprises which control world-wide markets. They have their local joints and subsidiaries in developing countries which act as their natural allies. Some of them control local newspapers as well. Apart from this, journalists are trained in Western style journalism and acquire the same professional approach to what is news and good journalism.

All this makes the news, views, and programmes of these transnationals readily acceptable to the local media and their audiences. With new technologies that the readily acceptable to the local media and their audiences. logies their information products have acquired a better professional finish and news is moved by them across continents in no time. Many journalists do not even feel the need for independent reporting from other countries in the circum the circumstances. I recall a seminar which had recommended strengthening

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of a local news agency abroad especially in non-aligned countries. In the press conference that followed, correspondents of some important newspapers showed their scepticism about it. "From where will the finances come?" they asked. "From Government!" they answered with sarcasm. The objections they raised were similar to the bogeys that transnational media men and their governments raise about the New Information Order—government control, official handouts, freedom of press, etc. They seldom pause to consider the narrow sieve of transnationals through which only news that they put can trickle out.

Historically, news agencies have been used as instruments of policy and international statecraft. Associated Press of USA, an intrepid supporter of "free flow of information," only after the Second World War, did not relish this flow even till the late thirties. Its general manager led a crusade against the dominance of Reuters after the First World War. He accused Reuters of fomenting wars for the last hundred years and considered it as one of the main causes of the Second World War. He admitted:

International attitudes have developed from the impressions and prejudices aroused by what the news agenies reported. Monopoly made the system of deception work.

The Chairman of Reuters himself proudly claimed that:

Reuters' news...finds its way, without a single exception, into every country in the world....I do not think there is any other factor that has been consistently working directly...with such effect for the advancement of British influence.

Several newspapers reproduce articles on current topics from well known English or American newspapers. Their pages are full of news supplied by their agencies. They are thus daily projecting the western viewpoint of international events and orienting their news readers towards a particular side in international disputes. The World Press Director of Associated Press boasted:

Over a million people a day make their valued judgments on international developments on the basis of AP news.

One cannot also wish away the fact that Third World journalists feel more at home with AP, UPI or Reuters than with the Press Agencies Pool which they consider amateurish and below par in collection as well as transmission of news. Interwoven with it are inter-linkages between professional bodies, media men, news agencies and other transnational empires. It adds up to a dominating hold of transnational power structures over the information

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power comm media of non-aligned countries and how successfully it operates internattionally and nationally.

Political awareness of the dangers of the present state of information was first reflected at the Algiers Summit in 1973. It was decided that "developing countries should take concerted action to...reorganize existing communication channels which are a legacy of the colonial past and have hampered free, direct and fast communication between them." Similar sentiments were expressed at later meetings of its bodies. Action on them was decided at the Foreign Ministers' Conference of Non-aligned Countries when they agreed to set up the Non-aligned Press Agencies Pool. Later Summit meetings—Colombo 1976, Havana 1977—have been equally concerned with this problem.

The Non-aligned Press Agencies Pool was based on an association of equal partners exchanging news about themselves through a network of redistribution centres. It is a self-financing arrangement in which the sender pays for transmission and the receiver for reception. It concentrates on development news. It still needs greater flow of information and news, better communication technology, lowering of tariffs for transmission of news and training of personnel. The Pool has gained in strength despite the mental reservations of many influential journalists. Its daily news-file has increased from 3,000 words in 1976 to more than 40,000 words recently. Its membership increased from a few countries to 70 countries in the same period. According to a recent estimate 25 per cent of news published in Indian papers was taken from the Pool copy. It is, however, considered an optimistic guesstimate by some others.

Yet, for all practical purposes this Pool is yet no where near providing any serious competition to the transnational giants. The former Chairman of the pool claimed for it merely a supplementary role. There was no plan to supplant the giants as such, he said. But unless the Pool is able to provide some good alternative services, it can never hope to stem even a little the gushing flow of news from the West.

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The Western monopolists of the media, however, get really alarmed when some countervailing measures like the New World Information Order are proposed by the Third World countries. A mere whisper of it throws them off balance and is enough to make them scurry for cover under the international documents they so merrily ignore in their work otherwise—The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Freedom of Information. It may be easier for people to believe the devil when he quotes scriptures are meant to raise the oppressed people and restore to them their identity, protection of laws for every one. They are not meant to give license to the communities in the name of freedom. Human Rights were not intended to

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be used as weapons in the Cold War to which unfortunately they are increasingly being reduced.

Western newsmen, with official support, invoke "free flow of information" to protect their self-generated flow of information. This smacks of "free trade" and "free flow of goods" of the nineteenth century when they had the monopoly of manufactured goods and mercilessly exploited labour, women, children as well as colonies for their selfish material advantage. The moment Japan and some other countries offered serious competition, all this was forgotten. Walls of protection were raised and protection became the article of economic faith; import and export controls were enforced and justified. "Free flow of information" is the twentieth century version of free trade. This "freedom" in the absence of other positive measures taken by the international community or by third world countries is bereft of any meaning or substance to the developing countries. It is sheer illusion to suppose that transnationals meet their requirements for freedom of information. In fact the transnationals exercise the power to deny information not approved by them. How can they approach with empathy, let alone, sympathy, regimes they do not approve of even if they are engaged in social regeneration of their people. Allende of Chile was for them a "Marxist" whose downfall was a deliverance. Did these transnationals at the time describe or reflect their countrymen's views or their own?

For Western agencies flow of information is only free when they are free to regulate its flow, i.e. send or withhold information as they please. The societies on whom they thus report remain powerless to enforce even a minimum of conditions of fair reporting. One is reminded of the "freedom of contact" during the hey-dey of capitalist society in the last century, when according to Prof. Laski it was "free to make contracts for its use by other persons...without a mass of legal imperatives which set limits to the contracts they could make." As democracy advanced legal limitations were placed on this irresponsible freedom by society "which uses the authority of the state power to deprive the owner of property of economic sovereignty." Information sovereignty of the transnational media similarly needs regulation by the United Nations (international community) as well as third world societies through the use of state power at their disposal. They may consider setting up regional councils consisting of media representtatives of the countries concerned to monitor information flow and could co-opt a representative of the foreign news agencies when corrective action is required.

As long as management of information is with foreign media they can influence the minds of unsuspecting people around the globe. This is too great a power for anyone to surrender gladly. News Agencies are the battalions of Western powers dispersed in other countries. Bolivar once observed, "journalism is the artillery of mind." Thanks to these transnationals it is the most devastating fire power in the hands of this bloc in the Cold War.

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Western media men and their official supporters take shelter under Article 19 of Human Rights which gives the right "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." But each right has a corresponding obligation. And when the right is claimed for powerful international monoliths, obligation has to be equally strong, precise and clear to save weak nations from information exploitation. As Justice Holmes of the US Supreme Court said in a judgment, freedom of speech does not mean "cry fire" in a crowded cinema hall.

Resolution 59 (1) of the United Nations General Assembly had set limits to the freedom of information:

Freedom of information requires as an indispensable element the willingness and capacity to employ its privileges without abuse. It requires as a basic discipline the moral obligation to seek the facts without prejudice and to spread knowledge without malicious intent.

Consequently the UNESCO Declaration includes "free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information" [ArtX(2)]. Art. VI is clear about "the establishment of a new equilibrium and greater reciprocity in the flow of information." It is equally specific about the inequalities in the flow of information. It says, "it is necessary to correct the inequalities of information to and from developing countries and between these countries."

In this context it is difficult to appreciate the acute anxiety of these transnationals over the New World Information Order. How can they possibly believe in the Divine Right of their representatives to misreport on other countries? They cannot fetter "the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" with which the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins. Information collected and disseminated by organized powerful enterprises becomes a responsible function and subject to social accountability. The Third World looks with some amusement at the overreaction of these free traders in information when they are reminded of their minimum responsibility in fair reporting. "The mere mention of UNESCO," says the New York Times, "has set off alarms in newspaper rooms throughout the United States and Western Europe where the organization is suspected of attempting to curb freedom of information by implementing a "code of journalistic conduct." This is one of the many examples of loud noises being made to frighten UNESCO from taking ameliorative measures on issues which the rest of the world considers necessary in the interest of justice and fair play in the reporting of events. The Director General of UNESCO moaned, "Some of the critical of the Critical Control of the Critical Cont the criticism we have received has verged on madness. There's either a big dose of ignorance or it's just bad faith." "UNESCO," he affirmed, "is in favour of pluralism and freedom of information."

Third World elites still value the written word more than the spoken

and consequently the Press receives disproportionate attention compared to the more powerful of the mass media—film, radio and television. There is greater infiltration of the media culture of the North in them than perhaps, in newspapers. There is however, greater discussion in the Third World on news and the Press Agencies Pool than these media. Conferences of Broadcasting Organizations of Non-aligned Countries and its Committee of Co-operation have been formed but have not been given the importance that they deserve. These countries depend on the Western companies for hardware. Software follows imperceptibly. Programmes need resourcesartistic, production and monetary. Most of the broadcasting organizations do not have adequate equipment and studio facilities to fill their scheduled time on the air. They inevitably turn to the finished products of the North which professionally and technically are really good. And the transnationals supply their needs with a smile. A half-an-hour TV programme which costs 300,000 dollars to produce in the United States is given at a pittance of 30 to 40 dollars to a developing country. Few local productions produced on meagre resources could ever hope to match these programmes. The elites welcome them and ask for more. A demand is thus generated which makes these canned programmes the staple diet of indigenous TV. The gains of the North are immense; it sells its life-styles, material splendour and culture and influences audiences to its way of living and thinking. But these are at variance with local life styles and cultures and give a false image of reality to them. A struggling economy then has to face rising expectations from a Western style which it cannot hope to fulfil, then rising frustrations, and consequent destablization of the national economy, culture and institutions.

The Conference of Broadcasting Organizations has taken several steps for better allocation of frequencies for non-aligned countries, greater exchange of information and cultural programmes and technical know-how, co-production of programmes and training of personnel working in the media. But national institutions, both public and private, have to make strenuous efforts to train personnel, provide technical know-how and strengthen their media through mutual co-operation. Collective self-reliance in this area can be of lasting benefit to the non-aligned movement and help to achieve the objectives of the New World Information Order.

Plural and balanced flow of information is now seriously being threatened from a new source. A profound revolution has taken place in the West, particularly United States, in information technology. It has taken a two generation leap forward while we in the Third World are still engaged in a generation-behind technology. The invention of micro-processors, memory chips, optical-fibres and micro-computers and satellites have resulted in a tremendous rate and speed of transmission due to the digitalization of messages. A present day satellite, for example, sends 200,000 words per second compared to 33 words per second of a telophone line. One fibre-optic cable (no thicker than human hair) transmits 30,000 simultaneous telephone calls. This is revolutionising production, office work, services and

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information flow. This will make non-aligned states further dependent on the West which possesses this high technology while the developing world will again be left struggling with "labour intensive" industries. This High Information Technology makes the control of world markets and minds by the United States an even more viable concept. It will thus continue to dominate information and the culture of Third World countries in the foreseeable future unless positive counter measures are taken by them.

Information—economic, financial and cultural can now be transmitted across borders and stored in remote computers and retrieved from many places. Billions of dollars can be moved across borders without any monetary control from the affected countries. This will erode the independence of developing countries. Nora Report (France) says, "The location of data banks constitutes an imperative of sovereignty. It equally constitutes the erosion of sovereignty of other states." Trans border data flows will reduce the non-aligned countries to a dependency status. The Canadian Minister of State for Science and Technology observed:

The problem of trans-national data flows has created the problem of growing dependence...and with it the danger of loss of access to vital information and the danger that industrial and social development will largely be governed by the decision of interest groups residing in another country.

It is, therefore, imperative for the non-aligned countries to pool their knowledge and resources in this area and take collective measures to offset dangers arising out of unrestricted trans border data flows. They must develop their own data banks, bases and increase information exchanges so that they are self-reliant and in a position to maintain their self-identity. Otherwise further colonization of information will take place. At present ninety-percent of all the information in the world is held in the data bases in the United States. The non-aligned movement must decide measures to combat the new dangers arising out of informatics.

Equally serious is the threat to the cultural identity of non-aligned countries. With transnational flow of information, dumping of mass media programmes, and foisting of foreign life-styles, an alien culture will swamp local cultures. "Free Flow of Information," as propounded by Western pundits, ideally serves the high information technology nations. It will, however, turn other nations into their cultural colonies. Freedom of information and right to information must therefore be subjected to the right of privacy of individuals as well as nations.

Information is a valuable social asset and must therefore be regulated in the national interest. The state must concern itself with what goes across its borders. Information purveyors in a high technology era cannot claim special privileges for themselves since information will increasingly depend on the economic and cultural well being as well as independence of nations. The

New World Information Order must take into account these new developments in information technology and safeguard interests of technologically weak nations against the world heavy weights. They will otherwise be tied to the apron strings of the North. As the final report of the MacBride Commission says:

Collective self-reliance is the corner stone of a new world information and communication order. The power and promise of ever new communication technologies and systems are, however, such as to demand deliberate measures to ensure that existing communication disparties do not widen.

Information has become multi-dimensional and no uni-directional flow can be justified or permitted for the interests of a few and at the cost of many. On the extent to which the North is willing to heed this warning, will depend the further peace and happiness of mankind.

March 1983.

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SOVIET NUCLEAR POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD

BOTH the USSR and the United States have, since the beginnings of the atomic age, been concerned about the problems of proliferation, control and regulation of nuclear weapons. In recent times their concern has widened to encompass the spread of a civilian nuclear technology in other parts of the world, particularly the Third World. They argue that there is very little difference between the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the making of nuclear weapons. Both follow varied strategies to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Interestingly, both have also been responsible for the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. From the late sixties onwards, the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), particularly (USA, USSR and UK) have been working to establish an international non-proliferation regime—a regime based on a set of rules, norms and procedures that regulate and control the nuclear activities of the nations. Presently these norms and practices are mainly based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its regional counterpart like the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the rules and procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Zangger Committee safeguards, the safeguards of the London Group of suppliers, as well as the United Nations resolutions. All these, intended to impose limitations on non-nuclear weapons states, are based on super power convictions that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the "irresponsible" states of the Third World, would be the most dangerous development—one that could cause the outbreak of a nuclear war.

SOVIET POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE

The USSR was the first to consider a complete ban on nuclear weapons. On 19 June 1946, its representative in the United Nations, Andrei Gromyko, proposed a draft in the UN Atomic Energy Commission demanding that an international convention be held for "the prohibition of production, storing and use of atomic weapons and for the destruction of such weapons within three months of the entry into force of the Convention." The Soviet proposal was a counter to the Baruch Plan, which was based on the idea that there was need to control all atomic energy first with a view to eventually eliminating all atomic weapons. The USSR however, rejected the Baruch Plan outright. In a nutshell then, whereas the Americans wanted first to control all nuclear energy and then to disarm, the USSR wanted nuclear disarmament first and control only later. The Soviet attitude then therefore was similar to the present attitudes of the states of the Third World to the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

During the Stalin period there was no question of the USSR providing any assistance in the matter of nuclear research to the states of the Third World because Stalin doubted even their bona-fides as independent sovereign

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nations. The USSR did not even provide such assistance to its allies of the East European countries and China. Following changes in leadership however, it agreed to provide nuclear research assistance to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and Romania.

After 1958, when China decided to go ahead with its programme of building a nuclear arsenal and to wrest the Quemoy Island from Taiwan even at the risk of a nuclear war, the Soviets were forced to reappraise its nuclear export policies. It apprehended that in a future crisis it might be dragged into a cataclysonic nuclear confrontation with the United States on account of the Chinese leaders' irresponsibility. It, therefore, first suspended and then terminated its nuclear research assistance to China. Nuclear exports were also slowed down and stringent restrictions and safeguards imposed on the recipients with a view to plugging all loopholes and preventing manufacture of nuclear weapons. It provided the East European states with nuclear reactors and other forms of nuclear research assistance but made such assistance subject to strict safeguards. It also gave them uranium fuel for their reactors and received from them the spent fuel rods for reprocessing. It did not allow them to develop their own reprocessing and enrichment plants so as to make it impossible for them to prepare uranium or plutonium for explosive purposes even when they had the necessary raw material. Besides, it saw to it that all of them signed the NPT and subjected themselves to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

In the 1960s, Soviet policy on the issue of non-proliferation was guided by one major objective, viz., the prevention of the Federal Republic of Germany acquiring nuclear weapons. This was why, in the course of the discussions on a treaty on nuclear non-proliferation, the USSR objected to any treaty which did not ban direct or indirect forms of access to nuclear weapons, such as the proposed Multilateral Force for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Atlantic Nuclear Force or the Nuclear Planning Committee. Its main concern was thus to keep the American nuclear weapons out of Europe in general and of West Germany in particular. Following protracted negotiations between the United States and the USSR, and only after acceptance of the Soviet demand that NATO should abandon its plans for a MLF, and that West Europe should accept IAEA safeguards instead of EURATOM safeguards, the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation was signed.

COLLABORATION WITH THE THIRD WORLD

Except for the export of nuclear power reactors and nuclear research assistance to its allies in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union has been extremely cautious in responding to requests from other countries for nuclear equipment. It has so far not provided any significant nuclear equipment, material or research assistance to the countries of the Third World. Cuba

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and Libya are the only two exceptions which have some nuclear collaboration with the Soviet Union. Cuba has got two power reactors on order from the Soviet Union. However, for all practical purposes, it is now considered to be a member of the Soviet bloc. The only third world country then to get a power reactor from the Soviet Union is Libya; a contract for a 440 MWe power reactor on order was reported in January 1978 after Libya had signed the NPT. The USSR has given Egypt and Iran a research reactor each. In 1961, it gave Egypt a research reactor, WWR-C2MWe, for testing and research without safeguards; it supplied Iraq with a research reactor, IRT-2000 2 MWe, located at Thwartha near Baghdad. The reactor is covered by safeguards. Negotiations for the supply of a 1,000 MWe nuclear power reactor are in progress between India and the Soviet Union. There are reports that the Soviet Union once offered a nuclear power reactor to Pakistan, but that the offer was never confirmed. The USSR supplied 200 tons of heavy water to India according to an agreement in 1976 under the IAEA safeguards, which were quite stringent. In 1980 it agreed to supply another 250 tons of heavy water. Nevertheless, the overall record of Soviet supply of nuclear material equipment and technology to the developing countries of the Third World is very insignificant. Unlike the United States and some other Western countries there has however been no clandestine transfer to these countries. The USSR has supplied only nuclear power and research reactors; it has not given any complete nuclear fuel cycle to any country.

The 1970s witnessed growing global concern about the depleting traditional fuel resources. The countries of the Third World-Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iraq, Libya, the Phillipines, South Korea and Taiwandesirous of acquiring civilian nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, particularly for electricity, have acquired this kind of technology. India carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in 1974. Israel and South Africa had acquired enough nuclear technology to be able to develop nuclear weapons whenever necessary. A number of other countries of the Third World are either planning or conducting feasibility studies to introduce civilian nuclear programmes; they are: Chile, Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. For these states, the issue of nuclear proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are therefore important. But, these and other associated issues, like security safeguard assurances, PNEs, international control of nuclear technology, etc., are now less serious in the case of states that are aligned with one Super Power or the other by way of a defence agreement such as the NATO, the Warsaw Pact, or the bilateral national security agreement between the United States and Japan. All of them have gone in for peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a big way. Many of them also have high nuclear equipment technology; they can manufacture nuclear reactors etc. Of course they have opted not to go in for nuclear weapons like Canada, West Germany, and Sweden.

The problem then relates mainly to those countries of the Third World

that need nuclear power for peaceful developmental purposes, but have been either denied or given this under strict inspection safeguards on the ground that the nuclear technology meant for peaceful purposes could be easily channelled for nuclear weapons purposes also. They are unhappy about getting nuclear power at the risk of compromising their sovereignty. Thus the issue of political pressures and manoeuvres comes into the picture; the nuclear policies of the "nuclear haves" having a direct bearing on the developing countries. Since 1970, particularly since India's peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974, the issue of nuclear non-proliferation has assumed added importance. The "nuclear haves" talk in terms of a nuclear non-proliferation regime which would have an adverse impact directly or indirectly on the developing countries of the Third World. The Soviet contribution to the cause of the establishment of a nuclear non-proliferation regime is by no means insignificant.

SOVIETS SUPPORT NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

Indeed the Soviet Union is the strongest pillar of this non-proliferation regime which is aimed primarily at restricting the flow of nuclear know-how to the countries of the Third World. Consequently, it has supported all those measures which the NWS have resorted to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It, along with the Western countries, supports the NPT, for creating a legal basis for a non-proliferation regime. It considers it an important instrument in averting dangers of nuclear wars and expects it to become universal. It also believes that the NPT is a part of international law and that, in order to establish a legal non-proliferation regime, all potential NWS should be persuaded to sign and ratify the treaty. The treaty, according to *Izvestia*, provides international legal basis upon which to regulate the participation of various parties in the sphere of peaceful uses of nuclear power. The *New Times* has said that it is necessary to "get more countries to accede to the treaty, which should be made truly universal."

Besides its support for the NPT, it along with the "nuclear haves" has resorted to political pressures, given assurances about security interests, exercised technological control, denied technical know-how and necessary material, built up a strong system of safeguards, etc. An analysis of the Soviet stand on these measures vis-a-vis the NNWS would enable us to understand Soviet attitudes to the problems of proliferation.

Calls for Extension of IAEA Safeguards

The USSR also fully supports the idea of extending IAEA safeguards to the nuclear industry of the NNWS, whether signatory or otherwise to the NPT. In fact, since 1975 the Soviet approach to the issue of non-proliferation has been clear; it actively participates in the IAEA's activities, is involved

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in working out new and improved verification methods and procedures and is training IAEA personnel engaged in inspection activity. Further, it has suggested that non-signatory states should not be given equipment and nuclear materials or any other assistance in the peaceful uses of atomic energy unless they pledge not to use such materials to create nuclear explosive devices. It has also called on NNWS to give formal assurances while accepting materials that they would not use them to manufacture nuclear explosive devices. The USSR, has in fact consistently held that the exporter should exercise control not only over the nuclear material and equipment but also over the technology transferred. Its own control over nuclear exports has been more rigorous and tough than that of the United States. With a view to promoting a truly impermeable nuclear non-proliferation regime it has pleaded for and advanced a number of suggestions for firmer and more effective controls to be established over nuclear exports.

In the Soviet view, the nuclear activities of a number of countries, including some developing countries—activities like the creation of "an industry for the enrichment of uranium and the processing of irradiated fuel with plutonium recovery"—are fraught with dangerous consequences from the point of view of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The USSR has, therefore, suggested that it is necessary to create multinational regional centres for the atomic power fuel cycle. This will not only be in the interest of the participating countries but also make atomic engineering more economical.

The USSR has also repeatedly emphasized the need to ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials. There is always a possibility of fissionable material being stolen by individuals, terrorist organizations, or criminal gangs for political blackmail or for other malevolent purposes. In view of it, the USSR insists on proper safeguards for nuclear materials during their use, stockpiling, or transportation.

Further, the USSR, a founder member of the London Suppliers Group (LSG) has advocated rigorous controls over nuclear exports to the non-nuclear states which are not signatory to the NPT. It fully subscribes to the "trigger list" and other guidelines of the group as approved in January 1978; it holds that only complete control over all nuclear activities of the non-signatory countries receiving these materials can ensure a strict enough non-proliferation regime. As a member of the LSG it has been "no less vehement in its insistence on enforcement of stricter safeguards by the nuclear exporting countries."

Nuclear Co-operation with India

The USSR supplied 200 tons of heavy water for the Rajasthan Power Plant after India had signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in November 1977. It is said that the safeguards accepted by India under this agreement are comprehensive and more stringent than those contained in

any other nuclear agreement India has signed so far; the terms and conditions exclude all explosions (peaceful or non-peaceful). IAEA safeguards are applicable to all that would come out of RAPP I and II. The agreement signed with the USSR in March 1980, would get for India 250 tons of heavy water to be used in any nuclear plant. IAEA safeguards would of course be applicable to any plant making use of this heavy water.

APPRAISAL AND CONCLUSIONS

It is thus interesting to note that even though the Soviet Union has stood for nuclear non-proliferation and has advocated rigorous measures for establishing such regimes, political considerations have played an important role in guiding and directing Soviet policy. When the NPT was being discussed it perceived non-proliferation as a part of its foreign policy strategy to weaken imperialist United States and to neutralize the threat emanating from the most agressive member of the imperialist bloc—viz., West Germany. The support for non-proliferation was aimed then at preventing West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. It viewed non-proliferation largely in the context of european security, later in the 1970's, in the context of detente it followed a more or less identical policy on the issue of non-proliferation.

Also, it is interesting to note that the Soviets have been convinced and enthusiastic about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In 1977 in a series of nuclear explosions it succeeded in developing a new technique for creating underground gas condensate storage facilities. A Soviet expert, V.N. Radionov, while speaking in a Technical Committee of IAEA, outlined the Soviet programme for peaceful nuclear explosions as,

... directed at creating large hydrocomplexes, increasing the power generation potential of the economy, increasing the country's mineral resources by making the exploitation of low grade ores worthwhile, solving technical problems associated with the storage of oil, natural gas and also chemical and radioactive wastes.

Nevertheless, the Soviet stand on nuclear explosions by nuclear havenots is contrary to this position. It considers such explosions by NNWS
to be fraught with the danger of developing nuclear weapons. It has also
voiced doubts about its economic viability. Y. Toumlin, a leading writer,
holds that "in technical terms a nuclear explosive device meant for peaceful purposes does not essentially differ from that of a nuclear bomb." This
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty
of Tlatelolco). The Tlatelolco Treaty, the Soviets believed, "permit peaceful nuclear explosions in contravention of the procedures established by
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." Moreover,

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"it contains no prohibition on the transit of nuclear weapons through the zone's territory."

The USSR has also exercised its political leverage and used political pressure to get non-nuclear states to sign the NPT. It has sought all possible safeguards from bloc members. In the case of Libya, it agreed to give it a power reactor only after it signed the NPT. On the other hand, though it is known to have wanted India too to sign the NPT, it has not made it a condition for any of the agreements signed with the former on the supply of heavy water. Despite its well-known stand on PNEs by NNWS it made no comment when India exploded its first peaceful nuclear device. TASS just carried a report saying that, India's research programme "followed India's striving to keep level with technology in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions." Prayda also discounted all alarmist views of India's nuclear explosion. The USSR in fact, did not condemn India openly on the issue of PNEs, though it was reportedly unhappy about it. Subsequently it strongly supported all the cartelist policies of the LSG. It must be noted nevertheless that, though it did not compel India to sign the NPT before supplying heavy water, it saw to it that the latter accepted the safeguards agreement with the IAEA which was quite comprehensive in scope.

The USSR has also not supported Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. The proposal has the blessings of the United States. The USSR has just sided with India although it has generally supported the setting up of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

In the final analysis, it may be noted that the present non-proliferation policy of the USSR favours the establishment of a formidable nuclear non-proliferation regime on a strong legal, political and technological basis. It subscribes to all the measures which the nuclear "haves" have either already taken or propose to take in the future to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and strongly supports the NPT. It also stands for strict enforcement of IAEA safeguards and virtually wants fullscope safeguards to be extended to non-signatory states, which receive nuclear aid. Further, the Soviets advocate curtailment of export of enrichment and reprocessing facilities.

In the context of the above beliefs, the USSR has been extremely cautious as regards its nuclear exports. Consquently, there has been virtually no cooperation between it and the states of the Third World in the field of nuclear research. Unlike the Western countries, it has not indulged in clandestine nuclear deals. However, what is important is that political considerations have weighed heavily in the decisions relating to the issue of non-proliferation. Though it wants NNWS to sign the NPT, it has not always used it as a political weapon with which to secure their adherence to the NPT. Its policy on peaceful explosions by the Third World countries seems to be ambivalent. Although it has all through supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free Asia a nuclear-weapon free zone.

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The USSR being a member of the group of nuclear "haves" cannot escape its share of criticism from the developing countries, that the nuclear non-proliferation regime which is sought to be established is an instrument of technological domination and of a discriminatory, exploitative, and hierarchical nuclear world order.

The objectives laid down in Article VI of the NPT are nowhere near realization. On the contrary there has been considerable vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons since the conclusion of the NPT. The developing countries, therefore, argue that a non-proliferation regime whose norms and rules do not touch the fundamental issue of vertical proliferation is hardly worth its name. Moreover, the countries of the Third World do not see the possibility of a widespread horizontal proliferation. According to them, the nuclear "haves" have exaggerated the threat of a horizontal proliferation beyond all reasonable limits. The developed countries are no less liable to trigger a nuclear war than the NNWS. The developing countries resent the suggestion that they might clandestinely use civilian nuclear technology to make bombs; they affirm that they need this technology for strictly developmental purposes and repudiate the charge that they are about to misuse it for military purposes. Indeed they feel that the aim of the nuclear "haves" in withholding their technology from them is to keep the developing countries in perpetual bondage. Moreover, they point out that proliferation is a political problem and that the nuclear "haves" are trying to pretend as though it was merely a technical issue. The motive is to deny and control this technology. The developing countries are also critical of the patently callous indifference of the nuclear "haves" to the energy needs of the states of the Third World. They charge them with blatantly indulging in "over consumption and waste" of valuable fossil energy instead of sharing it equitably. Finally the developing countries feel that the restrictions sought to be imposed upon their use of civilian nuclear technology are an assault upon their sovereign status.

So far there has virtually been no significant nuclear collaboration between the USSR and the developing countries in the field of nuclear technology. However, there is every likelihood of the USSR co-operating with the countries of the Third World in the different regions of the world in nuclear research. The reasons for its doing so could be strategic, political, or economic.

1. The United States has indulged in what may be called selective nuclear proliferation by enabling countries like South Africa, Israel and Pakistan to enter the nuclear field. France and Germany too have encouraged nuclear proliferation in different parts of the world to ensure their economic interests. To counter the West, the USSR may intensify its co-operation with the developing states. It may focus on those countries which are in the neighbourhood of states which are in receipt of nuclear technology from the West—such as Iraq, Iran, India (Pakistan), Syria, Libya (Israel).

2. The USSR supports the development of nuclear power in principle in

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as much as it is the basic source of energy of the future. It believes in the economic viability of nuclear energy and discounts the much-talked-about environmental hazards. In contrast there is confusion and doubt in the West about the future of nuclear power. The increasing energy needs of the developing countries can be met substantially by nuclear energy. In 1980 the nuclear energy made available to the countries of the Third World accounted for just 3,00 MWe or less than 3 per cent of the total world nuclear capacity. The USSR could make significant political capital by supporting the nuclear energy programmes of the Third World.

3. The main reason why the pace of introduction of nuclear power in the developing countries is slow is generally the incompatibility of the large standard reactors (600 to 1,300 MWe). Most of the developing countries have smaller electrical grids. With France, West Germany and the USSR now offering small reactors, which are suitable for smaller electrical grids, the situation is likely to change. The USSR is said to have developed a small reactor in the 100-500 MWe range. This seems to be meant for the less industrialized segment of the world nuclear reactor market. The USSR is also engaged in expanding its production of nuclear reactors. East European countries are specializing in the productions of components for the VVER-440 MWe reactors. The USSR has recently commissioned the Atomic Power Machinery Complex (Atommash) and has attained the capability to produce eight nuclear power reactors a year. It is thus likely to compete with the traditional suppliers of power reactors.

4. The USSR is the pioneer in the field of fast breeder reactor technology. The great value of such a reactor is that during its operation it not only produces electrical energy and freshens water, but also reproduces atomic fuel transforming "non-fissionable" uranium-238 into an efficient fuel plutonium. It combines two opposite processes: it burns fuel and simultaneously forms a new stock of it. It is, however, more expensive in terms of the initial cost than a thermal power reactor of equal capacity. It can, of course, be made competitive by increasing its unit capacity.

The rising energy demands, the depleting energy resources and uranium stocks, and the increasing cost of uranium constitute the major impetus to the development of the fast breeder reactors. The latest breeder reactor, it is estimated, is capable of extracting about seventy times more energy from uranium stock than light water reactors of today. The future of atomic power is, thus, linked with these breeder reactors. The developing countries which are confronted by the problem of scarce resources would find the fast breeder reactors economically very attractive.

5. The USSR is not unaware of the economic potential of this multibilion dollar industry. It is sceptical of the dualistic nuclear policies of the USA. On the one hand the USA allows hijacking of enriched uranium to south Africa and Israel to help weapon programmes; on the other it offers the extent of penalizing India for its PNE. This may well cause the USSR

to enter the nuclear commercial market by supplying nuclear technology to the developing countries for the development of nuclear energy for peace-

ful purposes.

6. By entering into nuclear co-operation with the developing countries the USSR may succeed in meeting, though on a limited scale, the criticism of the countries of the Third World that the two Super Powers have monopolized nuclear technology with a view to perpetuating inequality and discrimination.

BH 65 CV May 1983

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RACISM IN CANADA: SOME RECENT SURVEYS

THERE is a widespread opinion among Canadians, with their multicultural policy and liberal tolerance of differences, that racism¹
hardly exists. However, for whatever reasons—economic recession, increasing unemployment, spread of racist organizations such as the Ku Klux
Klan in North America, or increase in the numerical strength of non-white
immigrants in the Canadian ethnic mosaic—racism in Canada is far from
being dead. This is revealed in the results of a recently conducted Gallup
Poll² on behalf of the Canadian Government's department of multiculturalism. The results appear to confirm the apprehension of the leaders of
"visible" minority groups³ that strong racial prejudices do exist in Canada.

The survey was conducted in November 1981. About 2,000 adults were interviewed in their homes. The results are claimed to be accurate to within four percentage points 19 times in 20. Though the findings of the survey are somewhat self-contradictory and a bit confusing (because the questions are often naive and ambiguous), the central message is clear: at least 12 per cent of Canadians are "hard core" racists who think that "the people of this country are looking less and less Canadian" and who would "cut off all non-white immigration to Canada." (Table I)

It is likely that the same 12 per cent respondents along with an additional 2 per cent feel that "racial mixing violates the teaching of the Bible." This is not all. The racialist circle appears to be wider. Thirty-one per cent of all those surveyed generally agreed that they "would support organizations that would work towards preserving Canada for whites." This probably would mean a support for such "racist bases" as the Ku Klux Klan, the Moral Majority and other fundamentalist groups. Presumably, subsumed among these respondents are those 19 per cent who believe that "riots and violence increase when non-whites are let into the country."

The proportion of respondents who oppose racism ranges from 49 per cent to 67 per cent. However, it is surprising that only 34 per cent of the respondents pledged support to local organizations working toward "multiculturalism and harmony among races." About twice as many feel that non-white immigration has made Canada a culturally richer country.

While a little over half of the respondents (56%) see national strength in Canadian cultural diversity, a slightly lower proportion of them (49%) seem to appreciate fully the immigrant nature of Canadian society and history. A comparison of the responses to question no. 2 and question no. 7 shows that at least 11 per cent of the interviewees are not sure as to how the cultural richness "should result in the national strength."

Fifty-two per cent of the respondents generally disagree with any policy which would encourage the return of non-white immigrants to their homeland. However, fifty-eight per cent believe that non-white immigrants should "prove themselves" before getting government jobs. It is encouraging to note

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Table I

Gallup Poll on Responses to Racism in Canada, November 1981

	Generally Agree	Generally Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree
Riots and violence increase when non-			H0/1 11 110
whites are let into the country.	19	64	13
Non-white immigration has made Canada			三、 加热 多位
a culturally richer country.	67	21	8
Racial mixing violates the teaching	And the second of	to manufacture and	
of the Bible.	14	70	11
I would maintain a fairly open immigra-			THE RESERVE OF THE PERSON
	65	16	13
tion policy with few limitations.	The second of	10	I AL BEST STORMAN
I would support organizations that			
would work towards preserving Canada	01	50	12
for whites.	31	50	13
I would limit non-white immigration			
and those who were let in would have			
to prove themselves before they were			
entitled to government services.	58	23	14
A culturally diverse country is a			3. 以后,如何用证据
strong country	56	19	19
I would limit immigration in general,			
but would not base it on racial origin.	43	37	15
The people of this country are looking			
less and less Canadian.	12	74	9
I would support local organizations			
that worked toward multiculturalism			
and harmony among races.	34	43	19
I would cut off all non-white immigra-			
tion to Canada.	12	71	10
We are all immigrants in one way or			
another.	49	28	18
I don't mind non-whites, but I'd rather		20	10
see them back in their own country.	28	50	16
	28	52	16

Source: The Citizen (Ottawa), 6 March 1982.

that about two-thirds of the respondents favour maintaining "a fairly open immigration policy."

The Gallup Poll, just summarized, highlights only a few aspects of what is known as "individual" or personal racism. More precisely, it highlights the extent of racism in Canada. However, it does not pose more revealing questions such as: What kind of people tend to be racist? What are the demographic or background variables that correlate with individual racism? What is the psychological make-up of an individual racist? Why do some societies tend to be more racist than others?

A sociological study, designed to answer some of these questions, was

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conducted by Frances Henry⁴ in Toronto, the largest city in Canada with a population of over 2 million people. Based on the measurement of the attitudes of a random sample of 617 white Torontonians and using a specifically constructed questionnaire of 100 items, the study found that 16 per cent of the population can be considered to be extremely racist; 35 per cent incline towards some degree of racism; 19 per cent are extremely tolerant and 30 per cent incline towards tolerance." At the risk of some misrepresentation, the major findings of the study can be summarized as follows:

- —Older people (53 years and over) are more racist than the younger ones (under 39 years).
- —Highly educated people are the least racist, whereas those with little education are more racist.
- —Persons in the low socio-economic status category (measured primarily in terms of occupational status) are the most racist, whereas those in the high socio-economic category are the least racist.
- —The most racist persons are those who are not or are no longer participants in the labour force (such as housewives and retired persons). Students and those not working (unempoyed or laid off) tend to be the least racist.
- -Religious people are more racist than those who profess no religion.
- —Authoritarian personality seems to correlate with a very high degree of racism.
- ---Social contact (friendship) rather than physical proximity in the neighbourhood and/or work-place appears to be a factor contributing towards better race relations.

Although the Blacks are no less a victim of individual or institutional racism in Canada, it appears that compared to Indians or Pakistanis they are more acceptable to the whites. In the Toronto survey, summarized above, nearly 50 per cent of the respondents thought that most people in Toronto were more opposed to Indians and Pakistanis rather than Blacks. Blacks were perceived as generally belonging to the lower classes, whereas many more Asians were seen as belonging to the middle classes. Compared to the Blacks, "the Asian lifestyle" (in terms of religion, dress, food-habits, language, etc.) was seen to be more dissimilar to the Canadian life-style. In the survey Asians were also seen as "secretive" and "arrogant." Partly, this stems from a general lack of knowledge about Asians. In the words of the author of the Toronto survey report:

What this suggests is that less is known about Indians and Pakistanis; respondents have less information about them and are more socially distanced from them. Sentiment against them, however, is strong and perceived sentiment against them is far stronger than against Blacks. Prejudice in this respect is strong despite lack of clear-cut information

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about these groups. What appears to be generally known is that Asians are, or are thought to be, culturally very different to Canadians. Perhaps much of the prejudice against Asians is merely picked as a generalized attitude in much the same way that the term "Paki" is being used by youngsters who do not really know what it refers to.⁵

Racial prejudice against East Indians⁶ in Canada is strong not only compared to the Blacks, but also compared to the Chinese. This is supported by another study conducted by Peter Li⁷ in Saskatoon, a small Western Canadian city. At the time of the survey in 1978, Saskatoon had a population of approximately 134,000. The survey involved a systematic sample of 652 telephone interviews, each of about ten minutes duration.

The respondents were asked to answer five attitudinal questions about Chinese and East Indians with respect to the following:

- 1 Whether Canada had been harmed by their coming?
- 2 Whether the respondent would oppose their immigrating to Canada?
- 3 Whether the respondent would move if they came in great numbers to live in the respondent's district?
- 4 Whether the respondent would move if they came to live next door? and
- 5 Whether the respondent would oppose their becoming a close relative by marriage?

Background information regarding age, sex, education and other characteristics were also collected. The findings reveal a great difference in the

Table II

Racial Prejudice against East Indians and Chinese in Saskatoon, Canada, 1978.

	Negative Attitude Towards			
	East Indians		Chinese	
	No.	%	No.	%
1 Canada has been harmed by			Name of Street	
their coming. Oppose their immigrating to	175	26.8	63	9.7
Canada,	269	41.8	173	26.5
Move if they come in great numbers to live in my district.	141	21.6	75	11.5
Move if they come to live next door.	33	5.1	18	2.8
Oppose their becoming a close relative by marriage.	Las Seul			
Total number of respondents (N-652)	146	22.4	141	21.6

Source: Peter S. Li, "Prejudice Against Asians in a Canadian City" Canadian Ethnic Studies Association Bulletin, (Saskatoon) Vol. XI, no. 2, 1979.

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attitudes of respondents towards East Indians and Chinese. (Table II) The figures show that while 41.8 per cent of the respondents were opposed to East Indians immigrating to Canada, only 26.5 per cent opposed Chinese immigration into Canada. Except in the case of close relation by marriage (where both ethnic groups received almost equally negative scores from the respondents), on the rest of the items of the scale there was a significant difference in the attitude of the respondents towards East Indians and Chinese. For example, 26.8 per cent of the respondents thought that Canada had been harmed by East Indians coming into their country, but only 9.7 per cent thought that it had been harmed by Chinese immigrants. Equally significant is the difference in attitude towards the two racial groups regarding "their coming in great numbers to live in the district" and "becoming next door neighbour." Why this difference? Thus speculates the author:

Why the Chinese tend to be perceived more favourably than the East Indians is unclear. It may be related to increased trade between Western Canada and China after formal diplomatic relationships between the two countries was established in the early seventies. This in turn may be enhancing the international image of China and consequently improving the social status of the overseas Chinese. In contrast, India is largely perceived by the general public as an under-developed country haunted by problems of poverty and over-population. These images, in turn, may be continuing to tarnish public perceptions of the East Indians in Canada.8

An analysis of the bivariate relationship between the cumulative indexes of negative attitudes towards the two groups suggests that education, age and sex are significantly correlated. In other words, the older, less educated male respondents in the Saskatoon study tend to be more prejudiced towards the Chinese as well as the Indians than the younger, educated female respondents. Regarding age and education, the Toronto study comes to similar conclusions. Unlike the Toronto study, however, in the Saskatoon case racial prejudice does not seem to correlate significantly with the occupation variable.

Furthermore, multiple regression analyses of the data reveal that sex, age and education jointly explain only a small proportion of the variations in racial prejudice towards the two groups (4 per cent in the case of Indians and 7 per cent in the case of Chinese). This, according to the author, probably suggests "a closing of the attitudinal gap between the old and the young as well as between the educated and the less educated." It could well be that the younger and the educated Canadians also feel threatened by the arrival of better educated and skilled Asian immigrants and the resultant job scarcity and competition. It is perhaps fair to conclude this discussion in the words of another researcher who studied the results of post-War Gallup Polls on immigration and related problems in Canada: "To a

majority of Canadians, prevailing economic conditions and the extent of unemployment are of considerable importance in shaping their opinions about immigration." This is generally true about the Canadian Government's immigration policy as well.

January 1983.

PRAKASH C. JAIN*

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1 In this article the terms "racism," "racialism" and "racial prejudice" are used interchangeably.

2 Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Gallup Poll, November 1981, as reported in

The Citizen (Ottawa), 6 March 1982.

- 3 The "visible" minorities in Canada consist mainly of "Orientals" (Chinese, Japanese, etc.), "East Indians" (Indians, Pakistanis, etc.). and Blacks (mainly immigrants from the West Indies). Following is a current estimate of the population of these groups in the Canadian ethnic mosaic: Orientals 400,000; East Indians 300,000; Blacks 200,000. For a brief description of the overseas Indian communities in Canada and elsewhere in the world see Prakash C. Jain, "Indians Abroad: A Current Population Estimate," Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), Vol. XVII, no. 8, 20, Feburary 1982, pp. 299-304.
- 4 Frances Henry, The Dynamics of Racism in Toronto: Research Report, (Toronto, 1978), (Mimeographed).

5 Ibid., p. 52

6 In the Western hemisphere, people of Indian origin are generally referred to as "East Indians" which distinguishes them from the native Indians on the one hand, and the West Indians (people of the West Indies) on the other. Both terms "Indian" and "East Indian" are used in the following pages.

7 Peter S. Li, "Prejudice Against Asians in a Canadian City," Canadian Ethnic Studies Vol. XI, no. 2, 1979, pp. 70-77.

8 Ibid., p. 75.

9 Nancy Tienhaara, Canadian Views on Immigration and Population: An Analysis of Post-War Gallup Polls, Department of Manpower and Immigration (Ottawa, 1974), p. 29.

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ROOTS OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A Review Article

Many books and articles, dealing with Indian foreign policy, make scattered references to the interrelation between domestic politics and Indian foreign policy. There is however, no attempt to examine it in a scientific and comprehensive manner. The book under review* touches upon virgin fields in doing so. Moreover, there is a systematic attempt to trace the roots—the traditions and history which have moulded Indian political culture.

Dr. A. Appadorai, the doyen of Indian political scientists, has explained the substance of politics to a large number of students in one of his most popular text-books. In another book he boldly suggested the revision of liberal democracy to suit modern needs. As the first Secretary-General of the Indian Council of World Affairs and the first Director of the Indian School of International Studies, he organized studies on Indian foreign policy and international studies in the country. He maintained close contacts with those who formulated Indian foreign policy ever since India became free. As the Secretary of the Asian Relations Conference, the Secretary-General of the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung, and as a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations Assembly, Dr. Appadorai has had the opportunity to associate himself with those connected with the implementation of Indian foreign policy in its formative phase. In addition to making use of these experiences, he has done considerable research in the study of the domestic roots of Indian foreign policy.

I TRADITIONAL ROOTS OF BASIC CONCEPTS

In the first introductory chapter, as well as in the second on "Tradition and History," the author explains at length the Indian foreign policy objectives such as non-alignment and the pursuit of peace and friendship with all countries. No other scholar has tried to trace the roots of Indian foreign policy to the history of the ancient period of India, the one which is occasionally referred to as the Hindu period. Dr. Appadorai observes that the traditional values of India date back some thousand years to the scriptural texts such as the Vedas, the Bhagavad Gita and Buddhism. He notes with approval Nehru's views that the positive aspect of peace and the desire to promote a large degree of co-operation among nations on India's part was partly due to India's past thinking.

^{*}A. Appadorai, Domestic Roots of Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-72 (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1981), viii, 244p., Rs. 80.

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Dimensions of Non-Alignment

Two aspects of the traditions examined here are non-violence and tolerance. The observers of international politics and modern India's internal politics may feel that this Indian claim of being inclined towards non-violence is highly exaggerated. It resembles that of the United States, which claims that it stands for the free world, and Soviet Union's pretension that it stands for a lasting peace and a people's democracy. As far as India was concerned there was a dimension of power even in India's decision not to get involved in the power politics dominated by the two Super Powers. The following comment by Kissinger on the Indian position is significant: "In, the 1950s and 1960s, America oblivious to these countries' absorption with themselves, sought to fit them into its own preconceptions. We took at face value Prime Minister Nehru's claim to be the neutral arbiter of world affairs. We hardly noticed that this was precisely how a weak nation seeks influence out of proportion to its strength or that India rarely matched its international pretensions with a willingness to assume risks, except in the sub-continent where it saw itself destined for prominence."

Apart from this power dimension, there were other reasons for India to take to non-alignment. When the country became free, its leaders were called upon to assert independence from the erstwhile colonial powers and their allies. Without undertaking this minimum task, it could not have defended its newly won freedom and extended it. It would also not have been accepted as a full-fledged member of the international community and would have been treated only as a satellite. As tar as the Soviet Union of the Stalin era was concerned, it followed a foreign policy based on the assumption that those who were not its satellites were its enemies. Among other things, this feature of the international situation was as much a reason for India's "non-alignment" from power blocs as the metaphysical and philosophical traditions of the country. It was not an accident that a large number of countries, which did not share these traditions, finally accepted non-aligned policies.

Metaphysical Bases of Tolerance

The author of this book is much more justified in emphasising the Indian tradition of tolerance. He quotes with approval the approval the following view of V. Raghavan: "Tolerance is one of the most important among the concepts which invest the Indian traditional culture with a distinction and distinctness." And Dr. Appadorai adds: "The basis of this tolerance seems to be a metaphysical one. Since the human mind is limited, it cannot comprehend the nature of total reality; further the revelation that is made to it is not only limited but is interpreted by it from its own standpoint. Hence the great sages of Hinduism have said that there are as many religions as there are human minds." It is this tradition which was responsible for

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India not taking the position of Stalin and Dulles, that those who were not with them were against them.

principles of Conciliation and Compromise

In addition to this tolerance, there was also a balance of mind and a spirit of conciliation and compromise in Indian traditions. In the words of the leader of an Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly: "There are no great principles which are not flexible. Principles in politics are not like points in geometry, without dimensions. Principles must enable people to meet and reconcile their differences." And Nehru, more than any one, was aware of this; he made considerable use of this tradition of Indian history in articulating and defending various aspects of Indian foreign policy. It was this reliance on conciliation and compromise which enabled Indian leaders to take a balanced view of relations with China and Pakistan even after the armed conflicts with these countries. In China there was once a "Hate America Campaign." Then there was a mood to teach "Vietnam a Lesson." Many statements by Pakistani politicians, leaders of the Arab Liberation Front, Libya and of Iran also indicate an intolerance and the lack of balanced thinking. These are in contrast with the statements of Indian leaders.

Nehru could not always act in accordance with this basic approach of Indian tradition. He himself gave the reasons, "...a statesman who has to deal with public affairs cannot ignore realities and cannot act in terms of absolute truth. His activity is always limited by the degree of receptivity of truth by his fellowmen." Elsewhere he said: "Unhappily the world of today finds that it cannot do without force....But in resisting evil, we must not allow ourselves to be carried away by our own positions and fears and act in a manner which is itself evil."

This approach made it possible for India not to lose its balance and give up the non-aligned position in 1962, when the India-China armed conflicts took place, and in 1971 when India was involved in the war against Pakistan on Bangladesh. During the first incident, India received substantial help from the United States and at the time of second, from the USSR. But it was in a position to revover its initiative powers and assert its non-aligned position when the crises were over.

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Nevertheless, it is doubtful if one can accept Appadorai's claims of India's so-called desire for peace. Others can rightly point that India did make use of force on many occasions. Goa and the armed conflicts between India-Pakistan and India-China are some significant instances. Perhaps very few countries were as often involved in armed conflict as India was

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during 1947-1972. And no impartial student of international politics will admit that in almost all these incidents India was on the defensive while the other countries were the aggressors. That is the dominant popular view in this country. No objective scholar could share this. It is true that India was not involved in power politics on a major scale and India did not take any armed conflict to the extreme but, this only focuses attention on the fact that Indian leaders were not adventurists.

Again, Dr. Appadorai exaggerates the impact of the traditions of non-violence and Gandhi on the Indian political mind. Very few other countries had witnessed riots on such a mass scale and the killing of innocent people as did India in the recent past.

What one can claim on India's behalf is that a large number of Hindus in this country could make a difference between militant resistance to evil and violent activities. And among them there was also a readiness to conduct negotiations with opponents in a spirit of conciliation. The impact of the European liberation on the Hindu mind also strengthened these traditions. The industrialisation and the consequent emergence of a middle class in the country were other factors. Dr. Appadorai rarely makes a reference to any of these sociological questions. He confines himself to making references to the impact of the super-structure of Hindu ideas and traditions in isolation.

In this book he never did explain India's inability to come to a negotiated settlement with China on the issue of the borders. The fact of the matter was that, the Indian Government made a wrong calculation when the armed conflict between India and China took place in 1962; it did not anticipate the use of the Chinese Army on such a large scale. Moreover, it was compelled by domestic critics to take an uncompromising position towards China. Maxwell's *India's China War* is as much unbalanced on the other side as this book under review. But the books written by the former Indian intelligence officers and army commanders have also explained how the Indian Government functioned as the prisoner of the extremist critics and took a rigid position. It seems that one tradition of India was that of Gandhi and another was that of his assassin.

Three excellent chapters in this book are: "Democracy," "Pluralist Society"; Religious Divisions;" and "Federalism." These explain the institutional features of the Indian political system and their impact on foreign policy.

The author does not consider that Parliament was an important factor in the making of foreign policy in the Nehru era. He is rather in agreement with the view of Krishna Menon: "As for the general policy, these debates have been occasions for the assertion of the basic policies of the government. With the large majority the government has in Parliament, and with the debates could not materially affect issues." Menon's view on this matter ought to have been taken with caution. It is true that he himself was not

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very sensitive to the non-official views and pressure groups. But Nehru was. India's first Prime Minister knew that it was not by eloquence and the number of votes that opposition members could be mobilised and influence the decisions of the government. Seen in this context, Menon's removal from his post of Defence Minister, when pressures in Parliament mounted against him, is understandable. It was true that some members of the ruling party exerted similar pressure. But they were effective only because of the support they received from the opposition. Moreover, Nehru was always in search of a consensus and he took note of the views of the opposition irrespective of the number of votes it had. At first the opposition was from the Communists; later it was from the right. The Indian political situation, during the period under review, was dynamic and not static. It was not an accident that Nehru chose Asoka Mehta to replace Krishna Menon as the leader of the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly after the armed conflicts between China and India. Explaining the basic approach of the government, Nehru said: "Any attempt on our part, i.e., the Government of India here to go too far in one direction would create difficulties in our country. It could be resented and would not be helpful to us or to any other country." This search for consensus on the part of the government leads to the assertion of the democratic rights by the people. This is not always documented in parliamentary debates. One has to study the political behaviour of the people and go beyond the institutional framework to understand these aspects of the matter. The present work, never gives any indication that its author had any extensive discussions with the leaders of the opposition such as the Communists and the Jana Sanghis.

No other book or scholarly paper has dealt at length on the foreign policy implications of the pluralist nature of the Indian society. The presence of a large number of Muslims in India is a factor in India's policy towards Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Arab world. This is explained in some detail. The problems created by the people of Tamil origin in Sri Lanka is also referred to. One could have added the total impact of the fact that India is not a homogenous society or even a society in which any single cultural group is predominant. This multilingual and multri-religious character of the society is a guarantee against India becoming a fascist country.

Again, the chapter on "Nehru's Charismatic Leadership" does no justice to the complex subject. Nehru's basic approach to the political and economic development of the country and his perspective on international relations are not properly assessed. His appeal to the youth and to the left parties is not explained. Unlike other leaders of the liberation movements in Asia and Africa, like Nkrumah and Soekarno, Nehru could command the respect of senior civil servants and army officers who were trained by the erstwhile colonial rulers. And he could also make use of scholars and intellectuals like K.M. Pannikar and Krishna Menon.

There are not many references in this book to Nehru's successors either—Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers. One thing was obvious; they were

not in search of a consensus. They functioned as leaders of their parties and factions. And they were not scouting for talents in the implementation of the foreign policy or for partial contribution to the making of foreign policy. This explains the lack of colour in India's external relations today in spite of the fact that the "average" in the knowledge of international politics among the civil servants, scholars and political commentators has gone up. There were many external factors which were responsible for this development. Moreover, a new complexity appeared in Indian foreign policy as the result of India's emergence as the "Middle Power" and the foremost power in South Asia.

An important development which has enabled India to rise to this status, is the domestic background of the country. The chapter in the book on "The Demands of Economic Development" explains only one aspect of the matter-the role of foreign aid to India. It also deals with the impact of foreign private capital, foreign trade policy and the promotion of joint industrial enterprises. There are however, two important gaps in this field. What is the domestic basis of India developing a public sector in heavy industries with the help of the socialist countries? A Soviet commentator's view that India was having a "non-capitalist path" is highly misleading. But it is certainly a part of the strategy of developing a "national economy" with its many foreign policy implications. Dr. Appadorai has completely ignored the controversial discussions on this matter.

Another missing link is the limited need of the Indian economy to expand to other countries. The degree of industrial development India has achieved and the fact that India has a large number of scientists and technicians inside the country has its own logic in foreign policy. One cannot ignore the reality that in some respects India is today a privileged country in the world.

This was partly the result of increasing military power also. This has led to the emergence of pressure groups inside the country interested in the purchase of military supplies from one source or the other. Naturally these are not well documented and Dr. Appadorai writes only on matters on which the footnotes can be given. One can also say that some of these are evident only in the period later than the one covered in this study.

In the final analysis, this book is a comprehensive and thorough summing up of published materials. The author has not taken the risk of making any speculations. Very few will differ with what he has written. Only some may regret that he has not made any penetrating analysis of controversial questions. For instance, there is a Soviet lobby and an American lobby in this country. The power structure of these lobbies are distributed in different sectors such as the economic field, the Press, the Civil Service and the Army. A party such as the ruling Congress party has itself within it different pressure groups. It is difficult to gather information on them. The book is not concerned with these questions. It gives an account of only the institutions which are apparently connected with the making of the foreign policy. This undoubtedly is very useful as a background to the study of other forces s n

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at work. Finally, the book is indeed a very valuable addition to scholarly literature on Indian foreign policy.

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LESSONS FROM JAPANESE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A Review Article

THE plethora of studies on the secret of Japan's successful transformation attest to the widespread curiosity about the nature of the process. Studies in the last decade or so have sought the reasons in its social structure, group ethos, management techniques, ethical systems and in the fortuitous world situation which enabled it to escape becoming a colony of the Western Powers. Japan, in the context of the Cold War, offered to developmental theorists a safe model for the underdeveloped countries of the "free world" and it was Herman Kahn's book, The Japanese Superstate, which marked the emergence of an awareness that the Japanese had succeeded not only as an Asian country but were attaining a position which could challenge the supremacy of the United States and Western Europe. Ultimately, Ezra Vogel in Japan as Number One put forward the thesis that Japan could provide a model for American development.

These widely read and influential books from the work of Ruth Benedict through Chie Nakane down to Vogel have sought to explain Japan by examining its national character, value orientations and social structures. While undoubtedly providing useful analysis, they have unfortunately tended to create a Japan which is tension-free and in which a single value structure exists. In this homogeneous society there are no classes, hardly any conflict with authority, the workers are satisfied and respectful towards the ruling groups, who in turn are both benevolent and wise. This mode of analysis has not only tended to vitiate a clearer understanding of the process of Japanese development but it has also fuelled the imagination of conservative observers, who, seeing this capitalist paradise, hope to extract lessons, management techniques and institutions to bring about industrial harmony and greater productivity.' From theory to quality circles there seems to be something for everyone.

THE ETHIC OF JAPANESE CAPITALISM

Morishima* sets out not to offer us lessons which we can use but rather to look at the nature of Japanese development from the point of religious ideas and how they created a distinctive society. His theme is the larger question of how the possessors of a non-western attitude came to gain control and mastery over industrial techniques produced in the West. He uses the ideas of Max Weber, who argued that it is the ethic that is given and only an economy compatible with this ethic can emerge. Thus, while ideology may play a crucial role during periods of change, Morishima argues that it

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^{*}Michio Morishima: Why has Japan 'Succeeded'? Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982), 207p., £ 12.50.

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also has the effect of restricting the possibilities in day to day economic activity within the framework peculiar to that ideology. This, he feels, should serve as a counter to the trends of looking to China or Japan as models of development for backward countries.

The characteristics of capitalism in Japan differ from that of Western societies. Japanese capitalism is seen to be anti-individualistic, paternalistic and nationalistic. For Morishima these characteristics continue to make the growth of a true liberalism and individualism a serious problem in modern Japan. To trace the origins of the growth of these characteristics, Morishima looks at two crucial periods of Japanese history when it came into contact with more complex and sophisticated civilizations from which it borrowed ideas, institutions and technology. The first was during the sixth and seventh centuries, when Japan came into contact with China, and the second, during the middle of the ninteenth century when the West "opened" Japan and the latter began a forced march to try and equal the progress of the former.

In the sixth and seventh centuries, Japan was emerging as a society in need of more complex forms of organization and ideology and its contact with China gave timely access to Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism. The future pattern of borrowing is evident in this period, for while Japan borrowed with alacrity, the borrowings were adapted, not merely adopted. Thus, Morishima quite rightly stresses the differences between Chinese Confucianism and its Japanese variant. For the Chinese, benevolence and righteousness were the prime virtues while the Japanese stressed loyalty and loyalty not to ones' soul or inner being but to ones' lord. Similarly Tao, which in China had stressed worldly happiness and longevity for which a quiet, secluded hermetic exsistence was necessary, was used to develop, together with indigenous animistic beliefs, Shinto which inspired patriotism and Emperor worship. Japan lacked a successful tradition of a religion based on individuals and with the aim of helping humanity, so that the ethical doctrines which flourished really served only to provide an ideology for the ruling classes to uphold the status quo. The people, therefore, had no theoretical basis on which they could build beliefs based on individualism and internationalism. The state could channel the energies of the nation towards increasing the material prosperity of the country because the ethical doctrines emphasised material worldly prosperity, and further, with the underlying nationalism inculcated by these doctrines, the people could be directed in whatever direction the state desired. The seeming ease and quickness with which the nation was put on the road to change and progress had therefore its dark side, for it was in the same manner that a consensus was created to ed to suppress liberal activity Thus, Morishima argues that if the pre-war society of Japan can on this basis be called democratic fascist, then the postwar period should really be understood as a democratic planned economy.

The state, given this ideological backing, could pursue a policy which, to use Chinese terminology, was premised on increasing the "three differences", The second of the se ences." This meant that the state concentrated on developing a nuclei of

advanced enclaves in each sector rather than working for the balanced development of the entire country. This uneven development created and made possible the continued exsistence of a dual structure which Morishima quite aptly calls a loyalty and a mercenary market. It is the advanced loyalty sector which the government encouraged and worked in close cooperation with and it is this sector in which we find the well-known and much talked of life-time employment system, the welfare measures and the development of a company ethic. The "mercenary" sector which comprised the small-scale traditional firms, did not benefit from government aid and support but were nonetheless indissolubly tied to the system. In terms of productivity this dual structure enabled Japan to emerge as a powerful nation. That Western technology was successfully incorporated and a highly productive economy created can be seen quite dramatically from the following data on the shipbuilding industry. During the period from Pearl Harbour to the end of the war in August 1945, Japanese shipyards produced 15 aircraft carriers, 6 cruisers, 126 submarines 63 destroyers, 70 transport ships, 168 coastal defence ships, and others upto a total of 682 naval vessels. This does not include the 720 cargo ships and 271 oil tankers. In terms of productivity then, Japan was even then second only to the United States which, it should be remembered, suffered neither war damage nor a shortage of raw materials.

Morishima argues that the phenomenal success of the the post-war economy is really based on changes brought about during the war years. The compulsions of war made it possible for Japan to mobilize its population and transfer a larger percentage of the male population to industrial production at low wages. This made the growth of the heavy and chemical industries possible at a more rapid rate. The basis of post-war growth was thus laid in the period before the war.

In the period of post-war recovery, the role of the government and the American Occupation policies are given in a proper perspective. The government, as in the Meiji period, helped to re-establish private industry by not only instituting supportive policies but also with more material aid, by directly selling government facilities at low rates. For instance, the naval fuel depot at Yokkaichi was sold to the Showa Oil Co. and Mitsubishi Petrochemical Co. Japanese industry which was still mainly labour-intensive, producing goods like clothing, shoes and toys, received a fillip because of United States procurement for Korea for the five years from 1950-55, which enabled it to get back to its pre-war level. As in the 1930's, the special procurements from Manchuria by the Kwangtung Army had minimized the effects of the depression, so Korean procurements enabled the Japanese economy to recover from the ravages of war.

The disruption of the war and the consequent lack of trained executives in the upper echelons enabled younger managers to assume responsibility; Morishima sees the effect of their army experience in their style of functioning and their approach to industry. They regarded industrial production as

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a war objective and each firm as a unit. They therefore stressed uniformity, solidarity and moral training.

It is not enough to try and isolate a particular policy to explain Japan's success. One must, instead, see the entire framework in which government tax and credit policies could succeed because they were formulated and implemented by a close working together of firms, industries and banks with key government agencies. This process of continuous interaction enabled the government to keep changing the character of the economy toward a concentration of high value industries and enabled the government to implement programmes of phasing out unprofitable industries. Thus Japan moved from the labour-intensive industries of the late 50's to more capital-intensive industries like steel, motorcycle, ships and petrochemical based products like plastics and fibres in the 1960s. In the mid-70's it switched to automobiles, T.V. receivers and home appliances, and by the end of the decade to high technology areas like computers, robots and numerically controlled machine tools. The government worked to protect only infant industries and provided long-term financing but it did not curb domestic competition.

Morishima finally looks at the educational system and attempts to show how it has functioned as an integral part of the state. It's close control by the state has meant that it has been used not only to train the character and faculties of the student, to develop the habit of independent inquiry, but rather as a training ground for skills directly usable in the economy. It was to some extent because Japan concentrated on producing engineers that it could use technologies developed elsewhere. Ofcourse it should be underlined that the image of Japan as a mere borrower is a highly distorted mage and misses the crucial fact that Japan was able to adapt and modify the imported technology thus improving its capabilities. For instance, improved welding techniques made it possible for Japan to build the giant 500,000 ton tankers. In the universities however, the emphasis on engineering, business administration and economics has led to and created a neglect of science. Thus, in 1974 only 3 per cent of the total population of undergraduates was in the science faculties, while a comparable figure for the United Kingdom is 24 per cent. It is this neglect which has made the position of fundamental research very bleak. While so far Japan has been able to buy technology with ease, the future prospects look less sanguine as the threat of Japanese competition increases, for technology will not be as easily available. However, this is not a problem for Japan as it is now a major exporter of technology. Morishima also questions the commonly accepted view that through education upward mobility has been possible as the major with the maj the major criteria for advancement has been, not social status but the university on versity one graduated from. He argues that the figures are not significantly different control of the graduated from the argues that the figures are not significantly different control of the graduated from the argues that the figures are not significantly different control of the graduated from the argues that the figures are not significantly different control of the graduated from the argues that the figures are not significantly different control of the graduated from the argues that the figures are not significantly different control of the graduated from the argues that the figures are not significantly different control of the graduated from the argues that the figures are not significantly different control of the graduated from the argues that the figures are not significantly different control of the graduated from the graduate different from that of Britain, and moreover, intra-generational mobility

Morishima's argument is refreshing for he seeks to explain the development

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ment of Japan in a historical framework, but his attempt to explain the peculiarities of Japanese capitalism through ideas and ethical doctrines needs to be balanced by more concrete studies of ideas and institutions at particular periods to show not only how business strategies and industrial policies were formulated but also how "traditions" were re-created. Again, his caution that Japan, or for that matter China, cannot serve as models for other underdeveloped countries is not only valid but should serve as a useful check to the present euphoria for extracting policies and institutions and seeing in them the answer to our problems, without considering the society in which they arise and function.

CAN JAPAN BE A MODEL?

But can Japan be a model? A number of works, both scholarly and general, have sought to generalize from the experience of Japan and offer it as an example for the developing societies of today in an effort to extract policies and institutions which could be applied in a totally different historical situation. What is interesting is that this interest is not a new phenomena but in fact is somewhat similar to American and European interest in Japanese development at the end of the 1890's, when it had completed the first phase of industrialization. At that time a number of foreign advisors who had worked for the Japanese Government began returning to their countries and they contributed their experiences to this growing interest which centred around the question of how Japan had incorporated Western science and technology and was leaving China behind. A large number of articles particularly in technical and scientific journals like Nature and The Engineer discussed this problem. Though the level of debate now is certainly more sophisticated, the lack of serious concern with the historical process of Japanese development leads to distortion. While cultural factors as well as intellectual traditions did play a role in shaping Japan, non-cultural factors were crucial in allowing it to develop, both as an independent nation and as an economic power. Recent studies have shown that the Tokugawa Period, far from being a stagnant society, was a highly urbanized and dynamic one and had developed economic institutions which made it possible to absorb the new knowledge from the West. Secondly, the breathing space that Japan was allowed because of western interest in China was a crucial factor in allowing it to develop. To this may be added the fortuitous circumstances such as the infection of silk eggs in Europe which allowed Japan to step in and secure not only revenue but also use the opportunity to build its own cotton industry.

Thus, the very different historical situations of mid-ninteenth century Japan and present-day developing societies precludes the possibility of the former being used as a "model." The area of technology transfer offers a very clear example. Ian Inkster offers a preliminary analysis of Japanese policy towards foreign patentees and finds that they had very little prospect

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of gaining any control over technological innovation. He argues that while more detailed research is required to establish the function and influence of such mechanisms as technical associations, publication projects and joint research, it seems fairly clear that Japanese policy "served as an efficient means of technology transfer prior to 1869 all but prohibiting any rights of ownership to foreigners while importing patented machinery, and after that date continuing to encourage trading off final products by foreigners rather than encouraging the manufacture of new products or processes within Japan under a monopoly held by foreigners."2 (Italics in original) This is in strong contrast to the situation which developing societies face today as they adhere to the Paris Convention which has led to an unequal situation where foreigners own "over six times as many patents granted in poor countries than the nationals of these countries; over 90 per cent of these foreign-owned patents are never used in production processes in those countries."3 (Italics in original) Thus it is evident that to view the question of technology transfer in isolation is misleading and it is very necessary to consider the historical context in which Japan became a modern economic power.

To conclude, a large body of literature which seeks to draw "lessons" from the Japanese experience is flawed to the extent that each writer seeks to establish an aspect which he feels is crucial to the neglect of other equally important ones. Certainly, this body of literature has much to teach us, above all the "lesson" that to impose our prejudices and preferences seriously distorts any real understanding. Viewed historically then, Japan in the mid-nineteenth century had a certain autonomy, and as an independent nation, it could pursue a path of development which was in consonance with the ideas of its ruling groups' idea of national interest. That this was not, at all times and in all aspects, in accord with the thinking of all its people is also a subject which has much to teach us.

BRIJ TANKHA*

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3 Ibid. p. 170.

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INDIA

Anthropology and Development

L.P. VIDYARTHI and B.N. SAHAY (Eds.): Applied Anthropology and Development in India. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xxxix. 291 p., Rs. 100.

THE role of social sciences in the development process is being increasingly recognised. Social scientists are therefore now engaged in many applied areas. There is however, much discussion regarding the relationship between the "applied" and the "pure" aspects of social science research. Anthropology has been one of the earliest among the social sciences to be used in applied areas. One might even say that the origin and growth of anthropology has largely been due to dealing with practical problems. "The alien administration could realise that for an effective and successful administration of the natives they needed knowledge of their life and culture,"says the author in the Introduction with regard to the British Administration. The role of social sciences has now expanded and there are a wide variety of areas in which they are engaged—health, housing, police administration, rural development, resettlement and rehabilitation—to name a few.

The book under review, carries a detailed introduction regarding applied anthropology and development in India; this gives a historical perspective. There has been a controversy as to whether a laissez-faire approach should be taken for the development of the tribals or whether there should be active intervention. The controversy is now meaningless as it is an accepted policy to help the tribal communities to improve their quality of life. Education, health, agriculture, urban planning, etc., are areas in which "culture" has an important bearing when an effort is made to bring about change. "Culture" is a crucial concept in anthropology. The studies made, and the approach suggested by the anthropologists in these areas have been dealt with in the Introduction. Various patterns of collaboration between policy-makers and social anthropologists are also discussed.

The book is divided into four parts. Part I, dealing with the constitutional provisions, planning, development administration and evaluation, contains three articles. Part II carries two articles dealing with "social structure and stratification." However, the implications of the understanding of the social structure for bringing about change have not been dealt with. Such a discussion would have added to the "applied" aspect.

Part III deals with "Problems and Prospects of Social Development." It has the largest number of contributions. The areas covered are wide; one of the chapters deals with special provision for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Trites-How they worked? Other chapters deal with economic, agriculture and educational development. Family planning and banking are other aspects that have been considered. Here again, the case study Ws

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ic, ng dy of two sugar mills does not provide any anthropological insights and does not fit into the theme of the book.

Cross cultural adjustability and international understanding is the subject matter of Part IV. There are only two articles, one dealing with student exchange programmes and the capacity of the students of one state to adjust in another. A plea for further studies in comparative religion has been made in the chapter on "Role of Comparative Religion." A better understanding of the various aspects of religion would have contributed to a better international understanding.

By way of conclusion it may be said that an edited book, with many contributions, is difficult to review. There is not always a definite focus and presentation of a particular point of view. Although the theme of the book is applied anthropology and development, not all articles have a direct bearing on the theme. Moreover, the areas covered are wide. Hence, the role of anthropology in each of these areas comes through rather than in the totality of the process of development. There is an effort in the Introduction to deal with the "totality"—however, it does not pull together the articles in the book—but refers in general about the role of anthropologists and anthropology. A reference has been made in the Introduction regarding the dichotomy between fundamental and applied research and it was pointed out that applied research can contribute to theory. It would have been good if an effort had been made to pull together the theoretical insights from the various contributions of the book. The experience gained in implementing programmes could provide leads to adding to the theories of not only anthropology but also to development.

The book nevertheless, is a welcome contribution to the understanding of the role of social sciences in development. This latter, even though expanding is still limited—partly because administrators and policy-makers do not realise the socio-economic and cultural variables that have to be taken into consideration in development. Also, social scientists have been unable to communicate in a meaningful way their insights and understanding. The present study would certainly enable the bridging of this gap.

Indian Insitute of Public Administration, New Delhi.

A.P. BARNABAS

Socio-Political Currents

R.L. HARDGRAVE: Essays in the Political Sociology of South India. Usha Publications, New Delhi, 1979, xvi, 262 p., Rs. 60.

ESSAYS in the political sociology of South India, by Hardgrave, Jr., is a collection of articles on politics and society in Tamil Nadu and Kerala of Peninsular India. These articles are written by the author

and already published elsewhere. The book contains the author's perception and account of the Dravidian Movement, the riots in Tamil Nadu—problems and prospects of India's language crisis; when stars displace the Gods—the folk culture of the cinema of Tamil Nadu, caste-fission and fusion—varieties of political behaviour among the Nadars of Tamil Nadu; the breast cloth controversy; caste consciousness and social change—the new mythologies of caste in change and the Kerala community—contradictions of power.

Part I of the book, highlighting the Dravidian Movement and Tamil politics, not only portrays the political process in the then Madras Presidency, the rise and fall of political personalities during British rule, the emergence of non-Brahaminism, Justice Party, DK, DMK, and AIADMK parties, the social bases of the rise and development of regionalism and cultural nationalism and particularly the folk identity with the films and film stars for political expression among the masses in Tamil Nadu, but also the emotional issues of language, caste, i.e., linkages of cultural issues rather than economic issues with the political consciousness in Tamil Nadu.

Part II of the book, i.e., the "Nadars of Tamil Nadu" contains four chapters not only on the social structure of politics of Tamil Nadu i.e., particularly Nadar caste, its rise into social ascendancy, the role of missionary organisation behind their social ascendancy, both among Christian and Hindu Nadars, its subsequent rise into political ascendancy but also on the mythology of caste history and the entire process of social change in the Nadar caste.

Part III, a brief but precise account of Kerala politics, presents not only the portrayal of the structure of Communists both as a party and as individuals within a peculiar socio-political environment of Kerala society; the rise of Communists into power and the Party's inherent intention of using the constitutional process for extra-constitutional mobilisation for an eventual "class struggle" and ultimate failure and rise of several coalition governments and the split in the Communist movement but also the intricate network of the forces of social mobilisation behind the political process in the tiny but colourful state of Kerala.

In short, this piece of work is the author's personal encounter with peninsular politics in India both through interviews and various documentary sources. The author has a good grasp of the events which he encountered. He has effectively sketched with a clarity the events and personalities for an ultimate theoretical account of social mobilisation and political process. In an account like this however, the author could not escape from an eventual criticism of the authenticity of particular events and themes, the sources, adequacy and inadequacy of the coverage of the total portrayal. Hardgrave Jr. is not an exception to this. Nadar's caste history, about which there has been a considerable exchange of views between the author and another social scientist elsewhere, however, has raised certain issues of empirical evidences of the political process in peninsular India as a process

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of transformation of primordial sentiments. This sweeping generalisation of the primordial dynamics of Tamil politics may be warranting criticism more within the framework of a comprehension of political awareness of socic-cultural realities in the context of the universalisation of political process. He also had to face some traps from which he could not have escaped, namely over-dependency on the "pro-sentiment sources" and less on "anti-sentiment sources" in interpreting the linkages between social network and political process.

There are some factual errors also. For example, Karunanidhi's Parasakthi is written as Annadurai's Parasakthi on page xi in his introductory remarks. On page 23, the ideas expressed about the formation of the ministry in 1930 by B. Muniswamy Naidu and his subsequent fall could have been expressed

with more clarity.

On the whole, the book is a fundamental source book on Political Sociology for a first hand account of empirical realities and it is also a model for the research students to combine theory and facts into a hypothesis. The author has also to be congratulated for his candid account of the political process and theoretical interpretation.

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D. SUNDARAM

BHABANI BHATTACHARYA: Socio-Political Currents in Bengal: A Nineteenth Century Perspective. Vikas Publishing House, Ghaziabad, 1980, 147p., Rs. 60.

THAT a distinguished writer like Bhabani Bhattacharya should decide to publish his doctoral thesis produced about half a century ago may surprise his admirers; they will have a pleasant surprise when they read the book. Bhattacharya thought of getting the thesis published when an eminent historian who had read it in manuscript at the London University Library told him that it was excellent work and should be made available

It was Amit Sen (Susobhan Sarkar) who gave us an enlightened perspective of the intellectual movements of the nineteenth century Bengal in his book titled *Notes on the Bengal Renaissance* (1946) and since then not a few of our historians have been writing on the subject from various points of view making use of a vast mass of printed and manucript sources. The present work is not in the least antiquated by this new literature on the subject. On the contrary it has a perceptiveness which gives it the value of a fresh work on the social and political life of nineteenth century Bengal

The first chapter of the book is a documented presentation of the intellectual movement in Bengal which began with the establishment of the Hindu College in Calcutta in 1817 and was sustained by the new learning of which that institution was the most important centre. In the second chapter, Bhattacharya deals with some important early political associations like the Landholders Association founded in 1838, the British Indian Association (1851), etc., and gives interesting details about their activities and their impact on the political opinion of the Bengali middle classes then emerging as a community holding progressive and enlightened views on society and government. "The cry of the time," the author says, "was not so much for democracy as for nationalism." A succinct account of the Indigo Revolt, the rebellion in rural Bengal, forms the subject matter of the third chapter. This is still immensely readable even though in between Blair King published his The Blue Mutiny. The next chapter is on social reform and here Bhattacharya has shown a remarkable capacity for compression when he sums up the work of reformers like Vidyasagar in a general account of reformist Bengal without however leaving any of its significant details. I am afraid not many will agree with his view that "the countless Hindus who flocked to him (Ramakrishna) were seekers or self-delusion." The chapter on the "Rise of Nationalism," which follows, is the story of the emergence of the national spirit in Bengal after the Mutiny. However, the author's comments on some aspects of it may seem controversial; his views of what he calls cultural chauvinism of the nationalists who exalted India's past as a golden age are based on certain opinions which were not really a part of that sense of national dignity which sustained the moral side of our nationalist movement. The last chapter of the book, entitled "Years of Unrest and Preparation," is an account of the most significant events in political Bengal in the crucial decade between 1875 and 1885, the year the Indian National Congress was founded. The material used in this chapter may now seem old, but the author's observations on the main questions of the day have their significance. Readers may value Bhattacharya's final view of the political movement in Bengal and in India as a whole between 1857 and 1885 stated in three quotable sentences: "The political drama which had begun after the Mutiny moved with slow action during the sixties, gathering speed and complexity only after 1872 and reaching a peak point in the tempest raised by the Ilbert Bill. The Indian National Congress was in fact an anticlimax, but a very significant one....The bourgeoisie had at last found a common laboratory as it were in which to develop and crystallize its political thought; as also a common rostrum from which to project that thought."

Finally Bhttacharya's book is no less important as a view of nineteenth century Bengal very ably stated by a remarkably gifted scholar in a work produced in the thirties of the twentieth century. Its difference from the more sophisticated views of later years may itself be of considerable historical significance. And that this work on a rebel province of colonial India was

originally a successful doctoral thesis at the University of London is also one of the curiosities of Indo-British historiography.

Raja Ram Mohan Roy Library Foundation, Calcutta.

R.K. DASGUPTA

C.P. BHAMBHRI: The Janata Party: A Profile. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, vii, 228., Rs. 65.

THIS book consisting of 123 pages of text and 104 pages of appendices, bibliography, index, etc., is divided into eight chapters, seven of which constitute a post-mortem of the Janata Party which briefly emerged as an alternative to the Congress Party in the governance of India. Riding on the crest of great popular resentment against the excesses during the internal Emergency from 1975 to 1977, the Janata Party won the general election to the Lok Sabha in March 1977. It lost power within two and a half years owing to faction-fighting and leadership-struggle resulting in its eventual disintegration before the mid-term elections of 1980. What were the factors responsible for the rise and fall of the Janata Party? The first seven chapters attempt to answer this question. The author has done well to dwell on the genesis of the Janata Party with reference to the repression suffered by its constituent units during the Emergency at the hands of the Congress Governments, the impact of the Bihar and Gujarat student movements and the dynamic role played by Jayaprakash Narayan in bringing various noncommunist opposition parties together to fight the virtual monopoly of power enjoyed by the Congress Party. The weaknesses of the new alliance which never really grew out of its entrenched diversity of approaches to the problems of party organization and its functioning have been duly documented. The much professed unity of the new party proved too difficult to put into practice on account of consistent in-fighting amongst leaders and their factions. The social background of the leaders was seen to be too disparate to enable them to work together and contain their individual ambitions. In short the Janata experiment was doomed to failure because of the very heterogeneity of its composition. The author has done a competent job thus far.

In the last and longest (25 pages) chapter of the book however, the author renders the whole of the preceding analysis irrelevant to the understanding of the Indian political system for he sees little difference between the Janata and the Congress parties both of which represented the property-owning urban and rural rich classes faced with the challenge and threat to their privileged position from the have-not peasants and workers. This chapter does not fit into the general scheme or theme of the book which the blurb declares to be mainly concerned with the problems of party-building with a special focus on the Janata experiment. It merely repeats the Marxian line

of thinking as so many axiomatic statements which do not need any proof or elaboration.

It is intriguing to find among "Publications of the Janata Party" on pp. 223 and 224 the following newspapers and periodicals—Times of India, Hindustan Times, Statesman, Indian Express, Mainstream, Link, Economic and Political Weekly and Seminar.

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Rural Developments

UNITED NATIONS-ESCAP: Rural Development Administration in India: Some Emerging Policy Issues. Development Planning Division, Bangkok, 1979, viii, 92p.

NE of the basic objectives of planning in India is to ensure rapid economic growth with social justice. In the context of rural development, the emphasis is on the growth of employment and income of the rural population in general, and the rural poor in particular, through the development of agriculture, agroindustries, agrarian reforms and appropriate technological and institutional arrangements. On close examination however, one may find a striking difference between what has been said in principle and what has been achieved in practice. During the last thirty years of planning, the benefits of development and technological growth in agriculture, however small these might be, have accrued only to a limited section of the well-to-do peasantry who have land and other resources and there has not been any significant dent in the reduction of the proportion of the rural population living below the poverty line. From the standpoint of balanced development of all sections of the rural population therefore, there is need for a reorientation of the strategy of planning for rural development. The present study, prepared by the ESCAP in cooperation with the Government of India, provides enough food for thought in this direction.

The book is the outcome of the Round Table on Adaptation of Administration to Rural Development held at New Delhi in August 1978; it represents the contribution of various scholars and administrators of outstanding repute who actively participated on the occasion. Some of the leading issues in rural development, namely (i) perspectives of rural development and challenges; (ii) planning strategies for the alleviation of rural poverty; (iii) improving the administrative capability for rural development; (iv) strengthening institutional arrangements for ensuring productive inputs and social services and (v) promoting participatory organisations of the

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rural poor, have been discussed. The importan deliberations of the round-table, as contained in the book, may be summerized as follows.

In view of the fact that the affluent and vested minority in the rural areas had gained most from the way development had been conceived and implemented in the past, there is need for modification of strategies for rural development involving suitable changes in the agrarian structure, farm technology, institutional arrangements and above all in the administrative set-up. Rural poverty is closely related to the distribution of productive resources, particularly the land; therefore, a proper distribution of land and other resources through agrarian reform would be central to all efforts to alleviate poverty. The land policy has to aim at correcting the imbalances in the economic and political system created by the powerful pressure of the new rich and by their success in making the system deviate from its basic commitments of growth with social justice for the masses. Many earlier attempts had failed because government had neither the political will nor the administrative capacity for successful implementation. The development of the rural poor was a big challenge and the job could not be left entirely to the civil servants (who have their origin in the urban or rual elite class) to accomplish it. "The strategy of utilising the District Collector as the kingpin of the assembly line for rural development administration without suitably realigning the remaining revenue machinery and establishing new administrative pipelines had also resulted in proliferation of public functionaries at the grass-roots levels, creating confusion and bewilderment in the minds of the villagers." If the local people, particularly the poor could be organised and involved in the formulation of plans and their implementation, utilisation of the growth potential would be easier and much faster. While it would be necessary to lay emphasis on (i) the research and extension of research; (ii) provision of infra-structure; (iii) organisation og the supply of basic inputs; (iv) provision of investment resources and (v) a framework of incentives for increased production at the farm level, the distributional issue should not merely be concerend with the organisational aspects but ultimately with the basic question of how the whole delivery is affected so far as the distribution of benefits is concerned. If the delivery system is to be effective, the question of organising the unorganised should not be ignored. The state should see to it that the poor assert their rights, participate in the development process and benefit from it. It might be desirable for the government to establish funds to help finance activities contributing to the organisation of the poor. Besides, the resources and services provided by the public delivery system should be channelled in favour of the poor. Indeed a proportion of all such services should be specifically reserved for the poor. In addition, the pricing system should be used to assist the poor. For example, the poor could be given a price subsidy, while the not so poor would be required to pay a price which would cover the foll the full cost. Moreover, for the provision of agricultural inputs and credit requirements a "package approach" might be more appropriate as small

and marginal farmers in the countryside tend to shy away from a system which requires them to run to different agencies and organisations for obtaining their various requirements.

Thus the problems and prospects of rural development, with special reference to the development of the rural poor in India, have been intensively discussed in the book. Its concern for the upliftment of the rural poor through agrarian reforms, unionisation and technological and institutional changes deserves appreciation. Nevertheless, there are certain important omissions and commissions. First, an unduly great significance has been attached to the role of the government in bringing about agrarian reform and institutional changes in favour of the poor. This betrays a sense of bourgeois class character of the ruling government. The book does not answer the question why the state which is represented mainly by the relatively richer section of the rural population should help promote organisations of the rural poor. Secondly, the suggesstions that a proportion of all resources and services provided by the public delivery system should be reserved for the poor and that the pricing system should be used to assist the poor, do not carry much weight in view of the failure of some of the special development programmes earmarked for the rural poor in the past. In fact, poverty is the greatest cause of poverty and as long as the income gap between the rich and the poor remains significant, there would be leakages in any system of reservation for the poor and any resources meant for the poor might really be grabbed by the rich through manipulations. On the whole, however, the book makes interesting reading, stimulating creattive ideas in the minds of its readers and may be useful for all those concerned with rural development administration in India.

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R.P. MISHRA and K.V. SUNDARAM: Multi-Level Planning and Integrated Rural Development in India. Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, ix, 234p., Rs. 75.

In this book the authors make a passionate appeal on behalf of multi-level planning. They recognise it as the most important instrument for improving the living standards of the rural poor. According to them, a highly centralised type of planning has resulted in inter-regional disparities in income, employment and earning capacity.

However, in the context of Indian conditions, it is not easy to share the enthusiasm of the authors for launching block level planning in the country on a large scale. In terms of theory, there may be a strong case for planning at the block level or district level. But the question arises as to how this process can be initiated. To understand the requirements of a particular

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area and to ascertain the nature and extent of resources available in that area are not easy propositions. First, it is not realistic to speak of local requirments; any exercise to identify a particular area and study it in isolation will create more problems than it solves. The net result of such an experiment would be the creation of a large number of area plans without any proper arrangement for administrative and financial coordination and implementation. In fact, in a country like India where vital resources are always scarce, multiplicity of planning organisations in the garb of Panchayati Raj institutions or district or Block Planning Boards, will prove to be a costly experiment.

Then again, the eloquent talk about people's participation in planning does not have much relevance in the Indian context. In any area of this vast country, one will hardly find a group of people who have more or less identical problems and identical interests and who are willing to co-operate to solve those problems. Planning can be successful only if it can identify problems which affect a relatively large number of people at the block or district levels. But conditions in our country are such that even in a small village, there are fierce group loyalties which prevent them from coming together. Then there are the caste tensions. One cannot ignore the grim fact that even 33 years after independence, caste is a big force in India. This has often been cited as a major impediment to planned progress. Since people at the village or block level stay in different groups under the present caste dispensation, no meaningful participation by the people is possible. Under such circumstances, block level planning will only help the powerful segment of the society. The experience of Community Development Programmes will convincingly remove whatever doubts one has on this score. All the developmental programmes designed to help the villagers benefited only the influential people; this class became more prosperous as a consequence. At the same time, the rural poor were left to fend for themselves. This has generated social tensions. The authorities are fully aware that so much social discontent was created in the rural areas because of the excessive prosperity enjoyed by a small number of people. Under such circumstances, it is futile to talk about people's co-operation. It will be an exercise in self-deception.

Viewed from this angle, the idea of multi-level planning does not look so attractive. In a way, planning at a higher level, if implemented honestly and efficiently taking into account the overall requirements of the country as a whole, may prove more beneficial in India. The central authority is in a better position to take stock of the country's resources and in that capacity, is better placed to formulate developmental targets for different area. On the other hand, under multilevel planning, the programme of action in one area may prove harmful to other areas in the absence of overall coordination. If it is argued that the Central Planning Authority can keep a watch and exercise sufficient checks and controls over block level planning, it will amount to some sort of central planning. Then what exactly is the

advantage of creating a very large number of block and district planning authorities without much experience? Even the authors admit that the people at the block level do not often possess a reasonable degree of technical expertise. There is also the question of widespread corruption and inefficiency at the lower levels. Can this poor country afford to have such a luxury at the expense of the tax payers when the benefits accruing from such planning is at best peripheral? These are some of the issues which require a deeper study before the country goes in for multi-level planning in a big way. The basic weakness of this book lies in the fact that while the authors are fully aware of the limitations of multilevel planning, they fondly hope that it can achieve economic wonders.

New Delhi.

A.K. BHATTACHARYYA

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MAJID HAYAT SIDDIQI: Agrarian Unrest in North India: The United Provinces, 1918-22. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi 1978, xiv, 247p., Rs. 60.

THE present study seeks to examine peasant uprisings, the back-I ground of the rise of the Kisan Sabha and Eka Movement in Oudh after the First World War and the involvement of nationalist politicians as well as indigenous peasant leaders. The author has been successful in deliberating agrarian conditions and social tensions. The economic causes behind the agrarian upheaval have been admirably dealt with but a descriptive account of various taluqdari extortions is lacking. Siddigi has failed to make use of the Stewart Report regarding cesses in Oudh available at the Uttar Pradesh State Archives. Cesses like Ghorawan, Nazardaura, Upli, Kamishnarawan, Latiyawarn, etc., certainly deserve more detailed description as they expose the taluqdari oppression practised in a colonial set up, with the tacit support of the Government. One also searches, vainly, for details concerning the impact of the First World War (other than price rise), on the rural landscape of Oudh. The War contributions, forcible recruitment, recruiting cesses and raising of war loans make the peasantry desperate. On the pretext of helping their imperial masters the feudal barons and their kinsmen devised new methods to fill their own pockets. It should not be forgotten that besides the policies of the colonial administration, it were the taluqdars who were primarily responsible for the miseries of the peasants since they implemented the colonial policies in the countryside. The Mehta Report, very often quoted in this book, is full of such descriptions. But the author has chosen to gloss over them. Siddiqi's conclusion regarding the fragmentation of holdings raises serious doubts for it needs a comparative study to examine this issue; this he lacks. There is hardly any reference to the rural proletariat in the work. Their economic conditions and social status have not been discussed.

In the case of Oudh, the author seems to accept the Marxist proposition that the peasantry must be led from outside by a class more articulate in its capacity to formulate ideas for the peasantry. One can hardly dispute this proposition, but it must be noted that the class which came to help the Oudh peasantry was neither a revolutionary class nor did it help them without their own axe to grind. The activities of the urban politicians were aimed at covering up inherent contradictions in the rural society. The Congress leadership did not approve of the radical form of "non-co-operation" adopted by the peasant masses. It exploited the peasantry for its own ends and side-tracked the economic issues in its enthusiasm for carrying out the non-co-operation moverment. The author has been too moderate and lukeworm in dealing with this leadership, in general, and Gandhi and the Nehru's, in particular.

The work has some factual errors. Madari Pasi never preached peasant-zamindar unity against the government, instead, it was unity among peasants against zamindars and the government. This was the reason why the Congress disowned the Eka Movement. The Sehgaon-Paschimgaon riot has been attributed to a personal zamindari feud, but the economic issues affecting the opposition of zamindars to the shifting of the village bazar has been ignored. It would have been better if a page or two would have been devoted exclusively in dealing with the controversies associated with the Munshiganj Firing. Moreover, the use of phrases like "men who robbed Peter in order to rob Paul soon," or persons belonging to "criminal tribes" for the revolutionary peasant leadership, makes appear as if the riots have been examined through British spectacles.

Nevertheless, the book is a welcome addition to the growing corpus of literature on agrarian problems in India. It will be read with interest by all those who have a genuine desire to know people's history.

SPDG College, Ghaziabad.

KAPIL KUMAR

Industrial Growth

RAM K. VEPA: Joint Ventures: A New Technique for Industrial Growth.

Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1980, vi, 227 p., Rs. 70.

THIS account of what the author calls a new technique for industrial growth breaks new ground in the still too-slowly growing fund of Indian literature on industrial investment and management. It is to be welcomed written as it is by one who has been actively engaged in the formation and working of many of the undertakings which he describes. Despite this involvement, in a new and still somewhat untried system of joint public

sector and private sector undertakings, there is a certain objectivity in his analysis of the system at work in the forty odd undertakings that are listed in the book; all of them in the state of Andhra Pradesh, where he was Managing Director of the Industrial Development Corporation. It was this institution that promoted the introduction and extension of the joint venture system in that state since the mid-nineteen sixties.

An analytical account gains merit from its authorship by someone directly involved in the process; in this instance Dr. Vepa escapes the pedestrianism and over-much subjectivity of the practitioner, by bringing to his writing a quality of academic objectivity. He is clearly committed to the concept of the system, which he says has come to stay, in the proper advancement of industrial growth in a country like India. Perhaps judgment should be reserved, until we know more of the working results of what is still an innovation in the field of investment and management. Of all the undertakings that are listed, only a few have gone into production; which is not a cause for surprise or cavil, considering the lead times that are needed.

The picture would become clearer when some working results can be demonstrated in the form of balance sheets, statements of account, and profit-and-loss statements. While, as the author says, financial profitability is not all, the fact remains that moneys invested in industrial undertakings of the kinds listed, ranging from metallurgical, engineering, chemical, electricals and electronics, food and agro-industries, to units based on forest products, a wide spectrum of venture the risk investments, should return a fair return in terms of money. This has been emphasised in the government's and the Planning Commission's own policy statements; these investments are, on any system of accounting, public moneys and the nation's future industrial investment resources have to take into account the returns from all such investments. The undertakings listed in this book represent amongst them something of the order of Rs. 400 crores, ranging from the wire ropes project at Vishakapatnam with a capital of only Rs. 27 lakhs, to a paper mill project with Rs. 41 crores, with every quantum of industrial risk investment in between.

One other question mark hangs in the air. Committed to the policy of transferring the public sector shares of the undertakings to the private entrepreneurs, how is it to be ensured that the most profitable ones are not creamed off, while the government agency is left holding a number of sick babies? The author mentions that a simple formula has been evolved, for the valuation of the shares at the time of transfer, so as to fix the price to be charged. Share values and share prices are not so simple a matter; and more details of the formula adopted for the purpose would be welcome. The true value and the market value of a share depends upon a number of things taken together, such as the break-down valuation, the P/E ratios, the dividend and profitability record or expectations, all properly quantified.

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its cautions approach to the whole proposition and the precautions prescribed; all of which the author very properly sets out in full.

The blandishments and the traps to which even hardheaded bureaucrats can fall, despite all their precautions is illustrated by the example the author gives of the Republic Forge Company (although his purpose in doing so was to illustrate something different, namely, the problem of drawing risk investments for public sector undertakings from the Industrial Development Bank of India, the Industrial Finance Corporation of India, the ICICI, and even from the wholly government Life Insurance Corporation). This project was the brain-child of a Dr. Dharma Teja. The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation guaranteed a credit to Renault of France for nearly Rs. 2 crores (Rs. 17.90 million). This guarantee "became active" as the author says, "when Rr. Teja left the country in 1965 after the collapse of his shipping company." The story of Teja fleeing the country, taking refuge in a Latin American country, his arrest in London and extradition from there, and his trial and conviction in India, are a different story; but should serve as a cautionary tale for all who in this country tend to be over-ready for persuasion by slick salesmanship from abroad. In this instance, it must be held to the credit of the author, Vepa himself, that a rescue operation was mounted by his Andhra Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation (APIDC) and the project finally brought into production by 1969; a valuable project, as he rightly says, which added to the industrial capacity in the engineering sector. Significantly, however, this undertaking has remained in the public sector, and is not one of the joint-sector ones. Furthermore, although front-line firms like Delhi Cloth Mills, Modi and the Sahu-Jain group were wooed by the APIDC to buy out the undertaking and run it as a private concern, none of them would touch it. Is there a lesson here, for future benefit, about the importance of the profitability of an undertaking?

The author gives a graphic account of the trials and tribulations of any entrepreneur (indeed of anyone with an active desire to get on with industrial development), that beset him in his struggles through the veritable mazes of procedure and red tape, the delays, the non-possumus that confronts him at every turn. It is a truly dreaded forest, into which only the most determined and the most opportunistic, not necessarily the best, might venture. Every time that the government devises a new procedure, sets up a new office with the express purpose of speeding things up and cutting through tortuous procedures, the new point becomes simply one more hardly, one more bureaucratic hindrance, in the new entrepreneur's obstacle race towards his goal.

Since the jacket blurb describing the author says that he is now the Development Commissioner, Small Scale Industries, in the Central Government, here is his challenge and his opportunity to do something effective about what he has so rightly berated the government. Fot it is the small entrepreneur, the little man, who needs help most, more than the big ones.

If a critic might say it, without seeming unduly patronising, it is good to see such a book published in India and written in good English.

New Delhi.

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Education

T.V. RAO, ANIL BHATT and T.P. RAMA RAO: Adult Education for Social Change: A Study of the National Adult Education Programme in Rajasthan. Manohar Book Services, New Delhi, 1980, x, 192 p., Rs. 60.

THE national Ministry of Education under the Janata Party (voted to power in 1977), launched an ambitious scheme of adult education on Gandhi Jayanti in 1978. The NAEP (National Adult Education Programme) as it came to be referred to in educational circles, had been undertaken after a thoroughgoing and nation-wide preparation. The aim was to make a hundred million adults (men and women), between the ages of 15 to 35, functionally literate in the course of five years. Originally the target period was ten years, but the Prime Minister—Morarji Desai—wished it to be reduced to five years. The Ministry had taken great pains to look into every aspect of the programme, its all-round requirements, educational and administrative, consultations with state governments at different levels, training of personnel, finance, the broad purpose of the scheme, setting up of state resource centres, recruitment of workers, the method, quality and contents of supervision and reporting, etc.

This great project attracted much attention and also aroused much hope among the educational workers of the country. Nevertheless, there were many critics and pessimists who thought that the purpose could not be attained in the prevailing social and political conditions. One of the fears was that some narrow-minded political or sectarian groups would certainly misuse the opportunity and public money would be wasted.

In this background, the three authors (of the faculty of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad) were deputed to examine the working of the scheme in the state of Rajasthan. This involved a study of the performance of seven different, some of them fairly well established, voluntary organisations of Rajasthan which actively participated in the programme in their own areas. They ran 1785 centres. Besides these, there are many more agencies in the field.

The authors engaged 17 investigators to assist them by procuring complete data about the working of the ten-month programme. The various tables and statistical information contained in the book indicate the commendable spirit of research which guided the authors in their study. While they did not let the discouraging forebodings of superficial critics

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ous the idyitics cast a shadow over their efforts, they were further careful in judging the movement in different areas in the light of local situations.

It is necessary to mention here that the special feature aimed at in the NAEP was not literacy in the narrow sense, but people's participation in their development using literacy as the medium. The purpose was not so much the acquisition of the three R's, but opening the minds of the young adults to the social and economic conditions which had kept them down. This factor of creating awareness in the people was given importance and the scheme had to be judged on that basis. The whole project thus, inherently involved flexibility, people's interest in the scheme and above all the establishment of relations between the people and developmental agencies whether for credit, for improving agriculture, changing living conditions in the home and village life. "The appraisal techniques, therefore, have to the flexible, even if it means sacrificing standardisation, enough to really appraise the 'process' aspects of the programme." (page 45)

With this spirit, the programmes and methods of each organisation are judged in its own setting and the speciality of each one is identified. This feature makes the book valuable for a larger clientele.

The study of adult centres could be made more interesting and useful, if as the authors realise, the interviewers could spend some time—at least a couple of nights in a village. This of course would mean much more time.

The book establishes a direct connection between development and adult education as conceived in the NAEP. This does not involve any controversy. Of course the conditions for this achievement is a proper understanding of the functions at all stages, from the Project Officer down to the Instructor. The state government, through careful and constructive supportnot as an inspecting agency—has an important, indeed "crucial" role of its own. Its Resource Centre can be most helpful indeed a powerful incentive. In Rajasthan the movement for adult education had an earlier start than the beginnings of NAEP itself.

The eighth chapter on "Some Issues and Suggestions" makes the book very useful specially to the workers and students in the field of adult education. Many subjects and suggestions are brought out which are thought-provoking, based on direct experiences in the field.

Altogether, the authors have done justice to the assignment given to them. The true objective spirit of research has been maintained throughout the small book.

Udaipur.

MOHAN SINHA MEHTA

RHODA LOIS BLUMBERG AND LEELA DWARAKI: India's Educated Women: Options and Constraints. Hindustan Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1980, xii, 172 p., Rs. 60.

MUCH significance has been attached to education as a potent force of social change and modernisation in the developing countries in recent years. Not only is education expected to promote attitudinal modernity in the young generation, it is also believed to act as a leveller of inequalities between the sexes. Hence the special significance of education for the changing status and life-world of women, particularly in traditional societies such as India.

Blumberg and Dwaraki's book deals with this important theme in as much as it seeks to explore the meaning of education for some of India's educated women in transition. In particular, the book addresses itself to three major questions. What kinds of options are created for Indian women, mainly in the spheres of marriage and employment, when they attain higher education? How are they constrained by traditional role expectations governing marriage, education and work? How do they cope with their expanded set of statuses and changing roles? The questions are answered on the basis of interview data collected in 1966-67 from an initial sample of 97 women graduates and post-graduates of Bangalore and a follow-up study of 30 respondents of the original sample contacted by means of a questionnaire in 1977.

Advancement of marriage age on account of availability of education to "fill in time," liberation from male chaperonage, educational equivalence as a factor in match-making, calling into question the dictum of essentiality of marriage, alternatives to marriage with particular reference to career as its substitute, legitimization of spinsterhood, right to self choice of marriage partner and the positive valuation of the role of education in making a woman more rather than less adaptable to her role in the new family, are some of the options created by education in the sphere of marriage for the urban middle class women. But these options are not without constraraints which largely flow from persistence of traditional norms. For instance, educated women's disagreement with the norms of essentiality of marriage notwithstanding, the largest proportion of the follow-up group did marry. While the data drawn from the 1967 sample illustrate the encounter between tradition and modernity in the attitudes of respondents towards marriage, the data of the follow-up study seem to suggest a trend of modernisation of women's perspectives, though at the level of experience the pinch of tradition is still felt.

In the sphere of employment, education has advanced work as a new value for women of the middle classes. Indeed, it is noted that there is a positive relationship between the level of education and the probability of employment both for the original and the follow-up samples. As regards patterns of female employment, the jobs held by respondents continue to be

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new is a ty of gards to be limited to teaching, medicine and clerical fields, while jobs in bank constitute their career preference as these are viewed as "fashionable," glamorous and remunerative. Restrictions on the movement and social life of working women, considerations of distance of working place and of office timings, and avoiding more than formal contacts with male colleagues continue to act as constraints over her new role.

How does the employment status of the educated woman impinge on her marriage chances and marital adjustment? Presenting a decadinal development, the authors show how the working woman was thought by many to be disadvantaged in the marriage market in 1966-67. By 1977, many respondents reported the increased acceptance of "working brides" and considered it normal that highly educated women would seek jobs. Interestingly, while women's education has not decreased dowry requirements, women's employment is likely to have some effect on lessening dowry demands. The authors hope that some families might begin to weigh a prospective bride's earning capacity against their need for dowry, but there is not much evidence that it has occurred. At any rate, some educated married women have begun to question the traditional household division of labour which places a double burden, as it were, on the working wife.

Use of follow-up study, verbatim reproduction of many of the statements of respondents, meaningful section headings and at places quite realistic observations are some of the high points of the book. All this make the book generally readable. But the book is not without its flaws. In terms of its central concern, the book has rather a narrow objective as it deals with the choices and dilemmas of women only in the spheres of marriage and employment, ignoring several other spheres which are quite as important, if not more, as those already covered. Even when taken on its own terms, much of the account is rather general, only occasionally marked by perceptive notes. The emphasis is on description throughout, with little attempt at insightful analysis. Alternatively, the book abounds in extensive quotes from other sources, almost to a fault, leaving this reviewer to wonder as to why should the authors have chosen to underestimate, nay undermine, the value of their own materials. The value of the book is also seriously marred by redundant and sweeping generalizations and there is a surfeit of them. It is a pity that the editors of the studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, under whose auspices the book is published, chose to ignore these faults, thus risking the credibility of these series.

Panjab University, Chandigarh. S.L. SHARMA

AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOKS ON NON-ALIGNMENT

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By Ashok Jambhekar

ATTAR CHAND, Non-Aligned States-A Great Leap Forward: A Study in New International Economic Order. UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1983, xxxi, 308p., Rs. 150.

The non-aligned nations, at their various meetings, voiced their anxiety about the widening gap between the levels of economic advancement of the industrialized nations and the developing countries and demanded radical restructuring of international relations including economic relations. This study written with scholarly insight and precision highlights the trouble of global economics, role of MNCs in the Third World and the concept of NIEO vis-a-vis non-aligned nations. The author argues that no viable world economic system is conceivable today without consideration of the interrests of the non-aligned countries and believes that the total normalisation of East-West relations, the liquidation of discrimination in economic relations on political and ideological grounds and the abolition of the deformation of international division of labour should also be included in the concept of NIEO. The study proves that the NIEO can help forge closer and more abiding relations among the non-aligned nations than ideology or military imperatives do. The book also contains selected documents, speeches and messages covering a period from 1961 to 1983. (Reprinted from India Quarterly Vol. xxxviii, nos. 3 and 4, July-December 1982, p. 421).

ATTAR CHAND, Non-Aligned World Order: Ideology, Strategy Prospects. UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1983, Lxiii, 262p., Rs. 150.

The bibliographic survey with selected abstracts, covering the period 1961-1982, is exhaustive in respect of coverage reflecting development of the Non-Aligned Movement in all its dimensions and the contributions made by the leaders of the non-aligned nations for co-operation and unity among them. (Reprinted from India Quarterly Vol. xxxviii, nos. 3 and 4, July-December 1982, p. 421).

BAJPAI, U.S. (Ed.), Non-Alignment: Perspectives and Prospects. Lancers (on behalf of India International Centre), New Delhi, 1983, xxii, 309p., Rs. 160.

Collection of articles by experts from both aligned and non-aligned countries, invited by India International Centre, New Delhi on the eve of the Seventh Summit of Non-Aligned Nations. These contributions analyse the crises faced by the Movement and its failures and successes. It makes concrete suggestions for the Movement to overcome shortcomings and to provide strength and credibility to it. The volume takes into consideration concerned and relevant issues like the Cold War, NIEO, New Information Order, Disarmament, Development, Science and Technology vis-a-vis the Non-

Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries 1961-1979. Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division, New Delhi, 1981, 453p., n.p. Includes documents of all the Non-Aligned Summits and meetings at various

levels held upto 1979.

HAMEED, A.C. Shahul In Pursuit of Peace: On Non-Alignment and Regional Co-operation, Vikas, New Delhi, 1983, xix, 121p., Rs. 95.

Sri Lanka's first Minister of Foreign Affairs, an office held previously only by Prime Ministers of the country, explains the growth of Non-Aligned Movement in recent years. The author further discusses the task of co-ordination, regulation and organisation of the activities of the member countries which have diverse political, economic and socio-cultural perceptions. It shows also how, step by step, its durability and world-standing have been achieved without the encumberance of a separate

secretariat. In the opinion of the author, the non-aligned group is the greatest coalition on this planet and its greatest success is that it has prevented the world being divided into two cheering or firing squads.

JAIPAL, Rikhi Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace. Allied, New Delhi, 1983, xii, 214p., Rs. 90.

Indian diplomat, presently Assistant Secretary General in the United Nations at Geneva, dealing with multilateral disarmament negotiations, describes the growth of the Non-Aligned Movement from the first to the sixth summit, the changing attitudes of the great powers, the squabbles within the Movement, the economic needs of the non-aligned, the threat of the arms race to the survival of mankind, and poses some basic questions for the Seventh Summit at New Delhi. Based on personal experience obtained by the author when an active participant in numerous non-aligned meetings at various levels, from 1969-1979, the study is a thought-provoking critique of the strength and weaknesses of the Movement.

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JAISINGH, Hari India and the Non-Aligned World. Vikas, New Delhi, 1983, 156p., Rs. 75.

The author defines non-alignment, discusses its evolution and stance on various issues and the theory of equidistance between the two power blocs. He argues that the newly independent nations cannot join the colonial powers in the tirade against the Socialist World as they had been subjected to slavery, exploitation and humiliation by these imperialist and colonialist powers. He further points out that the Movement is opposed only to foreign exploitation and not to the capitalistic management.

KARKI, Dev Singh China and Non-Alignment. Sopan Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, viii, 93p., Rs. 40. (Paper).

Discusses the origin and growth of non-alignment and the Chinese response to it. MENON, M. S.N. and SHARMA, R.K. No To Exploitation: The Economic Case of the Non-Aligned. Mahajan Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, 163p., Tables, Rs. 80.

The authors discuss the global economic situation, economic situation in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Middle East, problems of trade, aid and technology development of third world countries, exploitation by multinationals, link between disarmament and development and need for collective self-reliance. The various economic declarations and resolutions adopted at the Non-Aligned Nations' Conferences and meetings are included in one chapter. Viewed in this context, the authors highlight the predicament of the Third World countries in the task of bringing about a new world order.

MISRA, K.P. (Ed.), Non-Alignment and Neutrality: Proceedings of the Indo-Austrian Seminar. Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, 1982, ix, 105p., Rs. 26. (Paper)

Contributions made by scholars and diplomats of India and Austria at the Indo-Austrian Seminar on "Non-Alignment and Neutrality" organised by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations on 26-27 November 1980. They dwell on the concept of non-alignment and its various aspects, and Austrian neutrality, clarifying distinctness of the two.

MISRA, K.P. and NARAYANAN, K.R. (Eds.), Non-Alignment In Contemporary International Relations. Vikas, New Delhi, 1981, viii, 285p., Rs. 95.

The volume consists of papers submitted to the Indo-Yugoslav Symposium held in May 1980 in New Delhi. Organised jointly by the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and the Institute for International Politics and Economy, Belgrade, it was attended by Indian and Yugoslav scholars. It brings together in one place the challenges encountered by the Non-Aligned Movement in the face of the collapse of detente, threat to the security and independence of the non-aligned countries by continuing power politics by the Great powers, deteriorating economic conditions of the developing countries and differences within the Movement. It further discusses fresh ideas and

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strategies for making the movement effective and productive in the present global atmosphere in conformity with its basic tenets and spirit.

SUBBARAO, T.V. Non-Alignment in International Law and Politics. Deep & Deep, New Delhi, 1981, 197p., Rs. 75. (Reprinted from India Quaterly, Vol. xxxviii, nos. 3 and 4,

July-December, 1982, p., 423)

The author examines the underlying principles and objectives and the origin and development of NAM from Bandung to the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Nations held in New Delhi in February 1981 with an exhaustive reference to all relevant international conventions and conferences. He also discusses the evolution of non-alignment in India, perspectives of super powers and policy of non-alignment as pursued by Sri Lanka, U.A.R. and Yugoslavia. Non-alignment's status in international law, its impact on it and contribution made to the development of international law by the non-aligned countries are discussed elaborately. The scholarly analysis based on authentic sources makes this a commendable work.

TEWARI, Udai Narain Imperialism Versus Non-Aligned Movement. Selectbook Service

Syndicate, New Delhi, 1983, v, 103p., Rs. 25. (Paper)

Non-Aligned Movement's struggle against imperialism, nuclear proliferation, intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America etc., is discussed. The author has also devoted a considerable part of the discussion to the role played by India in the Movement for establishing world peace, equality among nations and justice for the people.

TEWARI, Udai Narain Resurgent Tibet: A Cause for Non-Aligned Movement. Select-

book Service Syndicate, New Delhi, 1983. x, 138p., Rs. 75.

Presents events that led to the occupation of Tibet by China and describes the struggle of the Tibetan people for independence and sovereignty and discusses violations of human rights by China. The author hopes that the Non-aligned Nations' Summit in New Delhi would strengthen the voice of Tibet for freedom and assist it to regain independence and sovereignty. The book also contains a report by the Tibetan Fact Finding Mission 1980, to study Chinese attempts at destroying Tibetan identity.

VASUDEVA, Uma (Ed.), Issues Before Non-Alignment: Past and Future. Indian Council

of World Affairs, New Delhi, 1983, 190p., Rs. 75. (Paper)

Presents the proceedings of a seminar on "The Issues Before the Non-Aligned Conference" held under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs on 24 and 25 January 1983 and incorporates papers contributed by eminent personalities including former diplomats, economists, scientists and other experts, a report on the seminar and various suggestions and proposals relating to political and economic, culture and information, scientific and technological and strategic issues, made during the seminar and intended to help formulate attitudes even after the Seventh Summit at New Delhi.

VOHRA, Dewan C. Economic Relevance of Non-Alignment. ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, xv, 388p., Rs. 195.

The author discusses the doctrine of non-alignment in the background of the world political system beset with cold war among the Super Powers, production and stockpiling of arms for destructive purposes, expanding economic and commercial interaction between Warsaw Pact, Comecon, economic-political-military complex and the Nato-OECD economic-political-military complex, sucking in their fold the poverty stricken, politically independent but economically dependent nations of the Third World. He further the adds that in the race of arms transfers, the non-aligned countries are contributing only to the economies of tich countries by their participation under the garb of threat perceptions and belying the disarmament-development scenario in which the funds released from disarmament should flow for economic development to poor countries. The author agrues that in this context the doctrine has come in conflict with reality and holds that the socio-political-economic theory of non-alignment must be logically consistent and empirically valid to prove its raison d'etre.

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BONN'S OSTPOLITIK AT THE CROSSROADS?

By JYOTIRMOY BANERJEE*

In September 1982 the Social and Free Democratic coalition1 collapsed after thirteen years' rule; the conservative Union parties coalesced with the Free Democrats to return to power in Bonn. Two months later Brezhnev died in Moscow amidst an ongoing new Cold War with the Reagan Administration. His successor, as the Chief of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). turned out to be the former KGB chief, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov. With time running out for NATO's deployment of new missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and other West European states, and a significant conservative victory in the United Kingdom elections in June 1983, elements of uncertainty in the crucial relations between Bonn and Moscow may have increased. Between 1969 and 1982 the (SPD) had managed to reverse the (CDU's) twenty years of hardline approach to the Soviet bloc. Despite irritations, Bonn under SPD-led governments managed to keep its ostpolitik on an even keel. Central European detente seemed to have survived the collapse of the larger, superpower rapprochement. The critical question in mid-1983. following the conservative election victories in Bonn and London and against the background of significant US-USSR rivalry, is whether the latter rivalry would also suck into its vortex relative peace in Central Europe. Should that happen, the Cold War would return to Europe, reinforce the anomalies emanating from a divided Germany as well as the superpower adversary relationship in turn. In this context the present article will, first, take a retrospective look at ostpolitik, its causes and achievements, then explore Bonn's relations with Moscow as they evolved while the SPD was in power and, finally analyze the implications of the leadership changes in Bonn and Moscow for the future of ostpolitik.

BEGINNINGS OF OSTPOLITIK

The word ostpolitik needs some clarification at the very outset. Technically, all policy towards the "East" or Soviet bloc is ostpolitik in German, including the Cold War Hallstein Doctrine. However, the term attracted worldwide attention since Willy Brandt came to the political scene in Bonn in late 1966. Its only connotation in English, and a very prominent secondary connotation in German, therefore, is Bonn's detente policy with the Soviet bloc, which is associated with Brandt and the SPD. Theoretically, from the English language point of view, the term may be taken to cover Bonn's policy towards the German Democratic Republic (GDR) too. But in German it does not. The West Germans reserve the term "Deutschlandpolitik" or Germany policy for this purpose to avoid relegating the other half

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of Germany to the "East" and to emphasize the FRG's continued "special relationship" with it. For the purposes of this essay, however, we shall use ostpolitik in the broader sense to include the GDR for greater elegance of composition. The focus however, will be confined largely to Bonn's relations with the key capital, Moscow.

It would be folly to think that Bonn's detente moves towards the Soviet bloc began only from late 1966. Earlier, the CDU-led governments in Bonn had also taken an occasional cautious step towards easing relations. The founding father and long-time CDU-Chancellor of the FRG, Konrad Adenauer, was not known for softness towards Moscow. Yet he blew a large hole in 1955 in the impending formulation of the Hallstein Doctrine, which was designed to deny international recognition to the GDR, when he agreed to take up diplomatic relations with Moscow. Six years later, in June, Bonn's Federal Parliament or the Bundestag unanimously passed a resolution to activate the hitherto sterile ostpolitik. In late 1962, then Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder, attempted a limited opening towards East Europe by way of trade. He managed to set up trade missions in several East European states; diplomatic relations and normalization remained, however, an elusive proposition. In March 1966, Bonn issued a peace note which incorporated its ideas on detente with Moscow.2 But all these attempts failed to achieve a fundamental paradigm shift in Bonn's relations with the Soviet bloc. The CDU, which shaped Bonn's policies in the 1950's and most of the 1960's, was interested in a kind of carefully restricted detente that would keep the FRG's territorial claims east of both the rivers Elbe (the GDR) and Oder-Neisse (western Poland) intact and the GDR isolated. Both Moscow and East Berlin blocked the CDU's probings.

Prospects improved when the SPD coalesced with the CDU to power in late 1966. Discounting a few months in 1920, this was the first time that a Social Democrat, Willy Brandt, became Germany's Foreign Minister. Brandt says he was influenced by Walther Rathenau's philosophy of accomodation towards both the East and the West in the period between the two World Wars. He initiated confidential ostoplitik studies with the help of his close friend, Egon Bahr, who came to plan policy in the Foreign Office. Brandt's foreign policy outlook was however modified by the continued conservative CDU-presence in the government and the equally CDU-conditioned thinking in Bonn's Auswaertiges Amt or the Foreign Office. At the inaugural meeting with the foreign office officials, Foreign Minister Brandt informed them that he would appreciate their departmental loyalty only if it did not impede his own requirements.

The new ostpolitik made rapid initial headway, not least due to the lure of the West German capital and advanced technology. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Bucharest in January 1967 and with non-aligned "but communist" Belgrade one year later blew further holes in the Hallstein Doctrine. Signs developed that other East European states were also interested in establishing closer relations with Bonn. Rumania's defection so

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shocked the GDR that it immediately set about mobilizing an enthusiastic poland and also Czechoslovakia to block Bonn's subsequent thrusts and any further defections from among its allies. Several Friendship Treaties concluded in mid-March 1967 cemented the "Iron Triangle"—East Berlin-Warsaw-Prague. It upheld the so called Ulbricht Doctrine, a kind of counter-Hallstein Doctrine, which required Bonn's recognition of the GDR among several preconditions to the former's normalization with other Warsaw Pact states. Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and Sofia also got together to conclude similar Mutual Assistance Pacts in the subsequent months. Ideology, however, did not prevent Prague from exchanging on 3 August trade missions with consular powers in Bonn. But ostpolitik ground to a halt thereafter in the teeth of GDR and Soviet opposition. Brandt says Bonn had underestimated East Berlin's influence within the Soviet bloc.6 Its attempts to bypass the GDR and the USSR while "building bridges" to other East European states, hence, were checkmated. Moscow's earlier hostility towards a CDU-dominated Bonn continued through 1966-68, while the CDU-SPD Grand Coalition ruled in that capital. Soviet Ambassador Semyon K. Tsarapkin's contacts with Brandt, both before and after the latter became Foreign Minister, as well as exchange of notes between Bonn and Moscow on a renunciation-of-force treaty reflected this.7 The growing crisis over Czechoslovakia's liberal experiment in 1968, Bonn's suspected role in it and the rise of the neo-Nazi National Democrats did little to mitigate that hostility.8 Moscow even revived two articles in the United Nations Charter dealing with former "enemy states" to threaten intervention in the FRG.9

Prospects looked up again with the turn of 1969. Moscow suddenly grew conciliatory on the "enemy states" issue in February that year; Tsarapkin came calling on Brandt again. Next month two rounds of violent clashes broke out between Soviet and Chinese border guards on the far eastern river Ussuri. Thereupon Tsarapkin rushed to the West German Foreign Minister to give a detailed account of what had transpired. 10 A Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest that month was remarkably restrained on the otherwise usual polemics against alleged West German revanchism. The Federal Presidential elections could also take place unhampered in West Berlin on 5 March, although earlier it had seemed that the GDR was determined to prevent it. Moscow had obviously restrained the East German leaders; a major reason seems to have been the first round of the Ussuri clashes only days before, in which a Soviet patrol had been ambushed and annihilated by the Chinese. 11 Brandt says he also received "confidential reports" about how Moscow's worry about its relations with China would make it more conciliatory towards Bonn. 12 The stage was thus set for a new round of initiatives.

In April and June the SPD's Bad Godesberg and the FDP's Nuremberg Party rallies respectively passed conciliatory resolutions on ostpolitik.

In May, Tsarapkin hurried to brief Brandt, who was still Foreign Minister, on the Budapest Warsaw Pact meeting two months earlier and presented

it in a friendly light.14 While occasional confidential contacts had already been taking place between the SPD on the one hand and various Soviet and Polish officials on the other, 15 the new Soviet attitude from early 1969 gave the sagging ostpolitik a boost. In July and August leaders of the FDP and the SPD respectively held talks in Moscow. 16 These talks were a prelude to a series of negotiations between October 1969, when the SPD-FDP coalition government was already installed in power, and August 1970, when the key Moscow Treaty was signed.

INITIATIVES FOR GIVING THE CONCEPT A NEW LOOK

It was increasingly felt in the 1960's that the Hallstein Doctrine, which stood in the way of a Bonn-Soviet bloc normalization, had outlived its purpose. Signs were mounting that it could ultimately backfire on Bonn and lead to its own isolation, instead of keeping the GDR isolated. The latter turned out to be a viable and stable state, far more so than many of the newly independent states in Africa and Asia, even if the West challenged the legitimacy of rule by its Socialist Unity Party, briefly called the SED. Thanks to the Wall the SED had erected across Berlin in 1961, the GDR's refugee haemorrhage stopped; this boosted its economic performance. Given its political stability and improving economy, there was a widespread feeling, especially among Third World nations, that the GDR ought to be recognized. Even Bonn's Western allies entertained private doubts about the future tenability of the Hallstein Doctrine. 17 Clearly, a fresh look at ostpolitik was needed as the 1960's wore on. Brandt felt that neither superpower would be willing to face the risks inherent in a German reunification. Washington and Moscow had started their detente process soon after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In 1968 they exchanged surface polemics over the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia but postponed the opening of their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) only temporarily for a year. Neither the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 nor the continued US military involvement in Vietnam stopped their movement towards detente with each other, especially since the Nixon-Kissinger team took office in Washington in 1969. Hence, says Brandt, he wanted to seize some initiative in defining Germany's national interest, "instead of relying solely on others to speak for us."18 Besides, hard-headed economic considerations also swayed Bonn. "I do not disguise," says the former Chancellor, "that I was also motivated from the outset by concrete economic considerations. The export-oriented West German economy needed more markets for its capital, goods, technology and services. The less developed East European states, including the USSR, needed such imports from the West. As noted, Brandt's earlier ostpolitik successes as Foreign Minister had grown largely out of these economic conditions in Europe. In fact, the signing of the Moscow Treaty of August 1970 may have been facilitated by the extension of 1 billion Deutschemark (DM) West German credit to Moscow earlier in

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February.²⁰ At the turn of the 1970's the Bonn-Moscow talks included a swipe deal involving the supply of Soviet natural gas for West German technology.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's participation in the preliminary talks with Bonn's representatives underlined Moscow's keenness on detente with an SPD-led Federal Germany. Part of such keenness was political; it would serve Soviet interests if America's economically most powerful and loyal ally in Europe could be weaned away from the Western Alliance. France had already opted out of NATO. If Moscow could reinforce the uneasiness between a Republican-ruled Washington and a Social Democrat Bonn, this would mean movement towards those goals. It would be paying back the United States in its own coin since the Nixon Administration seemed determined to reverse past relations with China and cultivate the latter as a bulwark against Moscow. Khrushchev had revealed the Soviet anxiety about China to Adenauer way back in 1955 when he thrice pleaded with the visiting Chancellor to ease bilateral relations with the USSR so that the latter might concentrate inter alia on containing the perceived potential threat from China.

Both the Johnson and the Nixon Administrations were suspicious of the SPD's ostpolitik, notwithstanding their own advocacy of "building bridges" to, and opening an "era of negotiations" with the Soviet bloc. Henry Kissinger felt that ostpolitik was creating a dangerous "process" that might "unhinge" Bonn's "international position." For him, Bahr, who had switched to the powerful Federal Chancellory and conducted the key talks with the Soviets, was an "old-fashioned German nationalist" who "wanted to exploit Germany's central postion to bargain with both sides." Brandt, on the other hand, says that Kissinger "would rather have taken personal charge of the delicate complex of East-West problems in its entirety." Later, in 1978, then US National Security Adviser, Brzezinski, remarked that the FRG was heading for "self-Finlandization" that might eventually take it to the Soviet orbit. 25

THE GAINS

Bonn's key detente treaties with Moscow and Warsaw (signed 12 August and 7 December 1970, respectively); East Berlin (21 December 1972) and Prague (11 December 1973), implied that Bonn recognized the post-World War II "realities," i.e., East European governments and, de facto, the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse borders. The 1,297-km Elbe border, which separates not only the FRG from the GDR but also NATO from Warsaw Pact, is the most heavily guarded border in the world, backed by nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. The Potsdam Conference of 1945 had left open the GDR-Polish border after the war, pending the peace treaty that never came. Bahr argued successfully with Gromyko that Bonn had no jurisdiction over

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matters relating to Germany as a whole; the three Western allies and the USSR had reserved that right exclusively for themselves. Therefore, argued Bahr, the question of Bonn's de jure, as distinct from de facto, recognition of post-war German borders did not arise. Interestingly, Gromyko in a conciliatory gesture also made a distinction between "inviolability" of borders, a phrase used in the detente treaties, and their "unalterability." This distinction theoretically meant that the Federal Republic and the GDR could alter their common border and perhaps even abolish it, by mutual consent. The Brandt Government, while de facto recognizing the existence of the GDR, refused to recognize it as a foreign and totally separate nation. The conservative opposition in the Bundestag and other forces like the refugee organizations as well as the Karlsruhe-based Federal Constitutional Court stayed Brandt's hands, although it may also be doubted whether even Brandt or Bahr would want to write off de jure the FRG's claim that Germany, after all, was one.

From Moscow's standpoint, the greatest gains of *detente* in Central Europe were Bonn's renunciation of force and nuclear arms and active co-operation in organizing a conference on European security and co-operation, which could only follow Bonn's recognition of the postwar "realities." The result was the Helsinki Final Accords signed by 35 nations (including the United States of America and Canada) in 1975, which provided the grand finale for the Central European *detente* process. The SPD-led Government thereby shook off the earlier perceptions of the CDU and adjusted the country's polity to a changing international milieu.

Much was accomplished on the humanitarian level. On Bonn's initiative the Four-Power Agreement on West Berlin came to be negotiated and was signed in September 1971.28 The Agreement required Moscow to resume the responsibility for West Berlin's access routes and provided for order and easing of traffic and goods flow along them. It also recognized the FRG's special ties with West Berlin while reiterating the legal position that the latter did not belong to it. Conditions of travel from West Germany to the GDR and Berlin improved. From 2.6 millions in 1970, travel from the Federal Republic to the GDR and East Berlin rose to 8.3 millions in 1977.29 1, 181 direct-dial telephone lines sprang into existence by the end of 1980 criss-crossing the whole of Germany. During 1970-79, 353,077 East Europeans of German descent, including those from the USSR, were able to emigrate to the FRG, compared to 213, 882 during the past decade. 30 A series of deals on gas-pipes swipe were concluded during 1970-81. The trade level between Bonn and Moscow registered a 27.6 per cent increase in 1972 over the previous year's level, 31 and Bonn remains the USSR's most important Western trading partner. Their trade volume doubled during 1976-80 over that of the previous 5-year period, the two-way trade figure for 1980 being \$7 billion. In 1982 Bonn exported 9.4 billion DM worth of goods to the USSR while importing 11.4 billion DM of Soviet goods. 32 Besides trade, ostpolitik substantially contributed to the superpower arms control talks. JEE

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It was again on Bonn's initiative that the MBFR talks to cut conventional NATO and Warsaw Pact forces were opened in October 1973 in Vienna. The more recent US-Soviet talks in Geneva on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) and strategic arms reduction (START), begun from November 1981 and June 1982, respectively, got going largely due to Bonn's initiatives. For his achievements, Brandt received the 1971 Nobel prize for peace.

Even after the CDU came back to power in the Fall of 1982, Brezhnev seized the occasion of a Soviet exhibition in Dusseldorf to write a front-page article in *Pravda*. The article, appearing on 9 October 1982, noted that the exhibition, appropriately called "Co-operation—the Call of the Times," "appears as the joint contribution of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic to the long-term good-neighbourly, mutually beneficial relations between our countries..."

Bonn-Moscow relations over the past decade or so have continued to show patterns of irritation and co-operation. Besides the sensitive issue of West Berlin and the tapering off of ethnic German emigration from the USSR, the cuts in Summer and Fall of 1982 in the direct-dial telephone links binding the USSR with various West European states, including the FRG, added to Bonn's dismay.34 The Soviet Communist Party's traditional suspicion towards the CDU-CSU surfaced again when Moscow blamed them for supporting Reagan's alleged warlike plans. This came in August 1982, at a critical time for the SPD-FDP coalition in Bonn. 85 Moscow also claimed to notice the rise of neo-Nazis in the FRG.36 It openly continues to play to West German and other West European anti-nuclear weapons movements, thereby irritating Bonn. On the other hand, the broadcasts by the Cologne-based radio station Deutsche Welle and the US-financed but FRG-based radio stations called Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty continue to irritate Moscow.37 The latter also carefully notes the recent US-FRG host-nation-support arrangements as part of Bonn's "burden sharing" within NATO,38 and the continuing talk of possible FRG military deployment in the Persian Gulf supportive to the US military presence there. 39 It is not unlikely that the GDR's hike of the hard currency visitors' toll in October 1980 and its end-April 1982 cancellation of an intra-German summit Were undertaken partly under Soviet encouragement. 40 After all, Moscow still holds the key to intra-German relations and can cause ups and downs in them at will as a signal to Bonn. Yet routine political talks seem to have survived the leadership changes in the two capitals.

Bonn-Moscow Gas-Pipes Deal

Bonn and Moscow started the gas-pipes deal in 1970; renewed or expanded on it by further agreements in 1972, 1974, 1975, 1980 and 1981. At the Schmidt-Brezhnev Summit in summer 1980, plans were formulated to step up exchange. Brezhnev drew official satisfaction in his report to the 26th. Congress in February next year. The following September the

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10th Session of the Joint Soviet-FRG Commission met under Economic Minister Lambsdorff and Soviet Deputy Premier Kostandov. Its agenda featured the gas-pipes deal, which had already made "considerable progress," along with co-operation in liquefaction and gasification of coal. Next month Moscow made concrete offers; it invited Bonn's co-operation in experimental liquefaction in Siberia and the setting up of a steel mill in India. The real clincher came in November when on the eve of Brezhnev's third summit in Bonn, a large gas-pipes deal was signed.

Since the 26th CPSU Congress in early 1981, Moscow stepped up its gas extraction programme to overcome energy bottlenecks. Its target for the current 5-Year Plan is an increase of gas extraction by about 200 billion cubic metres. Moscow has planned to build five giant gas pipelines connecting the West Siberian gas deposits with European Russia and an export pipeline Urengo-Pomary-Uzhgorod. These pipelines, 1,5 diameter each, would extend between 3,000 and 5,000 kms. and would operate under a pressure of 75 atmospheres requiring 30-40 compressor stations each. Besides, completely new technology would be needed to tap and supply the West Siberian gas under adverse permafrost, marshy and undeveloped conditions of the deposit areas. Bonn was not alone in West Europe to seize this opportunity of widening its export market, which suited Moscow to the hilt. Moscow's gas-pipes deals with West Europe, including the FRG, provide for an annual supply of 11.5 billion cubic metres of gas from 1984; the total volume by the year 2000 is expected to reach about 200 billion cubic metres.48

But the Polish crisis nearly upset the applecart. Following the institution of martial law in Poland, the Reagan Administration clamped economic sanctions against that country on 14 December 1981. On 29 December it widened the sanctions against the USSR also. Washington extended them next year on 18 June, even though Reagan's European allies thought that they had reached an understanding with the United States President on such embargo affecting their Soviet trade at the Versailles and Bonn summits earlier that month.44 The sanctions rocked Washington's relations with Bonn and other Western capitals. Some of the technologies which West European firms were to supply to the USSR were US-developed and licensed. The United States' ban required suspension of their export to Russia. The Schmidt Government, probably seeing the writing on the wall, had questioned initially US wisdom in holding Moscow responsible for events in Poland.45 It now joined with UK, France, Italy and Japan to question the merits of an economic war against Moscow. Bonn feared that at a time of growing worldwide recession it would lose 200,000 badly-needed jobs if it observed the United States sanctions. 46 US policy of frowning upon West Europe's trade with the USSR while considering its own grain deal with the latter, appeared as sadism tinged with cynicism. In early January 1982, Schmidt dashed to the United States to impress upon its leaders "the strategic significance" of reducing unemployment for the stability of Western

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societies.47 The Schmidt Government agreed to withold export of "strategic goods" to the USSR via the COCOM channel but not to conduct a—suicidal-trade war. On 24 June, following Reagan's latest move, the Chancellor criticized US sanctions in the Bundestag; he said, these had been imposed without prior consultations.48 Consequently Bonn and other affected West European states stiffened their defiance. They ignored the American ban and encouraged their respective firms to carry out their export contracts with Moscow. In September, for instance, AEG Kanis, a West German firm, joined French and British companies to violate the ban and shipped 2 out of 47 turbines contracted for to the USSR. 49 Soviet media gleefully kept up commentaries on how Bonn defied its closest NATO ally to keep up detente with Moscow. 50 American-FRG relations did not look up even when US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the State Department took the cue from a Frankfurt/Main-based human rights organization that the Soviets were using political prisoners to build their gas pipelines. 51 But the deal was on amidst individual and collective West European criticism of US measures.

The differences between the United States and the Federal Republic on the Soviet gas-pipes deal revolve around several arguments. The Reagan Administration maintains that Moscow would earn \$7 billion through its gas sales to West Europe, enabling it to continue to divert a substantial percentage of its earnings to military spending. Without West Europe's co-operation, Moscow would have to be on its own; this would weaken its perceived military buildup and aggressiveness. Moreover, Soviet gas supply would increase West Europe's dependence on Moscow, which could be risky at times of East-West tension. Defending its own 23 million tons of grain sales promotion vis-a-vis Moscow, the United States maintains that the difference between grain trade and the gas-pipes deal is like the difference between feeding the bear from outside the cage and climbing into the cage to live with it. 53

Bonn disagrees; it argues on the other hand that the gas-pipes deal would lead to greater interdependence rather than unilateral West European depenence on Moscow. The latter has been a reliable partner in trade, which is preferable to trade with the volatile Middle East. The Soviet 5-Year Plans would also be geared to the deal. Hence, Moscow would have a stake in keeping its part of the bargain. Halting gas supply to West Europe would lead to a drop in the hard currency earnings which Moscow badly needs. Although West Germany depends for 51.3 per cent of its energy needs on imports, its dependence on Soviet gas in the 1990's would be only 6 per cent of its total energy consumption, i.e., less than its dependence on Libyan oil. Further, in Bonn's view, denial of technology would not hurt the USSR significantly since it is meant only for the export pipeline, whereas Moscow is building five more on its own for domestic consumption. West Europe's co-operation in developing the Siberian gas deposits would help the Soviet bloc cover its energy needs and thus keep Moscow away from "adventures"

to control oil sources in the Persian Gulf area, something which the United States professes to fear. Such co-operation, finally, would also act as a damper on East-West conflict. It is clear that Bonn's stakes are so high in the economic co-operation aspect of ostpolitik that no political party can halt it and still remain in power. In this, therefore, Moscow has succeeded in driving a wedge between Bonn and Washington, aided by hard geographic and economic factors.

NATO Missile Deployment Questions Bearing on Bonn-Moscow Relations

As early as mid-1976, NATO announced a Soviet nuclear buildup in Europe and called for improvements in its own Theatre Nuclear Force. known as "grey zone" weapons in then SALT parlance and now Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF). In December that year, NATO Defence Ministers took note of the impending Soviet deployment of the highly accurate and mobile SS-20 missiles with 5,000-km range and 3 MIRVed nuclear warheads. 55 These were meant to supplement and later substitute about 500 older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. 56 Next year, on 24 May, Bonn's Desence Ministry observed that it was watching the deployment of SS-20's with "concern". 57 Five months later, Chancellor Schmidt, while addressing the Strategic Studies Institute in London, urged that the SALT process should include "parallel" reduction of military "disparities" in Europe. 58 Then Defence Minister Georg Leber picked up the theme two months later and expressed that SALT should not foreclose the options provided by then new Cruise Missile technology, since these options could be used to balance the Soviet "continental" or Euromissiles. 59 Such concern in Bonn, that arms control talks on intercontinental and other "strategic" weapons between the two superpowers should be widened to include the eurostrategic weapons-led the United States to agree to closer consultations with Bonn and other allies. 80

In 1979, the Ministry of Defence in Bonn published a White Paper which stressed the country's concern about these missiles and urged that future US-Soviet arms talks should take them into account. 61 Bonn's concern stemmed from the perceived weakening of one component in a chain of three "interlinked for escalation," which constituted part of NATO's "flexible response" strategy. These three components were: the strategic nuclear forces of the superpowers, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces and the conventional forces. 63 Of these, the INF component was seen to be growing weaker in the face of the Soviet SS-20 buildup. Since the United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces checkmated each other, Soviet superiority in the INF area gave Moscow a distinct, even decisive, edge in Europe. This, explained the Ministry, needed correction.

Meanwhile in May 1978, Brezhnev had visited Bonn, as already seen, to dissuade Schmidt from supporting the expected US hardline in the forthcoming Washington-NATO Summit later that month. Besides the question JEB

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of possible acquisition of neutron weapons by NATO, the talks included the INF issue. Schmidt conveyed to Brezhnev, who downplayed the SS-20 buildup, that he did not believe in the Soviet leader's assurance that a "rough" balance of nuclear forces existed between NATO and the Warsaw pact. 64 Continued reports in subsequent years on the buildup seemed to confirm Schmidt's suspicion. 65 The Washington Conference drew up a longterm modernization programme for NATO; although the Europe-based missiles were dealt with separately, the drawing up of such a plan might have given NATO's INF plea a boost. When it became known that NATO would station 572 US-built later-generation INFs in West Europe, Moscow stepped up its propaganda and diplomacy to keep them out. The missile deployment question had a significant bearing on the Bonn-Moscow relations since all of the deadly 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 96 out of the 464 Ground-launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) were to be deployed on West German territory alone. The Pershing IIs caused special concern in Moscow; while all the 572 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces would be able to reach targets in the western USSR, the accurate Pershing IIs would take only about 6-8 minutes to hit Soviet targets from the Federal Republic. thereby reducing early warning time. They were also considered to be "counterforce" weapons, their intended targets being Soviet-Warsaw Pact troop concentrations, submarine bunkers, airfields, etc. 66

In June 1979 (25th-30th), GDR Defence Minister Heinz Hoffmann led a large delegation to Moscow for talks. 67 The visit must have had a bearing on Brezhnev's arms control offer of 6 October, which he made to the West while attending the GDR Anniversary Day in East Berlin. 68 The Soviet leader proposed the unconditional withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet troops, 1,000 tanks and other unspecified arms from the 20-division Soviet Strike Force based in the GDR. Hoping to soften up Bonn in this way, he then proposed that Moscow would reduce its Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces based in western USSR, if NATO, which was to meet next December, refrained from the decision to deploy the new United States' INF. With an eye to the forthcoming NATO meeting, Gromyko rushed to Bonn in November to warn that such a decision would "destroy the basis of negotiations" on the INF issue. 69 On 6 December, a Warsaw Pact meeting in East Berlin repeated that warning primarily for the listening pleasure of Bonn. 70 Nevertheless, the Brussels NATO meeting on 12 December endorsed the US-encouraged two-track decision: while talks with Moscow should be held on solving the problems pertaining to INF's, preparations for deployment must also simultaneously be made. If no agreement was reached by the end of 1983, NATO would go ahead with the deployment. The Schmidt Government fully supported that decision to Moscow's dismay and the latter accused Schmidt and Genscher of "double talk."71.

West Germany's geostrategic frontline location at the heart of Europe made Bonn take more than an academic interest in the United States-Soviet arms control talks, particularly in the subsequent INF issues. The Schmidt

Government had appealed to the Ford, Carter and Reagan Administrations to include the Euromissiles issue in the SALT process, but to no avail. 77 US phraseology like "grey zone" weapons or "Theatre Nuclear Forces" tended to downgrade their strategic importance. Moscow had also shown little enthusiasm about negotiating on them. But when Schmidt and Genscher visited Moscow in summer 1980, the Soviets were more forthcoming. Schmidt says this was because the Soviet leaders now realized that following the NATO decision six months ago, the United States would go ahead with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force deployment, should there be no talks. "Only in the consciousness of this knowledge, this prospect," says Schmidt, did they agree to hold talks and proposed these to Washington on 5 July 1980,73 i.e., within a few days of Schmidt's departure from Moscow. The Soviet leaders, of course, took care to remind America that the missiles and the US Forward Based Systems (FBS) aircraft stood in "organic connection" and should together constitute the basis of negotiations. 74 The talks opened on 30 November 1981; Bonn had been instrumental in bringing them about. Public posturing by the superpowers however, which is so characteristic of their INF negotiations, had begun earlier and continues, through mid-1983.

At the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981, as noted, Brezhnev praised detente with Bonn but warned that the deployment of the new Intermediaterange Nuclear Forces on West Gernam territory would affect bilateral relations. More substantially, he proposed a freeze on intermediate-range nuclear weapons on both sides, including the US Forward Based Systems, during the entire period of the expected INF talks.75 The West rejected the proposal as Soviet tactics to hinder NATO's acquisition of the new missiles. On 3 July West Germnany and the GDR held consultations in arms control. 76 When next month Schmidt wrote to Honecker requesting the revival of their postponed summit, he probably had the INF among other issues in mind.77 On the eve of the US-Soviet agreement to hold the talks, Gromyko urged the United Nations General Assembly to adopt a resolution against the first use of nuclear weapons. 78 This was clearly designed to trip up NATO, which relies on the flexible response doctrine that envisages a possible first use of tactical nuclear arms to compensate for the perceived Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces. The political dimension of the INF talks was again noted on 12 and 19 October when Brezhnev discussed arms control with prominent personalities from the Federal Republic who, however, had directly little to do with that subject. 79

Meanwhile, President Reagan had also been consulting his European allies. With Schmidt's encouragement he launched his "zero option" on 18 November as the basis for the forthcoming INF talks in Geneva. The days later in Bonn, just a week from the opening of the Geneva talks, Brezhnev, after a day of heated discussions with Schmidt, rejected the zero option. Since the US proposal implied that NATO would refrain from its deployment plan, provided Moscow dismantled all its INFs, it would mean unilateral

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Soviet disarmament in the face of the continued presence of the United States' Forward Based Systems and other systems, complained Brezhnev. He then repeated his earlier moratorium proposal and added, in his words. a "new element." Moscow was ready, he said, to make even advance cuts in its Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, if the US agreed to the moratorium.81 Schmidt says that the Soviet leaders showed "considerable uncertainty" at the summit regarding US intentions, although he told Brezhnev that Bonn was equally apprehensive of Moscow's military buildup. Schmidt, however, assured Brezhnev, with dubious success, that the Reagan Administration was serious about the talks. 82 Despite differences of opinion on a variety of global issues, including arms control, Bonn's key role as an "interpreter" between the two superpowers was reflected in the Joint Communique on Brezhnev's visit. It stressed the importance of the "political dialogue" between Bonn and Moscow. 83 Brezhnev also met with a wide spectrum of political leaders, from the arch rightwinger Strauss of the CSU to communist chief Herbert Mies to put across Soviet concern on the INF issue. Interestingly, some of the United States and Soviet arms control statements reflected Bonn's phraseology.

At the summit meeting with Schmidt in Werbellin, GDR, in December 1981 Honecker, not unexpectedly, backed the Soviet position in the INF talks. The military clamp down in Poland that month, as noted, worsened US-Soviet relations. This could not but affect Bonn's ostpolitik. A worried Schmidt rushed to America, as also seen before, in January 1982. He returned with what he said was Reagan's assurance that the renewed Cold War over Poland would not affect the INF talks in Geneva. Schmidt had also urged Reagan to accept a summit with Brezhnev. The Chancellor of course, took care to make the right noises for Washington and domestic consumption. On 26 January he took up cudgels, called the USSR "a highly armed military power" which "threatens the freedom of other countries." He, however, revealed a European subtelety compared with US naivete when he went on to explain that Moscow's perceived militarism stemmed from its "exaggerated security interests."

Meanwhile on 3 February, Brezhnev made a new proposal. Moscow was prepared, he said, to cut two-thirds of its INFs by 1990 and wanted to include tactical nuclear weapons in the cuts. The latter element he was, of course, secure in the knowledge that NATO would reject it. Meanwhile, suspicion of steady SS-20 buildup continued in the West. When CPSU Secretary Leonid Zamyatin came to attend a seminar in the FRG's Tutzing on 2 March, he assured the participants that the SS-20 had been deployed ever since Brezhnev's Bonn-visit the previous November. Possibly acting on Zamyatin's feedback, Brezhnev made himself heard again. On 16 March he declared a unilateral freeze on the SS-20 levels in the European USSR and said that the freeze would also extend to the replacement of the older SS-4s and SS-5s by the SS-20s. He said that the freeze would be on till an INF agreement was reached or the NATO deployment took place. Yet

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Bonn remained sceptical. Government spokesman Kurt Becker alleged the same day that since Brezhnev's May 1978 Bonn visit 250 additional SS-20s had been deployed, of which 200 were set up since the NATO two-track decision of December 1979. The total had reached 300, which meant 900 nuclear warheads, two-thirds of which were targeted on West Europe. Bonn's scepticism persisted from the further consideration that despite Brezhnev's freeze, additional SS-20s might be deployed east of the Urals and still be capable of hitting West European targets. However, Moscow's declaration of a unilateral freeze was not without its impact on sections of Western public opinion. To this extent its playing to the Western galleries succeeded admirably and nuclear freeze movements gathered momentum.

Again on Bonn's prodding Reagan offered START talks to Moscow on 9 May 1982, to be opened on 29 June. Bonn immediately welcomed this as "a necessary supplement" to the INF talks. As Schmidt explained, without simultaneous INF and START talks, it would be difficult to categorize some of the existing weapons. 91 A little earlier, Schmidt had asked the visting Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, that he (Kadar), might convey to his "friends" that Bonn took the arms control talks seriously,92 even if it did not directly participate in the nuclear weapons talks. He underlined that theme in his 10 June 1982 inaugural speech at the NATO Summit in Bonn, the first NATO summit held in West Germany. A new arms race, Schmidt said, would only destabilize the European balance. 93 His words may have been meant for Reagan's ears, who was present, to urge the latter to take the negotiations aspect of the two-track approach as seriously as the deployment aspect. The GDR's Foreign Minister, Oskar Fischer, who addressed a UN session on disarmament the same day, warned Bonn that "he who permits this deployment on his territory will have to bear the consequences and will assume a heavy burden of responsibility. . . . "94 This was the expected GDR support for Moscow. Its undertone that Bonn's policy on the INF deployment might jeopardize the fruits of its ostpolitik was unmistakable. The Bonn Summit nevertheless chose to determine that Moscow was spending on military preparations "widely" beyond its legitimate defence needs.95 The GDR's UN representative, Harry Ott, fired back next month, alleging that "a crusade was proclaimed against socialism" in Bonn. 96

As crisis was brewing in Bonn's ruling SPD-FDP coalition, Egon Bahr headed for Moscow after a vist to Beijing towards the end of August. Bahr headed the Arms Control and Disarmament Committee of the Bundestag; his Moscow visit came against the background of a recent speech by the Soviet Defence Minister Dmitry Ustinov dismissing the zero option. Moscow kept up its propagandab arrage against the United States' Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces. In this, its views converged with those of the left-of-centre elements in Bonn's political spectrum: the environmentalist Green Party, the leftwing SPD and FDP members, and of course, the Communists. "Neutralist" forces questioning Bonn's close military ties with Washington seemed on the rise, 98 The Hessen state parliamentary elections

of 26 September returned the "Greens" and thereby seemed to boost these forces. Meanwhile against the background of a massive peace rally in the Federal Republic, the Schmidt Government collapsed on 17 September. Less than two months later, on 10 November, Brezhnev died in Moscow. He was succeeded by former KGB Chief Yuri V. Andropov. These major changes in Bonn and Moscow seemed to increase the uncertainties on the INF issue and, more generally, the future of ostpolitik.

OSTPOLITIK UNDER CDU

Transfer of Power in Bonn

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The SPD-FDP ruling Coalition collapsed in 1982 as a result of an increasing internal conflict.99 The 1983 Federal Budget was the central focus; differences arose over the FDP's demand for pruning social welfare spending and tax on industry. On 17 September, four FDP Ministers, including the Foreign Minister and Party Chairman Genscher, resigned. This signalled the fall of the 13-year old SPD-led Coalition Government in Bonn as well as the 8-year Chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt. Opposition CDU leader and chairman, 52-year old Helmut Kohl, took over as Chancellor on 10 October. The new coalition of the CDU-CSU and FDP assumed power in Bonn, much to the satisfaction of Washington and consternation in Moscow. The split within the FDP over the defection, its subsequent disasters in Hessen and Hamburg state legislature elections and the rise of the Green Party caused panic among the Free Democratic leaders. CSU-chief Strauss seized the opportunity to bully them incessantly. Kohl could have remained Chancellor till 1984, when the current term of the Bundestag would end, but challenged by the now opposition SPD and goaded by colleagues from the Union parties, he deliberately lost a "vote of confidence" under Article 68 of the Basic Law on 17 December to make way for the dissolution of the Bundestag and, hence, fresh elections.

A major reason why the ruling coalition preferred interim elections was to get a clear mandate for its domestic and foreign policies, including unambiguous support for the NATO two-track decision. The elections would also remove the stigma from the Union parties of having come to power by dubious means. 100 Both Moscow and Washington were keenly interested in the outcome since election results would decide whether the West Germans were for or against the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces deployment. While the results were, in fact, largely determined by domestic-economic issues, they were nevertheless interpreted as endorsement of the CDU stand on deployment. To Reagan's relief, the CDU-CSU received 48.8 per of cent the votes (1980 elections: 44.5%), the second best result in their combined history. The FDP managed to scrape through with 6.9 per cent (1980: 10.6%). The SPD suffered clearly with 38.2 per cent (1980: 42.9%). The Greens for the first time entered the Bundestag with a little over the

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qualifying minimum, with 5.6 per cent (1980: 1.5%). Hans-Jochen Vogel, who had become the SPD's Chancellor candidate when Schmidt declined to stand for another term, took up the leadership of the opposition in the *Bundestag*.

Ostpolitik Under Kohl

Meanwhile, soon after the CDU had come to power in the Fall of 1982, Brezhnev indicated willingness to continue co-operation, as already noted. Reagan retracted on 13 November that year his economic ban; 101 given continued opposition to his embargo even from an usually faithful Bonn, he said that he was lifting it from that day provided that West Europe did not sign any fresh contracts to supply US-developed technology to Moscow. Besides opposition from Bonn and other allies, the Reagan Administration may also have wanted to make things a little easier for the new CDU-led conservative government; the CDU-CSU had been its long-standing faithful allies, while the SPD, although remaining loyal, had shown more independence in the ostpolitik.

Within days of Reagan's announcement Chancellor Kohl landed in Washington. In recognition of the hard economic realities, he informed US leaders that Bonn's Moscow trade would continue. 102 The CDU leader confirmed this constant feature of economic co-operation in ostpolitik again when he and his Foreign Minister, Genscher, visited America following their election victory during 14-15 April 1983. He called on the American President to keep East-West trade issues on the sidelines at the forthcoming Williamsburg Economic Summit among the industrialized nations so as to avoid conflict among allies. 103 In mid-May, the new CDU-led Government held talks with the Soviets on renewing the 1973-74 agreements as part of the ongoing long-term co-operation. 104 These talks covered issues like exchange of patents and licenses and co-operation in modernizing industrial plants. The United States-Soviet-FRG triangular interaction on trade with the USSR remains problematic. However, reports circulated in mid-1983 that Reagan was contemplating legislation to step up his ban again.

Continuity seemed the key word again in the Kohl Government's Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces policy. 105 The Chancellor stressed that word in his public speeches. Within a week of assuming the Chancellor's office Kohl met the visiting RSFSR Chief Minister, Mikhail Solomontsev, to discuss inter alia the INF issue. The discussion of course reassured the hardliners both at home and abroad. 106 On 15 November, President Carstens and Foreign Minister Genscher held talks again with the new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov in Moscow following Brezhnev's death. The same month Kohl and his Defence Minister, Manfred Woerner dashed to the United States to discuss INF. Their hosts seemed in trouble at that time. It appeared

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as if the Congress would pull the rug from under the feet of the US negotiators led by Paul Nitze at the INF talks in Geneva; it cut the funds for the development of the Pershing IIs after two flight tests had failed. Be that as it may, what is of interest here is to note that Kohl had lost little time after assuming the Chancellor's office to get in touch with both the Soviets and the Americans. On New Year's Eve he appeared on West German TV and declared as much. Despite his pro-American image, he was clearly treading the beaten track of the SPD rather than reviving the classical CDU policy. He did not show any significant anxiety to abandon Helmut Schmidt's "interpreter" role between Washington and Moscow. Kohl has continued to pursue this policy even after the March 1983 election victory.

Shortly after Brezhnev's death, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group determined that the SS-20 buildup had reached the total of 324, including those stationed in Siberia. In an opening gambit to test the new Kremlin Chief, it reiterated the Western rejection of the Soviet position on the INF talks. 109 Andropov replied with his first proposal to the West as the CPSU Chief on 21 December; he proposed that each side should have as many INFs as the British and French missiles, which totalled 162. In addition, each side might retain 138 medium-range bombers. 110 This implied that Moscow was willing to consider the missiles and the medium-range aircraft separately within the INF talks; the West, however, rejected it as Soviet bid "to win a public-affairs contest." The United States observed that this would allow Moscow to possess 486 nuclear warheads on its 162 missiles while there would be zero missiles on its side. Paris, London and Washington also resented the Soviet inclusion of the British and French missiles, which were independent of the NATO Command, in the INF talks in Geneva. Finally, in Western view, the SS-20s east of the Urals would remain intact and thereby still threaten Europe.

It should be noted here that the United States, from the very beginning, took a narrowly defined view of the INFs, considering only land-based missiles as falling in that category. Moscow, on the other hand, chose to take a broader view and widened the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force concept right from the start to include medium-range land and carrier-based nuclearcapable aircraft and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) also. Moscow insisted that for historical and geographic reasons it had traditionally relied on land-based missiles for deterrence. The United States, a seapower, on the other hand had emphasized SLBM-submarines and FBS bombers. Hence, in Soviet view, Reagan's zero option, which aimed at the elimination of land-based intermediate-range missiles only, in effect meant unilateral disarmament of the USSR. Soviet diplomacy was thus geared from the very beginning to the inclusion of the SLBMs and the FBS aircraft in the INF talks to achieve what Moscow described as "real" and "absolute" zero option. Andropov's proposal focused attention on the British and French missiles, but Moscow had long been citing them in connection with the INF question. 112 Andropov stuck to Brezhnev's view that NATO had

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1.5 to 1 advantage over the USSR in terms of the nuclear warheads total. Bonn's Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Altenburg, agreed that the British and French missiles could not be ignored but suggested that these should come under START talks as "strategic" arms rather than under the INF talks.

In January 1983, with the elections barely two months away, Kohl declared that while he was firm on deployment, he was not inflexible; 113 he conveyed his dialectical attitude to Gromyko, who called on him that month While agreeing with the Chancellor that detente should continue between Bonn and Moscow, the Soviet Foreign Minister encouraged the West Germans to assert their own interests rather than giving in to "outside" influence, meaning Washington. He also took care to add that Moscow could not overlook the fact that the FRG would be the only country where all of the 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles were to be based, should the deployment take place. 114 Whether Gromyko's words had their desired effect is not known; what is known is that Kohl conveyed his message of flexibility also to US State Secretary George Shultz, who paid a visit to Bonn at the end of the month. It is likely that he urged Shultz to encourage Reagan to take the INF talks more seriously and come up with a solution more flexible than the zero option. 115 The coming elections were a major reason for the "flexibility" aspect of Kohl's posture; he hoped thereby to take the wind out of the sail of his SPD rival Vogel, who seemed to be banking on support from the peace movement, the Greens and other left-of-centre elements. The Kohl Government and some of the other European allies thus seemed to pass some of the pressure from the substantial anti-nuclear movements on to the Reagan Administration which, however, had tenuous domestic support for its ambitious military programmes.

In February Gromyko repeated his advice, which he had tendered the preceding month in Bonn, that West Europeans should "independently" make up their minds on deployment. It triggered vigorous protests from the Kohl Government as a Soviet attempt to influence the forthcoming elections in favour of the SPD. The latter, somewhat embarrassed, also joined in the criticism. 116 It seemed that Moscow was even ready to risk pandering to German nationalism to reduce US influence in Bonn. 117 Despite such irritations, Kohl went on doing his ostpolitik homework. Towards the end of February, with the elections barely days away, he sent his arms control expert, Friedrich Ruth, for talks in Moscow. Ruth consulted with Gromyko and Soviet arms control experts. Upon return he reported that Moscow stuck to its view that the British and French missiles must also be included in the INF talks. 118 Nevertheless, his visit to the Soviet capital served the purpose of putting Kohl's arms control efforts on record for the electorate. Kohl even telephoned Honecker to suggest similar arms control consultations, and then personally announced this over the radio. 119

The CDU-CSU victory in the Bonn elections helped shore up the United States position at the Geneva INF talks. While stressing flexibilities Kohl

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had also filrmy campaigned for missile deployment, should the talks fail. The spD meanwhile distanced itself from the deployment issue and concentrated on the agreement part of NATO's two-track. However, despite victory Kohl could hardly afford to ignore the ongoing peace rallies and the fact that the Greens entered the Bundestag with the vow to publicize even confidential defence information. 120 Within a week of his victory, Kohl mentioned the possibility of an interim INF solution that might fall short of the gero option. He added that he was urging the Reagan Administration to consider this. 121 Even the hardline Thatcher Government in London and Rome joined Bonn to urge the same upon Washington. 122 To help Reagan make up his mind, the top Soviet expert on America, Georgi Arbatov. warned on 17 March in Pravda that Moscow would counter NATO deployment by setting up its own missiles in East Europe and even near the US border—presumably in troubled Central America. 123 By 19 March, Moscow delivered four such warnings. 124 But US-Soviet differences in the INF talks persisted. On 27 March Pravda published an interview with Andropov, who had meanwhile returned from the hospital after treatment of his ailments. 125 He went on record to say that Reagan "tells a deliberate lie" that Moscow was not observing its unilateral moratorium on the SS-20s. It was part of Soviet pressure on Reagan, working collaterally with West European pressure, to relent on the INF. Two days later the long expected US interim solution was tabled in Geneva. Reagan announced it next day-30 March-on the morrow of a 6-week recess in the talks, 126 shortened at US request. The President had worked out the plan with "significant" co-operation from Bonn. 127 The plan proposed that the United States would be ready to introduce less than the envisaged 572 missiles, if Moscow agreed to cut the number of "weapons" on its "longer-range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis." It did not include the British and French missiles, nor did it take into account the aircraft, on which Moscow was equally keen but which, according to the United States, were needed for "conventional defence" and, hence fell outside the INF talks. 128 As Genscher assured Soviet Ambassador Semyonov in Bonn, the question of the aircraft could be taken up in a later phase of the talks. He also criticized the Soviet position that would restrict Western Intermediate-range Nuclear Force to the British and the French total, saying this would deprive the Federal Republic of the US nuclear umbrella and that those weapons belonged in the realm of START talks. 129 The real clincher in Reagan's interim proposal, however, was his phrase "global basis." This meant that reductions were to include the Soviet SS-20s targeted on the Far East. Earlier, on 25 January and 3 February, respectively, Tokyo and Beijing had expressed their concern that the Geneva talks might result in shifting more SS-20s to Asia to Asian USSR to their peril. 130 Reagan's phrase, therefore, seemed to take that concern into account. Clearly, Washington was out to harrass Moscow worldwide over its SS-20s. Not unexpectedly, Moscow rejected the pro-Posal. Three days after Reagan's announcement, Gromyko called a press

conference in Moscow and complained that Washington's "tall order"—that even Asia-based SS-20s must be eliminated—fell outside the purview of the Geneva talks. Gromyko carefully repeated his contention that the US proposed to include the Soviet INFs based in Asia even though Moscow had given assurance that the SS-20s in that region would be placed in sites from where they could not reach West Europe. 131

On 6 April, the Warsaw Pact Powers held discussions in Prague while Chancellor Kohl consulted with Ambassador Semyonov on the INE issue. 132 About this time Ustinov repeated the familiar warning during a visit to East Berlin that deployment would expose the FRG to counter blows. 133 The Reagan Administration for its part launched a campaign suggesting that Moscow was violating a tacit arms control understanding, 134 Its attempt to include the Far East in the talks on European INFs was not entirely without results. A Soviet delegation under Mikhail Kapitsa hurried to Tokyo to hold talks on 12 April. But the hardline Nakasone Government rejected the Soviet assurance that no Soviet missiles threatened Japan. 135 Bonn meanwhile continued to consult with the superpowers at various levels. Bonn's Ambassador Landruth scurried home from Moscow to inform that US-Soviet relations had reached a new low. 136 In mid-April. just before Kohl and Genscher went to the United States for talks. Semyonov contacted Kohl's Chancellory chief, Waldemar Schreckenberger, to convey that Andropov was dissatisfied with the INF talks and had invited the Chancellor to visit Moscow for some specific consultations. 137 In Washington, Kohl welcomed Reagan's interim proposal and asked the President to grant INF negotiator Paul Nitze, who was held on "short tether" by the White House, wider discretionary powers to probe a compromise with the Soviets. 138 Mindful of the momentum of the freeze campaign in the House of Representatives, Bonn leaders sought successfully the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's backing for Reagan's modified proposal. Without such a card, the Kohl Government would run the danger of being isolated domestically and growing weak vis-a-vis Moscow. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Embassy's Minister Counsellor in Washington, Viktor Isakov, appeared on American TV to repeat the earlier Soviet warning that Moscow might choose to deploy missiles near the United States border, if NATO deployment took place. 139

Meanwhile on 3 May, Andropov during Honecker's visit to Mascow, put forth a counter-proposal to Reagan. Honecker's visit to Mascow, put forth a counter-proposal to Reagan. Shifting focus, he said that Moscow was willing to cut nuclear warheads down to the British and French levels. The West, in a public relations gesture, cautiously welcomed it. The United States said that the latest Soviet offer, which focused on nuclear warheads rather than launchers, came closer to its own view. The Soviet proposal implied that of the 729 warheads perched atop 243 SS-20s targeted on West Europe (out of a total of 351), Moscow would have to cut back 439 to match down to the 290 warheads on the 162 British and French missiles. The West continued to voice reservations over the

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inclusion of the latter systems and also pointed out that Andropov had not specified what he intended to do with the excess SS-20s nor as to whether he would include the Siberia-based missiles. While Strauss continued to snipe at ostpolitik, 142 Kohl made his first post-election government statement next day to express his satisfaction that Moscow was at last yielding and to announce that he would propose regular FRB-Soviet consultations when he visited Moscow on 4 July. 143 Andropov's latest offer was by without effect on the ongoing debate in the House of Representatives on the nuclear freeze issue. On 4 May, Catholic bishops in America, and on 5 May, the House passed separate resolutions calling for a nuclear weapons freeze by both the superpowers, neither of which contributed to Reagan's euphoria. The latter retaliated by manoeuvering the Williamsburg Economic Summit to issue a political statement which underlined Western firmness on missile deployment. Shortly thereafter, the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris reaffirmed it.144 Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger also conferred with his Bonn counterpart, Woerner, the details of the missile deployment plan, 145 the intended side-effect of which was to generate pressure on the Kremlin. Helmut Kohl's early July summit in Moscow produced no breakthrough. Although Kohl called his talks with Tikhonov and Andropov on 4 and 5 July, respectively, as "satisfactory," the INF issue evidently remained deadlocked. 148

WHITHER OSTPOLITIK?

The CDU comeback to power in Bonn after thirteen years, the ongoing bebate on NATO's missile deployment and the SPD's growing reservations on that question have thrown the greater issue of West Germany's future political orientation into sharp profile. A debate on that issue is currently raging in the Federal German Republic. The Social Democrats started a process of German self-assertion through their ostpolitik, while remaining within the United States security umbrella. Concrete gains were made; ostpolitik also remarkably managed to survive the Afghan and Polish crises. It is clear that no political party or leader in Bonn can afford to wipe out these gains. Besides, familiarity developed between the West German and the Soviet leaders over the past decade. While leadership changes in both Bonn and Moscow may have somewhat weakened the top-level personal ties, the stakes in trade and humanitarian exchanges remain high. As of mid-1983 this proposition remained valid, notwithstanding the revival of old rhetorics on Germany's territorial claims and the CSU's polemical approach to ostpolitik. Not that these claims and polemics are entirely devoid of meaning. It is an irony of history that the right to national self-det. self-determination is taken for granted in the Third World context, but that the same right is left out in the cold in the context of Germany. The German to their recent history. Germans have had sheer bad luck when it comes to their recent history. The Bismarckian Reich, founded in 1871, shrank in less than half a century

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following World War I. Hitler managed to restore the earlier borders of the Reich and even expand them, but only briefly. Following World War II Germany again shrank drastically. Whatever territories remained were split into the Federal and the Democratic Republics of Germany.

The SPD essentially tailored its ostpolitik to alleviate that division by abandoning the CDU's hardline stance and by means of greater interaction with Moscow and its allies. This revived memories of Soviet-German collaboration of the 1920's, notably the Rapallo Treaty. Ever since Schmidt's fall from power, the SPD has been distancing itself from Washington. and not only on the INF question. While this might have been election tactics to win support of the Greens and the peace movements, the continuation of that posture after the 6 March 1983 elections seems to be a new trend in Bonn's political scene. Schmidt criticized the Reagan Administration for its failure to take the INF talks with Moscow seriously and consult West Europe on its economic sanctions against it. SPD leader, Wischnewski, followed up by calling the US Central American policy "intolerable". The SPD also expressed solidarity with the nuclear freeze resolution of the House. Such Social Democratic resistance to the Reagan Administration's policies has given rise to the question of German national interest. Moscow has been playing it up. Soviet enthusiasm on the subject, however, is confined to the FRG's defiance of the United States and continued co-operation with the USSR. The Soviets are apparently willing to risk the encouragement of German national interest, if only against the United States, and ignore for the time being the implications for the GDR population. In this context Moscow has been extolling the virtues of Rapallo.

The important near-term question is whether Bonn will risk the missile deployment? Although Kohl reiterated the government's stand during his talks with the Soviet leaders in early July this year, he would possibly like to avoid going down in his country's history as the "missile Chancellor." Judging by the Kohl-Andropov summit, the post-Brezhnev leadership in Moscow may not at all relent on the INF issue. Western expectations of a last-minute Soviet compromise may turn out to be illusory. Kohl possibly has little illusions himself and may be seeking to steer the two superpowers to a mutually acceptable compromise. This is seen in that he took the trouble of discussing the possibility of a US-Soviet Summit with Andropov. The longer-term question is of even greater import for the East-West power equation, viz., whether the trend towards "neutralism," which Kissinger and Brzezinski feared, would ultimately "unhinge" Bonn's international position, even though that trend is now largely outside the government. Moscow's emphasis on German national interest seems to cause considerable able uneasiness among the West Germans. The Soviets may have touched upon deep-rooted German nationalism that lies dormant below the USoriented identity that Bonn wears on the surface. SPD leader, Lafontaine, is correct when he says that the older generation Germans eagerly sought psychological refuge in that identity when the Third Reich collapsed and

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the values they had hitherto cherished, lay discredited. 147 In a mirror-image case, the GDR leaders found refuge in their zealous embrace of Soviet identity.

The SPD now seems to encourage a process that increasingly questions the FRG's borrowed identity. This is but a natural evolution. The postwar generations in both parts of Germany are remarkably free of their fathers' complexes and see things in a different light. The artificial external restraints and voluntary constraints imposed upon, and accepted by, such a hardworking, talented and disciplined nation as the Germans cannot last forever. This is, incidentally, also true of Japan. Although Kohl criticized the SPD to say that a "swing policy" between Washington and Moscow was undesirable, operationally his policy has not revealed a radical departure from that of Schmidt's. If nothing else, the prospects of a return of the economic chaos of the 1920's and 1930's and the consequent radicalization of politics in Germany are major considerations in favour of continuing the SPDchapped ostpolitik at a time of world-wide economic recession. To this extent, perhaps a redefinition of German national interest is already underway in Bonn. This does not mean that Bonn would disown Washington. It means that henceforth even the CDU will not blindly act according to the whims and vagaries of Washington. If this is true, then the SPD's ostpolitik may have effected a paradigm shift in the FRG's thirty-four year history. It may have shown the way out of an artificial identity into an uncharted wilderness, to which maturity must lead. Bonn has only to shed its Kafkaesque uncertainty to stand tall in international life and probe. It may turn out to be a rewarding experience.

July 1983.

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- 137 "Wo er Mag," Der Spiegel, n. 103, p. 28. Andropov, in an interview with Der Spiegel, confirmed that he expected Kohl to visit Moscow. 19 April 1983, n. 110, p. 6.
- 138 The Christian Science Monitor, 18 April 1983, p. 5.
- 139 VOA, 18 April 1983. Isakov, appeared on CBS TV. 140 The Christian Science Monitor, 4 May 1983, p. 1; Andropov's Speech in Soviet Review, Vol. XX, no. 20, 12 May 1983, pp. 2-5. US and Soviet counts of French warheads tally but not those of the British warheads. The West says that the 64 British missiles carry a total of 192 warheads; the Soviet figure, however, is 336. The Christian Science Monitor, 6 May 1983, p. 6.
- 141 Weinberger's reaction, VOA, 4 May 1983; Ned Temko, "Andropov Arms Control Offers," Science Monitor, 5 May 1983, Offer: More Politics than Substance," The Christian Science Monitor, 5 May 1983,

142 See CDU vs. CSU controversy over ostpolitik, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 May 1983, p.1.

143 Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 5 May 1983, p.2.

143 Sueducusche 2011, 31 May 1983, p. 1. The Williamsburg Statement was issued on 30 May 1983. On NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting, Die Deutsche Welle, 9 June 1983. This was followed by the NATO Defence Ministers' Brussels resolution reiterating the same. Die Deutsche Welle, 1 June 1983.

145 VOA, 30 May 1983. New Times, 22 May 1983 noted this on p. 15 and called it "a deliberate attempt at blackmail."

146 Andropov postponed summit from 4 to 5 July. BBC, 4 and 5 July 1983; VOA, 6 and 7 July 1983.

147 Der Spiegel, Vol. 16, 18 April 1983, pp. 35-38.

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TRANSITIONAL POLITICS IN BANGLADESH: A STUDY OF SATTAR'S INTERIM PRESIDENCY

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By SHAUKAT HASSAN*

President Ziaur Rahman's assassination at the hands of miscreants in the port of Chittagong in May 1981 stunned his compatriots. Zia was the first appularly elected president with a 77 per cent electoral mandate. His youth, vigour and dedication had earned him the respect of his countrymen. He was the only President to establish genuine and regular political contact with the rural majority, bringing to them the promise of a better life. And in the eves of the informed public he had pulled Bangladesh out of the backwaters of the Asian sub-continent into the glare of international limelight. But his sudden death threw the nation into chaos and uncertainty, and a resolute adherance to the Constitution seemed to be the only modus operandi ad interim. The immediate reaction of the government, the opposition parties and the armed services to the news of the assassination was a spirited portrayal of national unity. With Zia's Cabinet still intact, the ailing septuagenarian Vice President, Abdus Sattar, was hurriedly brought from an army hospital and sworn in as the Acting President, pending presidential elections within 180 days as was required by the Constitution.2 Immediately after, the new Acting President proclaimed a state of emergency³ as a step towards national consolidation. An emergency Cabinet meeting was held, following which Sattar declared his government's resolution to honour Zia's international commitments and carry forward his domestic policies and objectives. Next, the Chiefs of the Armed Services, the Intelligence Services, the Bangladesh Rifles and the Police were summoned to the "Bangabhaban," and their total support to Sattar's interim government was publicly announced. The parliamentary group of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the party then in power, also hurriedly met in a special session to reaffirm the party's solidarity with and total support to Sattar. Sattar also invited the leaders of the opposition parties to "Bangabhaban' and secured assurances of their full support to his transitional government. The chiefs of the navy and army in their television broadcasts assured the nation of their allegiance to Sattar and their united commitment to contain the rebellion in Chittagong expeditiously. Thus, within 48 hours after Zia's assassination, the new government managed to portray a picture of national unity and solidarity, though the national crises that loomed large were yet to

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CALL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION

Zia's assassination brought to the fore three immediate crises: i) the rebellion in Chittagong; ii) the general fear of army takeover; and iii) the constitutional obligation to hold fresh presidential polls. But psychological fears abounded: could the Army contain the rebellion and its contagious effects so that the series of coups, as occurred in 1975 would not be repeared? Could the BNP maintain its unity without Zia? Would the opposition, particularly the Awami League-Hasina AL (H), exploit the situation to the country's disadvantage? Would there be orderly political transition to avert an internal breakdown or external threat? Would the ailing Acting President live long enough to allow the continuity of the rudimentary democratic process instituted by Zia? The next 180 days were indeed critical.

Continued attention was given to Major General Manzur's rebellion in Chittagong. Through assurances of security to rebels if they surrendered to the government forces surrounding them and the repeated extension of deadlines tor surrender, the rebel forces' morale was finally broken and the rebellion crushed within a few days. But identifying Manzur's secret supporters within the Army remained a difficult task: what followed within the armed services were massive transfers, forced retirements with or without promotions and posting abroad of potentially problematic generals as ambassadors. According to one well-informed source, over 26 senior army officers were retired before the November Elections.

Despite General Erahad's repeated declaration of allegiance to the Constitution, the public was unwilling to accept the Army at face value. They were perturbed at the fact that two popularly elected leaders, Mujib and Zia, were killed by the Army. There were also the fear that as soon as the Army consolidated itself it would takeover power. The government's concern was revealed in Sattar's second television broadcast to the nation which was generally interpreted as an eulogy of the Army to appease them. Sattar also personally visited the senior officers of the three services.

The fear of army takeover was also shared by most of the political parties in the country. The opposition parties unamimously condemned the killing—inferring army's insubordination to civilian authority—and cautioned against the adoption of any undemocratic means to power. They felt that the only way their rights could be preserved was by adherence to the democratic process and constitutional transition. Against this backdrop of political and psychological insecurity, the nation cautiously directed its attention to the coming elections. But soon the political parties themselves were swept by a number of internal crises of their own making.

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INTERNAL CRISES SWEEP POLITICAL PARTIES

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BNP Crises: Muslim League Succeeds Through Duplicity

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party was confronted by three major issues—nomination of a presidential candidate (and party chairman) in the absence of such provisions in the party constitution; choice of Vice President and the preservation of unity in the face of possible intra-party feuds and factionalism.

The need to incorporate in the party constitution the mode of choosing a successor was never taken up seriously by the BNP perhaps because Zia's youthfulness and vigour had forestalled such an immediate necessity. Thus the party was wholly unprepared to deal with the unforeseen problem of succession to the chairmanship and to the presidency.

On 13 June 1981, a general meeting of the all powerful Standing Committee, the Executive Committee, the BNP parliamentary group, BNP cabinet members and representatives of countrywide BNP organizations was called to discuss these outstanding issues. Among the most important decisions arrived at were that henceforth all BNP political undertakings would be based on unanimity; that whoever be nominated for the forthcoming presidential polls, all BNP members would be sworn to support him or her; that the Acting President would announce within three days the election date; that the BNP would uphold Zia's presidential system of government; that it would not seek electoral alliances with any other party; and that no BNP nomination would be given to non-pariy candidates.4 It was further stated that the Standing Committee and the Executive Committee would jointly evolve a mechanism for the nomination of a presidential candidate. But inspire of a similar assurance given at another special BNP Standing Committee meeting on 19 June, that the BNP candidate would be chosen on 22 June in consultation with party leaders at various levels, Sattar was nominated, seconded and accepted in what appeared to many party members a duplicitous move. The rank and file viewed it as a post-haste superimposition without properly ascertaining their views and a pre-emptive strike by Prime Minister Shah Aziz, Muslim League (ML) clique in the BNP to grab power.

The rank and file of the BNP, comprising mostly freedom fighters, had strong reservations against pro-ML Sattar because they believed that the ML clique would dominate the BNP; that the clique would identify too overtly with Pakistan and the Mideast which would vitiate Bangladesh's relations with India and certain other major powers; that the ML clique, in collusion with the rightists outside the party, could bring ruination to the country by triggering fundamentalism; that the ailing Sattar himself would not come about and that the strenuous nature of political campaigns and

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the demands of the presidency made Sattar totally unfit for candidacy. Another interesting argument was that since the army comprising of, on the one hand, professionals trained in Pakistan who witnessed top generals occasionally interfering in the political process and, on the other, of freedom fighters thoroughly politicised and believing their destiny to be tied to that of the country's, could not be kept away from politics by pious resolutions alone. Therefore, to eliminate the possibility of their intervention the next person would have to be well-known and acceptable to the armed forces.

However, although the majority of the BNP membership resented the undemocratic means adopted to select Sattar, their acquiescence to the fait accompli set the ground for subsequent intraparty feuds.

The next crisis that followed was over the choice of the Vice President. It was a critical issue because given Sattar's health the Vice President could have been called on to run the government or even take over should Sattar die in office. The Shah Aziz group wanted the Vice President to be chosen by the members of Parliament where he would have control over BNP members constituting the majority, but a dissenting group wanted him to be a running-mate of the President as part of the electoral ticket. They argued that the people should have the right to choose their Vice-President since the Zia-BNP faction stood for people's rights and represented liberation politics.

The dissenting leaders within the BNP led by Barristers Moudud Ahmed and Nurul Islam were particularly concerned that should the Shah Aziz clique dictate both the presidential and vice-presidential nominations, the control of the party would go to the hands of the anti-independence forces.5 In view of the fact that Shah Aziz and a few others like him were on the dismissal list, Zia had allegedly prepared for his next cabinet reshuffle after the budget session in June 1981, their shrewd strategy of controlling the nominations so that it would guarantee their own survival and accentuation of power against the interests of the BNP was found to be particularly galling.

Thus on 30 June, seventy dissenting members of the BNP parliamentary group petitioned to the Acting President to amend Article 49 of the Constitution—that allowed the President to appoint his own Vice President—and make the latter post an elective one so as to enable him to finish the president's term of office should the need arise. In response, a 12 member Constitution Committee of the BNP parliamentary group was formed representing three lobbies: the Shah Aziz lobby demanding election of the Vice President by the Parliament; the dissident lobby demanding his election as runningmate of the President and the third lobby favouring Sattar's desire to maintain status quo. At a high level meeting on 8 July it was agreed that the Vice Presidents would be an elective post, but deadlock remained over the method of election.6

A resolution requiring members of the committee to submit written recommendations, underlining their respective views on the issue, for

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committee discussion was passed. Two main suggestions—Moudud's and State Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Abdus Salam Talukdar's—were placed before the committee for support from other members. Talukdar, supported by Shah Aziz, argued that any amendemnt of Article 49 would affect Article 48,7 requiring referendum for its ratification. This Moudud refuted; after lengthy deliberations, Moudud's suggestion was accepted as the working paper to be placed before a three-member subcommittee to study it and consult with constitutional experts, sincluding the Attorney General to work out its recommendations which would finally be considered by the constitutional committee. However, with Moudud's temporary absence from the country the responsibility of placing it before the sub-committee was given to one of Shah Aziz's men, Abul Hasnat, the Chief Whip of the BNP. But the issue was never placed before the sub-committee and with that the episode of democratically electing the Vice President as the running-mate of the President came to an end.

Intra-party Divisions in Hasina Awami League Foil Alliance With Other Groups

The Awami League (Hasina) had its share of internal crises to contend with: whether to participate in the elections; how to mend its intra-party feud and choose a consensus candidate; and whether to enter into electoral alliance with other opposition parties or to go it alone.

Regarding participation in the elections, one small but powerful lobby argued for boycotting them and waging a people's movement against the Government in the hope that the anti-government agitation at this critical juncture would lead to sufficient chaos which would ensure the takeover of power by extra-political forces. With BNP out of power, its internal schisms would destroy the party. A scuttled BNP and the comparatively insignificant strength of the combined opposition parties, the AL(H) believed would enable it to become the sole political force in the country. They were further convinced that popular sentiment would inevitably turn against the Army in power, and they then could, with its by then preponderant grassroots contact and organizational skill, be able to launch a massive popular agitation against the Army and eventually seize power.

However, this view was not shared by the majority of the rank and file who called upon the central leadership of the party to participate in the polls. But, even as late as the first week of August, the central working committee was divided on the issue—while one group favoured participation even if the 21 September election date was not postponed as demanded by ed by most political parties, while another group supported by Hasina herself argued in favour of building up an anti-government movement boycotting the polls.

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In a Public meeting on 16 August, Kamal Hossain and Tofael Ahmed, with Hasina's backing, called for a general countrywide half-day strike on 26 August purportedly to demonstrate publicly the party's strength, though the real intention was to test whether a popular movement could be successfully launched. Nevertheless, the strike was a failure, and with sustained pressures from the rank and file and lower level leaders to participate in the polls, the party was forced to decide in favour of participation by the third week of September.

Mending of the intra-party feud and the selection of a consensus candidate was far more difficult. After Mujib's assassination in August 1975, the party's top leaders had been decimated. Mujib's daughter, Hasina Wajed, who was at the time abroad had preferred to settle down in New Delhi. In the absence of the original party stalwarts, a leadership struggle had ensued resulting in two factions: one led by the pro-Moscow General Secretary Abdur Razzak, who enjoyed considerable influence over the workers, and the other led by the pro-West Organizing Secretary Tofael Ahmed. It was hoped that Hasina's return from six years's exile would cement the party. But the rift was too deep and inspite of her initial neutrality, the presence of pro-West Kamal Hossain, a former Foreign Minister under Majib, gradually drew her closer to the Tofael faction.

Failing to bridge the rift and in order to consolidate her own position, Hasina opened dialogue with the intention of a merger with the dissident Awami League Mizan Group AL(M), 10 which had split in August 1977 from Mujib's party over the issue of continued validity of BAKSALISM in Bangladesh.11 By the end of October about 81 leading figures of the AL (M) had applied for readmission to the AL(H) faction after Hasina made an important concession; she openly declared support for parliamentary democracy as opposed to one party rule. 12 Earlier, when a serious internal squabble had split the AL(H) student wing along Tofael/Razzak factions, Hasina extended her recognition to the Jalal-Jahangir group of the AL(H) Student League thus virtually eclipsing the pro-Moscow Razzak's influence over the student organization.13 But though she was able to consolidate her strength over the Razzak faction, this more split the AL(H) even further with Razzak believed to be surreptitiously working to consolidate his already stronger hold over the AL(H) workers in anticipation of future power struggles.14

The choice of an AL(H) presidential nomination was the real bone of contention. Hasina who enjoyed the emotional appeal of the party because she was Mujib's daughter could not qualify being underage. The Razzak faction supported the candidature of either Abdus Samad Azad, the former Foreign Minister and party leader or Malek Ukil, while the Tofael faction supported Kamal Hossain as their candidate. Since the Tofael faction lacked men of stature, its strategy was to project Kamal Hossain and help him develop rapport with the workers so that he could emerge as the man representing the Tofael faction in its power struggle against the Razzak faction. Hasina also favoured Kamal Hossain's candidacy because of his untainted reputation and non-involvement in the intra-party feud.

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him pretion. But a ser ous split over the issue appeared inevitable forcing the AL(H) to even consider non-party candidates such as ex-president Justice Abu Sayed Chowdhury and Jatiya Janata Party (JJP) leader, retired General Osmani, who was the opposition's candidate against Zia in the 1978 presidential polls. This possibility of a understanding with other opposition parties, however, also failed to materialize as no one appeared to accept the AL(H) as primus inter pares. The AL(H) toyed with Osmani's name intil the night before nomination when he was abruptly dropped in favour of Kamal Hossain because at the largest party the AL(H) decided to put forward its own candidate. Another explanation was that Osmani would blame the AL(H) if he lost and at the same time take credit for whatever votes he would get. 16

Apparently, the Razzak faction's opposition to Kamal Hossain's candidacy was also withdrawn. Though it was officially explained away as display of party unity, a more probable reason was Razzak's anticipation that the AL(H) would lose badly in the polls anyway thereby smearing Kamal Hossain's and Tofael faction's party images with net gain for his own group.

The possibility of an electoral alliance with other parties became an issue after the leadership realized that the intra-party feud was so deep that the necessary party unity to contest a presidential election would not be forthcoming. Besides, the strength of the Army-supported incumbency would be so formidable that an alliance with other parties would be tactically desirable. So by the third week of June the A:(H) became part of a 10-party alliance whose aims, inter alia, were to nominate a single candidate from the combined opposition.

The alliance was however destined to have limited success as the divisive currents within it were too strong and as the AL(H) workers in general felt little use for it. The leadership also was never sufficiently serious about it. Given this internal disunity, the AL(H) looked for "causes" to draw public attention and support. It singly called for country-wide hartals in an effort to seek national constituency but got little public response. It issued a 4-point ultimatum¹⁷ to the Government to be met by 16 September but was totally ignored by the latter. It also unsuccessfully tried to cash in politically on the hunger strike initiated by some family members of the twelve army officers convicted for taking part in Zia's killings. Finally the alliance broke down, ostensibly over the issue of selecting a common candidate, and the AL(H) decided to go it alone.

Crises Among Other Parties

The limited membership, weak organizational skill, poor financial backing and the leaderships' inability to project themselves to the public continued to seriously undermine the capabilities of the many small opposition their only importance lay in how successfully they could project themselves

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as indispensable coalition partners to the bigger parties. On their own, no opposition party, except the AL(H), could possibly make an honourable show at the polls. Thus, electoral participation through alliance was for them the most realistic way of sharing in power.

Within two weeks of Zia's death the leaders of the opposition parties held closed door meetings to evolve a joint strategy to contest the polls. The opposition camp was broadly divided into two groups: a 10-Party Alliance including the AL(H), and an 18-Party Alliance led by Ataur Rehman Khan of the Jatiya League (JL) and Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed of the Democratic League (DL). The 18-Party Alliance proposed wider dialogue with the 10-Party Alliance but the AL(H) refused to have any truck with Moshtaque, an erstwhile senior Awami League member reportedly linked to Mujib's murder. 18

The AL(H)'s smaller partners in the alliance were strongly in favour of putting up a charismatic candidate from a small party. Major Jalil's Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), Rashed Khan Menon's Bangladesh Worker's Party (BWP), Surenjit Sen Gupta's Jatiya Ekota Party (JEP) and Muzaffar Ahmed's National Awami Party (NAP-M) strongly favoured JJP's Osmani. But the AL(H) continued to push its own candidate who was totally unacceptable to the JSD, BWP and Siddiqur Rahman's Sramik Krishak Samajbadi Dal (SKSD), that together formed the three-party Alliance within the larger alliance. The other parties of the alliance were non-committal. The 3-Party Alliance had strong reservations against the AL(H) because it believed that the latter was a bourgeois party whose socialist arguments were to mislead the people; that their work programme was too dissimilar from what they wanted; that its past activities, while in power, had tainted it beyond repair; and that it had not rectified its image or revised its programme. Also, the (AL(H)'s foreign policy was unacceptable to the JSD. But the major difficulty was that the JSD was unable to reconcile with the fact that the Awami League had been responsible for the killing of many JSD workers during the early seventies.

The AL(H) also alienated its traditional allies—the Bangladesh Communist Party (CPB) and NAP(M); their failure to invite Moni Singh (CPB) and Muzaffar Ahmed (NAP-M) to participate in the reception given to Hasina on her return from India, or to invite them to address the functions, also had adverse reactions among the junior partners. ¹⁹ Also, the AL(H) had not contacted either the CPB or the NAP(M) but only the JSD to explore the possibility of joint action regarding a proposed nationwide strike on 26 August. This left the two so disillusioned that the CPB criticized the AL(H) for its "big party" attitude and the NAP(M) charged that it was not interested in a united movement. The CPB called for the abandonment of parochialism, one party chauvinism and the policy of going it alone so that a common candidate could be put forth by a genuine alliance of progressive, patriotic and democratic forces. ²⁰ Consequently the 3-Party Alliance

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ne so progjance also threatened to put up their own candidate if the AL(H) would not accept their proposal of setting up a candidate from a smaller party.

Meanwhile, a non-party organization styled as Citizen's National Committee (CNC), representing a cross section of intellectuals, enamoured of Osmani's "integrity of character" and his role as a consistent champion of unfettered parliamentary democracy, wanted to project Osmani as a "non-party national candidate." At the same time the 3-Party Alliance wanted to project him as a "political candidate." During the negotiations between them, the CNC demanded that the CPB and the AL(H) should withdraw from the 10-Party Alliance if Osmani were to be their joint candidate. But Osmani himself, in his idealism preferred to be projected as an above parties national consensus candidate rather than a political candidate, and after pushing his party (JJP) to acquiesce to his personal wish he accepted the CNC nomination. The 3-Party Alliance resenting Osmani's failure to consult them before accepting the CNC's nomination withdrew its support and decided to project its own candidate.22 With the remaining parties also deciding to put forward their own candidates, the 10-Party Alliance finally broke down with only the CPB still hanging on to the AL(H) coat-tails.

In the 18-Party Alliance the main aspirants to presidential nomination were Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed (DL) and Ataur Rahman Khan (JL). Moshtaque, who had earlier been convicted by the Special Martial Law Court (SMLC) in 1977, filed a writ petition with the Supreme Court for removal of constitutional restrictions on his nomination. Although the defence lawyers challenged the competence of the SMLC and also argued that Moshtaque's conviction by it was "not properly reviewed" as provided by Martial Law Regulations, the petition was denied. With Moshtaque's departure the 18-Party Alliance, now styled as the National Front (NF), pinned its hope on Ataur Rahman Khan. But by late September the NF had to manoeuvre itself to a position of boycott when it had no alternative choice when Khan also withdrew on grounds of old age and ill health.

There were other attempts at alliance formation. On 1 July, eight political parties and groups formed a united political platform styled as the National Democratic Front (NDF).²⁴ By the middle of August some leftist groups and individuals formed a new alliance under the leadership of the pro-Peking Mohammad Toaha, chief of his faction of the Samyabadi Dal (Marxist-Leninist). Finally a new leftist Patriotic United Front emerged comprising two factions of the Samyabadi Dal led by Toaha and Nagen Sarkar, the Progressive Democratic Party, a faction of the People's League and some left-leaning individuals, But none of them had any political impact whatsoever, and all the alliances collapsed because of the pettiness and shortsightedness of their members.

III NATIONAL ISSUES AND POLITICAL PARTIES

There were no "genuine" national issues around which political parties could rally, only issues created by BNP's ineptitude. These were: i) Proclamation of Emergency; ii) constitutionality of Sattar's candidacy; iii) the appropriateness of constitutional amendment; iv) date of the election; and v) the issue of parliamentary versus the presidential form of government.

The proclamation of Emergency issued by the Acting President on 30 May under clause (1) of Article 141(A) of the Constitution became an issue of sorts when it was placed before the Jatiya Sangsad (Parliament) by the leader of the House, Shah Aziz, on 4 June for its approval of extension beyond 120 days. The political parties while aware of the situational expediency were none the less concerned about the wide-ranging implication of empowering the government to make laws under Emergency Powers; they cautioned that in the name of emergency, democracy must not be impaired and that fundamental rights curtailed by it should be restored as soon as possible.

To the Opposition's demand for immediate withdrawal of Emergency so as to enable free and fair elections, Shah Aziz assured that the polls would be free and fair; he cited the examples of the last presidential (1978) and parliamentary (1979) elections held under Emergency when the opposition got more than 80 seats. But in view of the government's claim that normalcy had been restored in the country, the validity of the Emergency was questionable. Inspite of the Opposition's demand for its withdrawal, on 9 July the BNP parliamentary majority approved the Proclamation and its extension. It was a cautious move by Shah Aziz to strengthen his hands against all potential adversaries.

The other issues were the constitutionality of Sattar's nomination and the subsequent government move to amend the Constitution. The nomination of Acting President Sattar as BNP's presidential candidate caused a furore in the Opposition. Surenjit Sen Gupta observed that the posts of President, Vice President and Speaker of the Jatiya Sangsad were offices of profit according to Article 66(2A) of the Constitution and since Sattar's substantive position was that of a Vice President, he could not contest the polls without violating the Constitution. The leader of the Opposition argued that neither the Acting President nor the Vice President was exempted by the Constitution to contest the elections. Rashed Khan Menon (BWP) suggested that Sattar should contest the polls by resigning his post and handing over power to the Speaker.

Shah Aziz, realizing the government's gaffe, argued that Article 66(2A) could be variously interpreted and that Gupta's point of order was premature since Sattar's nomination papers had not yet been filed or scrutinized by the Election Commission. Thus the Opposition had to concede a tactical blunder. Their position would have been stronger had they raised

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the issue after the deadline for submission of the nomination papers had elapsed in which case any subsequent government attempt to amend the Constitution would have given the Opposition important political gain. Shah Aziz pointed out that constitutional flaws and omissions existed even in most developed countries and that the government would remove all anomalies, meaning that the Constitution would be amended. The Opposition was in furore again, claiming that while Sattar swore to uphold the Constitution, a reactionary section of the BNP was villating that pledge. The government's move to amend the Constitution to legalise Sattar's candidacy was variously described by the Opposition as "self-serving," "malafide" and a "violation of the sanctity of the Constitution."

On 1 July, Shah Aziz introduced in the House the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act 1981, to "remove certain anomalies...regarding the eligibility of a sitting President and Vice President for election to the office of the President." Article 51(4) was substituted to read: "If a Vice President is elected as President he shall be deemed to have vacated his office on the date on which he enters upon the office of President," and Article 66(2A) was amended so that the offices of president, vice-president and prime minister would not be offices of profit. Claiming that this "certain anomaly" was an "inadvertent lapse" when the Constitution was "democratised" in 1978, Shah Aziz defended the bill as being not "substantial but technical." 25

The Opposition's objection to the introduction of the amendment without the stipulated seven day notice was countered by Shah Aziz's observation that in 1975 the Fourth Amendment, that instituted one party BAKSAL rule under the Mujib Government, was introduced without proper notice and passed in fifteen minutes without any discussion. Anyway, after three days of stonewalling by the BNP dissenting group which forced Shah Aziz to concede certain dissident demands, and despite the Opposition's frequent walkouts, the House passed the amendment on 8 July with 252 voting in favour (including 7 independent and opposition members) and 6 abstaining.

Another issue was the scheduled election date. Shah Aziz had assured the House that members of the Opposition would be consulted by the government with regard to any legislative measures for a future course of action and on national issues and problems. But the Opposition was taken aback by Sattar's announcement that presidential polls would be held on 21 September. The Opposition as a whole resented this high-handedness; Osmani saw it as the government's lack of intention to seek co-operation, while Jalil and Rob (LSD) saw it as the government's "obduracy" to discuss Shall opposition. 26

Shah Aziz's argument was that the announcement of the election date was the government's constitutional obligation and not a national problem. breach of spirit since the Constitution did not require the government to

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consult with the Opposition. Only Khan A. Sabur of the Muslim League (ML) supported the Prime Minister's stand declaring that the holding of election was an executive function and that the present government was fully competent to fix the election date without necessarily holding consultations on the issue.²⁷

But the setting of an early date by Sattar was deliberate, opportunistic and not in the best interests of the democratic process. With polls set for 21 September the BNP wanted to capitalize on public sympathy for Zia and their anger over his assassination. It would also deny the Opposition the time to prepare an effective political campaign, giving the BNP a possible blitzkrieg victory. Also, the motive of Shah Aziz's ML clique to consolidate its power as early as possible by ramrodding the election cannot be denied. While an early date ensured return to normalcy without undue delay that could cause deterioration in the political climate, democratic norms demanded the Opposition must be given reasonable time to prepare themselves for the polls. However, the Opposition's almost unanimous demand for a later date was also politically motivated. It would lessen sympathy for Zia, and therefore, for the BNP; people's votes would be more "political" and less "emotional;" and it would reduce the incumbency's overwhelming advantage by allowing more time to the Opposition to organize itself.

The situation in the country also warranted a postponement. Forty days official mourning for the late President Zia was declared from 30 May. The next thirty-day period from 4 July to 2 August was the Holy month of Ramadhan, followed by a period of harvesting and planting. And with rains in September, movement and communication would be difficult. The Opposition's claim that the poll date was inopportune and impractical was thus valid.

To appease the Opposition, Shah Aziz assured the House that he would advise the Acting President to hold consultative meetings with each and every opposition leader.29 But on 28 July the government shifted the polls to 15 October, again without consulting the Opposition. In response, the latter almost unanimously decided to boycott the polls and stage demonstrations and public protests. To preserve the legitimacy of the scheduled polls, the government was forced to open dialogue with a recalcitrant opposition, and after a series of talks finally announced 15 November as the new date. 30 The Opposition could thus finally claim a solitary victory against Shah Aziz, though the concession also improved the BNP's "democratic" image among international observers. The final contentious issue, and the only real national one was that of parliamentary democracy versus the existing presidential form of government. With Zia's death the country had faced a succession crisis and it was felt by every political party in the county. Yet, while the Opposition made parliamentary democracy a political demand, the government was loathe to consider it. Knowing full well that a public campaign over this issue would make no difference, the Opposition

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hoped to bring about a constitutional amendment by convincing the government of its necessity.

But support for it within the Opposition also varied in degrees. The leader of the Opposition pointed to the necessity of avoiding the concentration of all powers in one hand. The three-party Alliance argued that without parliamentary democracy any other system would inevitably lead to dictatorship. And while the AL(M), DL, JJP, IDL and the 18-party Alliance strongly demanded the return to genuine parliamentary democracy where power would rest in the Parliament, the NAP(M) and the CPB were far more cautious. Both observed that the constitutional amendment needed to return to the parliamentary system should not be pushed too far lest it unravel the existing, albeit tenuous, "democratic" process. 31

However, when the AL(H) Central Executive Committee in its 4 June meeting demanded the introduction of parliamentary democracy, it left the party's workers and supporters confused and bewildered because they felt it was a serious deviation from Mujib's one-party system. Whether the AL(H) leadership actually desired multi-party democracy or merely wished to "go with the tide" is debatable, but the party's stand was initially confusing as Hasina preached BAKSALISM while Kamal Hossain called for parliamentary democracy. Later on, as a face-saving measure, spurious distinction was made between economic BAKSALISM and political democracy, but the damage had already been done.

The government's reaction to all this was passive but firm. With the dissident wing of the BNP also demanding greater democratization in the country, Shah Aziz's response was that the "appropriate occasion" to raise it as a national issue would be the next parliamentary elections to be held in 1983 and not in the presidential polls which were a "mid-term" poll. Since the "dictatorial" nature of the presidential system was quite amenable to the temperament of the ML clique, Shah Aziz was content to shelve the issue.

IV THE POLL

"Issueless" Campaign

As predictable, the campaign had more to do with personalities than issues. Both the AL(H) and BNP dragged the names and images of their dead mentors, Mujib and Zia, to attract votes.

The BNP had no substantive campaign issues except "to sustain and preserve all objectives, policies and institutions created by Zia, including the form of government." Its energies were directed at putting the entire government machinery at its disposal and to co-opting potentially threatening adversaries, like Hafezji Hujur. With an eight-member BNP committee as a front, Shah Aziz took personal charge of the campaign strategy.

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Ministers were directed to visit their respective constituencies during parliamentary recess to strengthen local BNP organization and maintain the pace of peaceful revolutionary programmes initiated by Zia. The members of the BNP parliamentary group were directed to hold country-wide public meetings to make their presence felt. The Standing Committee of the BNP decided to form 26 electioneering units in 20 administrative districts, and the district development coordinators and political district presidents and secretaries were inducted in district level campaign bodies to spearhead the campaign. The sub-divisional officers and additional district commissioners at the district and thana levels were allegedly promised promotion after election for their efforts to secure votes for the BNP. Monoranjan Das, a Hindu BNP member of parliament campaigned for hindu votes, while Gour Chandra Bala, leader of the Bangladesh Scheduled Caste Community, assured his community's support to Sattar.

Considerable efforts went into co-opting or undermining the rightist forces that posed a challenge to Sattar. The government renewed its promise of increasing the pay scales of superintendents and principals of madrasahs with the result that the Jamaat-i-Islami leadership allegedly directed its workers to vote for Sattar. Shah Aziz was also extremely concerned with Hafezji's "damage capacity" and personally visited the Imam to convince him to withdraw from the elections on grounds that he would be taking away Sattar's votes which would benefit the AL(H). Failing to convince him, Shah Aziz packed off twelve of Hafezji's intimate supporters for haj to Makkah to undermine his organization.

There were also unconfirmed reports of the government's excesses, such as, planting saboteurs in Hafezji's camp and burning down of their posters and festoons by BNP thugs. Sattar himself called one of Hafezji's financiers and asked him to desist from supporting the former. Intense efforts were made to sow suspicion among Hafezji's supporters and well-wishers and to destalilize his campaign. The propaganda that Hafezji was being financed from India was speculated to be of BNP origin.

The AL(H)'s campaign was seriously hampered by its internal disunity over strategy and presidential nomination. It had no distinct manifesto to offer. Though BAKSALISM, its bete noir, was defended as "not in fact a one party system, rather it was a party of all those who fought for liberation and believed in the four state principles [of Socialism, Secularism, pedaled.³³ The distinction made between economic BAKSALISM and political democracy was totally lost on the public, while to the discerning where fundamentally inconsistent. In a parliamentary democracy the State? How could the BAKSAL economy exist in an unfettered demowhich would widen class distinctions.

With the government's acceptance of its demands for polls in November

and lifting of Emergency, much of the AL(H)'s thunder was lost. Its demand for release of political prisoners was not met. The political manifesto was finally explained in the last week of October: the 1972 Constitution in its original form would be restored; the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment (passed in April 1979 to legalise all the laws passed under Zia's Martial Law between 7 November 1975 to 6 April 1979) would be repealed; and the multi-party system and a sovereign parliament would be restored. One of the AL(H)'s tactical moves was to support Hafezji's candidacy because he was an adversary's (BNP) adversary.

The rest of the parties hardly had any campaign issues. The IDL promised a government based on Islamic ideology to counter India's alleged collusion with foreign powers in its expansionist design. The ML (Sabur) campaigned for a welfare state under Islam. Osmani (CNC) promised to fight against despotism and pledged a strictly non-aligned foreign policy, greater rights to workers and peasants, support to co-operatives and moderniza-

tion of agriculture.36

The Three-Party Alliance was much more vituperative in its campaign demands. With the collapse of the 10-Party Alliance, it directed its venom against "the fascist BAKSAL forces and the authoritarian Sattar Government (who) are both anti-people elements," reiterating its pledge of replacing the present parliament by one duly represented by professional groups, lowering of land ceiling, providing unemployment allowances, rights to share-croppers, and creating work brigades with the landless and the jobless. It campaigned alone after its initial strategy of participating in the polls as part of a nation-wide movement to restore the democratic and economic rights of the peoples failed.

Hafezji Hujur, the respected Imam of Lalbag Mosque, Dhaka, was a totally unknown and unexpected political phenomenon on the scene. His nomination was a challenge to secularism, seen by his hardcore supporters as the modus operandi of a society in decay. He represented a symbolic protest against the regime in power and against the use of religion for political purpose. Hafezji is a follower of the orthodox deobandh tarika which exhorts followers to be punctiliously guided not only by substance but also by form and ritual. His political ideology, to the extent it existed, was that society should follow the Islamic laws and practices, in whose absence it would lose its anchorage in a world of chaos and drift aimlessly towards destruction. He was not aligned with any political force, party or country and he had no foreign backing. He had no mentionable organization, only goodwill among his followers. However, many political parties and factions—Ataur Rahman, Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed, Kazi Jaffar wanted to join his bandwagon hoping to reap some benefits for themselves. His political manifesto stated that he would re-fashion everything from politics to trade and commerce in the light of the Quran and Sunnah; provide the country with an Islamic political, legal, educational and economic such mic system; and replace parliament with an Islamic Majlis-e-Sura to run the country. 88 His main financiers were two prominent business houses in Dhaka.

Sattar Sweeps the Polls

As expected, Sattar won with a huge plurality. The BNP's manipulative use of the government machinery and the Army's wholehearted support for him were important factors in the victory.

While rigging was unexpectedly minimum compared to the 1973, 1978 and 1979 elections, the AL(H) did poorly because of a number of reasons. Over-confidence in AL(H) speeches regarding reserved Hindu votes drove away large sections of the Hindu voters to supporting the BNP fearing recrimination from the latter when returned to power. The nature of the AL(H) slogans reminded the public of the anarchy and threat to life under AL government during 1973-75; even many AL supporters feared the breakdown of law and order, social discipline, BAKSALISM and AL thugs. Then, their indecision till the very end-whether to participate in the electionsand the internal squabbles within its leadership were other factors that were responsible for lack of support. Besides, most opposition parties in their campaigns strongly condemend the AL for its undemocratic activities in the past. They were also organizationally weaker than before because of inconsistencies in ideas and practices, although financially they were sound with several business houses solidly backing them.

The Three-Party Alliance saw the election as a struggle to maintain the continuity of people-based power and obviate return to military rule. To what extent they succeeded in their electoral strategy to introduce themselves to the people and lay the groundwork or popular mobilization after the elections, in order to stir a popular renaissance in the country, is debatable.

The leftist parties generally did poorly because ideological differences among them short-circuited their "reach" to the people who, wholly concerned with immediate problems of survival, cared very little about global problems or foreign ideologies. In Bangladesh, a failing by one leftist party is generally viewed by the public as the failure of Leftism, and today's leftist parties have not yet been able to cast off the liabilities and stigma of the past failures. Besides, lack of co-operation among leftists, political vacillations and poor organization were major causes of their poor show. Financial problems were particularly acute as hardly any business invested its money or influence on leftist causes.

Among the rightists, only Hafezji Hujur made an honourable show. An aged but honest and simple man, his lack of political shrewdness did however cost him many votes. For instance, his remark that women had no role in society except that guaranteed by tradition got him very few female votes. His campaign tactics were also wanting, the sight of this decrepit figure lying on the campaign dais visibly transmitted to the people

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7 01 W his senectitudinal weakness and uncertainty of age. Many people turned away from voting him because they wanted their votes to count.

The bulk of the people who voted for him were from the intelligentsia and from those religious-minded who were on the political scene years ago during united Pakistan, but who got alienated by the fanaticism of ultrareligious groups like the Jamaat-i-Islami, Nizam-i-Islam, Jammaat-i-Ulema, Ulema-i-Islam and other factions of the Muslim League. These people, on the periphery of politics but retaining their Islamic bent, found in Hafezji their candidate. Also those who believed Hafezji could jar BNP into some soul-searching voted for him. However, the basic fear of fundamentalism also cautioned people from wholeheartedly supporting him and this perhaps explains why the rightist parties got very few votes.

CONCLUSIONS

Bangladeshis are a god-fearing and tolerant people with a tremendous capacity and willingness to absorb discomfort and inconvenience. In every election, to secure their minimum rights of food, clothing and shelter, Bangladeshis opted for stability, security and continuity. Their mandate to Mujib and Zia amply testify to that. This time too a unanimous mandate emerged against extremism, radicalism and bold departures. Perhaps their shrewd horse-sense and acute awareness of the political process explains why they opted for the maladministration of the BNP over anarchy under the Awami League.

The 1981 elections were unique for its theme of co-existence. Unlike previous times, the symbols of boat (AL) and sheaf of paddy (BNP) stood intact side by side, as each side played Mujib's or Zia's speeches and national music. Though political violence as before was strangely absent, perhaps as credit to Zia's nurturing of democratic sentiments, a handful of the well-informed still wondered if a recent Burmese horoscope that chaos would prevail in Bangladesh until 1986 had passed.

April 1983.

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¹ The Constitution of Bangladesh, Article 55 (1). 2 Ibid., Article 123 (2).

³ Ibid Article 141A (1).

⁴ Bangladesh Observer (Dhaka), 14 June 1981.

⁵ The Muslim League leaders were generally against separation from Pakistan. Indeed,
Shah Asia Shah Aziz, as the leader of the Pakistan Delegation to the United Nations in 1971, strongle.

strongly spoke against the creation of Bangladesh.

⁶ Holiday (Dhaka), 12 July 1981.

⁷ On the contrary, the amendment of Article 49 would have had no effect on Article 48 which start the amendment of Article 49 would have had no effect on Article 48 which start are the start and the start are the start and the start are the which stated that 'There shall be a President of Bangladesh who shall be elected

in accordance with law by direct election" and that, "the President shall, as Head of State, take precedence over all other persons in the State," It was a deliberate move by Shah Aziz to scuttle the issue through a legal wrangle.

8 Comprising of prominent lawyers, Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, Syed Ishtiaq Ahmed and K. Bakr.

9 Holiday, 12 July 1981.

10 Bangladesh Observer, 21 June 1981.

- 11 In January 1975, the Fourth Amendment was passed by the Mujib Government consitutionally replacing the multi-party system with the one party Bangladesh Awami, Krishak, Sramik League (BAKSAL) rule.
- 12 Holiday, 1 November 1981.
- 13 Ibid., 20 and 27 September 1981
- 14 Ibid., 1 November 1981.
- 15 Article 50 (a) requires presidential candidates to be at least 35 years of age. Hasina's age was variously put between 31 and 34.
- 16 This explanation was given by Tofael Ahmed in a private interview with the author on 30 November 1981.
- 17 The 4-point ultimatum was: a) revision of voters' list on the basis of the latest population census; b) lifting of the Emergency; c) release of political prisoners; and d) guarantee of free and fair elections.
- 18 There is wide speculation that he, in collusion with the CIA, had a hand in Mujib's death. Immediately after Mujib's assassination, Moshtaqe became the new President. See A.L. Khatib, Who Killed Mujib (New Delhi, 1981), cited in Sumit Mitra, "Pretender to Power," India Today (New Delhi), 15 November 1981, pp. 181-182. See also, Laurence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (London, 1979).
- 19 Holiday, 24 May 1981.
- 20 Bangladesh Observer, 16 July 1981.
- 21 Ibid., 29 July 1981.
- 22 Holiday, 27 September 1981.
- 23 Moshtaque was convicted by a Special Martial Law Court in 1977 on charges of abuse of power and moral turpitude.
- 24 They were Gono Muslim League, Islamic Democratic League, People's Democratic Party, Jatiya Dal, Republican Party, National Awami Party (Bashani), Jatiya Dal (Mohiuddin) and Jatiya Shevak Dal Front.
- 25 For details of the parliamentary debate, see issues of Holiday and Bangladesh Observer, 1-9 July 1981.
- 26 Bangladesh Observer, 17 June 1981.
- 27 Ibid., 19 June 1981.
- 28 The rightists, Jamat-i-Islami and Abdur Rahim's Islamic Democratic League (IDL), accepted the 21 September poll date. Bangladesh Observer, 28 June and 18 July 1981.
- 29 Ibid., 19-20 June 1981.
- 30 Holiday, 6 September 1981.
- 31 Ibid., 21 June 1981.
- 32 Bangladesh Observer, 19 June 1981.
- 33 Ibid., 29 June 1981.
- 34 Although CPB General Secretary, Farhad, arrested on treason charges following his speech in a rally, where he allegedly said his party would try to stage an Afghan-type revolution in Bangladesh, was released on bail on 29 July, 1981. Bangladesh Observer, 31 July 1981.
- 35 Ibid., 28 June 1981.
- 36 Holiday, 25 October 1981.
- 37 Bangladesh Observer, 26 June 1981.
- 38 Holiday, 25 October 1981.

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THE INDIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: PROLOGUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

By T.A. KEENLEYSIDE*

prior to 1947, India, despite its dependence upon Great Britain, was represented in most of the bonafide international conferences and organizations that evolved especially during the inter-war years. For example, India particinated in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Washington Conference on Naval Armaments of 1921, the London Naval Conference of 1930, the Disarmament Conference of 1932 and the annual inter-war conferences of the International Labour Organization. In addition, India was represented in two important international organizations of the inter-war period—the British Commonwealth, in whose deliberations it was included from 1917 onwards and the League of Nations, of which it was a founding member. For a variety of reasons, Indians involved in the independence movement disassociated themselves from and were critical of official Indian diplomacy conducted through the major international conferences and institutions of the world community and tended to attach greater importance to those non-governmental organizations in which the voice of nationalist India could be fully heard that is to the deliberations of such bodies as the League Against Imperialism, 1927-1930, the Anti-War Congress of 1932, the World Peace Congress of 1936 and the International Peace Campaign Conference of 1938. Nevertheless, despite the nationalist antipathy for official Indian diplomacy, an examination of such governmental institutions as the League of Nations from the perspective of nationalist India is still important in order to understand some aspects of independent India's foreign policy and more specifically its approach to international organization. Further, even though Indian delegations to the League were unrepresentative, there were subtle ways in which they reflected national Indian opinions and exhibited specifically Indian traits, so that a study of the official Indian role is useful in drawing attention to what were to prove to be some of the earliest and most persisting elements of independent Indian diplomacy via such bodies as the United Nations. It is thus the purpose of this article first to explore nationalist Indian attitudes towards the League (especially the reasons for opposition to the organization), second to analyze the extent to which the official Indian role in the League reflected nationalist Indian concerns, and third to comment upon the impact of the League of Nations on independent India's foreign policy, especially its role in the United Nations.

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NATIONALIST INDIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE LEAGUE

Despite the initial enthusiasm for the League, demonstrated for example by Lokamanya Tilak in 1919 when he declared that India could be a "powerful steward of the League of Nations in the East.," disillusionment in nationalist circles developed quickly as the independence movement became increasingly assertive in the 1920's. One major cause of growing Indian antipathy was the belief that the organization could not assist the attainment of Indian independence. There were, it is true, occasional suggestions that an attempt should be made to invoke the League on behalf of Indian freedom, but most nationalists were more inclined to the view of Ramananda Chatterjee, the editor of the pro-Congress Modern Review, who on his return from a trip to Geneva in 1927, wrote that "so far as India's desire and efforts for political emancipation were concerned, the League of Nations would be of as much help to her as a college debating society."

The slight change in the British attitude towards the League during the premiership of Ramsay Macdonald did not alter Indian scepticism of its efficacy for nationalist India. When Britain acceded to the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in 1931, The Hindu, while agreeing that Britain's action was commendable, none the less said that it was of no significance to nationalist India since Britain had attached the reservation to its accession that it was not prepared to accept League arbitration in disputes between itself and the dominions or dependencies.⁴

The 1931 reservations were, in fact, symptomatic of the over-all cause of Indian pessimism of the League's benefits to the independence movement. Even if some of its member states were sympathetic to the nationalist cause, the body was powerless to intervene without Britain's consent; it had no jurisdiction over the domestic affairs of its members. In addition, as the League had already failed in its handling of crises which the organization had been specifically designed to combat, there was little reason to hope that it could successfully contend with domestic issues of imperialism where it did not have a clear mandate to act. "What earthly good" could the League of Nations be to subject countries like India, asked the Muslim leader Abdul Quaiyum in 1939, when free nations could meet with the fate of China, Abyssinia, Czechoslovakia and Manchuria? Thus, with nationalist Indians preoccupied throughout the inter-war period with the struggle for independence, it was inevitable that they would have little sympathy for an institution which professed to be the guardian of independence and self-determination and yet could do nothing for Indian freedom.

In addition to hostility born of frustration at the League's inability to further Indian interests, nationalist alienation from the League was also partly a consequence of the radicalism injected into the national movement by that generation of leaders that followed Tilak in 1920 and of a concomitant disaffection with organizations supported by Britain, particularly those

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in which India too was represented, but without liberty for its delegations to pursue policies independent of Britain. The ignominy of being the one country represented in the League whose delegation lacked the freedom to pursue national policies naturally aroused animosity to the League. This hostile feeling was compounded by the fact that nationalist Indians differed with the pro-British attitude of Indian delegations on political matters. Indians felt that Britain was undermining the League by shying away from the use of collective action to solve international disputes. Accordingly, they felt that if Indian delegations reflected British attitudes, India too was contributing to the emasculation of the League. The Leader wrote in 1929 that although Indians had "every sympathy with the ideals of the League," they could do nothing to help achieve disarmament and world peace because they had no independent voice in the organization's affairs. "If India had had any influence at Geneva, she would not have allowed the League to ignore China's appeal for justice" at the time of Japan's attack on Manchuria, the same newspaper wrote in 1933.7

Because of this inability to express their own point of view at the League, many Indians advocated that India withdraw from the organization. In 1932, Congressman B. Das said in the Legislative Assembly that either India should be made an "equal partner" in the League or else it should leave the organization altogether. In 1935, the newspaper Aj wrote that since representation in the League only served to enhance the voting strength of Britain, the Legislative Assembly should urge the severance of India's connection with that body. T.S.A. Chettiar took up this idea in 1939 when he moved a resolution in the Assembly calling for India's withdrawal on the grounds that it was impossible for Indian delegations to make an independent contribution to the organization, since they were "tied to the chariot wheels of Great Britain."

The dominant source of Indian antipathy towards the League however, stemmed from the nationalist feeling that the League had failed to fulfil the high principles of the Covenant and that it had become instead a handmaid of the imperialist powers of Europe. Indian disenchantment with the League, because of its failure to serve effectively the cause of international peace was, of course, not unique. The catalogue of minor failures which the League had sustained by the late 1920's had already disillusioned many of its earlier admirers. The failure to end the Polish-Russian War, the fighting in Armenia, the Greco-Turkish War, the Polish-Lithuanian dispute over Vilna, the reluctance to take decisive action over the Italian invasion of Corfu and the inability to make real progress towards disarmament collectively led to the widespread view that the League was incapable of dealing with the major sources of tension in Europe. Inevitably, too, the great powers of the League—Britain and France in particular—were singled out for most of the blame for the League's failure on the ground that initiatives on their part were required if the League were to take effective action to end Europe's problems. Indians simply shared in this general

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climate of disillusionment, and like many others, concluded that "lip service alone" was being paid to the principles on which the League had been founded. 11 Wrting at the outset of the 1928 session of the League, The Hindu's Berlin correspondent said that he expected the new session to end like all others, "by making pious declarations" which meant nothing and "by postponing all the fundamental issues" that were still waiting to be solved. 12 Indians also shared with the League's European critics the view that the organization was being controlled by the great powers to serve their own self-interest rather than fulfil the principles of the Covenant. This outlook led The Hindu to refer in 1927 to the "veiled domination of the smaller nations in Europe by the bigger ones," precisely the situation which the smaller states had originally hoped to prevent by adhering to the League. 13 As a result, nationalist Indians concluded that Britain and the other great powers intended to use the League exclusively "for looking after the status quo,"14 or, in other words, for maintaining the predominance of Britain and France and preserving the weakness of the defeated World War I powers.

In India, the attack on the major powers went further than in most European circles, for Indians linked great power control of the League with their pursuit of imperialist ambitions. The Modern Review, for example, wrote in 1927 that the League was dominated by imperialist nations which were not "at heart, or in practice, promoters of the cause of brotherhood," and that, the League thus could not give effect to the high principles professed in the Covenant. Similarly, The Hindu declared that the great powers used the League as "an instrument to advance their imperial interests," deploying it as a screen to hide their war preparations, secret negotiations and military alliances. Even the liberal paper, The Leader, claimed in 1933 that the powerful nations of Europe were using the machinery of the League of Nations for imperialist purposes. 17

Nationalist Indian political leaders also joined in this repudiation of the League for being a tool of imperialism. Following a 1927 debate at the Benares Hindu University on a motion resolving that the League of Nations was "a menace to subject nations," the veteran Congress leader, Lala Lajpat Rai said of the League that it was "a hypocritic institution composed of representatives of some bigger nations for the purpose of subjugating smaller nations." Jawaharlal Nehru, speaking in 1928, declared that the object of the League was to maintain "the present status quo, with the imperialist powers dominating and exploiting half the earth."

Indian hostility to the League increased during the 1930's, when the latter confronted with grave challenges to its authority failed to take effective action, under the terms of the Covenant, to halt aggression of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931. The Leader wrote that the League's impotence to check the Japanese assault had "dealt a mortal blow" to the "moral authority" of the League, encouraging other powers to

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v" to "follow in the footsteps of Japan in pursuit of a policy of national aggrandizement." The Standard Review concluded that since the League had shown itself "wholly impotent and incompetent in either preventing wars or safeguarding the interests of weak nations," there was no point in maintaining the "costly pomp" of an organization which had proved to be "a mockery and a sham." Once again, Indians related the inactivity of the great powers at the time of the Manchurian assault to their imperialist nature. Hrishikesh Roy, writing in the Indian Review in 1932, charged that Britain took no action to defend China for fear of the consequences to its own imperial possessions (Hong Kong and Singapore), if it provoked Japan. Further, he argued that since Britain and the other powers were "birds of the same feather" as Japan and had pursued similar imperialist policies in China in the past, they could not and would not force Japan to comply with a request to cease hostilities. 22

The failure of the League to act effectively following the Italian attack on Abyssinia in 1935, and the policy of non-intervention of the European powers in the Spanish Civil War further alienated Indians from the League, so that condemnation of the organization was almost universal in the nationalist press by 1936. In July of that year, protest meetings were organized throughout India to urge severance of the Indian connection. The attack was also carried into the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State in 1936.23 Members of both bodies accused the Indian Government and other states of a tardy and weak response to Italian aggression by way of economic sanctions,24 and members of the Legislative Assembly criticised the government for removing economic sanctions in keeping with the British action, since in fact, the Indian public was "universally opposed" to their withdrawal.25 In the Council of State in September, an unsuccessful attempt was made to pass a resolution recommending that the Governor-Generalin-Council give notice of India's intent to withdraw from the League of Nations,26 and a similar effort was launched in the Legislative Assembly in April 1937.27

As in the case of Manchuria, Indians related the failures of the League in the Abyssinian and Spanish crises to the imperialist nature of the European powers, which, Indians charged, were using the League to further their own ends. "The entire blame lies on imperialism and capitalism which form the basis of the present-day civilization," declared the newspaper, Bedar. 28 Writing to Lord Lothian in 1936, Jawaharlal Nehru contended that the League simply represented the policies of some of the great powers which had no intention of giving up their privileged position and which merely used the League "to make the world safe for themselves." While this nationalist denunciation of the League powers for inaction was fully justified, the Indian attempt to construct a relationship between their inertia and imperialism meant that there was a tendency to overlook a more obvious explanation for the immobility of the European countries—a

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reluctance to become involved in coercive action which might lead to war, before their own national interests were self-evidently endangered.

The German aggression in Czechoslovakia in 1938 provided the final basis for Indian condemnation of the League for its failure to adhere to the principles of the Covenant. In February 1939, a new debate on withdrawal from the League was initiated in the Legislative Assembly; members indicted the former for, inter alia, failing to resort to collective security measures in aid of Chzechoslovakia. The Assembly eventually approved the withdrawal resolution by a vote of 55 to 45, 30 indicating the extent of antiscleague feeling by 1939 even in a reasonably moderate body like the Legislative Assembly. Speaking on a foreign policy resolution at the Tripuri session of the Indian National Congress in March 1939, Nehru too, condemned the League for inaction in the Czechoslovakian Crisis; he condemned the "betrayal of Czechoslovakia by England and France," stating that, it demonstrated that the League of Nations was "nothing but a tombstone of peace." 31

Another source of Indian hostility towards the League was its failure to adhere to the principles of the Covenant relating to the mandates system. Indians attacked the administration of mandates as another example of how some European powers were using the League for imperial aggrandizement. Speaking at the Bengal Students' Conference in 1928, Jawaharlal Nehru described the mandates system as "a new cloak for the greed of the imperialist powers."82 The nationalist newspaper, Pratap, also declared that the method of administering mandates showed that the League was "the happy hunting ground of European imperialists."33 The Indian National Herald wrote that mandates were not "instruments of civilization," but "merely a source of profit to the powers," which would "neither be transferred nor given up till the oil, rubber and labour in the Mandated Territories" had been "thoroughly exploited and made safe for High Finance."34 Indian criticism, in particular, focused on the use of force in the French administration of the Syrian mandate, on British attempts to join the Tanganyika mandate in a wider union with the British East African colonies, on repression in New Zealand's administration of Western Samoa, on racial discrimination in the Australian mandate of New Guinea and on British favouritism toward the Jewish community in the Palestine mandate.

Thus, throughout the inter-war period, most nationalist Indians denounced the League on the grounds that it was of no help to nationalist interests, that Indian membership was illusory and that the leading powers in the League were not fulfilling the principles embodied in the Covenant of the League, but were distorting the organization to suit their own purposes. In fact, the only national Indian political organization which openly and consistently supported the League of Nations throughout its existence was the National Liberal Federation. Indian Liberals supported League membership because, unlike the more radical Indians, they felt that since the League provided an opportunity for Indians to participate in international

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ague e the onal affairs with delegates of independent countries, their participation would enhance the achievement of dominion status by India. "Anything that will raise India's international status will react on her internal status. The elevation of her international status cannot but lead to the elevation of her national status," said the Liberal leader, Sir Phiroze Sethna in a 1930 Council of State debate on the League. While Liberals often shared the despair of more radical nationalists over the many political shortcomings of the League, their pragmatic approach to international affairs led them to conclude that the League's inadequacies did not constitute sufficient grounds for forsaking the organization. Thus, for instance, in opposing the 1936 Council of State resolution on Indian withdrawal from the League, the Liberal leader, P.N. Sapru said that the failings of the League were only a reflection of the imperfections of the world and that the organization could not be abandoned simply because of its inevitable limitations. 36

Basically, however, the Liberals' differing attitude from other Indians stemmed from their belief that Indian diplomacy through the League of Nations could be Indian in character and not simply a mirror of British diplomacy. More radical Indians might also have been optimistic about the League's value for the achievement of independence, and, they too might have favoured Indian membership despite its evident political failures if they had felt that Indian delegations to the League were representative of Indian opinion. However, so far as they were concerned, Indians at the League fulfilled no worth-while diplomatic function either for the nationalist cause or for the international community. By contrast, Liberals felt that their very presence in the League delegations, 37 even if they were not representative of majority Indian opinion, meant that it had a distinctly Indian identity which distinguished it from the British delegations, however imperceptible were their differences in policy. What the Liberals desired, therefore, was to strengthen the inherent Indian nature of the delegations to give greater meaning to Indian diplomacy through the League of Nations. The most obvious initial way of achieving this ambition seemed to be to obtain Indian leadership of League delegations. The struggle for the attainment of this objective was largely waged by Sir Phiroze Sethna, who from 1924 onward continually pressed for Indian leadership of largely Indian delegations. 38 In 1927, he received support of the National Liberal Federation for his cause, 39 and in 1929 his efforts bore fruit when in reply to his renewed appeal, the Government announced that an attempt would be made to appoint an Indian leader of the 1929 delegation. 40 Subsequently, Sir Muhammad Habibullah, a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, was appointed head of the delegation for that year.

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INDIA AT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The extent to which indigenous leadership could instil Indian character into official Indian League diplomacy was inevitably limited. Muhammad Habibullah and subsequent delegation heads remained, after all, appointees of the Indian Government and, as in the past, they continued to receive their instructions from the India Office so that the expression on political matters of independence and specifically Indian views was still precluded by the responsibility of Whitehall for the policies of the Indian delegations. Further, the very agreement of Indians to serve at the League meant that on the whole they were personally in accord with British policy. It was not surprising therefore that there was no marked change in the character of Indian diplomacy at the League from 1929 on.

However, on matters "not of first class political importance" where it was not necessary "that the seven British Empire members of the League ... preserve a united front," it was the intent of the British Government that its influence be kept to a minimum and that the Indian Government be allowed "the greatest possible freedom of action" under the influence of the "legislature and public opinion" in shaping its policy at the League of Nations.42 Still, even in the non-political sphere, there were few conflicts of policy between the British and the Indian delegates. The Report of the Indian Statutory Commission on constitutional change, published in 1930, listed only six issues on which the British and Indian delegations differed upto 1927. Three differences involved matters before the International Labour Conferences and three within the main body of the League, but none was over a matter of more than mundane, domestic import. One disagreement, for example, was over the compulsory disinfection of wool against anthrax.43 India's independent role amounted largely to a demand for minor adjustments in League and particularly in International Labour Organization decisions to take into account differing circumstances in India. By the end of 1936, India and Britain had voted differently on labour questions on 45 occasions, but, largely on issues of a minor, technical nature. 44 Nevertheless, in the non-political area of League affairs it was possible for Indian delegations to give special attention to matters which were of particular interest and concern to Asian countries, and more specifically the Indian sub-continent. Thus, India was especially active in the campaign for the abolition of slavery and traffic in women and children, 45 in the League's efforts to control the sale and manufacture of opium and other drugs, in the attempt to achieve economy in League finances, 47 and to improve international standards of health. In such non-political fields as these, it was thus possible for the Indian delegations to reflect to some degree on national Indian opinion.

One particular area in which Indian delegations imparted India character to League affairs rather than echo British views and interests was in their emphasis on the non-European role of the League—on its obligation to

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combat international tension incited by racial feelings and to raise the status of dependent territories and of the peoples of Asia and Africa generally. By stressing these functions of the League, Indian delegations were either responding to or echoing national Indian opinion, for one of the nationalist criticisms of the League was that it had neglected the welfare and concerns of non-European countries. 48 Indian delegations also supported the popular demand that their representation in the League Secretariat be increased in an effort to strengthen the role of the East in the organization. National pressure for action on this issue came almost every year from Indians of all parties in the Legislative Assembly, and periodically the Indian Government or the League delegation would raise with the Secretary-General or with the Assembly of the League the question of increased representation. 49 Since most posts in the Secretariat were held on long tenure, rapid changes in composition were not possible. None the less, Indian representation in the higher ranks of the League and the International Labour Office did rise from three in 1927 to eight by 1938, plus an additional two temporary members. While the latter figure was still inadequate compared to British and French representation in the Secretariat, Indian representation compared favourably with other countries, particularly considering India's distance from Geneva. In 1935, India tied for seventh place out of 59 nations represented in the secretariat, and had more members than any of the dominions of the Commonwealth or, indeed, than any other non-European country. 50

Finally, Indian delegations to the League reflected in their attitudes at Geneva the popular concern of Indians about the size of India's annual contribution to the revenues of that body. After Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union, the Indian contribution was always the next highest, amounting in every year, except 1921, to over five per cent of the total assessment of the League members. 51 Since all those countries which contributed more than India to League funds enjoyed permanent seats on the League Council, the League's activities were primarily related to European affairs. Then again since India was an underdeveloped country which urgently required all available funds for domestic economic and social projects of more obvious benefit to it, the high cost of membership was one of the most persistent causes of nationalist Indian dislike of the League. 52 Sensitive to this nationalist concern about the cost of the League to India, Indian delegations on numerous occasions, commencing with the first Assembly, 53 pointed out the discrepancy between India's payment to the organization and its status within the League, and urged economy in total League expenditures. 54 These promptings did not, however, result in much relative reduction in India's share. Although in 1937 the League did cut back on its expenditures generally, leading to a significant drop in India's payments, its share still remained at more than five per cent of the total of member states.

Apart from the official Indian role at the League, it was possible for other

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Indians to exert a modicum of influence on behalf of the nationalist cause through the specialized agencies of the organization, in which not all repressentatives of India had to reflect Government of India policy. For example, at the annual sessions of the International Labour Conference, one of the three delegates from India was always a representative of Indian workers and he naturally was more sympathetic to nationalist aspirations. Both in private and in public, these workers' delegates criticized the failure of the Government of India to provide adequately for the welfare of Indian workers, and on occasion they championed the cause of Indian selfgovernment. 55 Another League agency which provided an opportunity for nationalist Indian international activity was the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, on which India was represented from 1931 to 1939 by an illustrious non-official, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. At the 1931 proceedings of the Committee, Radhakrishnan observed that Indians felt that the League and its various committees had "an inadequate appreciation of the travail" through which India was passing. He urged the world's intellectuals to show greater understanding of the Indian national movement. 56 In 1932, he spoke to the Committee on the obligation of nations to bring moral pressure to bear on imperial powers to end their exploitation of colonial peoples. 57

In sum, nationalist concerns were not altogether absent from India's voice at the League; a variety of subjects which exercized the national political movement received an airing, however circumscribed, either through official diplomacy in the League Assembly or through non-governmental representation in subordinate agencies of the League.

LEAGUE IMPACT ON INDEPENDENT INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

While most nationalist Indians repudiated the League of Nations, they never rejected the idea of future co-operation in an international organization in which India would be represented by the delegates of a responsible and nationally elected government and its interests and those of other newly emergent states in Asia and Africa would be appropriately recognized. Indians were disillusioned with the League because of its failure to serve their national interests and the cause of world peace, but they remained wedded to the notion of co-operation through international institutional structures. Thus, for "example, The Leader declared in 1929 that an independent India would use her moral weight properly to bring about world peace" through the League and that it would "pursue peace by assisting disarmament."58 In 1936, Nehru argued that India should work for the creation of a new, "democratically constructed" League of Nations, 59 and in 1939, the Congress Working Committee said that a free, democratic India would gladly associate itself "with other free nations for mutual defence against aggression and for economic co-operation."60

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and for its dearth of idealism were indicative of an Indian commitment to an active international role in the the future, for their charges amounted to an indictment of the League for failing to be truly international. The condemnation of the League, therefore, did not amount to a rejection of internationalism; implicit in the attack was a future commitment to a more representative and also a more idealistic international organization. It was also apparent that Indian nationalists anticipated that India would play a prominent role in such a new international institution. Thus, The Leader emphasized the importance of India achieving national sovereignty since its people were "keenly interested in disarmament and in the renunciation of war and conquest and the domination of one country by another"61 so that with independence India would "be in a position to use her moral weight properly to bring about world peace."62 In 1929, Congress leader, C. Vijiyaraghavachariar opined that India had a special destiny to fulfil within the League after the country had obtained freedom and Indian membership had become substantive. Once India had secured "an effective voice in the ordaining of world policy," he said, its usefulness to the international community would be unlimited.63

Those more moderate Indian nationalists who supported League membership also exhibited an internationalist outlook, although in their case it inclined them towards League membership despite the limitations of the organization. Indian liberals, for example, felt that India could enhance the moral quality of the organization and hence the realization of its most noble objectives, even if Indian delegations were unrepresentative. In 1929, liberal leader Sir P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer said that India and other Asian countries should "endeavour to educate the other members of the League to a broad-minded conception of international morality" and help "produce an atmosphere of sympathy and good-will towards all." Similarly, Sir Phiroze Sethna supported League membership in anticipation of the special contribution India would make to the attainment of its aims:

I entertain the sincerest hope that the influence of this country will always be exercised so as to make the League of Nations a real and powerful force making for the peace of the world, for making the reign of freedom and self-government universal and impregnable and for promoting the highest ends of human culture, civilization and unity so that the difficulties that exist at present in the way of the human race realizing more and more its moral and spiritual ideals may be removed. 65

In sum, the attitudes and perspectives of both the League's critics and supporters reflected a commitment to international institutional co-operation that presaged independent India's important role in the United Nations. It was not surprising, given the earlier postitions adopted by Indian nationalists, that support for the United Nations became a key element of Indian foreign policy after 1947, and that this manifested itself in the

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endorsement of the concept of collective security via the UN, in an active role in talks regarding arms control and disarmament, in participation in UN supervisory and peacekeeping functions and in the encouragement for the economic and social activities of the United Nations family of institutions. Conscious of how lack of attention to and progress in areas such as these had undermined the success of the League, Indian leaders demonstrated a concern to avoid a repetition of the shortcomings of the past and to make the UN work in ways the League had not.

Further, some of the specific bases of nationalist criticism of the League became apparent in positions adopted by India in the United Nations. Thus, the inter-war preoccupation with the League serving as a tool of the imperialist powers and with the mandates system operating to enhance their colonial empires was reflected in India's strong support at the United Nations for rapid decolonization and close UN scrutiny of the trusteeship territories' progress towards independence. Similarly, the nationalists' concern with great power dominance in the League found expression in India's UN policy in its efforts to strengthen the General Assembly vis-a-vis the Security Council and to counter-balance the influence of the Western industrialized states by enhancing the cohesion of the developing countries through such measures as the development of the Group of 77. As well, some of the viewpoints expressed by Indian delegates to the League became important dimensions of Indian diplomacy at the United Nations. As at the League, Indian representatives to the United Nations emphasized the importance of the organization giving attention to the problems of Asia, of its dealing with the issue of racism and of its raising the living standards of the peoples of developing countries everywhere. In general, these preoccupations indicated a determination to see the United Nations develop as a less euro-centric organization than the League. And with India's assistance, this goal was in time largely accomplished as manifested in the shift in the focus of the discussions and activities of the United Nations institutions away from the West towards issues that predominantly exercise the countries of the Third World. In a variety of ways, therefore, the seeds of Indian foreign policy in the United Nations were sown in furrows ploughed before 1947, and India, unlike most other newly emerging states, acquired the outlines of an international personality before the attainment of independence.

Official Indian diplomacy at the League was also of some significance for post-independence Indian foreign policy in that it enabled India and Indians to become internationally recognized before the actual attainment of national sovereignty. In this respect, India achieved a unique advantage over other newly emerging countries which did not have similar opportunities of participating in a major international organization before independence. The Indians deputed to the League, while not representative of national opinion, were none the less, often of considerable distinction. The list included such prominent national political figures

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as Srinivasa Sastri, Atul Chandra Chatterjee, A.P. Patro, Fazl-i-Husain, Muhammad Habibullah and the Aga Khan. The selection of important political personalities to represent India ensured that while the delegates might lack political authority, they would none the less be a credit to Indian capabilities and would enhance the Indian reputation in international circles. Many of the delegates succeeded in doing this; Srinivasa Sastri in particular impressed the 1921 session of the League of Nations by his eminence as an orator. He led the British historian, H.A.L. Fisher, to comment that it was "no flattery of exaggeration to say that the great sensation of that meeting was furnished by the eloquence" of Sastri. 66

Finally, India's participation in the League had importance for the post-independence period in so far as it provided training for Indian diplomats. In this respect too, India had an opportunity that was not available to the other states that emerged after World War II. Although the number of Indians who were able to profit from the pre-independence experience after 1947 may not have been large in absolute terms, it was a significant figure relative to the other new states whose nationals never had a comparable chance to receive practical diplomatic training before independence. The number of Indians who actually had League exposure was quite considerable. According to a Government of India report, by 1934, 101 Indians had served in some capacity in Indian delegations, while by the same time only 72 Europeans had represented India at Geneva. In later years, with increased Indianization of the delegations, the proportion of Indians compared to Europeans increased still further.

Out of these delegates to the League emerged some important personalities for the early years of independent Indian (and Pakistani) diplomacy, particularly with respect to the United Nations. Girja Shankar Bajpai for example, who obtained experience in international affairs, inter alia, as a League representative in 1930, served on the Economic and Social Council and the Executive Committee of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations in 1946 and in the Indian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947 and 1948. He also became the first Secretary-General of independent India's Ministry of External Affairs. Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, who served in the 1938 delegation to the League, participated in the 1946 United Nations Conference on International Organization, and was, in addition, a member of the 1946 Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 1947 and 1948. Finally, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, who was Chairman of the Indian League delegation of 1939, headed the Pakistani delegation to the 1947 General Assembly and to the Special Session of the United Nations in 1948.

In addition to those Indians who obtained useful experience for the post-independence period through membership of Indian League delegations, independent India also benefited from the experience some of its nationals

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derived from participation in the League and International Labour Organization secretariats. Perhaps the most important of these for independent India was Dr. P.P. Pillai, who served in various administrative capacities in the League of Nations and in the International Labour Organization between 1924 and 1946. After independence, he acted as chairman of the Asiatic mission of the International Labour Organization (1946-47), and as minister plenipotentiary and permanent representative of India to the United Nations in 1947 and 1948. In later years, he undertook additional diplomatic activities on behalf of the Indian Government. Sir Atul Chatterjee, who was President of the International Labour Conference in 1927 and of the International Labour Organization's governing body in 1933, served after independence on the Committee of Experts of the International Labour Organization until 1951. Finally, Shamaldharee Lall, who was a member of the International labour Organization's governing body of 1938, participated once again in the executive of that organization after independence.

Some Indians who obtained experience at the League in unofficial capacities were also of value to India after 1947. N.M. Joshi, for example, who was a workers' delegate to the International Labour Conference on four occasions, was also a member of the governing body of the International Labour Organization after independence. V.V. Giri, a workers' delegate to the International Labour Conference of 1926, was leader of the Indian delegation to the Asian Regional Conference of the International Labour Organization in 1950 and High Commissioner to Ceylon from 1947 to 1951. B. Shiva Rao, a delegate to the International Labour Conference of 1929, was after independence a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 and 1948. Finally, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who participated in the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation from 1931 to 1939, was active after independence in the parallel body of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), becoming chairman of the executive board in December 1948.68 Thus, while not the only training ground for India's future diplomats, the League of Nations was nevertheless of considerable importance in helping to provide India on the eve of independence with a reservoir of personnel experienced in international affairs. 69

The League of Nations' history was a tragic one. This fact, coupled with the inevitable nationalist antipathy for an organization dominated by the major powers of Europe in which India was confined to an ignominious, subordinate role, unrepresentative of national opinion, has led to some neglect of the League in the context of the Indian nationalist movement. No doubt this has also occurred because there are other more important avenues of inquiry for an understanding of the origins of Indian foreign policy. Yet, as shown above, nationalist attitudes towards the League and the nature of Indian participation in the organization are helpful in

shedding light on the evolution of independent India's prominent diplomatic role via the United Nations and other international organizations. The contribution to the development of Indian foreign policy of those nationalists who concerned themselves with League affairs and of those who participated in League activities should not therefore be forgotten.

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- 10 Legislative Assembly Debates, n. 5, p. 172. See also Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 7, 1936, p. 1765. In his 1939 Presidential Address to the Faizpur Indian National Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru also declared that Indian membership of the League was a "farce" since the selection of delegates was made by the British Government. Indian Annual Register (Calcutta), Vol. 2, 1936, p. 225.
- 11 N.B. Bonarjee, "League of Nations and Fascism," Indian Review (Madras), Vol. 28, no. 3, March 1927, p. 157.
- 12 The Hindu Weekly, 4 October 1928.
- 13 Ibid., 30 June 1927.
- 14 Ibid., 29 March 1928.
- 15 Modern Review, Vol. 42, no. 3, September 1927 p. 363.
- 16 The Hindu Weekly, 12 April 1928.
- 17 The Leader, 6 October 1933.
- 18 The Indian National Herald (Bombay), 11 January 1927.
- 19 Dorothy Norman, Nehru, The First Sixty Years (New York, 1965), Vol. 1, p. 164. In 1925, Mahatma Gandhi wrote that the League of Nations was "in reality merely England and France." See M.K. Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War (Ahmedabad 1949), p. 61.
- 20 The Leader, 11 January, 1932.
- 21 "League of Nations and Disarmament," Standard Review (Madras), December 1933, p. 12 San Nations and Disarmament," Standard Review (Madras), December 1932, p. 12. See also S.C. Sarkar, "The Clash in the Far East," Calcutta Review, June 1932,
- Hrishikesh Roy, "The League and the Far Eastern Dispute," Indian Review, Vol. 33, no. 6, 190, 2, February, 1932, 33, no. 6, June, 1932, p. 394. See also *Modern Review*, Vol. 51, no. 2, February, 1932, p. 218

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23 Although the legislative councils were precluded from responsibility in matters relating to international affairs, none the less, there was considerable leniency in the application of the rule with respect to the League of Nations. The result was that both chambers devoted considerable attention to League affairs.

24 Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 5, 1936, pp. 3889-3902; Council of State Debates,

Vol. 1, 1936, pp. 697-703.

25 Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 7, 1936, pp. 1230-1232. See also the resolution passed at the Sind Socialist Conference, Karachi, in September 1936. Indian Annual

Register, n. 10, p. 311.

- 26 Council of State Debates, Vol. 2, 1936, pp. 52-57. It is interesting to note that this resolution was introduced by a Muşlim nationalist, Hosain Imam. Later in 1939, it was another Muslim, Abdul Qaiyum, who stiffened by amendment the Legistative Assembly resolution of that year, calling for Indian withdrawal from the League. See Legislative Assembly Debates, n. 5. pp. 170, 184-185. These actions reflected the fact that it was not just Hindu nationalists who were exercized by the failures of the League. Indian Muslim disenchantment with the League stemmed in particular from its failure to defend the Arabs of Palestine against the alleged encroachments of Jewish immigrants, from the brutal treatment meted out to Muslims in Syria by the French under the auspicies of the League of Nations Mandates Commission and from the League's inability to preserve the independence of Abyssinia in the face of Italian aggression. In the light of these failings with respect to the Islamic world, Indian Muslims had little faith that the League, which one Muslim newspaper said was "committing daylight robbery on the freedom of the world," could help to advance their interests. See "Mushir" Note on the Press, United Provinces, 27 January 1934. See also the Presidential Address of Khan Bahadur Hafiz Hidayat Hosain to the All-India Muslim League session of 1933. Indian Annual Register, Vol. 2, 1933, p. 214.
- 27 Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 3, 1937, especially pp. 2595-2600. In December 1936, Jawaharlal Nehru also criticized the activities of the League member states in his Presidential Address to the Faizpur Congress. The League had "fallen very low, Nehru claimed, so that few people took it seriously "as an instrument for the preservation of peace." Indian Annual Register, n. 10, p. 225.
- 28 "Bedar," in Note on the Press, United Provinces, 16 May 1936.
- 29 Jawaharlal Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters (London, 1960), p. 141.

30 Legislative Assembly Debates, n. 5, p. 690.

31 Quoted in Dorothy Norman, n. 19, p. 615.

32 R. Dwivedi, (Ed.), Life and Speechs of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (Allahabad, 1929), p. 126. See also Jawaharlal Nehru, The Unity of India (London, 1948), p. 272.

33 "Pratap" in Note on the Press, United Provinces, 1 October 1927:

34 The Indian National Herald, 17 February 1927.

35 Council of State Debates, n. 2, p. 106.

36 Ibid., n. 26, p. 62.

- 37 From the beginning Indians always predominated in Indian League delegations. Usually the delegations consisted of one British official and two Indians, either officials or non-officials.
- 38 See Council of State Debates, Vol. 4, 1924, p. 504; Vol. 7, 1926, p. 115; Vol. 1, 1927, p. 531; Vol. 1, 1928, p. 382; and Vol. 1, 1929, p. 294.

39 Indian Quarterly Register, Vol. 2, 1927, p. 435.

- 40 Council of State Debates, Vol. 1, 1929, p. 299.
- 41 See Cmd. 3569, 1930, Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. 5, Memoranda Submitted by the Commission, Vol. 5, Memoranda Submitted by the Government of India and the India Office to the Indian Statutory Commission, pp. 1324 and 1645 mission, pp. 1334 and 1645.

42 Ibid., pp. 1632-1633.

43 Ibid., pp. 1638-1640. See also J.C. Coyajee, India and the League of Nations (Waltair, 1932), pp. 24-26 1932), pp. 24-26,

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44 Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 8, 1936, pp. 2509-2512.

44 Les for example, League of Nations Official Journal (Geneva), Special Supplement No. 174, September 1937, p. 34.

46 For example, India was represented on the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs and on the Permanent Central Opium Board. In April 1939, Sir Atul Chatterjee was elected President of the Board. See Monthly Summary of the League of Nations (Geneva), Vol. 19, no. 4, 1939, p. 151.

47 The Indian delegate, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar participated in the Committee on the Allocation of League Expenses, appointed by the 1938 Assembly to examine the modifications that should be made in the scale of contributions. See Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, Vol. 19, no. 2, 1939, p. 77.

48 See Modern Review, Vol. 43, no. 6, June 1928, p. 755; Vol 55, no. 6 June, 1934, pp. 7222726; The Leader, 19 May 1929, 12 October 1933; The Proneer (Allahabad), 7 September 1930. For examples of the attempts by League delegates to interest the organization in problems of particular concern to Asia, see P. Kodanda Rao, The Right Honourable V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, A Political Biography (London, 1963), p. 110; J.C.

Coyajee, n. 43, pp. 18-19; Final Reports of the Delegates of India to the 3rd, 9th, 10th (Ordinary) Sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations, 1922. pp. 131-133; 1928; 1929, p. 127.

49 See for example, Final Reports of the Delegates of India to the 9th and 11th (Ordinary) Sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations, 1928, p. 128 and 1930, Appendix 3, Annexes 6 and 7; League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplements Nos. 160, 173, 187, 1936, p. 12; 1937, pp. 15-16, 20, 148; 1938, pp. 24-25, 113. See also Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 1, 1927, p. 944; Council of State Debates, Vol. 1, 1928, p. 79; Vol. 2, 1930, p. 109.

50 From tables compiled by the Government of India. See Council of State Debates, Vol. 2, 1935, pp. 92-94. According to a government spokesman, the 1935 statistics on Indian membership as compared to other countries were still accurate in 1939.

See Legislative Assembly Debates, n. 5, p. 188.

51 See Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 8, 1938, p. 2874. 52 See for example, New Era (Madras), November 1928, p. 184; The Leader, 7 March 1929; Council of State Debates, n. 26, p. 57.

53 F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London, 1960), p. 129.

54 See Final Reports of the Delegates of India to the 9th 14th 15th (Ordinary) Sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations, 1928, pp. 130-131; 1933, pp. 15-26; 1934, pp. 16-24; League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplements Nos. 159, 187; 1936,

pp. 30-31, 76-77; 1938, pp. 38-39; Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 1, 1936, p. 628. 55 See for example, The Hindu Weekly, 29 June, 1930; Modern Review, Vol. 62, no. 1, July, 1937, pp. 114-115; The Manchester Guardian (Manchester), 11,20 June 1938.

56 The Hindu Weekly, 9 August 1931.

57 Indian Review, Vol. 33, no. 8 August 1932, p. 594.

58 The Leader, 5 April 1929.

59 Indian Annual Register, Vol 2, 1936, p. 255.

60 Ibid., Vol. 2, 1939, p. 227. 61 The Leader, 6 October 1933.

62 Ibid., 5 April 1929.

63 Indian Quarterly Register, Vol. 2, 1929, pp. 482-483.

64 P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer, "A League to Enforce Peace," New Era, September 1929, p. 920

65 Council of State Debates, n. 2, p. 106.

66 Servant of India (Poona), 30 March 1922. See also the comment of F.P. Walters, n. 53, p. 151

67 Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 4, 1934, p. 3109.

- 68 The above personnel information has been compiled from the League of Nations Official Journals, the Yearbooks of the United Nations, the International Who's Who and various biographical compilations published in India.
- 69 The opportunity which League membership provided for gaining experience in international affairs was in fact, one of the arguments adduced by moderate nationalists in favour of retaining League membership. See for example, the view of P.N. Sapru, Council of State Debates, n. 26, p. 62. See also Naresh Chandra Roy, "India's Connection with the League of Nations," Calcutta Review, January 1937, p. 105.

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By BIMAL PRASAD**

THE policy of non-alignment emerged as the natural result of the experience and aspirations of the countries which acquired their independence after the end of the Second World War. Under foreign rule almost all of them were dragged into innumerable wars in pursuit of the politics and interests of the imperial powers. Consequently, they developed a strong urge to maintain their independence in foreign affairs and to keep away from the policies being pursued by the big powers for their own purposes. As the struggle for freedom progressed, they developed an equally strong urge to play their due role in world affairs. They were particularly keen to make their contribution to the ever continuing struggle for peace and freedom. Such urges could find fulfilment only through the policy of non-alignment.

As the pioneering role of India in the evolution of the policy of nonalignment has been generally recognised, it will not be out of place to illustrate the development of the above-mentioned urges by referring to the history of the Indian nationalist movement. Thus the Indian National Congress, the chief vehicle of that movement, strongly opposed the use of Indian resources for wars in which Indian interests were not involved right from its birth in 1885, when it deprecated the annexation of Upper Burma and protested against the rise in the military expenditure of the Government of India. Subsequent sessions opposed the use of Indian resources for British wars across India's frontiers and demanded that the cost of such wars should be borne by the British Exchequer. It extended its support to the British during the First World War (1914-18), but this was largely in the hope that this would hasten India's march towards self-government. Disillusioned with British policy after that war, it became doubly cautious during the Second World War (1939-45) and, in the absence of a clear assurance of India's independence, opposed the use of Indian resources for the British war effort to the point of launching an open, albeit non-violent, rebellion. Simultaneously there also developed a strong urge on the part of the Congress to play an active role in world affairs in the interest of peace and freedom. This was reflected in active support to the major anti-imperialist and anti-fascist struggles during the 1930s in such countries as China, Palestine and Spain.

The views of the Indian National Congress and the urges and aspirations of the Indian people in the field of foreign policy found the most

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eloquent expression in the writings and speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, who ranked only next to Mahatma Gandhi in the affections of the Indian people as well as the heirarchy of the nationalist leadership. As early as 1944, while writing The Discovery of India in prison he noted that the supremacy of the United States and the Soviet Union was going to be the outstanding international consequence of the Second World War. Much in the world, he thought, would depend upon the relations between these two powers whose viewpoints were marked by deep differences. As for the attitude of India and other Asian and African nations towards this emerging conflict between the two super powers, Nehru made it clear that for them the test by which to judge the stance of the two emerging powers would be: Did it help towards their own liberation? Did it end the domination of one country over another? Would it enable them to live freely the life of their choice in co-operation with others? Would it bring equality and equal opportunity for nations as well as for groups within each nation? Did it hold forth the promise of an early liquidation of poverty and illiteracy and the establishment of better living conditions? Here, in a nutshell, are the ideas motivating the movement as well as the policy of non-alignment.

In the light of such views it is not surprising that in his very first official broadcast as the Vice-President of the Interim Government on 7 September, 1946, Nehru gave succinct expression to the policy of non-alignment, He observed:

We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races.

Replying to the debate on the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly a few months later Nehru explained the rationale behind the policy of non-alignment in the following words.

We wish for peace. We do not want to fight any nation if we can help it. The only possible real objective that we, in common with other nations, can have is the objective of co-operating in building up some kind of world structure, call it one world, call it what you like. The beginnings of this world structure have been laid in the United Nations Organisation. It is still feeble, it has many defects; nevertheless, it is the beginning of the world structure. And India has pledged herself to co-operation in its work. Now, if we think of that structure and our co-operation with other countries in the structure and our co-operation with other countries in achieving it, where does the question come of our being tied up with this group of nations or that group? Indeed, the more groups and blocs are formed the weaker will that great structure become.

Needless to add, the co-operation with other countries to which Nehru refers here could only be on the basis of equality and not on that of the domination of a few powers over the rest of the world. Nehru gave the most memorable expression to this sentiment in the course of his address to the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947:

For too long we, of Asia, have been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own feet and co-operate with all others who are prepared to co-operate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others.

These words represented the innermost feelings of peoples in almost all countries of Asia and Africa. Among the pioneers of non-alignment mention must be made particularly of Indonesia. The preamble of its constitution drawn up in 1945 set forth the objective of setting up a government which would contribute to establishing "an order in the world which is based upon independence, abiding peace and social justice." President Soekarno was correct when he observed in the course of his address to the first Summit Conference of Non-aligned States in Belgrade in 1961:

There was no prior consultation and agreement between us before we adopted our respective policies of non-alignment. No. We each arrived at this policy inspired by common ideals, prompted by similar circumstances, spurred on by like experiences.

Soekarno, however, did not deny that the examples set and methods followed by some nations influenced and/or inspired other nations in adopting the path of non-alignment. As he put it:

...not one of us, I think, will deny that we did inspire each other. The experiences of one country in discovering that a policy of non-alignment is the best guarantee for safeguarding our national and international position have undoubtedly helped others to come to a similar conclusion.

It is in the light of the perspective offered by this observation that one can properly appreciate the significance of the role played by Nehru in the emergence of the policy of non-alignment on the world stage. As India's first Prime Minister he not only pioneered this policy, but also showed its effectiveness not only in safeguarding the nation's interests but also in contributing significantly to world peace. His bold and adroit practice of the diplomacy of peace-making during the Korean War from 1950 to 52

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particularly impressed the world as a great, constructive achievement and indicated the manner in which the policy of non-alignment could contribute to world peace. Nehru's increasingly significant role in world affairs filled the hearts of countless millions in Asia and Africa with pride as they saw the leader of a country which was until recent times a dependency of a foreign power rubbing shoulders with the high and mighty of the world and being respected by all as a leading statesman of the world. And it was known that this was largely possible because of the policy of non-alignment.

Right from the days of the struggle for freedom Nehru had been emphasizing the necessity of the nations engaged in that struggle coming together with a view to helping each other and facing the challenges posed by the imperialist powers. It is with this end in view that he had inspired the convening of the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March-April 1947. Attended by representatives from twenty-eight countries, this was the first major demonstration since the end of the Second World War of the growing sense of solidarity among the Asian countries. The Bandung Conference of the Afro-Asian nations in 1955 was its natural sequel; it owed much also to the initiative and enthusiasm of President Soekarno. The whole world took note of it as symbolising the emergence of the Asian and African nations on the world stage.

While the representatives of the various Asian and African countries gathered at Bandung showed a remarkable sense of solidarity and unanimously proclaimed their determination to pursue the path of freedom, justice and equality in world affairs, their deliberations and, in particular, the utterances of some of them indicated that the attitudes of some Asian and African countries were being shaped by their attachment to one or the other bloc of nations. On the other hand, there were some nations outside Asia and Africa who were showing deep interest in world affairs untrammelled by considerations of bloc politics. This particularly applied to Yugoslavia which, under its great leader, Tito, had been pursuing such a path since 1948. The delegations of some of the Asian and African countries, including India and Indonesia, at the United Nations Organization found the Yugoslav delegation joining hand with them in the struggle for freedom and peace at the world level. Gradually a feeling of solidarity based on a common outlook developed among them. After the exhibition of the influence of bloc politics at Bandung it began to be realized that the nations which were truly independent and uncommitted to either bloc should come together to raise their voice in support of freedom and peace. The famous meeting between Nehru, Nasser and Tito at Brioni (Yugoslavia), in 1956, was a symbolic demonstration of this new trend in world affairs. Another landmark was provided by the consultations between Nehru, Nasser, Tito, Soekarno and Nkrumah at Yugoslavia's Mission to the United Nations during the General Assembly's Session 1960, which led to joint action resulting in the adoption by the General Assembly of its Declaration on Decolonisation.

It is in the context of this growing solidarity as well as realisation of

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the need on the part of the non-aligned countries to assert themselves in world affairs that Tito took the initiative in suggesting the holding of the first conference of the non-aligned countries in 1961. It was in recognition of this initiative that the conference was held in Belgrade. What Tito had at the back of his mind in taking this initiative comes out in the following lines of his opening address before that conference:

The idea that the non-aligned countries should participate, in one way or another, more effectively in international developments, particularly in those which are of direct and vital interest to them, stems from the realisation of the fact that, in our time, responsibility for the future of mankind cannot be borne only by a few states, irrespective of how large and powerful they may be....The non-aligned countries do not, of course, pretend to be able to solve the problems that the Great Powers have not been able to solve so far; however, they can contribute much towards this end and towards the easing of dangerous international tensions in general.

Though the suggestion for holding the first non-aligned conference had come first from Tito, it had, of course, the strong support of other stalwarts of the non-committed world, notably Nehru, Nasser, Soekarno and Nkrumah. The speeches of these stalwarts at the Belgrade Conference will ever remain as a source of inspiration for the statesmen of the non-aligned world. Nehru, in particular, set the tone of the conference and delineated the central purpose of the non-aligned movement in the following words:

We call ourselves non-aligned countries. The word "non-aligned" may be differently interpreted, but basically it was coined and used with the meaning of being non-aligned with the great power blocs of the world. "Non-aligned" has a negative meaning. But if we give it a positive connotation, it means nations which object to living up for war purposes, to military blocs, to military alliances and the like. We keep away from such an approach and want to throw our weight in favour of peace.

If the birth of India as an independent country in 1947 marked the emergence of non-alignment as a foreign policy doctrine, the holding of the Belgrade Summit of Non-aligned Countries in 1961 may be described as marking the birth of the non-aligned movement. One of the constructive achievements of that summit was the consensus in favour of the criteria for membership which had been settled by the Preparatory Conference at Cairo a few months earlier and which have lasted upto the present day. According to these criteria, in order to be invited to the conference of non-aligned states a country must have the following qualifications:

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- 1. The country should have adopted an independent policy based on the co-existence of states with different political and social systems and on non-alignment, or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy.
- 2. The country concerned should be consistently supporting the movements for national independence.
- 3. The country should not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.
- 4. If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or is a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.
- 5. If it has conceded military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.

The Belgrade Conference had met against the background of mounting international tensions, worsening relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the continuing struggles for national liberation and racial equality in a number of countries. It addressed itself to all these problems, extended its sympathy to the peoples in several countries still struggling for their freedom, condemned the policy of apartheid, called for general and complete disarmament and the abolition of foreign military bases, and appealed to the heads of governments in the United States and the Soviet Union to start a dialogue among themselves with a view to reducing international tension and safeguarding world peace. Its greatest significance, however, lies in its enunciation of certain fundamental principles which have continued to guide the activities of the Non-aligned Movement till the present day. Declaring that the non-aligned countries assembled at Belgrade did not want to constitute themselves within a bloc and could not be a bloc, the conference expressed the sincere desire of the participating countries to co-operate with any government which sought to contribute to the strengthening of confidence and peace in the world. At the same time the conference boldly asserted that under the prevailing conditions the existence and the activities of the non-algined countries in the interests of peace constituted one of the more important forces for safeguarding world peace. They went on to affirm that the further extension of the non-committed area of the world constituted the only possible alternative to the intensification of cold war policies. Decrying all attempts at imposing upon peoples one social or political system or another by force and from outside, the conference declared: "All peoples and nations have to solve the problems of their own political, economic, social and cultural systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and potentialities."

While the major portion of the Belgrade Declaration dealt with political issues, it did not at all ignore the economic ones. Asserting that all peoples may, for their own end, freely dispose of their national wealth and resources

subject, of course, to any obligation freely accepted in the interest of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit and international law, the Declaration asked for efforts being made to remove economic imbalances inherited from colonialism and imperialism. According to it, it was necessary to close, through accelerated economic, industrial and agricultural development, the ever increasing gap in the standards of living between the few economically advanced countries, and the many economically less developed countries. With this end in view, it asked for the establishment of a United Nations Capital Development Fund and demanded just terms of trade for the economically less-developed countries. It put particular stress on the need for constructive efforts to eliminate the excessive fluctuations in trade in primary commodities and the restrictive measures and practices which adversely effected the foreign trade earning of the developing countries. It went on to invite all the developing countries to co-operate among themselves effectively in the economic and commercial fields. Finally it called upon them to consider the convening, as soon as possible, of an international conference to discuss their common economic problems. This marked the beginning of efforts which led ultimately to the convening of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and other efforts for the establishment of a New International Economic Order.

Surprising though it may seem, the Belgrade Conference did not take any decision regarding the holding of the next conference of non-aligned nations. While it is safe to assume that the leaders of the non-aligned countries would not have thought there would be no further conferences of those countries, it is also clear that they did not envisage such conferences at regular intervals. Non-aligned conferences, they might have thought, would meet off and on, as and when necessary. In any case, as no conferences at regular intervals were envisaged, no procedures for summoning them were provided for. The future course of development of the movement was, therefore, uncertain. The convening of the next conference depended on individual initiative.

It was such an initiative on the part of Tito and Nasser (Nehru had passed away) which led to the convening of the Second Summit Conference of the Non-aligned Nations at Cairo in 1964. This was a successful conference, but again there was no decision regarding the next conference. The years following saw a considerable improvement in the international situation as a result of partial detente between the two super powers. This could have instilled a sense of complacency among the leaders of the Non-aligned Movement. Besides, many of them were preoccupied with major internal problems in their own countries. Thanks to the initiative taken again by Tito, the Third Summit Conference of Non-aligned Nations met at Lusaka in 1970, six years after the holding of the second conference. This conference, for the first time, decided "to ensure the continuity of action by holding periodic consultations of representatives of non-aligned countries at different levels and by

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convening summit conferences more frequently depending on the prevailing international situation." Since then the summit conferences of non-aligned nations have been meeting at regular three yearly intervals. Thus the fourth summit met at Algiers in 1973, the fifth at Colombo in 1976 and the sixth at Havana in 1979. Since Algiers, the venue and dates of the next summit are decided at the summit itself. The Seventh Conference would have in normal circumstances met in 1982, but as the venue had to be shifted at the last moment from Baghdad to New Delhi, it had to meet in March 1983. In between summits, the non-aligned countries now also hold regular conference at the level of Foreign Ministers. Occasionally, there are other meetings at ministerial or official levels. Besides, the heads of delegations of the non-aligned countries at the United Nations regularly hold consultations among themselves. The Fifth Summit Conference at Colombo in 1976 decided to set up a Co-ordinating Bureau consisting of upto twenty-five representatives of non-aligned countries, and charged with the co-ordination of the joint activities of the non-aligned countries aimed at implementing the decisions and programmes adopted at Summit Conferences, Ministerial Conferences, meetings of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries at the United Nations and at other gatherings of non-aligned countries.

In the meanwhile there has been a steady increase in the membership of non-aligned countries. This is borne out by the number of participants attending the non-aligned summits. Thus while the representatives of only twenty-five countries participated in the Belgrade Conference (1961), this number rose to forty-seven at Cairo (1964), fifty-three at Lusaka (1970), seventy-five at Algiers (1973), eighty-five at Colombo (1976) and ninety-five at Havana (1979). In addition to the members, the number of observers and guests has also gone on increasing. This is a most spectacular demonstration of the growing popularity of the non-aligned movement and the nearly universal acceptance of its principles among countries located not only in Asia and Africa, but also in Latin America and Europe and representing not only diverse social and political systems, but also innumerable stages of development.

Along with the increase in its membership, as well as the frequency of its conferences at various levels, there has also been a widening of the horizons of the Non-aligned Movement. The most important development in this regard has been the increasing attention being paid to economic issues without any disregard of the political ones. This is particularly noticeable since the Lusaka Conference (1970) which adopted a separate Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress in addition to the Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Co-operation and Democratisation of International Relations. The former contained a pledge on the part of the non-aligned countries to cultivate a spirit of self-reliance and to foster mutual co-operation among developing countries so as to impart strength to their national endeavour to fortify their independence. With this end in view it adopted a Programme of Action providing for co-operation among the

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developing countries at "sub-regional and inter-regional levels" in the fields of planning and projection; trade, co-operation and development; industrial, mineral, agricultural and marine production; development of infrastructures; and application of science and technology. Calling for "a rapid transformation of the world economic system, particularly in the fields of trade, finance and technology so that economic domination yields to economic co-operation and economic co-operation is used for the world community," it defined the goals and objectives of international economic co-operation in the following terms:

- (i) International co-operation for economic development is not a onesided process of donor-donee relationship; the development of developing countries is a benefit to the whole world, including the more advanced nations;
- (ii) The aim of international economic co-operation should be to provide a dynamic combination of the world's production, market and technological factors to promote a rational division of labour and a humane sharing of its fruits; international co-operation should strengthen the capability of developing countries to exercise fully their sovereignty over their natural resources;
- (iii) A rapid transformation of the world economic system should be achieved through the adoption of convergent and concomitant policies and measures so that the developing and developed countries become partners, on a basis of equality and mutual benefit, in a common endeavour for peace, progress and prosperity.
- (iv) The essential purpose of development is to provide equal opportunity for a better life to everyone; the aim should, therefore, be to accelerate significantly the growth of gross product per head so that it is possible to secure for everyone a minimum standard of life consistent with human dignity.

The trend towards greater attention to economic issues has continued to be strengthened at the subsequent conferences of the non-aligned countries. The representatives of the leading non-aligned countries have also been playing a major part in the discussions on economic issues related to the North-South dialogue at the United Nations as well as elsewhere. Indeed the Non-aligned Movement has for quite sometime become inextricably interlinked with the struggle for the establishment of a New International Economic Order.

Along with this the Non-aligned Movement has also launched a struggle for a New International Information Order. The Fifth Summit Conference at Colombo (1976), particularly emphasized the significance of this struggle when it declared that a new international order in the fields of information and mass communications was as vital as a new international economic order. Explaining this point, the Political Declaration issued by the Colombo

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Summit noted that there was a vast and ever growing gap between communcation capacities in non-aligned countries and in the advanced countries. This had resulted in a situation of dependence and domination in which the majority of the countries of the world had become "passive receipients of biased, inadequate and distorted information." It was an urgent necessity to rectify this situation. "The emanicipation and development of national information media," the Declaration stated, "is an integral part of the overall struggle for political, economic and social independence for a large majority of the peoples of the world who should not be denied the right to inform and to be informed objectively and correctly."

While the number of non-aligned countries has rapidly expanded and the Non-aligned Movement has acquired new dimensions, it has also been facing several problems in recent years. Indeed the present state of the Movement represents a peculiar paradox. On the one hand, it has within its fold the overwhelming majority of the countries and peoples of the world—a clear two-thirds of mankind. On the other hand, this itself has created a situation in which the Non-aligned Movement is marked more and more by lack of cohesiveness and solidarity among its members. There are nations who are formally non-aligned, but in reality tied to the apron-strings of one bloc or the other. Very often some of them have been noticed trying to deflect the Non-aligned Movement from its chosen path. Sometimes the differences among them are so great that concerted action, as for instance, during the last United Nations session on disarmament, becomes impossible. This is eroding the credibility of the Movement in the eyes of the very people it is supposed to represent. This is also reducing its capacity to influence the emerging shape of things in the world. In this connection it is pertinent to recall the words of the Burmese Foreign Minister, Myiat Maung at the Havana Summit (1979), while announcing the withdrawal of his country, one of the founder members, from the Non-aligned Movement:

The principles of the Movement are not recognisable any more; they are not merely dim, they are dying. Differences of views and outlooks are only to be expected, but deliberate deviation from the basic principles can only be fatal to the Movement. And it is not enough for the movement to just exist in name. There are among us those who wish to uphold the principles and preserve their own and the Movement's integrity. But obviously there are those who do not, and deliberately, exploit the Movement to gain their own grand designs.

Those interested in strengthening the Non-aligned Movement must ponder over the meaning of these words: it may perhaps help to recapture the spirit which animated the founding fathers of the Movement. While the nature of problems facing the world goes on changing and new solutions must be found for them, the members of the Non-aligned Movement must keep themselves completely detached from bloc politics. They must also

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nder the the tions must also develop a feeling of solidarity among themselves and show their readiness to help each other in difficulty without, of course, seeking to turn themselves into another bloc, which in any case is impossible. The Non-aligned Movement must also earnestly seek means to implement some of it own very far-reaching and constructive directives, particularly those related to the growth of self-reliance and co-operation among them in the economic field. Only then can the Non-aligned Movement continue to play its historic role.

ON GIVING SUBSTANCE TO COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE*

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By TARLOK SINGH**

The central inspirations of non-alignment were political in nature. Non-aligned countries had sought to be independent of the great powers and of their military alliances and blocs. The concept of peaceful co-existence was designed to leave them free to pursue their own economic and social development. For many years, non-aligned countries thought of development primarily in national terms. Each country, acting alone, found itself in a condition of growing dependence on the richer countries. Therefore, it was natural that after the oil crisis of 1973 and the Declaration of the United Nations on the New International Economic Order, collective self-reliance should begin to be seen as the key element in the economic content of non-alignment.

While non-aligned countries have continued to stress the dominance of politics above economics, they have increasingly acknowledged that their political goals will only be achieved to the extent economic aims are realized equally by individual countries, by groups of countries, and by all of them together. In this process, the distinction between the economic objectives of non-aligned countries and of "developing countries" in general has virtually disappeared and resolutions of the non-aligned countries have stressed their own role, not separately, but together with "other developing countries." In considering ways of achieving greater collective self-reliance, therefore, the two combinations, described respectively as the Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77, can be viewed as one, representing the deeply felt need of all less developed countries both for a more equitable international system and for greater economic and technical co-operation amongst themselves.

Collective self-reliance has been viewed, on the one hand, as a means for ensuring national self-reliance for individual countries and, on the other, as a means for intensifying co-operation among less developed countries, thereby also giving to them greater bargaining power in relation to the more developed countries. Upto the present, neither the non-aligned countries, nor the Group of 77, can claim to have made significant progress towards collective self-reliance. Successive reports on the implementation of the action programme drawn up at the Sixth Summit in Colombo in 1976 do not go much beyond small beginnings.

It is true that for its full fruition collective self-reliance calls for radical changes in relations between more and less developed countries. The main

^{*}Reprinted from Uma Vasudev (Ed.), Issues Before Non-Alignment: Past and Future. Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 1983,

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elements of change are well-known. They involve restructuring of international trade, a more equitable international division of labour in the area of production—specially, industrial production—reconstruction of the international monetary system, larger transfers of resources, including debt relief and fairer terms for transfer of technology, foreign investment and the operations of transnational corporations. Greater progress in mutual cooperation among less developed countries would itself be a sanction for greater response on the part of the developed countries and, however unwilling some of them may be, they would feel compelled to move. Therefore, at the present stage, the most effective method of achieving progress in the direction of a new international system would be more substantial advances by less developed countries towards their own self-determined goal of mutual co-operation and collective self-reliance. Of the two sets of obstacles, the external and the internal, in the first phase it is the latter which are the more real, and these are the ones to which the non-aligned countries and the developing countries have jointly to give their first attention. This has also been thus far the area of greatest weakness on their part. In reviewing the action visualized and the progress made, it is convenient to look at the situation of the less developed world as a whole, even turning a blind eve to the fact that while most countries in this group are non-aligned, a few may be on the margin or even nearer for the time being to one bloc or the other. The need for collective self-reliance makes too sharp a distinction among less developed countries on political considerations.

As a consequence of developments over the past two or three decades, less developed countries as a group have now a larger potential for mutual co-operation. Their productive capacities, infrastructures and skilled manpower have grown. Differences in levels of development provide conditions for interchange of experience and transfer of technology, such as did not exist earlier. However, possibilities of mutual co-operation have to be developed at several levels—bilateral, regional and inter-regional. Conditions have to be created in which countries in a position to provide and require given services can enter into co-operative arrangements to mutual benefit.

National development needs and priorities provide the essential foundation for wider forms of co-operation. Co-operation at the regional level makes possible across the board mutually agreed support among neighbouring countries, including arrangements of a bilateral character. When the group of countries becomes very large, transcending regions, co-operation is necessarily of a highly selective nature. In the full meaning of the expression, it is mainly at the regional level that collective self-reliance can be built up as a system of continuing and comprehensive relationship. Therefore, for less developed countries as a group, collective self-reliance implies strong development links among countries within different regions and sub-regions. Without these, the larger objective will not be realized.

In discussions among non-aligned and developing countries, over several years, a number of promising ideas or areas of co-operation have been

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thrown up, but little action at the practical or institutional level has yet occurred. It is now necessary to pick up each of these ideas, examine the conditions needed for their fulfilment, and create mechanisms through which they can be pursued steadily. Even so, the totality of what is achieved is likely to fall far short of collective self-reliance, but the process would have been set moving along constructive lines. By way of illustration, we may review a few of the more significant lines of development which have been visualized and consider how they may be given a more organic shape within national, regional and inter-regional plans. In each area of co-operation, the less developed countries have to come forward to adopt among themselves those very principles and codes which they wish to see adopted by the more developed countries in relation to the less developed. This would be their collective moral authority for speeding the onset of a satisfactory international order. If their own schemes of transfer and co-operation are well-conceived, the international codes for which they rightly press will follow suit sooner rather than later. In other words, the less developed and non-aligned countries should see their own role as one of peace-setting rather than of merely waiting for the codes to emerge through the readiness of the more developed countries to take a long-range global view of the needs of three-fourths of the world's population. There is little doubt that the example they set will have a decisive influence on the United Nations system and, through it and otherwise, on the richer countries.

In the area of transfer of technology, secrecy of information has been a major weapon of the developed world. Viewing their own immediate, shortterm interests, to a large extent less developed countries and their enterprises have accepted many of the conventional limitations imposed on them and, in turn, they have themselves become partners in withholding information from others. It is possible for the less developed countries, through the nonaligned movement, to determine once and for all that they will make available to one another their own knowledge and such other knowledge as becomes available to them through collaboration agreements. The code for transfer of technology which they introduce among themselves will become before long the code for all countries. The programme of co-operation which was accepted at Caracas in 1981 included several measures which the nonaligned and less developed countries are fully in a position to implement on their own without having to wait for a response from the richer countries to the challenge of a new international economic order. Four such proposals should be specially mentioned:

(i) Conducting joint negotiations for purchase or transfer of specific technologies required from industrialized countries;

(ii) Establishing networks of scientific and technological institutions for mutual benefit, and facilitating harmonization of strategies and joint programmes in scientific and technological development;

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(iii) Instituting extended and long-term training arrangements between institutions; and

(iv) Organizing co-operative efforts for enhancing the negotiating power of developing countries in regard to technology supplies from the developed countries through exchange of information and experience. removal of restrictions on transfer of technology, and co-operative working relations among competent organizations.

In most developing countries the national economy is lacking in balance between agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Rapid growth of industry is an inescapable necessity. Industrialization may often lead to long periods of further dependence on developed countries. The processes of flows of technology and resources from the developed countries accentuate this dependence in two ways. Industries are chosen such as lead to industrial enclaves with little impact on the living conditions of the bulk of the population. Such technologies are chosen as are out of step with the prevailing levels of skills and manpower and employment needs in the receiving countries. In other words, much of the industrialization that has taken place has tailed to answer the genuine social and economic needs of the less developed countries. The principal lesson to be learnt is that, keeping their own resources and demographic conditions in mind, the less developed countries should build more firmly on one another's experience and draw more fully on their own technological resources. But they have to do so on lines altogether different from those governing relations with the developed countries and their large transnational corporations.

The concept of joint ventures has not yet gone very far in relations among less developed countries. To the extent joint ventures have been established, they have proceeded largely on the basis of short-term profit expectations of enterprises from the better-equipped countries. They have not been integrated with the long-term designs of industrial development in the receiving countries. Co-operation in industrialization within the less developed world must have wider aims. The establishment of a new industrial activity is only part of the objective. There should be, at the same time, substantial components of transfer of technology on easy terms, of technical and management training and orientation and of R & D facilities in the receiving country, as well as continuous exchange and sharing among scientific and research institutions and centres whose work bears on the given industry. Individual production units which serve as the basis of industrial trial collaboration should be seen, in the less developed countries, within the framework of a broader industrialization process and networks of related units should come into existence over a period.

Non-aligned and less developed countries should lay down and implement guiding principles for mutual collaboration among themselves such that transnational corporations in the developed countries are also obliged to adopt them to a substantial degree. The Caracas proposals on co-operation

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in industrialization fell far short of this approach. The declarations of the non-aligned countries on industrialization have also not gone much beyond preliminary and somewhat general statements. Yet, industrialization, with transfer of technology, development of natural resources, co-operative programmes of training of scientific and technical manpower, and co-operation and free exchange of knowledge between scientific and technological institutions lies at the heart of collective self-reliance.

For most developing countries, important as it is to develop rapidly growing industrial activities, which are evenly spread and harmonize different levels of scale and technology, strengthening of the food and agricultural base and improvement of agricultural productivity remains the key to the future. At various gatherings of non-aligned countries, there has been a keen awareness of the risks of dependence on supplies of food and agricultural products from other countries, and specially from the developed world. Supplies of food have all too often come close to becoming instruments of pressure on countries in need. While systematic, scientific and technical co-operation among less developed countries would extend to agriculture as to other areas of development, there is one field in which the non-aligned and developing countries can quickly gain collective selfreliance if they organize their resources and knowhow on a co-operative basis. This is the area of production and supply of agricultural inputs and specially of fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery and implements, as well as improved varieties of seeds. In this area the possibilities of joint planning are immense and the practical response from non-aligned countries must be equal to the challenge.

As in industry and agriculture, so also in relation to energy, the roots of collective self-reliance lie in schemes of national development and regional co-operation. The problem of energy supplies to the less developed countries has to be dealt with no doubt at the international level which, in this case, falls fully within the sphere of relations internal to the non-aligned world and the Group of 77. Yet, even apart from this factor, there are at least four directions in which among less developed countries there is increasing scope for national and collective self-reliance. Firstly, scientific, and technical co-operation could do much to speed the growth and utilization of renewable sources of energy. Secondly, through mutual co-operation and without excessive dependence on the developed world, all countries can do much to intensify their efforts to make their surveys and investigations of existing and potential reserves more precise and accurate and thereby enlarge their usable resource endowments. Thirdly, groups of neighbouring countries could co-operate in moving step by step from national grids to larger bilateral and regional inter-linked and mutually supplementing systems of distribution of electricity. Thereby, their natural resource endowments would be developed and utilized more effectively than is likely in the ordinary course. Finally, nary course. Finally, most developing countries need to expand their domestic capacities for producing equipment, components and other requires of such ion,

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their quirements of the energy sector. Invariably, this is an area of dependence on the developed world and heavy foreign exchange expenditures have to be incurred.

As in the case of fertilizers and agricultural inputs, within the non-aligned and developing world, resources of knowledge and production capacities are now available such as can serve as a base for systematic plans of individual and collective self-reliance with only marginal resort, of necessity, to the developed world.

Among non-aligned countries and the Group of 77, many worthwhile ideas on mutual co-operation prove to be non-starters because of lack of satisfactory payment arrangements and monetary co-operation. This is now among the most urgent requirements if collective self-reliance is to become a meaningful instrument of development at the country as well as regional and inter-regional levels. Several important propositions were put forward at the Colombo Summit in 1976. Not much progress seems to have been made so far and non-aligned and developing countries have waited much too long for monetary reforms at the international level in directions in which the developed countries are still reluctant to move.

While there must be unrelenting pressure to reconstruct the international monetary system, there is much that non-aligned and developing countries (including the energy-exporting countries) can do from their own resources. Among the propositions which have been envisaged for several years, speedy progress should be possible, for instance, in relation at least to the following:

- (i) Setting up of the Solidarity Fund for Economic and Social Development;
- (ii) Establishment of a system of inter-linked regional payment unions;
- (iii) Creation, at the initiative of central banks, of operational links among financial institutions of developing countries, including commercial banks, for the purpose of financing large scale bilateral, regional or sub-regional projects;
- (iv) Extension of arrangements for export credit and export credit guarantee schemes among developing countries to help foster the financing of their mutual trade; and
- (v) Co-ordination and dissemination of information on financial flows and financial co-operation policies among developing countries at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

Much can be done in terms of the existing resources and potentials of non-aligned and developing countries. Over several years, thought has been given to the identification of feasible proposals. But both non-aligned countries and the Group of 77 have chosen to remain unequipped in terms of apparatus and machinery. There has been serious weakness not merely and getting track of specific proposals, but even in collecting information getting it disseminated to all interested countries.

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The mechanism of small groups of countries for individual areas of coperation, with one of the countries providing co-ordination, is a necessary one. But continuous action and follow-up cannot possibly be achieved without even a limited form of standing organization. By whatever name such an office or organization may be described, the need is real and cannot be deferred very long. In fact, although there is a close identity in terms of economic objectives between the non-aligned countries and the Group of 77, each of them needs its own central organization. The permament secretariat of the non-aligned movement will perhaps have to give its major attention to issues of a political nature. However, on the economic issues, it has to co-operate with and draw constantly on the Secretariat of the Group of 77, whose work should be reflected in concerted action on the part of member-countries at every step in all the fora of the United Nations.

Without a sound organization to pursue the objectives of collective self-reliance through effective and continually broadening and deepening mutual co-operation, the goal itself is now beginning to recede and fails to reflect itself in current reality. In the present world economic crisis, when most less developed countries are under extreme pressure on account of balance of payments deficits, burdens of debt, and risks of inflation and stagnation, the greatest need for non-aligned and developing countries is to organize themselves effectively for achieving all that lies within their own power, be it at the national, regional, or inter-regional level. If they do their part, there is reason to believe that a great deal of what they rightly seek from the developed world cannot lag too far behind.

MNC's IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

MULTINATIONAL Corporations (MNCs) date far back to the end of the nineteenth century when capitalism in the advanced capitalist countries of Britain, the United States, France, Germany and Japan reached its highest state—monopoly capitalism or imperialism. This new stage of capitalism was marked mainly by the attainment of sophisticated productive forces, high productivity of labour, concentration of production and centralisation of capital leading to the formation of various forms of monopolies that competed and struggled against one another for highest profit returns—monopoly "profit maximization." This process is still going on but with greater intensity and consequences.

The seizure of cheap markets nationally and internationally in the form of raw materials, labour power for the purposes of lowering production costs and thereby reaping high profit, gave the foreign market such great imporance that it became one of the major causes of the First and Second World Wars. World monopolies with the support of state monopoly capitalism scrambled for these markets and spheres of influence through a redivision of the already divided world market.

The foreign market became vital not only as a traditional dumping ground for profitable sale of goods manufactured by the monopolies but also the main sphere where foreign capital got the highest rate of returns, be it from the share of material production in extractive industry and manufacturing or in circulation—banking and insurance. Export of capital or foreign capital investment thus for the first time gradually took prominence over the traditional export of other commodities.

Corporations, like all forms of monopolies—companies, trusts, firms, concerns, cartels, etc.—date far back to the end of last century. Perhaps what is new in the MNCs is their "multinationalism." As from World War I, and especially after World War II, up to date, industrialisation and general advancement of all productive forces (be they in the form of manpower skills or even machinery used), have led to quantitative and qualitative developments in the whole conception and operations of all forms of monopolies. Although retaining in essence their original purpose, monopolies have in many cases either collapsed, got "swallowed up" or grown to be what is now called a "state within a state," a multinational corporation. And, "by its nature and affiliate of a multinational corporation it will almost always represent a direct investment, and conversely the bulk of direct investment is owned by multinational corporations."

MNC's DEFINED

What is a multinational corporation then? According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the distinguishing feature of the multinational corporation is that its operations are distributed among two

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or more countries to a significant extent. An enterprise with more than 20 per cent of its assets distributed among two countries may be considered

a multinational corporation.2

This definition or description of a MNC is inadequate since mere distribution of operations among two or more countries does not represent all its functions. A multinational corporation means highly advanced monopoly capital production relations which are extensively socialised and internationalized but are under the centralised control of a high and ever growing concentration of economic power; the diversified production process itself takes a more massive size as a result of its dynamic technology which is supported with financial resources of the financial oligarchy in the basic institutional unit or at home with greater state involvement.

Some quantitative data may help to understand our definition, the might and importance of these MNCs.³ The United Nations estimated that, one-fifth of the whole total GNP of the non-socialist world and exceeding the GNP of any one country except the United States, was value-added in these MNC's at \$ 500 million in 1971.⁴ The share of MNCs in the world economy is growing rapidly; at least since 1950 its annual rate of growth has been "high and remarkedly steady" at 10 per cent, compared to 4 per cent for non-internationalized output in the Western developed countries.⁵ It is envisaged that within a generation some 400-500 MNCs will own something like two-thirds of the fixed assets of the world.⁶

The value of internationalized production? now exceeds the value of international trade and the former has therefore displaced the latter as the main vehicle of international economic exchange. Although we are not told as to what has caused this foreign "philanthrophic" trend, US officials confirm these facts by saying that their overseas production has grown faster than its exports, and sales of overseas subsidiaries are today several times

larger than their exports.8

At the same time, US multinationals overall are responsible for 62 per cent of the exports and 35 per cent of the imports of manufactured goods of that country; domestically they account for at least one-third of the country's economic activity and are, by far, the principal influence on the United States balance of payments. A member of the United States Government Public Advisory Committee on MNC Foreign Investment and Balance of Payments, Booth, concurs that the free movement of capital across borders is a vital means of gaining and preserving access to markets that otherwise would be lost to the United States. In dividends it earns abroad and in the exports it generates, direct overseas private investments received is one of the most important sources of payment received in the United States international accounts. The power and importance of MNCs is therefore not only in host countries but also at home. They are "the Almighty" in the capitalist economics and therefore in the political and other spheres of human life globally.

The consequence of this is that since World War II, there has been an

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increasing awareness of their impact on the lives of roughly two-thirds of the world's people which it affects, resulting in continued underdevelopment of these areas. It is a unique phenomenon to the Third World and is seen in the statistical findings on increasing unemployment, growing inequality in income distribution, and the fact that 40 to 60 per cent of the population have suffered not only relative but also absolute decline consumption patterns.¹¹

The objective of this paper is to explore whether the phenomena of continued underdevelopment and a rise to a new world-wide institution—the Multinational Corporation are related to each other. Specifically, exploration will focus on three main aspects: the empirical reality of the role played by MNCs in the economies of the Third World, the methods and practices utilized by them in third world operations, and the results of these operations and their impact on the development potential of these countries.

CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES OF CORPORATE INVESTMENTS

In recent years, much criticism of the role of multinational corporations in underdeveloped countries has emerged. One of the primary sources of this critical perspective has been the Latin American Dependency School, which considered the multinational corporation as the basis for a new type of technological industrial dependence to replace earlier forms of dependence. Other critical perspectives have been presented by Northern Europeans with globally-oriented acciological structural models, ¹² Africanists concerned with colonial and prescolonial centre-periphery relations, ¹³ a diverse array of North American conomists, sociologists and political scientists ¹⁴ and the United Nations. ¹⁵

Despite differences of opinion about the economic and political implications, the general consensus is that these are tantamount to reduction of economic and political capabilities for further development. Thus multinationals are criticized for their distortion of development. There is also consensus that multinational investments increase the propensity for conflict—either international or domestic—between multinationals and the host country or between competing groups within the host country. Even when overt conflict is absent, there is a consensus that investment by multinational corporations both enhances and maintains their hegemonic dominance in underdeveloped countries.

On the other hand, conventional writers attribute major economic benefits to the presence of multinational corporations because these enterprises bring in missing or deficient factors of production such as capital, technology and managerial skills. For less-developed countries, too small to be viable as national economies under present technologies, research and capital requirements and existing transportation and communications facilities, multinational corporations are often "the only real hope." Multinationals also

provide access to foreign markets for export of subsidiary products. As a corollary to the provision of production factors and access to export markets, multinational corporations provide jobs in less-developed countries. From the consumer point of view, the multinational corporation provides a better product at a lower cost and may even raise the prices of domestic factors of production.¹⁷

In addition to these direct benefits, these writers contend a whole series of indirect benefits from multinational investments; they can provide the necessary stimuli to energize the resources of less-developed countries and have a considerable multiplier effect. The export-oriented industries that multinationals foster could keep down inflation, because cost increases reduce the sales of exports. Further, multinationals enhance competition and break local monopolies.

Finally, a counter factual argument sometimes made on behalf of multinational corporations is that the alternatives to multinationals (the absence of foreign investment altogether, or alternative methods of technology transfer) would be no better. These arguments thus tend to suggest that multinational corporations enhance the economic capabilities of the less-

developed countries and contribute to their development.

A similar scenario applies to the political capabilities of less-developed countries. The nation shares in the increased profits of multinational corporations through taxation, and since multinationals tend to be more scrupulous than their indigenous counterparts about paying taxes, their presence increases governmental revenues and its capability for further activities. For these traditionalists then, multinational corporations are agents of change, altering traditional value systems, social attitudes and behaviour patterns. They encourage responsibility among the political leadership of less-developed countries. By improving the economic situation and capabilities for less-developed countries, multinationals facilitate political development whether defined in terms of governmental capabilities, stability, institutionalization, or systems capacity.

MNC's IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Before discussing the impact of the MNCs on developing countries, it is essential that we should be familiar with the institutional conditions and economic structures of these economies. In addition, a familiarity with the politico-economic circumstances of developing countries would shed further light on why it cannot be assumed that the contributions of, for example, a United States corporation's subsidiary in West Germany to that economy are the same as the contributions of that corporation's subsidiary in Nigeria to the Nigerian economy.

Developing countries share the same trait—"poverty"—relative to the rest of the world. A United States' Senate Report of a few years ago set the world GNP at approximately \$3,000 billion, of which the developing nations,

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he rest set the ations, with the vast majority of the world's population accounted for only about 12 per cent. At the other extreme, about one-fourth of the world's population has access to about 88 per cent of world GNP.¹⁹

Though aggregate statistics are often obscure as much as they reveal, most analysts feel that economic growth rates in the developing countries are fairly high by world historical standards. Neufarmer and Mueller estimated in their report that real growth in the developing countries was 4.5 per cent between 1960 and 1966, a growth rate higher than that enjoyed by countries like Britain and France in the second half of the nineteenth century, the period of their most rapid industrialisation. This study suggests that the developing countries' growth rate in this period compares fairly well with that of the developed nations' 5.1 per cent. The difference, the study observes, is heightened significantly by the much higher rate of population increase in the developing world. Per capita income growth in the developing countries was thus only 2 per cent, compared with 3.6 per cent in the developed areas.²⁰

According to other studies, covering longer periods, per capita GNP in the developing countries grew almost as fast (or even faster) as in the developed world. A United States' Department of State Report for example, notes that per capita GNP in the developing countries increased by 213 per cent between 1950 and 1975, compared with an increase of 205 per cent in the developed countries.²¹ But overall per capita income in the developing states went upto only \$437, while in the developed the per capita figure was \$4,445. Even if the developing nations do have a higher growth rate, which is debatable, it could well be hundred years before they catch up. If the amenities gap is ever to narrow, developing states would have to grow at a much higher rate than the industrialized countries. While the richer of these developing areas maintained per capita growth rates of around 6 per cent during the 1960's and the 1970's, per capita income in the poorest of them did not increase at all. Resultantly, the gap between the rich and poor countries continues to widen. In relative terms, the poor are getting poorer and the rich richer, and this basic trend is likely to continue indefinitely.

Another feature of developing countries, which is more prominent in Africa than in the other developing areas, is the lack of adequately trained civil servants to examine and investigate whether or not commercial and business laws are being complied with by MNC's. The implications of this lack of expertise is that the very laws themselves are old and need to be revised to take cognizance of the major changes in the origins of economic power. Secondly, whereas we normally think of the institutions of organized labour in advanced countries as a countervailing force of check upon the power of the corporation, this is not the case in most developing countries where organization amongst labour is either weak or absent. Thus, the 'bargaining power' of the MNC to maximize profits is far greater in developing countries than in the developed because of the absence of strong institutional mechanisms to control the behaviour of subsidiaries. Galbraith

observes, Third World countries are characterized by an absence of "countervailing" power of government and organized labour for setting limits on the power of modern corporations.

Then again, the economic structure in these developing countries has two significant needs: the need for sources of technology and sources of investment financing. Economic modernization and expansion of most developing countries, is characterized by the role of middlemen who are between cash crop production by peasant farmers and export, leaving exploitation of resources to multinational corporations. Fortunately or unfortunately, most developing countries have already set in motion a process of industrialization highly similar to that found in the advanced capitalist nations of the West. This is not only similar in terms of the output of industry (capital goods and private consumption goods), but also in terms of modern technology and human technical skills needed for its implementation. In other words, the voluntary or involuntary institutionalization of Western consumption values as the goal of economic growth has, in turn, brought about the need for a technology which can satisfy this pattern of consumption. What then are the sources of this technology? (Table I below gives some indications).

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TABLE I

PATENTS GRANTED TO FOREIGNERS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PATENTS GRANTED BETWEEN 1957 AND 1961—BOTH YEARS INCLUSIVE

"Large" Industrial Countries		"Smaller" Industrial Countries		Developing Countries	
U.S.A. Japan West Germany United Kingdom France	15.72 34.02 37.14 47.00 59.36	Italy Switzerland Sweden Netherlands Luxemburg Belgium	62,85 64,08 69,30 69,83 80,84 85,55	India Turkey U.A.R. Trinidad and Tobago Pakistan Ireland	89.38 91.38 93.01 94.18 95.75 96.51

Source: Statistical information appearing in United Nations Document "The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries," New York, 1964, pp. 94-95. Cited in Constantine Vaitsois, "Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries," The Journal of Development Studies, 1973. p.6.

Developing countries are virtually dependent on foreign sources, especially of the advanced nations of North America, Western Europe and Japan for their technology. Not even these figures reflect the ownership of patents

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actually utilized for producing goods. A comparison of patents granted but not utilized in production will show that:

... if the number of patents is weighted by their economic or technological worth (i.e. volume of sales or value-added) most developing countries are likely to find that the so-weighted patents belonging to their own nationals amounts to a fraction of 1 per cent of the total patents granted by such countries.²²

The second characteristic is in the form of investment. Here, a similar set of vicious circles is also at play in the financial patterns of these countries. It is well-known that in almost all developing countries there is scarcity of local savings available to be channeled into financial capital for productive investments. This scarcity of savings is due not only to the low level of income, but also the repatriation of certain portion of this savings abroad. In other words, apart from internal scarcity, indigenous wealth-holders also channel a part of their savings out to MNC's (the so-called phenomenon of "capital-flight"). Adding to the outflow of savings through repatriated profits and capital-flight is the increasing debt-repayment to bilateral and multilateral aid agencies (AID, World Bank, etc.) on loans. Taken together, the magnitude of these outflows is so huge that, the poor countries are now ironically helping to finance the rich. That is, the financial outflows from developing countries far exceeds the inflows.²³

There is thus a twofold dilemma in the financial structure of developing countries. While on the one hand, there is a growing gap between the supply of available local savings and the demand for investment funds to alleviate the growing poverty, on the other, the particular technology which is required for industrialization is not only expensive, but must be paid for inforeign exchange. Even when there are sufficient savings to finance needed investment projects, the investment may not take place because savings in local currency cannot be translated into foreign exchange for the purchase of imported technology that may be required.

Protagonists of the MNC role in developing countries point out that they provide scarce capital technology and know-how which enables the manufacture and provision of commodities at lower prices. They also argue that in some cases the MNCs provide access to export markets and contribute through the taxes paid and the employment created to local development. Each of these claims, however, can be challenged.

First, contrary to the accepted proposition that MNC's expand from their home countries because of an excess of surplus finance (capital) relative to inadequate domestic investment opportunities, they do so to a much lesser extent than might be supposed from looking at figures of assets owned. Over the period 1960-1968 MNCs repatriated on an average some 79 per cent of their net profits, not to mention the additional remissions of royalties,

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interest, and other fees.24 In manufacturing, repatriated profits were somewhat lower but they increased from 42 per cent of net profits during the 1960-1964 period to 52 per cent in 1965-1968.25 For each dollar of net profit earned by an MNC subsidiary, 52 cents is repatriated home even though 78 per cent of the investment funds used to generate that dollar of profit came from local sources. If we look at all sectors in which MNCs operate in Latin America, the inflow-outflow accounting gets even worse. Each dollar of net profit generated was based on an investment that was 83 per cent financed from local sources, but only 21 per cent of this profit remained in the local country. From the above indicators it is clear that there is a net decrease in the amount of local savings that is being utlized for the benefit of either indigenous consumers or investors in the local economies of developing countries. In this sense, the MNCs increase their profit and drain the cash of developing countries who, instead of benefiting from the corporations' establishment, are being faced with financial problems. This practice also prevents formation of domestic capital and results in a net outflow of capital from developing economies in the form of repatriated profits, royalties, interests, etc.

Another impact of the MNCs is the inflow of technology and technical know-how. There is no doubt that MNCs do bring modern technology to developing countries, but there is again the question of the net effect of such technology. The United Nations estimated that in 1960 approximately 27 per cent of the population of developing countries were unemployed. By 1970, the estimates of the percentage of active population unemployed had gone beyond 30 per cent.26 An underlying cause of the unemployment crisis rests in the particular industrialization process being utilized to bring about economic growth. One important impact of this process was emphasized earlier, that almost all the technology in developing countries comes from the developed countries and is controlled by foreign sources, namely the MNCs. Also, technology transferred to the developing world by the MNCs has been designed for the resource conditions of the advanced industrialized nations where there is relative abundance of capital and relative scarcity of labour. In other words, this technology is incapable of absorbing labour because it has been designed to be capital intensive, that is, "labour-saving and capital using." In effect then, the MNCs are eliminating many more jobs than they are creating.

As regards income distribution, the Multinational Corporations have played a very marginal role in influencing it since their establishment in developing countries. This is because developing countries' economies are based on the legal institution of capitalism, where owners of capital resources receive the income generated by them. Suffice it to say, that where there are only a very small number of owners (and thus a very large number of nonowners) of capital, and where the technology used generates a larger proportion of income from capital than labour resources, the distribution of income will be highly unequal. Hence, the MNCs have only contributed

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rger on of uted to the richest 5, 10 or 20 per cent of these populations, but have been an absolute disservice to the human condition of the greater majority of the population of developing countries.

According to Arrighi, the investment policies of these multinational corporations are biased against the development of capital-goods industries of the developing areas and favour the use of capital-intensive techniques in their extractive and export-oriented undertakings in these countries. Both these biases hinder the balanced development of the African economies. Capital intensive techniques require less labour per level of output than the labour-intensive techniques. They also require a small labour force composed of specialized management personnel and semi-skilled workers whereas labour intensive techniques tend to require a much larger labour force composed largely of skilled and unskilled workers. Thus Arrighi argues that the multinational corporations are creating a small, but a relatively privileged "labour aristocracy" of well-paid employees while restricting the growth of wage employment opportunities in the modern sector of the economy for a large number of unemployed or underemployed urban migrants.²⁷

The bias against the development of the capital goods sector prevents a balanced growth of the internal market and, along with the use of capital intensive techniques, increases the dependence of the developing economics on the importation of specialized machinery and other capital goods from the metropolitan countries. The latter aggravates the balance of payments problems experienced by most of these countries and further integrates the modern sectors of their economies into the economies of the industrialized metropolitan countries. In sum, the new pattern of investment which Arrighi sees emerging in developing countries is incompatible with both the attainment of economic independence and any significant improvement in the living standards of people of developing countries.

It is true that MNCs are sometimes agents for gaining access to certain international markets, like those for oil or diamonds. While this may make them indispensable for a particular economy, it is hardly beneficial to the developing economy when one considers their role from a broader perspective, since it is their control of markets which makes their agency necessary in the first place. In addition, it is often the case that MNCs actively discourage exports in competition with their global marketing strategies.

Also, it is undeniable that MNCs make major contributions to many public purses. This again can hardly be counted as a net benefit without taking into account revenue lost through the outflow of funds or other losses occasioned by their activities. In any event the generation of this revenue is not dependent on the MNCs as such and would be equal or greater if the activities in question are financed through loan capital and managed individually.

Another point worth noting is that the MNCs are always in a position to force or induce third world countries to forego large chunks of potential revenue by demanding and obtaining extensive tax concessions. Their

demand along these lines becomes more insistent and effective as the country in question becomes increasingly dependent on capital inflows to balance the effects of capital outflows generated by the stock of existing foreign capital. This does not however mean that, there are no occasions when MNC activities provide net long-term benefits to an economy. By the same token there are undoubtedly some circumstances where their effects are ultimately negative.²⁸

Lastly, this paper accepts the concept of sovereignty in its entirety—that any independent country is sovereign. As such, it has power over all its citizens, safeguards the interest of its citizens, its boundary, etc. But does the establishment of multinational corporations in any country allow this

fundamental concept of sovereignty to function?

The problems associated with MNCs emerge from their distinctive transnational features in a world that is divided into separate sovereign states. Despite the fact that multinational corporations have developed important capacities which can be of use to world development, the same capabilities are used in a way that are detrimental to the interests of individual countries.²⁹ While the objectives of African states are to advance the welfare of its citizens, that of the multinational corporations are profit and growth. Thus there is a clash between the objectives of an individual state and multinational corporations as the actions of the latter negate the concept of sovereignity.

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Furthermore, the size and scope of MNCs has made it possible for them to control substantial shares of the local and sometimes world mrakets; they can engage in price discrimination, place stringent conditions on the transfer of technology and patents, export market allocation and enter into cartel agreement which reduces competition. Consequent to the above, MNCs can make decisions which have far-reaching effects on developing countries. Their activities also affect patterns of consumption since they produce or own most of the basic commodities used in industry and commerce. They also employ advertising and marketing techniques to influence patterns of consumption of developing countries.

Then again, since MNCs control the strategic sectors of the developing nations' economies and support local comprador groups in both their investment and trade activities, the self-interests of these local groups occasionally conflicts with declared national development policies. Hence the

overall impact of MNCs ridicules the concept of sovereignty.

What then, is the role of developing state governments? The governments of the developing countries are no match for the multinational corporations. Consequently, their efforts to bargain with, and regulate the operations of, these giant corporations are largely ineffectual, particularly when the corporations are backed by the government of their home countries. Green and Seidman note that "the individual states are smaller in terms of revenues and reserves than the firms whose policies they seek to control," and the dependence of these countries upon foreign aid "results in the determination of

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'national' economic policy and even the limitation of domestic investment resources by foreign public and private interests."30

Infact, foreign investors and their governments tend to work together to exact as favourable conditions as possible from the developing states. According to Green and Seidman:

The resulting pattern is one of joint investor and government pressure on developing states. High rates of profits are a usual symptom and a drain on capital needed for economic reconstruction. But probably the most crippling results are the determination of structural change, the warping of economic plans to suit foreign investors or governments and the thwarting or blocking of polices designed to secure developing countries' control over developing economies.³¹

Under such circumstances, the individual states find it next to impossible to formulate and execute development plans which do not have the approval of the foreign private interests involved in their economies. In other words, foreign private interests tend to exercise a veto over the development plans of the developing states. Moreover, it is obvious that under these conditions, foreign financial pressures can be used to coerce these states to pursue domestic and foreign policies compatible with foreign interests.

CONCLUSIONS

There can be little doubt as to our overall conclusions concerning the impact of MNCs on developing countries. We have found more myth than reality in the claims made about the three most important contributions of MNCs. Our analysis of their contributions in technology and technical know-how revealed a basic cause of further umemployment and concentration of extremely unequal income distribution, despite the excessive prices being charged by the MNCs in transferring this technology.

Upon examination, it was noted that the so-called financial returns were really more of a financial drain, decreasing both current consumption and available local savings—thus future consumption for the vast majority of developing countries.

The third area of analysis, the balance of payments contribution, led to similar conclusions. In contrast to contribution, the empirical information showed no superior export performance by MNCs relative to local firms unless it was accompanied by export underpricing. Concomitantly, exports were further limited via restrictions placed on their technology by the MNCs. While potential inflows were minimized, the balance of payments outflows were accentuated the contribution of payments and infloted royalty payments.

Were accentuated through import overpricing and inflated royalty payments. There can be little doubt that such an impact can only contribute to the further impoverishment of the poorest 60 to 80 per cent of the world population. Summing up the specific consequences, however, leads to an overall

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consequence which should be briefly mentioned. The involvement of MNC's in the structural processes of developing countries cannot be ignored. We have already referred to the fact that this process permits greater control over technology and the finances of a majority of developing countries. resulting in what among others, has shown to be an over-growing external dependency of the poor nations on the few rich nations of the world.32 Besides the transfer-in of inappropriate technology and the transfer-out of financial resources, the process includes one further destabilizing force, the transfer via advertising and mass-media programming of a consumption ideology, the goals of which only 30 per cent at best and, more realistically, 20 per cent of developing countries' populations can hope to achieve in the foreseeable future. These consumption goals do not go unheeded by the greater majority of these countries; rather, they are observed and become part of the poor, the not-so-poor and the rich. Thus, just as the MNCs are involved in restructuring the production sector, so too are they a major force in restructuring the consumption "sector."

The increasing penetration of developing countries by MNCs raises the question of how is one to deal with their impact. It is sometimes suggested that this can be done satisfactorily through minor reforms in the tax structures, in transfer-pricing mechanisms or in programmes to employ local staff, and that it must be in this way lest the corporations are alienated as potential investors. Unfortunately this last structure is rather arbitrary in its effect and represents a threat which severely constrains the ability of governments to act effectively in these marginal ways. However, we are of the opinion that constructive action needs to be undertaken by these developing countries.

The developing countries should thus welcome the MNCs by ordering their needs. For instance a country's need may be iron and steel construction, then the most advisable thing to do is to contact a multinational corporation that is specialized in steel manufacturing. In addition, it should insist on local equity participation; the developing country would finance 51 per cent of the total cost and also participate in the corporations' decision-making. Eventually, the population of the developing host country should be allowed to buy shares out of the remaining 49 per cent. Thus it allows goods normally imported to be produced in the host country and also creates room for local ownership.

In addition, each developing country should promote technical and professional education for initial training and later send people abroad for specialized training. On their return, the government should encourage them to set up indigenous private firms. As a result, the government would not solely depend on foreign firms. To cite the case of the electronic industry as an outstanding example of the lack of diffusion of technology—a Malaysian businessman, referring to the electronics industry says: "Three thousand people were trained but all three thousand cannot make a complete computer circuit. They each can only make certain parts. If the MNC's

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were to pull out, we would still not be able to make a complete unit on our own, 33 Thus it suffices to say that when they leave, workers will be unemployed because the skills are not transferrable.

For successful implementation of the above suggestions, people in developing countries require motivation which should be geared to improvement of the economic machinery. This will enable each government to create "... a sociological climate within which people live and work; favours the use of devices in a manner which yields optimum economic advantage to the individuals concerned."34 When everybody or a reasonable number of citizens in a developing country possess economic satisfaction and advantage, there would be self-improvement as well as national improvement and development.

June 1983

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GROWING REGIONALISM IN SIKKIM: A NOTE

FOLLOWING Sikkim's merger with the Indian Union in 1975 it was hoped that the Sikkimese would join the mainstream of Indian life, politics and culture. As long as Kazi Lhendup Dorji and his party, the Sikkim Congress, was at the helm of affairs things were not allowed to drift. But then came a change in 1979 when the State Assembly elections were held. Regionalism appeared on the scene and has continued to caste its sinister shadow ever since then. This paper tries to elaborate how the stance of regionalism came to the fore through the sub-nationalist programmes and policies of political parties. Sub-nationalism has in fact manifested itself in policies directed against the plainsmen, Hindi and the Centre.

The reaction against plainsmen (according to one estimate there are 60 thousand plainsmen in Sikkim), initially came in the form of a warning from the Chief Minister Nar Bahadur Bhandari. The Bhandari Government made clear that the plainsmen were not welcome in the area and they should be prepared to vacate Sikkim at the shortest notice. The Chief Minister is on record as having said, "that his government would intensify its sons of the soil policy in the state, and outsiders, who came to Sikkim after 1970, should start packing their bags. This should be treated as my notice to them."

DEVELOPING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PLAINSMEN

Discriminatory Economic Policies

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The sense of insecurity of the plainsmen has also increased because of the government's policy to deny permanent jobs to them.3 Most of the plainsmen in Sikkim hold jobs of a contractual nature so that they could easily be fired. This discrimination is seen not only in matters of public appointments, but is also reflected in the economic policy of the government which is clearly directed against them. New trade licences are denied to them, old ones are not renewed, or if renewed, deliberate delay is made. To crown all, the Industrial Licencing Bill, cleared by the Sikkim Legislative Assembly, entitles "only three ethnic communities - Bhutia, Lepcha and the Nepalese of Sikkim origin - the exclusive rights of participation in the industries to the exclusion of all others settled here." In spite of the Advocate-General's advice to the Chief Minister that such a clause would be unconstitutional, the latter declared that the wording of the bill was in the "best interest of the Sikkimese people." It is significant that this bill takes away the claims of old in the sikkimese people." of old inhabitants of Sikkim who came as early, if not earlier, than the Nepali, as an ethnic group of Sikkim. The Chief Minister has thus stigmatised them

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Political Rights Suspended

The conspiracy against plainsmen extends also to the political field. Their political rights were suspended as a result of the writ petition by R.C. Poudyal, the President of the Sikkim Congress Revolutionary, which challenged the validity of the statute which had altered the parity formula of representation in the Sikkim Assembly. It may be recalled that the 1973-1975 formula which, while barring reservation of seats for the Lepcha-Bhutias, Shanghas and Scheduled Castes, had reserved the rest for the Nepalese.⁵ This was undone in 1979 by conceding reservation of seats for the Lepcha-Bhutias-12, Sanghas -1 and the Scheduled Castes -2. The rest of the 17 general seats were open equally to all.6 This was tantamount to the Nepalese being equated with plainsmen for fighting for the general seats. Poudyal, with the backing of the Chief Minister, now wants to alter this electoral formula by practically disfranchising the plainsmen and making provision for only the Nepalese to get elected through general seats. Their formula, if accepted, would leave just one nominated member to represent the plainsmen in the Sikkim Assembly.7

It is not difficult to find out the motive behind all these moves. Non-plainsmen are nervous of the prospects of new contenders for political power. In the last Assembly Elections, of the 17 open seats, eight were contested by plainsmen. The Nepalese, in particular, are really afraid that the plainsmen may oust them from political power in the coming elections if they were allowed to contest from the general non-reserved seats. That explains the hue and cry against the plainsmen. Thus it is not only the ruling party (Sikkim Pradesh Congress (I), erstwhile Sikkim Janta Parishad) that has an anti-plains policy, but even Poudyal's opposition party.

Apathy to Hindi

Another important indicator of growing sub-nationalism is the apathy towards Hindi. Hindi, because of its rich literature, wide circulation, contact language status and popularity is understood by almost all the urban population of Sikkim. But the powers that be have strong prejudices against Hindi which in their mistaken opinion is synonymous with Indian nationalism. This anti-Hindi prejudice is reflected in many ways. The government's attitude towards Hindi in the state is passive and unresponsive; most of the junior schools are without Hindi teachers, even while it is compulsory upto class VIII. At the higher secondary level, students are either denied admission or discouraged on the pretext of non-availability of Hindi teachers. There is an element of hypocrisy in the government's language policy. To curry favour of the Central Government, the Chief Minister reportedly criticised the language policy of neighbouring CPM-controlled West Bengal as anti-national, yet in his own state, he has done everything possible to wipe out Hindi. The government has abolished the Hindi Language Department at the

Gangtok Government Degree College and terminated the services of the Hindi lecturer.8 The Nepalese language fanaticism is naturally not liked by the Lepchas and the Bhutia but being nervous of repercussions by the dominant community they remain quiet. They also do not assert their own firm belief of having Hindi recognised as a link language.

DEFIANCE OF THE CENTRE

Coming back to the emerging anti-Centre stance, both the ruling and the oppositon parties have voiced their protest against, what they feel to be, uncalled for and unjustified Central Government interference. Poudval is on record as having said, that "every legislation passed by Parliament, even on central subjects is not acceptable to the people of Sikkim and that the state government should be consulted on every matter, including the Union List subjects." The open defiance of the Central High Command came to the fore during the Rajya Sabha Elections (1981), when the ruling party of Sikkim felt that the Centre had imposed its own candidate ignoring the wishes of the Sikkimese people. "Why don't you elect and send even a Chief Minister from Delhi?" - was how two former cabinet members quipped. 10 The Sikkim Congress Revolutionary has been demanding the same status for Sikkim as that of Kashmir. 11 The consecration of Wangchuk as Chogyal of Sikkim, much to the embarrassment of Delhi was the severest blow. That this selection had the sanction of six ruling party MLA's and three of the opposition is ominous enough. 12 That all honour of Chogyal, be bestowed on Wangchuk when Chogyalism stood abolished, is a dangerous portent to revise the old story of integration.

All these portents are serious. The regionalists and sub-nationalists in the state are in search of their regional identity; in this connection they have sought links beyond the bounds of Sikkim with its geopolitically proximate neighbour Darjeeling. This search makes common cause with the majority Nepalese secessionists in Darjeeling and Kalimpong, from whence the Gorkha League demanded a Gorkha State.13 The Sikkim Chief Minister, N.B. Bhandari has endorsed the affinity; he stated that "the people of Sikkim and Darjeeling were the same." It was due to the political shortsightedness of the then ruler that Darjeeling was handed over to the British. He further added, that "it would be my effort to keep the morale of the 60 lakh Nepalese high" as the sentiments of the hill people and plains people differ; hence the "Centre should think about it." In support of the Gorkhaland (separate state) concept, he stated "I stand by it." He also called for the application of "the sons of the soil theory" and questioned why posts Were being filled up by outsiders in Darjeeling. 14

This linkage approach between the regionalists and sub-nationalists of Sikkim and Darjeeling is probably intended to merge the Darjeeling hill area with Sikkim where 60 lakh Nepalese can be identified. To achieve their regional goal, the Gorkhas of Darjeeling are getting "fire-arms from the

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Communist Party (Marxist) with intentions to create an anarchic situation for the non-Communist government." In such a situation where the Gorkhas are up in arms and the Sikkimese secessionists creating trouble for the Central Government — things could be pretty bad.

As the growth of regional consciousness throughout India is perceptible in the formation of group identities, so also in Sikkim a distinctly sub-regional consciousness among the ethnic groups has been encouraged by the parties in the state. Although there are intra-ethnic group contradictions yet these are always overshadowed by those against the plains people and the Central Government. Ethnically and culturally the Buddhists of Sikkim have felt closer to Tibet and the Nepalese Hindus to Nepal than to the plainsmen in the state; they have thus maintained their indentities and distinct way of life. They now want to preserve this identity and a separate status even after their integration with the Indian Union.

APPRAISAL

What, then, are the political implications and lessons of the emerging trends of regionalism? In terms of the party system, the picture has exposed the bankruptcy of the national parties, none of which has been able to reach the grass-root levels. Nor are there any political leaders in Sikkim who could propound with a force the cult of Indian nationalism. The logical result has been that regional parties with leaders, having only a regional vision, regional perspectives and regional interests at heart have come to occupy the political scene of Sikkim. In a way, the parochialism and anti-plains psychology which had been evident in the non-democratic Chogyal era, continues even today despite the democratic revolution. Even the present day ruling party, the Congress (I) of the Sikkim state has only adopted a national party badge but is essentially catering only to regional needs and aspirations, generally adversely affecting the national interest.

It is difficult to predict the exact course of action of the regionalists in the state, but it seems that every political group has the tendency to proclaim secession from the Indian Union. The secessionist forces in the state have been encouraged by Kashmir's unique identity within the Indian Union, the ambition of the Punjab secessionists, the strong hold of regional parties DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, Telegu Desham in Andhra Pradesh, Kranti Ranga in Karnataka and more by the popular movements in Assam and other states of north-eastern India with their militant regionalism. Therefore, it is no wonder that the two dropped ministers, Serab Palden (Finance) and Sanehman Limboo (Education), may form a new party on regional lines, centralising among the Lepcha-Bhutia and Tsong of Sikkim to challenge the Congress (I) in the coming Assembly Elections of 1984.

The geopolitical links of Darjeeling and Kalimpong with Sikkim may lead to the revival of the concept of old Sikkim on the political map of India. Such a development would naturally accentuate the further demand of

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independent status for Sikkim by the regionalists and secessionists in the state. One may recall how this was visualised and advocated by the American wife of the late 12th Chogyal, Mrs. Hope Cook Namgyal as early as 1966. She had advocated that Darjeeling should be retrieved to Sikkim and an independent status be given. This would also suit the American design that "the Northeast should be the first part to form a separate state" as an identity entirely alien to the rest of India. The india.

The plainsmen, excluding the Marwari businessmen, may thus be driven out like the 300 Karnataka families from Goa. As regards the Marwaris, since their ousting would mean the collapse of trade and commerce, which is the pipeline of the Sikkimese economy, they are safe for the present. Later on however, they too could be suitably substituted by promoting local business aspirants.

Now, what is the best possible way to avert the crisis? How to effect a viable solution of the issue within the broadest perspective of national integration? National integration implies a sense of belonging, a feeling of togetherness among all segments of citizenry. National integration has been defined as "the absence of divisive movements that would balkanise the nation or drastically jeopardise the power of the Central Government and to the presence of attitudes throughout the society that give preference to national and public interests as distinct from parochial interest."19 The feeling, of course, does not come out of any mechanical force but rests on organic unity within diversity; for if there is only unity, integration becomes unnecessary, and if there is only diversity, then integration may not be attainable. Nor can integration be viewed merely as a static co-existence of different groups and communities; "it is primarily a socio-economic problem of removing the obstacles in the path of development so that they can advance according to their own genius and culture unfettered and unhampered."20

Within this conceptual frame of national integration—in the present situation the Central Government has two options for Sikkim: (a) it may aim at a total merger of Sikkim with India by amending the Constitution and giving it the status of a Union Territory or (b) it could genuinely provide policies and conditions as advised by the Nehruvian concept of "Tribal Panchsheel." This concept had advocated the development of peoples along the lines of their own genius without imposing anything on them. They should be encouraged to retain and develop their own traditional art and culture. Tribal rights in land and forests should be respected and attempts should be made to train and build up a team of their own people for administrative functions. Some technical personnel from outside would undoubtedly be needed initially, but we should avoid introducing too many outsiders into the tribal territory. Further, Nehru advised that we should not over-administer these areas or overwhelm them with a multiplicity of schemes. We should rather work with them keeping in mind always their social and cultural

institutions. Then again, results should be judged not by statistics or the

amount of money spent but by the equality evolved.21

After stopping the Nepalese influx in the state, a Regional Council of Sikkim like the Northeastern Regional Council, could be established with a permanent secretariat under the charge of a Chairman appointed by the Government of India. Secondly, the Regional Council should be wholly financed by the Central Government and should be assigned functions for coordinated development of the region keeping in view the security aspect of the country as well. Finally, it should be a living institution which would meet frequently for adoption of schemes for the development of the state.

Thus, the regional urges within the state could be satisfied and their reconciliation with one another would ensure the integrity of the state and its emotional integration with the rest of the country. Sikkim is not merely a vital strategic outpost of India touching the Tibetan border of China; it also symbolises, no less important, the question of integration of ethnic groups with the national identity.

March 1983

SATYA NARAYAN MISHRA*

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^{*}Dr. Mishra is Post Graduate Teacher in Political Science at Rongli, East Sikkim.

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INDIA'S IMPERILLED FRONTIERS

A Review Article

PEOPLE do not read books on economics for pleasure; or for that matter, books on northeast India either. The author has to be somebody like Galbraith, who gets read irrespective of the subject. There are few points in common between Galbraith and Nari Rustomji or Mehra. Apart from the difference in their (physical) height; conversations with Galbraith are great fun but you mostly listen. Conversations with Rustomji and Mehra are also great fun, but you mostly talk.

Nari Rustomji's two earlier books had a dominant autobiographical streak. This is absent in *Imperilled Frontiers*;* instead, there are attempts at generalisation. The author wants to come out with what he feels has been done correctly, what has been done wrongly and what should now be done. To those of us who know him, generalisations and discussion of concepts are things which Rustomji shys away from. When he does undertake such an effort, there is all the more reason why everything he says is heard with attention. In his present study, he says many wise things and much one can learn from.

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Taking the book as a whole, the impression obtained is that most of the things that have gone wrong in the Northeast have been largly due to hurry and overspending of much money. Where things have gone right, it is because of patience and selection of the right person for the right job. One must agree. Cultural engineering takes time. The author also regards Arunachal as the success story in northeast India. It was in Arunachal that, right upto the early seventies, the greatest care was taken in choosing officers for the territory and there was very little pressure to come up with results. The local politician and the civil servant on the spot had and have a great deal of lattitude. NEFA did not even have politicians till 1972; it was also an exception in that panchayats, local councils and the elected ministry, all came into being, before they were demanded. At the other end is Nagaland which received the most attention and was also the least quiet (even if audit objections there received shorter shrift than even those of NEFA). In Nagaland the local population also believed that they got too little of everything too late. One also recalls wryly how Manipur and Tripura, in the 1950s, were regarded as the places where things got done.

One can ponder over the way NEFA was handled during 1950-70 (more so between 1954 to 1962); the benign neglect of the area showed up in many ways. Defending audit objections before the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) was easiest if the complaint was about expenditure in that region. Even now a stint in the Northeast is regarded as an adventure by the

^{*}Nari Rustomji: Imperilled Frontiers—India's North Eastern Borderlands (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1983), 160 pp., Rs. 60.

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deputationists who go there. Whatever it was, neglect and lack of knowledge of the area need not always yield good results. A look at how much of the news from the Northeast during the last three years is not about dog-bitingman is enough to convince any person that things can be a great deal better.

The author is critical about the Freedom of Religion Bill. One wonders if this is justified. The overwhelming population of Arunachal are not Christian, though the overwhelming majority of the tribals in Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Meghalaya are. The opposition to the Bill has been almost entirely from the tribals outside NEFA. The elected representatives of NEFA wanted the Bill. It is not a question of Christianity being good or bad for tribals at a low level of economic development. Instead, it is whether missionaries (Hindu, Muslim or Christian) are wanted by the major sections of the population. One would recall that the policy of stopping missionaries, lawyers and politicians from entering NEFA was adopted when Rustomji was in-charge and the policy was continued during the tenures of K.L. Mehta, P.N. Luthra and K.A.A. Raja.

Imperilled Frontiers gives Verrier Elwin a great deal of the credit for working out the specifics of Nehru's policy formulations. Most of what Elwin said was common sense and common sense is situational and contextual. If Elwin were around now, there would be much in his philosphy which he may not regard as applicable to the present phase of the on-going process of cultural change. What continues to be true is the starting point of Elwin: Jawaharlal Nehru's statement that the tribals must be helped to develop according to their genius.

Assam is disposed off briefly and Meghalaya receives only slightly more attention in Imperilled Frontiers. Nagaland is dealt with in detail. The author deplores the wielding of the big stick, talk about teaching the tribals a lesson and the misery caused because of insurgency in Nagaland. One wishes he had also referred to the guidelines laid down by Jawaharlal Nehru (guidelines, no Governor of Assam, and no Chief of Army Staff questioned). That guideline was: "The rebels in Nagaland are Indians." Many unfortunate things have happened in Nagaland and little purpose is served in trying to argue whether they were more due to the activities of the rebels or of the security forces. One point however must be remembered: the total number of persons killed because of the rebellion during the period between 1950 and 1980. That number should again be seen in the context of the size of the security forces deployed in Nagaland, the time span involved of three decades and the feelings of the insurgent leadership. It is so small that one can take pride in comparing how India handled insurgency in Nagaland with how similar troubles had been handled in the Americas and even during the post-Second World War period by some countries in Asia.

^{*}Parshotam Mehra: The Northeastern Frontier—A Documentary Study of Rivalry Between India, Tibet and China 1914-54. Vol. II (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980), 192 pp., Rs. 50.

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Northeastern Frontier* by Parshotam Mehra takes on a theme entirely different from Rustomji; the book is a collection of documents dealing with what has come to be known as the McMahon Line. Dr. Mehra's introduction is clear, concise and disciplined. There is an excellent appendix, giving biographical sketches of the principal actors in the drama. With his earlier McMahon Line and this volume, an enormous amount of data has become available to the public. We can now cease to worry about what foreign scholars have said and can make up our own mind.

The dominant impression that one gets from Northeastern Frontier is how heavily the British imperial interests took precedence over those of India and next Tibet. On 2 August 1918, Jordan complains that Teichman's Mission to eastern Tibet had antagonised Chinese opinion. (p.3) Predictably Jordan also argues that Great Britain and Tibet were ganging up on China. (p. xiv)

The talks between Yuan Shih-kai and Jordan show that the Chinese dictator's pre-occupation was, in fact, not even with the whole of the Tibetan boundary with China but actually only Litang-Batang. (p.xiv) Mehra gives a great deal of importance to Ivan Chen. From the actual documents however, it appears that perhaps Yuan himself was against concessions and Chen was only acting as the President's mouth-piece. I also have to differ with Mehra about Charles Bell's visit to Lhasa; when on page xv, the author seems to suggest that the Dalai Lama was worried about cession of Tawang. A better reading of the tenor of the discussions may be that the Dalai Lama was worried about the China-Tibet border and Britain's failure to help Tibet on it. In fact there is little to show that Tawang was a major point in the discussions.

Till now, students of Sino-Tibetan relations had to depend almost entirely on Teichman for data on the Sino-Tibetan fighting during 1915-18, particularly the Truce of Rongbatsa. The present volume not only supplements our information on the fighting but also reproduces the texts of the Chiamdo Agreement and the Rongbatsa Truce. (pp. 4-10) Just like the 1915-18 fighting (in fact worse than it), the data available to scholars till now regarding the 1931-35 fighting between China and Tibet has been very scanty too. For the agreements of Dege Gonchen (1932) and Nangchen Tetsagon (1933), which ended that war, we are still left only with the tantalisingly brief references by Tsepon Shakabpa and Li Tieh-tseng. One strongly wishes that somebody would bring out a volume on the Sino-Tibetan boundary question and more particularly the Sino-Tibetan border wars of 1915-18 and 1931-33. However, seeing that we still have to come up with a good study of the 1962 Sino Indian border war, perhaps a full length study on the Sino-Tibetan border war is too much to expect!

The Eden Memorandum of 1943 is another important document which becomes public with this study, (pp. 146-47) It is much shorter than references to it by most scholars who have suggested and also less definite about many issues. The crucial part of the memorandum, perhaps, is the reiteration of

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the Alston Line. On Curzon's orders, Alston had in August 1921 conveyed to Wellington Koo that Britain was going to treat Tibet as an autonomous state. While the Alston-Koo exchanges eventually tailed off, Eden's communication to T.V. Soong on 5 August 1943 indicates that the Alston Memorandum continued to guide British policy.

The Gould Memorandum is printed in full by Mehra and raises various new points. (We have till now had to depend on the extracts from Gould released in 1960 and of course what Lamb had to say). For instance, Gould thought that prior to 1914 Tawang was Tibetan. (p. 76) He was obviously influenced here by the relationship between the monasteries of Sera and Tawang. Gould's misreading of the situation is shared by Lightfoot. Inspite of the deep interest taken by Lightfoot and the great work done by him, his understanding of the correct nature of the role the Tsona Dzongpas had south of Bumla was faulty. (Caroe does not confuse the Tawang monastary's position with that of the Dzongpons). The pussy-footing by the civil servants after Lightfoot visited Tawang can well become an excellent case study of how easy it is to shirk responsibility. Since Tawang was Indian territory; Lightfoot, the Assam Government and the Government of India wanted formal administration to be extended to that region. London's solution instead was: Tibet should be asked to reaffirm that Tawang was Indian territory!

Several other new things come out. On 29 February 1920, Teichman had proposed referring the Sino-Tibetan boundary dispute to either the League of Nations or to arbitration by the United States. (pp. 22-30) The India Office supported the proposal but Lord Curzon dismissed it curtly. Then in May 1920 a proposal was mooted by the India Office that Tibet should sign an Arms Traffic Convention in 1919, on the same lines as Canada. The Foreign Office shot down this proposal.

"The Mongolian fringe" is something everybody talks about but few people have read. The events of the last thirty years in the Himalayas are a standing witness to Caroe's prescience. (pp. 110-24) Apart from the broad sweep of generalisations, the former Secretary to the Foreign and Political Department's paper contains a very interesting item of information (new, at least to me): at one stage in the drafting of the Government of India Act, Sikkim was considered for inclusion in the Federation.

Philips, the personal representative of Roosevelt, is remembered by most students of Indian history for unsuccessfully trying to persuade Whitehall and New Delhi to make up with the nationalist forces in India. We now know that Philips was simultaneously pressing the Secretary of State to agree to China re-establishing a presence in Tibet during 1942-43. (pp. 133-36) This was also the period when China was suspected of planning an invasion of Tile. of Tibet with high level exchanges on the subject between the United States, China and Great Britain.

The rest of the book (pp. 154-65) covers the exchange between India and China on the "liberation" of Tibet. Melancholy reading! The last document in the volume is the 1954 Agreement between China and India regarding the Tibetan region. With the benefit of hind sight we now know that one of the several things left vague by that Agreement was the meaning of the "Tibet region." The topic came up briefly during the 1960 discussions, but had to wait till 1971 before there was a study of applicability to Eastern Tibet.

The Northeastern region of India is, to most people in this country, what the northwestern territories are to Canada—vast, exotic, rich but really not worth spending time worrying about. The whole thing can be safely left to civil servants and soldiers. All that one need to prove this is to look at the subject catalogue in any major library in India or look at the shelves. Little will be found and what one finds will be, often, either uninformative or out of date, or both. The newspaper coverage is no better. This is a pity. The region has immense economic potential, its land communications with the rest of the nation bad, and much worse, it abuts on a number of foreign countries. During the last forty years India's northeast has in fact suffered two major invasions. With this background the publication of two solid works, in quick succession, by recognised authorities, is a very happy development. Both Imperilled Frontiers and Northeastern Frontier are valuable additions to the literature on a very important region of our country and should be standard reading for all serious students of the northeast. Each, in its own way, makes one envious of the author for what he has attempted and achieved.

New Delhi.

T.S. MURTY*

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THE 'WHITE MUTINY' AND GENESIS OF INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

A Review Article

From almost the beginnings of their rule in India, the British brought in the English legal institutions and forms; yet being colonial rulers in India, they left behind the basic philosophy of individual liberty and equality underlying the British system of justice. Thus the institutions and forms of justice were in essence British but some of the basic substantive norms of British justice were missing. For long the British in this country followed the policy of racial administration in the administration of justice. This racial discrimination had taken at least three forms—non-association of Indians with the judicial administration by not appointing them as judges except in petty positions (like munsifs), lack of jurisdiction in the East India Company Courts over British subjects living in the mofussil who could be tried only by the Crown's Courts in the Presidency Towns, and even when the courts had jurisdiction over the British subjects they could not be tried by Indian judges. By 1850, however, this discrimination was done away with in civil matters, but it continued in criminal matters for a much longer period.

As a result of the polls in Britain, the Liberals came to power in 1880. Their appointee in India as Viceroy was Lord Ripon. The law membership in the Executive Council of the Viceroy fell on Ilbert. Both were confirmed believers in liberal principles and both did not like the invidious distinction between the Indian and British subjects in the matter of trial by an Indian judge. An attempt was made to do away with this pernicious distinction in 1883 by introducing a bill (known as the Ilbert Bill) to that effect in the Legislative Council on 2 February, 1883.* The purport of the bill was to give jurisdiction to Indian judges over Europeans in criminal matters. Ripon and Ilbert had thought that the bill would have smooth sailing, but it ran into rough weather.

The British subjects did not like the idea of being tried by Indian judges. To begin with opposition to the bill was mild but it mounted quickly. The main attack on the bill was based on the superiority of the Englishman. The agitation by the Whites against the bill was mainly through public meetings, public utterances and the Press manned by the Europeans. The battle against the bill was even carried to London, and the British Press voiced its strong opposition to it. The agitation created the feeling of social hatred and class conflict, both among the British and Indian subjects and led to the imminent possibility of racial violence. The strong opposition generated by the bill threatened the stability of the British Raj. "The protests against

^{*}Edwin Hirschmann, 'White Mutiny': The Ilbert Bill Crisis in India and the Genesis of the Indian National Congress (Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1980), x, 331p., Rs. 80.

the Ilbert Bill were genuine, widespread and massive." (p. 109) So great was the vehemence against the bill that the author characterises it as a "White

Mutiny."

The opposition fury of the British subjects invoked the government to compromise and make a retreat. The result was a dilution of the provisions of the Bill. The Executive Council considered a few proposals and counter proposals. Ultimately, the compromise arrived at was that in trials before the High Court, or Court of Session, or District Magistrate, an European, British subject accused of an offence could ask for his trial by a mixed jury, i.e. a jury of which not less than half the members were Europeans or Americans, or both Europeans and Americans¹. This compromise was ultimately enacted into law (which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure 1882) on 25 January 1884.

The author rightly asserts that the full story of the Ilbert Bill has never been told nor its full implications examined. This has been accomplished by the author in a grandiose manner. He has reconstructed the whole story of the Ilbert Bill in great depth with the minutest details in a chronological order. The author has examined the old Official Documents, both in India and England, and also the mass of newspapers of the period—a task involving tremendous labour, persistence, and patience. The style of the book is clear and its impact dramatic. The author brings out certain facts which had hitherto been concealed in the government and newspaper archives. History may not be worth much if an author does not draw his own generalisations from facts and events that occur during a period and as noticed by him. The author has done this job remarkably well.

Some of the views and propositions of the author may be highlighted here because of their undoubted interest to Indians and to all those who were interested in the independence of India. According to the author, the English believed that "they would have to maintain their position in India permanently, or at least for all the foreseeable future." (p. 1) However, this was not to be. The author says, "British rule in India proved far less durable and more fragile than the Victorians had foreseen; perhaps it had never been really stable or secure. Perhaps the raj was essentially a huge bluff, a 'confidence' game run, not by demi-gods on horseback, but by men who, behind their stern Victorian masks, were frightened and puzzled mortals, though they dared not admit it even to themselves." (p. 2)

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The beginnings of the end came with the upheavals of the Englishmen themselves, with their sharp but crude reaction to the Ilbert Bill.

As a result of the "White Mutiny", according to the author, Indians were aroused and along "with increasing tensions there was increasing interest in public affairs. New Indian newspapers were founded that summer in Calcutta, including *Bangabasi* in Bengali and *Indian Echo* and *Indian Nation* in English. The Ilbert Bill and the events it touched off had created a new level of political excitement in Bengal and had upset the jittery Europeans." (p. 184)

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As regards the impact of the settlement about the controversial bill, the author comments:

On reconsideration, neither Indians nor Europeans were pleased with the outcome, but both accepted it grudgingly. Indian leaders, resenting any privilege granted to Europeans, drew the lesson that the way to improve their condition was to organize, agitate, and pressure the government into reforms, rather than rely on the benevolence of a liberal viceroy. (p. 270)

The author opines that the stiff opposition to the bill by the Englishmen created consciousness among the Indians for freedom from British rule and this led to the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885. Again, in the words of the author:

The Anglo-Indian campaign. however, backfired. Their furious attacks on government and 'babu' cost them more in prestige than the bill itself ever could have. The crisis which they provoked exposed concealed weaknesses in what had appeared as a stable, well-run, durable structure. It showed that the empire was unable to resolve the conflicting claims of Europeans and 'Westernized' Indians. It left the three principal partiesthe Government of India, non-official Europeans and educated Indianssuspicious and antagonistic toward each other. This lasting rift, this poisoned atmosphere, led to the founding of the Indian National Congress two years later and the eventual end of empire. In this way the Anglo-Indians helped to bring about what they wanted least.2

The book is both interesting and absorbing. Bereft of legal technicalities, it provides easy reading. It will be rewarding reading even for a lay man.

REFERENCES

1 Till then the benefit of jury trial was available to an accused only in certain jury districts. The jury was to be of European majority for an European defendant and an Indian majority for an Indian defendant. See Hirschmann, pp. 169 and 247.

2 At p. 290, the term "Anglo-Indian" at that time meant a British resident of India, as distinct from an "Eurasian," a person of mixed ancestry.

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History

DAVID PAGE: Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 1920-32. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1982, xv, 288p., Rs. 120.

THE book is a revised version of the author's doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Oxford. Its main objective (as is evident from the title) is to explain how disparate Muslim communities throughout India were mobilized to see Pakistan as a common goal. It does not question the part played by religion in the formation of the state or the interest of the imperial system in dividing the national forces to retain power. The author contends to provide a structural explanation of Muslim politics during the period under review; the main constraints on political development, he says, were imposed by the introduction of the electoral system which led to a steady increase in communal awareness among the Muslims of different provinces.

The author analyzes the theoretical basis of his thesis in the Introduction and examines the political developments under the Morley-Minto Reforms as an illustration. It shows how the linkages provided by the reforms between provincial and district levels of politics and the introduction of a substantial elected element in the Provincial Council gave impetus to political confrontation and the rise of communalism in these areas. (pp. 4-6)

The book takes up the period between 1920-1932, and the author justifies it by arguing that Muslim historians have, by and large, ignored this period while concentrating their attention on two main historical periods: 1857 to the foundation of the Muslim League and the period after 1937. The author, with good reasons of course, feels that the period between 1920-1932 was crucial to the development of the idea of Pakistan and the partition of India. Once the concept of communal politics was entrenched among the Muslims through separate electorates, legislative polltics and the Communal Award, Pakistan did not remain a distant goal despite the fact that a formal demand was made only in 1940.

The book is divided into four chapters in addition to the Introduction and Conclusion. Analyzing the effect of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms on the structure of all India politics, Page opines that the weightage given to landlords and separate representation conferred on different communities were the devices to offset the challenge of the nationalist politicians. (pp. 30-31) The Reforms encouraged development of communal blocs in the councils. The author proves his point by giving figures about the composition and functioning of the Legislative Council and tables regarding distribution of the Muslim population in the Punjab. (pp. 34, 47-51) Comparing the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, Page suggests that since the Muslims in

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Bengal were economically and politically weaker than their counterparts in the Punjab, it is the Punjabi Muslim leadership which took advantage of the new dispensation to consolidate their position in the power structure of the province. (pp. 59-72) This view, though by and large correct, disproves the allegations made by the leaders of the Unionist Party in the Legislative Council, day in and day out, that the rural interests and the Muslims suffered at the hands of the urban interests and the more advanced Hindu companity.

Chapter 2 examines the growth of communal tension following the introduction of the Reforms and the polarization of politics in India. Since the tension was most marked in the Punjab and the United Provinces, the author focuses attention on these two provinces. Table 7 (p. 74) gives the figures of deaths and injuries on account of communal disturbances between 1923-27—the period described as the period of civil war by Ambedkar. The author suggests that the growth of communalism in the Punjab was on account of the use of political power by the majority community against the urban Hindus who reacted by organising the Hindus on communal lines under the leadership of the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Sabha. (pp. 88-91) Though David Page does not use the usual analysis against the British of encouraging communal divisions, he makes clear in no uncertain terms, the Government's satisfaction over these developments. For example he comments, "the Government also saw the growth of communalism in political terms but it chose to cast itself, officially at least, in the role of a spectator." (p. 89) With the weakening of the Khilafat Movement, which is dealt at some length (pp. 94-106), communalism reigns supreme in Indian

Chapter 3, entitled "The Emergence of Punjabi Dominance," again deals with the effect of the operation of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. The author surmises, "It is the contention of this book, however, that the seeds of this dramatic conflict were sown during the first period; that the Constitution itself fostered the political developments of the later years and that the result of the battle between centrifugalism and centripetalism might have been predicted in 1926..." (p. 141)

The Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution produced two main trends in Indian politics, a centrifugal trend and a communal trend. When the author talks about Punjabi dominance in this chapter, he does not imply the role of Punjab in communal politics but the influence of the civil servants (who had worked in the Punjab) with the then Viceroy. In his words, "this reliance on Punjabi personnel was not mere favouritism between 1909 and 1937; with the possible exception of Sir Reginald Craddock, there was no Governor Dunnel. Their clarity of mind and political shrewdness were in a class accepting Punjabi ideas and managing all-India politics from the Punjabi point of view..." (p. 152)

According to the author, the Punjab civilians had three main characteristics: firstly, contempt for the political classes, secondly, a political vision that was essentially communal in outlook and thirdly, a distinctive esprit de corps which separated them from other civilians elsewhere. Out of the four civil servants mentioned above, Hailey played the more significant and sinister role as he relied on the provinces and on the Muslims. (pp 152-157) But among the provinces, "it was the Punjabis who drove the Muslim Indian bus and the other provinces sat behind." (p. 194)

The final chapter examines the role of the Muslim Conference during the period of constitutional revision. Once again, attention is drawn to the importance of the Punjabi Muslim leader, Fazli Husain, his role as the organizer of the Conference and as one who shaped the Government of India's proposals for Reforms as a member of the Viceroy's Council. Thus, the cooperation between the Punjabi bureaucracy and the Punjabi Muslim leadership became an important factor in the partition of India. In the last resort, they (the British bureaucrats) realized that "they and Fazli stood or fell together, and in Fazli's dealings with the Government of India that was a considerable advantage." (p. 201)

In conclusion, the author examines the implications of the Award for the future of Muslim politics. He opines that Pakistan became a reality when the most important provincial interests created by the Reforms had been converted to it. The study ends with the assessment of imperial policy in the creation of communal consciousness and the central role of the Punjab which continued even after Pakistan was created.

The book, written in a lucid style, is a scholarly work and breaks new ground in the history of development of communal politics in India. Based mainly on original sources, the author convincingly shows the role played by the British bureaucracy in developing communal consciousness in India. It was convergence of their interests with the communal Muslim leadership which was responsible for the division of India on communal lines. Limited in scope, the book only superficially deals with Hindu communalism and hardly talks about the role of the national movement.

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Political Theory and Political Developments

J.S. BAINS and R.B. JAIN (Eds.): Perspectives in Political Theory: Essays in Honour of Frank Thakurdas. Radiant Publishers, 1980, xiii, 207p., Rs. 60.

THIS volume of essays was brought together to honour Frank Thakurdas, edmired and respected by generations of students in Delhi and by political scientists from all over the country. Thankurdas himself has

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devoted his academic career to the teaching of European political thought; most of his writings are also on the same subject. But he has always evinced a keen interest in Indian intellectual affairs. The contributions to his felicitation volume are divided into two sections, dealing respectively with the Western and the Indian traditions of political thinking.

The opening essay by Sudipta Kaviraj is by far the most interesting piece in the present volume. His subject is the Social Contract and he talks about Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, but not in the usual manner which so baffles and bores young undergraduates on their first introduction to political theory. Instead, Kaviraj deals with them as "the three fundamental possibilities" inherent in what was a "historically constituted" problem, viz., the theoretical systematisation of a new capitalist social order. He rejects the inherently ahistorical approach of many commentators on political thought who treat the classics as so many separate texts on certain eternal problems of human society. He also rejects the common liberal assumption which regards the contract theorists as dealing with a shared problem, that of defining the theoretical bases of the liberal democratic state. Instead, Kaviraj deals with the theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau as three aspects, emerging successively, of the single historically constituted problem of providing an adequate ideological basis for the exercise of power in capitalist society. The three aspects emerge one after the other as capitalist society successively passes through; first, the phase of asserting its distinct moral as well as epistemic validity against the established philosophical and political premises of feudal society, second, the phase of establishing a stable and legitimate economic and political order, and third, the phase of renewing its moral foundations of legitimacy against an emerging challenge to its own established processes of exercise of power. The basis of this threestage ideological edifice is laid by Hobbes who enunciated with virtually unrivalled clarity what may be called the central theoretical principles of capitalist society. Kaviraj then shows how this enunciation, despite its logical neatness and rigour and despite its demolition of the principles of feudal social organisation, was inadequate as an ideology for a dominant capitalist order. He identifies three "errors" in Hobbes, viz., his failure to recognise the existence of class, his failure to construct a structure of representation through which sovereignty would be ambiguously located between a sovereign and the people, and his failure to realise the necessity of an ideological apparatus for manufacturing consent. Hence the paradox of Hobbes; unquestioned founder of the theory of capitalist society and yet roundly condemned both by his contemporaries and by successive generations of liberal commentators. "This was because of his excessive reliance on logic," Kaviraj says. A somewhat misleading sentence this, but it serves to bring into s into focus the other paradox of Hobbes, the fact that whenever the capitalist order list order comes face to face with a fundamental crisis, when the cumbrous, incleant the company consentinelegant ideological structures of liberalism, of representation and consentmanufacturing of which John Locke still remains the classical architect,

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seem to crumble, capitalist society almost inevitably "gravitates towards a Hobbessian solution of political conflicts."

The truly ambiguous figure is that of Rousseau. A fundamental and unrelenting critic of bourgeois society, Rousseau provided in his work the elements for a truly radical subversion of the capitalist order, the premises for a transcendence. And yet Rouss eau too could be appropriated within a renewed ideology of populist democaacy, one which has often come to the rescue of the capitalist order as a whole in an age when capitalism has faced an organic challenge to its dominance. Once again, Kaviraj identifies the source of ambiguity in the central theoretical shortcoming of Rousseau; his inability to p'ace his critique of bourgeois society within a theory of the historical process. "Rousseau is certainly a radical. But he personifies a somewhat tragic kind of radicalism, one without a sense of history."

Kaviraj's essay is both provocative and insightful. It does not elaborate every point into a full-blown argument. In fact, it would probably leave a a careful reader with more questions in his mind than he would find answers to. But that is precisely what a good article should do.

Z.M. Quraishi too has written about Rousseau, competently, with considerable erudition, but schematically. V.P. Verma's "Marxism: The Eternal Dimensions" aims to be a critique of positivist thinking about politics. He seeks to establish the validity, indeed superiority, of the dialectical mode of reasoning. He also attacks, with considerable justification, the tendency in much of what passes as orthodox Marxism to equate the epistemological and ontologiccal principles of Marx's work with a deterministic, indeed mechanistic, nineteenth-century "materialism." The relation between Hegel and Marx is much more problematical and ambiguous than one would suspect from a great deal of "orthodox' Marxist writing. Hence, although not everyone may wish to phrase it in these terms, one can vaguely see what Verma means when he says "with confidence that Soviet theoreticians try to dogmatise Marxism by asserting that all idealistic and metaphysical methods are hostile to Marxism." The difficulty arises when he tries to raise the dialectical method of Marx to something he calls "the eternal dimension." It is one thing to say that it is simpleminded to dismiss all of Hegelian "idealism" as being antithetical to Marxist "materialism," it is quite another to say that "Marx and Hegel are the two sides of the same coin," that they in fact represent two expressions of a single "perennial nature." For them surely the very specificity and the crucial importance of Marx's intervention in the nineteenth-century idealism-materialism debate is lost. In fact, in his breathless urge to embrace the whole of this "eternal dimension," Verma gets quite carried away. "... Hegel's otherness and Marx's alienation," he says, "are nothing but the category of Indian Maya." Sometimes his analogies verge on the nonsensical, as for instance: "The fundamental investigations of Gauss and Riemann had suggested and Lorentz's transformations agree that in a case of group transformation all continuous transformation of the case of group transformation all continuous transformation of the case of group transformation all continuous transformation of the case of group transformation all continuous transformation and the case of group transformation all continuous transformation and continuous tra formation of the coordinates take place. In social sciences, dialectics also ds a

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believes in the continuous flow of cultural, political, economic and social coordinates." And what is one to say of the following staggering suggestion? "Hegel was no fool to peg his tent amidst the sky, far from the earthly inertial well; all twentieth century space research and earthly observation follows the Hegelian methodology of satellite communication."

Subrata Mukerjee's brief essay on the "Poems of Karl Marx" is interesting in itself, but hardly analytical. L.S. Rathore's piece on Hannah Arendt is bland, unenlightening and textbookish in the extreme. The same goes for some of the essays in the section on "The Indian Perspective." J.S. Bains on Guru Gobind Singh is informative, but in an area where so much exploratory analytical work needs to be done, i.e., the entire field of medieval political theory in India. It is, one might say, almost inevitably disappointing! Bibekbrata Sarkar's "Nationalism, Marxism and Gandhi" is a complete let-down. His treatment of this important subject is so commonplace and banal that it hardly deserves its alleged status as a contribution to political theory.

Isaiah Berlin writing on "Tagore and the Consciousness of Nationality" justifiably raises a lot of expectation. But this too is a disappointment. Berlin traverses that well-worn path: the argument that, the consciousness of nationality implies both a demand for "recognition" and a demand "to acquire whatever the modern age requires." The attempt to achieve at the same time these two, not necessarily compatible, goals raises many different political possibilities which are represented by different trends within nationalism in various countries of the world. The Indian case gives us many interesting instances of attempts to resolve these contradictions, and Tagore's work is clearly one immensely complicated example. But Berlin has little new to say about Tagore, because unfortunately, though perhaps not surprisingly, he does not have the requisite degree of familiarity with Tagore's work.

The final essay in the book by D.C. Grover, allegedly "propounds the hypothesis of the New Left in India to determine its viability as a theory of social and political change." The subject specifically is Jayaprakash Narayan, "the spokesman of New Left in India." There is, inevitably, a Western analogue in Grover's argument, an explicit comparison with Marcuse, his critique of the "Old Left" in Europe and his identification of the youth, and particularly of students, as the new vanguard. Nowhere does Grover raise such problematical issues as the differences in the basic social and economic contexts of the political struggle in advanced capitalist societies and in large agrarian countries such as India, or the respective political traditions of the "old" working class in the two contexts, or the validity of treating the sayings of Jayaprakash Narayan on the same theoretical plane as the writings of Marcuse and the specific intellectual heritage to which he is heir. Grover's prose still bears the signs of the effusiveness of those heady days of 1977 and "total revolution." Reading it now, one cannot but

wonder why the alleged "New Left of India" is not in fact one of the variants of a New Right.

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SUMANTA BANERJEE: In the Wake of Naxalbari: A History of the Naxalite Movement in India. Subarnarekha, Calcutta 1980, xii, 436p., Rs. 50.

A S someone who had closely followed—as a university teacher then—the rise and fall of what is known in common parlance as the "Naxalite" movement in West Bengal, sympathized with the goals and sources of inspiration of that movement, though not with its often patently insane methods, the present reviewer has no hesitation in stating that this book is by far the most truthful inward look at the movement by someone who was not only an insider for a while, but also had the equipment of a trained first class journalist. In contrast, other similar attempts are either so much journalese, like the otherwise neutral book by Shankar Ghosh, or mere jaundiced projections of a party-line, like the one by Biplab Dasgupta for instance. Sumanta Banerjee has succeeded in objectifying the process of the rise and fall of this memorable flash of youthful protest, which sought to renovate in one mad fling the calloused Indian Left—iron having entered the soul of that Left.

Not that one necessarily agrees with Banerjee's implicit analytical framework which he brings to bear on the nature of the Indian state, the nature and role of the Indian propertied classes (including the "bourgeoisie"), the role and nature of the Soviet Union, of "revisionism", of Maoism and its various variants including the latest Deng Zhiao Bing type, or on the nature, role and composition of what Banerjee still seems to consider "the peasantry" in India—a largely elusive category. One suspects that as far as the basic analytical premises are concerned, the author continues to subscribe to one of the three main rubrics of catechism to which Marxism in India has been reduced, little realising that, perhaps, all the three are mere sets of dogmas ill-suited to a correct understanding of the complex processes of change in India, the mismatch being borne out by the increasingly patent irrelevance of all the segments of the Marxist Left to the developing Indian political situation in recent times. Banerjee also seems to share a highly simplistic notion of the overall strategy of imperialism in India as well as of the complex interplay of the mood of the masses and the pace of development of the economic and political crisis in an ancient multinational country, exemplified by the fact that Telugu Desham is somehow the heir to Telengana and Srikakulam!

Nevertheless, Banerjee's thumbnail sketches of the sources of the "Naxa-lite" upsurge constitute the ablest analysis till date of how exactly Lenin's

dictum—that anarchism is the legitimate retribution of reformism, economism and parliamentary cretinism—worked itself out relentlessly in the Indian Left in the sixties and the seventies. Inter alia, he points his finger accurately at the sources of urban and rural discontent, the sources of populist deception and violence practised by the Indian ruling circles, the international origins of the movement in the Sino-Soviet split and of its subsequent disarray following the Sino-US detente. Wrestling relentlessly with himself, Banerjee is also able to precisely pin-point the moment after which a potent political movement of rebellious youth tended to degenerate into senseless individual terrorism and violence, sometimes coming dangerously close to the ways of the underworld—like Valery's snake eating itself up, characteristic of Bengal's petty bourgeois revolutionaries ever since Tagore immortalised them in his "Four Chapters". He also describes in a fairly objective manner the pre-emptive tactics and programmatic moves initiated by the ruling circles to take the wind out of the sail of rural and urban discontent. only to be followed by the Emergency.

Having said all this, however, one feels constrained to note that if Banerjee's implicit analytical premises smack of one set of Indian Marxist catechism, his idea of what constitutes a "revolutionary situation" also smacks of urban petty bourgeois wishfulfilment, and has nothing to do with Lenin's most elementary definitions. Which is why, he can still write on page 368, with an air of finality that: "The reality of 1967-72 conformed to an inch to the appraisal contained in the party's political resolution of 1969: 'Today, the ruling classes are enmeshed in a deeper economic and political crisis than ever before. Contradictions between imperialism and the people, between feudalism and peasants, between capital and labour, and between different sections of the ruling classes are growing sharper and sharper everyday ... the working class, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie are victims of growing pauperisation and unemployment. At least ninety-five per cent of our people can no longer endure the poverty and wretchedness that are now their lot and are impatient for a fundamental change...."

One wishes, that were really true! We keep on underestimating our own capacity to endure, to invent ways of deceiving and compromising ourselves, to chase the crumbs—the objective basis of the reformism, the economism and the parliamentary criticism and corruption of the Indian Left.

Calcutta.

BOUDHAYAN CHATTOPADHYAY

V.K. ANAND: Conflict in Nagaland: A Study of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Chanakya Publications, New Delhi, 1980, xii, 268p., Rs. 70.

HE book under review is more an account of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Nagaland than an analytical appraisal of the basic

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issues involved in the conflict in Nagaland. The merit of this lucidly-written monograph is that it is based on the author's experience of active service in the Corps of Engineers of the Indian Army. The author discusses the operational problems of insurgency and counter-insurgency at the conceptual level. He has also drawn upon experiences in other countries to give an idea of the relative strength and weakness of the tactical moves of the Naga insurgents as well as of the Indian Army in different phases since the early fifties. Anand has also tried to link up the success and failure of the moves on both sides. with the changing socio-political milieu in India and in the ajdoining countries. As a description of the events at the formal level it is fairly comprehensive, but no attempt has been made to go into the heart of local nationalism and ethnicity which are emerging today as global phenomena in different parts of the world. Besides, the author has failed to take into consideration the phenomenon of transnationalism of the ethnic groups found across the boundary of a single nation-state.

In-depth understanding of the conflict in Nagaland would also require a more careful examination of the provisions of Indian Constitution, as to the extent to which these protect the traditional "entitlements" of the tribal communities to their resources in the wake of emergence of a ubiquitous national market basically tied up with the world capitalist system. The turn of events in Manipur, Tripura and Assam have revealed inadequacies of the Constitution even in cultural matters. Simplistic adulation of the Constitution in its present form will not prepare the nation to face the challenges of the eighties. There is a danger that a monograph like the present one will generate more confusion than understanding.

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B.K. ROY BURMAN

Modernization and Social Change

DHIRENDRA K. VAJPEYI: Modernization and Social Change in India. Manohar Book Service, New Delhi, 1979, vi, 299p.

THE book, under review, is the result of a study conducted in three phases in 1966, in 1972 and finally in 1976. It claims to be a report on the "changes which have occurred due to political participation, mass media exposure and empathy in the attitudes of citizens of a north Indian state—Uttar Pradesh over a ten-year period, 1966-1976." Painstaking efforts, over a prolonged period, seem to have gone into the making of this research project. The author tells us that he learnt his first lessons in research and writing at Lucknow University and had further opportunities of sharpening his research interests and training in social sciences at Michigan State University and the University of North Iowa, America. He made a number of visits to

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India to collect data for this project. So the book holds promises for all those who value data-based research on politics and society in India.

In the fifties and early sixties, Indian middle classes in general, and social scientists in particular, were taken in by an euphoria for modernization. After the end of World War II, a large number of former colonies, like India, had gained political independence. The United States' had emerged as the dominant power in the non-socialist world—politically, economically, militarily and above all ideologically. Theories of economic growth, political development and modernization emanating from the United States had found almost uncritical acceptance in India. The Fourth General Election in 1967 resulted in shattering to pieces the "one-party dominance" model of development that had emerged for India. Non-Congress governments were formed over the whole of North India-Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab. The Congress monopoly of power was breached in Tamilnadu and Kerala in the deep South. The Congress Party not only continued to rule at the Centre initially with a reduced majority, but through a number of major policy decisions was able to reestablish its hegemonic positions at the Centre and restore its power in most of the lost States, especially in the North, through electoral victories in the early seventies. The declaration of Internal Emergency in June 1975 and the rout of the Congress Party led by Indira Gandhi in 1977, were certainly political developments demanding some explanation by social scientists. The present work, being based on empirical data collected from 1966 to 1976, could provide some clues to understand and interpret these developments and possibly also the re-emergence of Indira Gandhi as the dominant political leader in 1979-80. In the opening paragraph in the Preface, the author states that "a positive disposition of citizens towards government policies and performance is essential for modernization and social change." Does that mean that (i) a positive disposition is not a function of the path of development (call it modernization, if you like), pursued by the dominant leadership, or that (ii) positive disposition of citizens towards the government once built and expressed can be altered only if the citizens want to go against modernization and social change, or that (iii) absence of a "positive disposition of the citizen" may not be expressive of a search for an alternative model of modernization and social change by working for a replacement of a negative government by one which is more positively oriented towards the citizenry's preferred model of modernization? One reads through the book to find out if some theoretical or empirical justification is advanced to stick to this rather naive perspective developed in the fifties and sixties by the by now dead Structural-Functionalist School of American social scientists.

The book is divided into seven chapters. In the "Framework of Analysis" the author discusses different conceptualizations of modernization known to him. In the section which studies the sociological approach, David Apter's "mobilizational model," "consociational model" and "modernizing auto-

cracy model" are referred to. McClelland's psychological approach emphasising achievement motivation and Eisenstadt, Harold Isaac, Myron Weiner, Talcott Parsons, Robert Bellah and Shils, under the rubric "historical models," are also mentioned. But all this discussion neither helps the reader in a better understanding of these writers nor in critically appreciating the logical and conceptual lacunae. The author seems to have relied on secondary systematizers without adding to clarity or evaluation. The same superficial acquaintance informs his discussion of "current conceptualization of the modernization process in India." Srinivas and Dube are the only two Indians who have enlightened Vajpeyi on the modernization process in India, and that too through three pieces in all, published in 1965 and 1967. Even A.R. Desai and Yogendra Singh are unknown names. No wonder that the author relies almost wholly on what he understood of Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society (1966). The discussion on the conceptual and theoretical aspects does not connect with what follows in later chapters, and of course, the questions relating to the momentous political and other developments of the 1966-76 decade are neither raised nor attempted to be answered.

The second chapter discusses "Uttar Pradesh: The Setting." Reading this chapter is really taxing and the experience goes on deepening as one proceeds with the book. We are informed that Uttar Pradesh ranks ninth in India in terms of density of population and twenty-fourth in literacy as shown in Table 2.1. But the table gives no such information. Rather we find to our amazement that "density of population per female was 250 (1961) and 300 (1971)." The book has some 115 pages filled with statistical tables and some maps and diagrams. A good part of the linguistic text is an attempt to restate in linguistic form the numerical explanatory or analytical effort. The empirical data provided in the statistical tables is crushing, be they abstracted from secondary sources or the result of primary sources generated by the author's visits to India. It becomes impossible for the determined reviewer to come to a definite conclusion as to the source of his difficulties author's poor copying, ineptness in dealing with numbers and English language, absence of editing, or proof reading. Here the reviewer can give only a fraction of evidence from the book to absolve him of any charge of arriving at too harsh a conclusion. Table 2.2 shows the population of Uttar Pradesh, according to the 1981 Census, as 72 millions plus out of which Hindus constitute 8.5 per cent. The table on p. 22 gives the rate for male and female samples drawn per 100,000 of people as rural male 2, urban male 5, rural female 5 and urban female 2. The linguistic description and explanation on the following page does not agree with these figures, nor do the figures of Table 1.22. On p. 24 there is a reference to Appendix I, but the reviewer failed to locate any Appendix. On page 18, Beteille and Bottomore are referred to in paranthesis with page numbers, but neither the notes nor the bibliography include any work of theirs. When a research report is more than one third full of statistical tables and the reader is compelled to WS

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verify the veracity of every numerical figure by cross-checking or by face validation, the only excuse for such a publication can be either its theoretical conclusion or momentary subsidy that it carries for publication.

We learn from the author (p. 33) that one of the two main crops of the eastern part of the state is sugar. Further, the author observes that, as a result of the abolition of Zamindari "the landlords were hurt economically and socially while the landless agricultural labourers were generally affected." (p. 39) Now what does this "generally affected" mean, is left to the imagination of the reader. Further we are told that "most of the reserved seats in the state and national legislature belong to this (Chamars) caste." (p. 42) How do any seats "belong" to a caste, is left to our guess. Discussing the loss of power by the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, Vajpeyi writes, "The party has lost not only one more state but also one of the most populous states, and along with it the *Indo-Gangetic plain*." Some of us who never had the chance to cross the Atlantic had the "illusion" that a major part of the Indo-Gangetic plain was lost not only to the Congress Party but to India as such through partition; the parting kick of the British Imperialists in 1947.

Going through Chapters I and II, which present the methodology of this research piece, the reviewer gets the impression that the actual procedures followed by the researcher are not shared with the reader. But a number of questions do rise as teasers. Was the sample drawn for the 1966 phase continued for the 1972 and 1976 phases? The way it is stated by the author in the footnote on p. 30, one could conclude that the same sample was continued. Since no mortality has been reported or accounted for, one wonders if any sample was at all used for the second and third phase of the study. The statement that, "Within each state, the urban population was stratified with reference to the size of the town or cities they stayed," (p. 27), clearly indicates that the write-up is verbatim lifted from some bigger study which had a sample drawn from many states. There is of course nothing intrinsically wrong in this, but it should not have been concealed, or should have been done with greater care. A number of incongruent statements in relation to sampling arouse avoidable suspicion that the claim exceeds the actual strategy. In the chapter on "Measurement of Variables", dividing "age into young, middle-aged and old," is cited as an example of nominal scale (p. 56) as distinguished from the ordinal and interval scale. If the elementary distinctions are not understood, citations from Kaplan, Coombs or other American texts on measurement and scaling are poor substitutes. The assertion, that the nominal, ordinal and interval scales, including selfanchoring method, were also used to standardize the concepts, is untenable. The ordinal and nominal scales have been used following Lerner's conceptualization of "empathy," "political participation" and mass media exposure. "Empathy is the lubricant which helps the modernization process," has been repeatedly stated. (pp. 60, 110) If the metaphor inspired by Lerner has some explanatory power, the need for discovering the gasoline too should have been felt. But the reader has to be satisfied by the statement:

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"The central concept in Lerner's model of modernization is empathy." By empathy is meant the acquisition and diffusion of psychic mobility and its comprehension is recommended for all those who plan rapid economic growth by means of rapid social change.

So modernization is economic growth by means of rapid social change planned by some and executed on others. This heterogenetic conceptualization of Lerner and other Americans informs the project under review. The acceptance of imaginativeness and greater cognitive flexibility, both as very important indicators of modernization as well as generative forces for other congenial psychological traits, leaves out the fundamental question of the relationship of social practice and cognition. It can neither explain nor prognosticate possible developments. Property relations, institutional tie-ups, ideological struggles, hegemony and power structures do not enter anywhere in this conceptualization of modernization. Mass media is conceptualized as "nobility multiplier," as "the more emphatic are more capable of drawing modernization import from messages in the mass media." That all this is social science euphemism for study of the ease with which some third world people become victims of hegemonic goals of neo-imperialist powers is difficult to be seen by United States-based research, even by third world nationals!

The fourth, fifth and the sixth chapters of the book give tabulated results of verbal responses to the questionnaries administered to the sampled respondents on political participation, empathy and exposure to mass media respectively. These are the three dimensions on which measurement of disposition and their correlations have been attempted. We also find the relationship of the measured variables with socio-economic status of the respondents. The empirical findings are of interest only to the extent that they run on expected lines and confirm what they were intended to confirm. For example, in short, education and high exposure to media were the most important empathy multiplier factors—low caste, low education, low income and rural females topped others in low exposure to media and low levels of empathy. (p. 116) When it is found that in 1976 the percentage of urban respondents with low exposure to media and low empathy drops to 10 and 16 per cent for females as against 35 and 44 in 1972, should not one conclude that they were most modernized in 1976? This is what happens if modernization is equaled with directed social change. (p. 146)

There are some other minor irritants, probably adding spice to the joy of reading. Lerner is credited with the proposition that a participant society is a modern society. Empirical finding (1) Women when participants, contribute to traditionalism and conservative activities. Finding (2) Respondents with medium education participated more than the highly educated ones. (p. 87) Thus, the compelled policy recommendation for modernizers should be to reduce the number of women in society and curb higher education! The author's political understanding is worthy of note. Swatantra is clubbed with Congress, both Communist Parties of India, the PSP and the

SSP as progressive, (p. 85) In 1977, we are told the CPI shifted its support in North India from the Congress to the Janata-CFD. (p. 52) With Rajni Kothari, he believes that caste associations play an integrative role, comparable to interest groups in the West. (p. 83-84) Empirically it is found that by 1976 the percentage of membership in caste associations for all SES groups had increased. Again the author asserts that caste associations play an integrative and secular role in Indian politics. (p. 87) After all Almond and Verba have written: if ordinary men and women are to participate in a democratic political process, they must have the feeling that it is safe to do so, that they do not assume great risks when they express political opinions and that they can be relatively free about the person to whom they talk. (p. 75) Brice, as known to Vajpeyi, had prescribed "experience of active participation in the work of small self governing groups." National and global participation is for the chosen few! But caste wars are too obvious phenomena to be accepted as integratives.

The book can be used as illustrative pedagogical material to show what passes for social science research, provided appropriate support structures are activated. For the general reader it would be too exasperating to wade through incoherent language, unreliable mass of numerical data and unrewarding outdated borrowed theoretical assertions!

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SUDHA V. DESAI: Social Life in Maharashtra Under the Peshwas. Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1980, xv, 220p., Rs. 80.

THE eighteenth century in Indian history is looked upon as the Age of Maratha Supremacy; the Marathas dominated the Indian political scene during this period. They enjoyed peace and prosperity, but their society was not dynamic and progressive socially. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, the great Maratha historian, has remarked that "...national glory and prosperity resulting from the victories of Shivaji and Baji Rao I created a reaction in favour of Hindu orthodoxy and accentuated caste distinctions and ceremonial purity of daily rites In the security, power and wealth engendered by their independence, the Marathas of the eighteenth century forgot the past record of Muslim persecution; their social grades turned against each other."

Although a good amount of work has been done on the political history of the Marathas by scholars in and outside Maharashtra during the present century, their social and economic history is yet to be written in a systematic manner. However, pioneering work providing glimpses of the social life of the Marathas under the Peshwa ru'e has been done by a number of scholars,

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such as Justices M.G. Ranade and K.T. Telang; D.B. Parasnis, G.C. Wad, V.V. Khare, G.S. Sardesai and S.N. Sen. Serious attempts to portray the social life of Maharashtra in the Marathi language were made by Maharashtrian scholars like V.K. Bhave, whose *Peshwekaleen Maharashtra*" was published in 1935 and Mrs. Sharda Deshmukh whose *Shivkaleen Va Peshwaitil Strijivan* came out in 1973.

The present book, by Sudha V. Desai, entitled Social Life in Maharashtra Under the Peshwas, deserves to be welcomed as a commendable attempt to study Maratha social life of the Peshwa period in a systematic manner. It is the first of its kind in the english language which enables scholars outside Maharashtra to have access to an in-depth study in the social life of the people of this region. The book is a doctoral dissertation under the able guidance of Dr. George M.Moraes, an eminent historian and Director of the Institute of Historical Research, Bombay. It was however a sheer misfortune that the author of this fine work, could not see it in print; she died in November 1971, before the thesis was submitted to the Institute. This posthumous publication should be welcomed as a monument to the hard work of a brilliant woman scholar, who had also earned other credits and prizes for her scholarship during her academic career.

Social life is a continuous process and it does not change in its essentials as fast as is the case with politics. As such, the social fabric of Maharashtra from 1645 to 1818 could be viewed as a single stream with varying strands and shades. It is from this point of view, that the reader of Desai's book has the feeling that the study begins abruptly from the period of the Peshwas without giving any brief background of the social life of Maharashtra under Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj and his successors. This would have been useful

in drawing a comparison of it with life under the Peshwas.

The author's treatment of social life with the help of original source materials is worth appreciation. She remarks that, "social life in Maharashtra under the Peshwas centred round the village communities They contained all the constituents of a miniature state as well, and were in a position to provide opportunities of a full life to their members." (p.1) The author has drawn a graphic picture of village life; the description particularly of the baluta system is quite interesting. She points that, "The (baluta) system gave economic stability to its members and thereby strengthened the basis of village communities; (p.15) and brought about social integration of the community."(p.28) But the author has failed in assessing the evils of the system. It resulted in a great loss to and social humiliation and economic exploitation of the Ati-Sudra or untouchable balutedars such as the Mahar, the Mangs, etc., who were reduced to the level of beggars under the system. Despite their hard work they could never hope of becoming equal partners with the people they served. With all its merits, it could never be forgotten that the baluta system had arrested the growth of industrial skill in the absence of any competition and was responsible for turning society into a stagnant pool of backwardness.

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The chapter on caste has been dealt with at some length, but one finds it strange that there is hardly any reference to the authority of the Hindu pharma Shastras cited while presenting the theory of caste. The discussion on the practice of untouchability is fully explained with the help of contemporary original source material. The tensions between sub-castes among Brahmanas is well referred to. The bitter controversy between the Prabhus and the Kokanasthas over the "Vedokta Karmas" is explained. The worst effects of the caste system have also been carefully noted. The author has pointed out that, "(castes) fostered a spirit of division to an extent of disunion. The resulting fission did much harm to the society of the times....The ritual basis of castes fostered fissiparous tendencies among its members. Again, the besetting sin of the caste and its rigidity made it a static society dominated by caste, which naturally enough tended to be unprogressive." (pp. 52-53) But the author has ignored an explanation of the causes of the growth of rigidity of castes under the Peshwa rule. Moreover, no reference is made to the favourite dictum of Chhatrapati Shahu, viz., "No old practice should be discarded, no new one be adopted," which has affected Maratha society so deeply. This love for the old traditions and their continuation had been the most characteristic feature of Hindu society of the Peshwa times. There is also no mention of the Peshwas' contribution to the making of a more orthodox and ritualistic society.

Then again, the author has referred to the Shrawanmas Dakshina to the Brahmans at Poona without making any attempt to study the effects of the charities on the finances of the state. Justice Ranade, who studied the Peshwa Diaries carefully, remarked, "The Dakshina charity started with a view to encourage learning, became a grant generally to all Brahmans and Poona became the centre of a large pauper population....In the hands of the last Peshwa (Baji Rao II), the state ceased to be the ideal protector of all classes, and upholder of equal justice." Desai's further observations that, "the Brahmans had always been the focus of most of the charitable practices of this period," (p. 94) also carefully avoids to explain the Peshwa policy of extending special protection to the Brahman class. The Brahmans, under the Peshwas, were given preference in its services, they were exempted from payment of ferry charges, octroi duties on transport of goods, house tax, etc. They were futher permitted to pay land assessment in cash at low rates. They were exempted from veth or forced labour, death punishment, mutilation of limbs and other harsh punishments for any serious crime. The documents of the Peshwa period make it clear that they (Peshwas) had accorded special and privileged treatment to the Brahmans who looked upon the start and privileged treatment to the Brahmans who looked upon the state as "Brahmani Daulat" or empire of the Brahmans. Justice Ranade has remarked that "Brahmans at this time came to regard themselves as a governing caste with special privileges and exemptions, which were unknwon under the system founded by Shivaji."

The author's presentation of details of famly life, daily life, education, pastimes, religious cults, slavery, etc., with the help of contemporary sources, is a good job done. But she has ignored the institution of forced labour which had victimized the untouchable classes in the society.

Finally, Desai has rightly concluded that, "...the religious orthodoxy in the form of Brahmanism and casteism gained ascendency during the Peshwa period and worked against the unity in the society and state. It may be remembered that under conditions of religious oppression and insecurity during the preceding Shivaji times, the Marathas as a whole had closed their ranks and had come together as co-religionists. The very birth of Swarajag could be effected on the strength of this unity by the genius of Shivaji. However, during the Peshwa period, the narrow conservatism, racial dissenssions and traditional caste-based intolerance was aggravated undercutting the foundations of Swarajya by destroying its unity." (p. 198)

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ARTHUR WESLEY HELWEG: Sikhs in England: The Development of a Migrant Community. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1979, xiii, 175p., Rs. 55.

THIS is a perceptive portraiture of Sikh Jats of the Jandiali village of Punjab — a highly self respecting community with a high degree of social-familial cohesiveness-in the British setting called Gravesend. The focus here is on their migration between 1947 and 1971 — in three phases (1947-1961; 1965; 1971) -and on their adjustment and accommodation within the British society. In a painstaking manner, the writer is able to spell out the nature of encounter between the pre-existing value-compulsions of the Sikh Jats and the constraints and pressures of living in an alien society and also highlight both the continuities and discontinuities between their past in Jandiali, India and their present in Gravesend, Britain. The study is based upon field investigations both in India (6 months) and Britain (7 months), followed up by a brief re-visit to the field locations in 1971. The method of inquiry followed may be roughly recognized as a variant of participant observation, a technique followed usually by social anthropologists for depth investigations into the primitive and rural communities. The writer was assisted by his Indian wife and both had the competence of communicating in Punjabi—a language spoken by the Sikh Jats, especially in their informal communications.

The book runs into eight chapters, followed by a brief epilogue. The first three chapters supply the socio-cultural backdrop of the people studied and also their initial rationale and modality of emigration. The Sikh Jats are characterized by a strong sense of honour, caste and familial loyalty, which is supplemented by such related value-orientations as muhabhat (brotherly love), khidmat (hospitality), seva (service to others), robh (power) loxy

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attachment for pirhi (generation), strong urge for jaidad (wealth) and zamindari (land ownership). All these orientations were strongly instrumental in urging the Sikh Jats to migrate, as well as motivate the early migrants to help their kith and kin and their caste-brethren to migrate and then stabilise in a foreign land. Those who came earlier knew that in extending support and succour to the newcomers they were enhancing the prestige of their families. All this provided not only a natural fillip to migration but also shelped migrants tide over their initial difficulties.

Migration into England in quite a few cases—especially in the beginning—was the result of the enterprise of the entire family which pooled its resources to send one who looked most likely to make a success out of it and to help the rest of the family migrate. Motivations for migration were supplied by the meagre land resources of the expanding families and the exaggerated tales of England as a land of opportunity. For the rest it was a chance of replenishing their sagging life-resources or an escapade from the ignominy of a good-for-nothing fellow.

First generation migrants had found their bearings in Gravesend by 1960, after which they started inviting their families, as well as friends. The close male-network came very handy and each bit of information regarding lucrative job opportunities became an invaluable input into the placement and establishment of migrants into Gravesend. The latter, eventually grew to full size and complexity of an indigenous Indian community. The profile drawn by Helweg easily brings home the point that the proud Sikh Jats of Jandiali despite agreeing to slog as double-shift operators in factories and foundaries or even as janitors—a job they could not do in India except at the cost of total erosion of their personal and family honour-do manage to maintain a distinct ethnic and cultural identity. This is because of their strong commitment to the Sikh religion and to several of their traditional and cultural values such as the complete exclusion of their womenfolk from any contact with the British males. The gurdwara the traditional temple of Sikhs—has played an important role in perpetuating their socio-cultural identity. This is all the more so now because of the politics that has come to be associated with its management.

As the subsequent five chapters of the book bring out, after three decades of their settlement in Gravesend, contradictions in the life of Sikh Jats are becoming manifest, rather virulent. First and foremost, they are caught in the contradiction of their explicit denial of planning a permanent stay in England and their inability to migrate back home. Exposure to England has created a new structure of aspirations and expectations among the migrants, which is impossible to fulfil on return to Jandiali. Individualism of the characteristic British genre seems to have occupied a permanent niche in the psyche of an average Sikh Jat. Hence an automatic subconscious resistance on their part to the idea of going back to pre-migration life. ones, the migrant parents find it impossible to prescribe the precise cultural

format of their day-to-day existence. This successive distancing from their cultural nexus over generations despite the authoritarian family style which they still espouse and practice, does not augur well for the puristic perpetuation of their cultural values. Yet the author's conclusion is to the contrary, if at all, in that the close family and community network supplies sufficient resilience for these values to continue; and also that the ultimate reference point continues to be Jandiali or the place in Punjab to which they hold on with profound attachment. No less "push" contribution is made by the British society which continues to view these migrants as an unwanted burden and a threat to the employability of the Britons. Expressions of this public hostility towards Indian migrants has often assumed explicit and virulent forms.

The present study runs between ethnology and anthropology, having the merits of neither. It lacks the narrative depth characteristic of the former and misses the theoretical perception, let only conceptualisation, which is often associated with the latter. A priori caricature of the cultural value-orientations of the subjects without any explicit basis in empirical investigations is coupled with highly opinionated statements such as:

Without emigration, Jandiali and some other parts of Punjab might have been the scene of starvation and poverty instead of being prosperous and developed as they are today.

Of course, the sight of newly constructed brick-houses in Jandiali seems to act as opiate to the author's sensitivity, so that he totally disregards the onset of the green revolution in Punjab during the sixties and its prosperous effects on the countryside as well as the massive developmental effort made by the state to improve the situation of the marginal and average farmers. Safer than the above-quoted conjecture on the part of the author, is to hold the view that the already sick British economy would have zoomed down faster without the massive savings obtained from sub-standard wages paid to the Asian migrants. Another dimension which the writer would have done better to explore is the hostility syndrome which beclouds the British perception of the Asians. This subjectivity is caused perhaps not only by the perceived onslaught on the British economy, but also has certain historico-cultural bearings. Could it not be at least a partial spillover of the self-perceived racial and political superiority on the part of the British?

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Economic Perspectives

CHARAN SINGH: Economic Nightmare of India: Its Cause and Cure. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981, xii, 564 p., Rs. 175.

THE "nightmare" to which Charan Singh, Lok Dal leader and briefly Prime Minister in 1979, refers in the title of his book is the orientation that Jawaharlal Nehru gave to the post-independence economic development of India. The gravamen of his charge is that Nehru reversed the Gandhian, village-centred approach to economic development and made the Congress adopt instead what has come to be known in the theory of economic development as the "trickle-down mode." "(Nehru) wanted to build India from the top downwards, that is, from the industrialists, managers and technicians, and hence followed the centrality of the town. (He) lived to regret his decision but it was at the fag end of his life, when little time was left for him to reverse the gear even if he would." (p.vi) Nehru died half-way through the Third Plan period. Rethinking on plan priorities and some preliminary ideas on systematising changes in them in the Fourth Plan were by then already underway. As Chairman of the Planning Commission Nehru was party to these, and there is no reason to think that he would have resisted even basic changes if they were demonstrably called for.

But "reversal" is another matter. The author's assumption that a "reversal of gear" in Indian planning was what was needed is not well-founded. After five hundred pages of writing on agriculture, industry and the Gandhian approach, he is apologetic and on the defensive. He says: "So that, as the reader must have already noticed, when the writer lays emphasis on development of agriculture, he should not be taken to mean or believe that India should 'stay agricultural,' instead of developing. Nor does he share the belief that industrialisation ultimately degrades. The argument that neither the carrying capacity of land, nor the market for farm production, is such as to permit the masses in India and, for the matter of that, in other poor countries to reach a high level of living without a major shift to non-farming activities, is conclusive." (p.529).

It is true that by "non-farming activities" the author has medium and small-scale industries in mind. But since he also wants "development," it is impossible for such industries to produce all the requirements of development which include machinery of every description and high technology products. These are required for developing communications and various means of transport, for building dams to impound waters for agriculture, for manufacturing fertilisers and pesticides and drugs and chemicals to keep farmers in a physical condition for farming operations, to name only a few industrial pre-requisites of agricultural development. The alternative to their domestic production is import. The author impliedly admits in the passage quoted above that Indian agriculture may or may not produce sufficient surpluses for export. How then do we pay for the import, especially since

he looks upon foreign aid as demeaning? (p.317) He does not appreciate that India's rural regeneration based on agriculture is not practicable without an expanding industrial structure that meets both the domestic need for capital goods and industrial products for export. Without them Charan Singh's reversal of gear may indeed stall all development, including agriculture. His idyllic vision of the village community (p. 529) will be chimerical.

Further Charan Singh says that upon attaining independence India needed a "firm and clear-headed leader" and not a "political philosopher with no capacity for administration, and in whose opinion the world had arrived at a stage when national frontiers were no longer relevant." (p. 547) The latter is an obvious reference to Nehru. His administrative capacity may be a matter of opinion; so is the author's. But competent leadership and political philosophy are not antithetical. After all the author himself swears by the Gandhian philosophy of a decentralised economic development and draws copiously on Western authors to buttress his critique of the Nehruvian philosophy of development. Presidents Jefferson and Wilson were political philosophers. So was Lenin. The vision of their administration was enriched thereby, not weakened. As for a world that transcends national frontiers, it was a greater reality in 1979 than in 1947. It is a pity that Charan Singh was not Prime Minister long enough to realise it. He would have realised, moreover, that for a large part of the Indian developmental programme the question of "reversing" does not arise. It is irreversible. His model has been overtaken by history.

To the extent that problems of developing countries like India are "nightmares," there is no once-for-all cure for them. They have to be met and resolved as the country goes along its developmental path. This is not to say that Charan Singh's analysis and arguments are invalid or irrelevant. Much of it has been advanced before even by Nehruvians and is undeniably of much substance. They are based on painstaking research and reference, albeit on secondary and published sources. Above all, the author's views are honestly and sincerely held, however one may disagree with them. His book has a place in the literature on post-independence Indian economy.

New Delhi.

H. VENKATASUBBIAH

ASHOK MITRA: The Share of Wages in National Income. Oxford University Press, 1980, vi, 152 p., Rs. 75.

THE problem of the distribution of national income is inextricably linked with the process of economic development. The debate on the subject started about two centuries ago and continues even now without abatement of the enthusiasm that marked the initial years. In fact, recent years have witnessed further intensification of interest in income distribution especially in view of the accentuated inequalities confronting the contem-

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porary economic world. The book under review provides a comprehensive catalogue of both conflicting and reconciliatory presentations on alternative theories of income distribution.

Ashok Mitra builds up the classical scenario by succinctly projecting the contributions of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus. Whereas the distribution aspect figured only indirectly in Adam Smith's investigations of the causes of expanding wealth, Ricardo had a more explicit focus. The latter's analytical long-run macro-economic dynamics has been very rightly described by the author as a theory of income distribution par excellence. However, the Ricardian approach suffers from several limitations. The assumptions are static, and even more glaringly, the theory does not touch upon the true nature of macro-variables involved in an economic system. In this context, the author also brings into prominence the theory of Marx which is considered to be a pioneering attempt in anticipating temporal movements in major macro-economic variables such as wages and net profits. Notwithstanding the near perfectness of both these models, the question of delineating the precise trajectory of various components of national income was neither considered by Ricardo nor by Marx.

The marginal productivity theory of income distribution and the empirical surrogate of this i.e. the Cobb-Douglas production function have been the subject of intensive probing in Chapters I and II. The marginal productivity theory was essentially cast in a static framework and yet it was used to demonstrate the observed temporal stability of income distribution in the United States and Britain. The noted empirical confirmation could well have been a mere conincidence. There is, however, no a priori justification for using a static analysis to explain a long-run phenomenon. The author takes full cognisance of this inconsistency together with other contradictions that have marked the empirical testing of the Cobb-Douglas production function; the observed equality between theoretical and actual wage shares cannot, for instance, be used to prove both the base of perfect competition, as well as the validity of the function.

The necessity of incorporating the impact of market imperfections in any meaningful analysis prompts the author to highlight the Kalecki's model of income distribution. Although the monopoly theory advanced by Kalecki provides a new and more realistic interpretation of the phenomenon of income distribution, this too is not free from the overshadows of a static framework. The operationalisation of this theory meets with insurmountable difficulties mainly because the quantitative dimension of the concept of monopoly was not elaborated upon by Kalecki. In fact, Kalecki merely presumes compensatory movements in the degree of monopoly to demonstrate observed constancy of income distribution in the United Kingdom.

Mitra's subsequent discussion centres on providing an appropriate measure of the degree of monopoly. The core of his thesis lies in developing a model which brings out some of the fundamental determinants of income distribution. Mitra uses the analytical superstructure built upon Cournot's theory to highlight the importance of both the technological variables and those relating to the market structure. The concepts of labour quota and import quota invoked as prime determinants of marginal cost are real innovations. The market influences are captured by introducing variables such as zero demand price, the number of competitors, price level of imports and wage-price ratio. While examining related data on UK, Mitra uses compensatory movements in these variables to corroborate observed stability in income distribution over time.

Given the chronology of various contributions to the theory of income distribution enumerated above, we may conclude that the work under review is a significant refinement over what Kalecki had attempted. Unlike the latter, Mitra's analysis does not suffer from any presuppositions. However, his attempt cannot be characterised as being a significant breakthrough. One may recall at this stage the problem raised by Ricardo and assess the degree of advance made in seeking a solution for the same. A full comprehension of the movement of relative shares of factors of production over time would have required development of a truly dynamic framework of analysis. The present study has sought to scrutinize exhaustively the available literature only to highlight the impending necessity for initiation of such a dynamic attempt. The real effort is yet to be made.

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ARVIND SHARMA: Hindu Scriptural Value System and the Economic Development of India. Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, x, 113p., Rs. 50.

THERE are certain fundamental problems with this book. The author has taken up an important but sociologically complex subject and attempted to deal with it—literally—in a sketch, based on haphazard, brief and long, but numerous quotations from several kinds of texts.

The first problem is his lack of knowledge of the Weberian thesis on religion and society as a whole and the important sociological literature that has developed on the subject since the first decade of the 20th century. Otherwise, he would not have considered it advisable to suggest that Max Weber and K.W. Kapp are two comparable writers on the subject.

The second problem is his notion of Hindu scriptural values. Either one attempts a Hegelian definition of them, i.e., one consciously sets out to synthesize the essential ideas in them; or one takes a sociological view of them and describes them in their completeness in a series of ideal-types. Had Sharma studied Weber's methodology, as developed in his methodological essays as well as in his sociology of religion, he might have contributed something worthwhile to our understanding of the values he wishes to base his opinions on.

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Thirdly, there is the problem of relationship between values and economic development. Let me point out, since values and ideas are being treated synonymously by him—that Weber's formulation that "interests, material and ideal—not ideas—govern action," is of primary importance in sociological analysis and theory, one should be aware that ideas cannot be translated into actions or events without the intervention of human motives and interests. In other words, ideas cannot translate themselves into anything, however refined their form may be and without the value-elements of belief, ethics and interests created by them, there would be no "developments"—economic, historical, social or subjective.

I am afraid I find the publication of such a book rather depressing, for it shows that there are some publishers who seem totally unaware that the material object that they produce and call a book has to have some readable content, i.e., ideas, agruments and, above all, a cohesive intellectual substance. Printing and selling of a set of loosely connected excerpts as teaching aids which someone might possibly be able to develop verbally, if he knew what he should say, cannot be a substitute for a proper book. The manuscript should have been subjected to a thorough critical analysis by someone who knew the subject. Perhaps, then, the anthor could have provided us with something to read and think about.

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

ARUN SAHAY

Language Issues

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N.K. PRASAD: The Language Issue in India. Leeladevi Publicatons, Delhi, 1979, 126p., Rs. 45.

WHEN India became independent in 1947 language was not really one of its major problems. Nothing then prevented the country from organizing a system of public instruction which would have given its children a fairly sound education in their vernaculars. For that education was needed a corpus of elementary text-books which it should have been possible for the states, union territories and the Central Government to produce through appropriate agencies. Nor was it a problem to spread literacy amongst its vast masses of illiterate adults through a phased programme of such education drawn up and financed by the Central and State Governments. And our vernaculars were to be the only media of instruction. Even a quarter of a century after the inauguration of the Republic of India, the rate of literarcy was only a little above 30 per cent. And literacy here does not mean even elementary education which is expected to create in us a habit of seeking knowledge in the printed word.

Instead of initiating a grand programme of primary education and of adult

literacy, using our vernaculars for both, we created a problem of medium of instruction and this problem again arose out of the primary problem of an official language of the new nation. There was indeed no such problem in either ancient or medieval India. In Hindu, or Buddhist India, Sanskrit was the language of administration and of higher learning but not the language of the masses. In medieval India, Persian was the language of the Court while the people used their vernaculars in their daily life; this did not prevent the growth and development of a great literature in our vernaculars. Perhaps the ideal linguistic situation in a country is that when kings and plenipotentiaries, judges and lawyers, scholars, philosophers, poets, the vast masses of common people—including the rich and the poor—the urban beggar and the village bard use the same language. The history of human civilization, however, shows how a fine intellectual culture grows out of an encounter between two languages.

In the great ages in the history of World civilization, the makers of those ages have cared for a language other than their own. The early Romans loved Greek, the language of their political slaves and there would have been no Virgil if his countrymen had not exalted Homer as the first amog poets. As Professor H.I. Marrou says in his History of Education in Antiquity (Eng. tr., George Lamb, 1956), "a genuinely autonomous Italian civilization had no time to grow up, because Rome and Italy were snatched up into the civilization of Greece." And the Romans, the teachers of modern Europe, did not believe in any form of cultural autarchy. Horace's famous line, "captive Greece took captive her savage conqueror" expressed a universal Roman idea about the birth of the Roman civilization. Even Cato, who very patriotically advised his son to avoid Greek literature and Greek medicine, spent the last years of his life learning Greek to be able to read Thucydides and Demosthenes.

The writers of the New Testament were bilingual and they preferred to express their Hebraic thought in Hellenistic Greek and there is no record of any qualms in their Christian soul about their choice of a pagan tongue in proclaiming their new faith. The golden age of Arabic literature, that is, the Arabic literature of the eighth to eleventh centuries, shows the Arab's creative response to Hellenistic and Persian cultures. During the Renaissance Europe had developed its vernaculars and yet not a few great minds of this great age expressed themselves in Latin. No patriotic Englishman was unhappy about Bacon choosing to write his Novum Organum in an ancient and foreign tongue. Even as late as the seventeenth century no Englishman questioned the validity of the law of gravitation because Newton had not described it in his mother-tongue. It is the privilege of the civilized man to master a language other than his own.

The present work is a carefully prepared statistical statement of the whole problem of medium of instruction in our university system. The author is absolutely free from any dogmatic view of the question. He has made a very worthy effort to have an objective view of the whole situation and the material

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he has collected for the purpose is indeed of great value for all serious enquirers in the field. His analysis of the details he has put together is not warped by any preconceived notions about what actually should be the medium of instruction at various levels of our university education. Actually the facts about medium of instruction in our universities which he has gathered through his questionnaires offer their mute comments on the complex situation. Yet the author is too modest to claim that what he has found is the final answer to the question. The last of his recommendations is that in regard to the problem of language there is a need for conducting comprehensive research without further delay so that the correct position may be known and the right acceptable solution found. It will be suicidal to impose any ready-made solution in haste. Perhaps it is our politicians' desire to impose a ready-made solution which is responsible for the establishment's indifference to what the author calls "comprehensive research."

The author's list of 37 universities which use the English language as the medium of instruction is enough to show that this language cannot be dispensed with at the moment as an instrument of higher learning. Even in Maharashtra, where there is a strong popular feeling against the continuance of English as medium of instruction, the majority of senior teachers, the author reports, "generally prefer the English medium." The author quotes a Maharashtrian professor who says that "discarding English as a foreign language would be as good or as bad as rejecting the Pythagoras's theorem, because Pythagoras was a Greek."

About the Hindi-speaking states, the author says that "in these states English is being brought back as a compulsory subject now" and appropriately adds that the "reverse trend is significant." The author points to the origin of the three-language formula in a resolution of the Congress Working Committee adopted on 2 June 1965 and remarks that evaluation of the implementation of this formula "reveals many gaps" which represent the limitations of our social, economic end political set-up. When Professor Triguna Sen declared the three-language formula as the educational policy of the Government of India not a few amongst our educationists thought that to ask a Hindi-speaking student to learn a south Indian language because the students of the south were required to learn Hindi was nothing more than a principle of parity in academic exercise which put an unnecessary burden on both sides.

Prasad has made a very important contribution to the understanding of our language problem through this copiously documented survey of the present situation regarding the medium of instruction and examination in our universities.

Calcutta.

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian Publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences.)

AGRAWAL, M.P. Taxation of Mutual Societies: (Social Clubs, Trade Associations, Chambers of Commerce, Stock Exchanges, Race Clubs, Insurance Societies, Banking Funds). Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1983. xv, 150p. Rs. 45.

Contains general principles with exhaustive references to cases, Indian cases in relation to these institutions and English decisions on the subject. The book provides proper exposition of the legal principles governing the mutual societies.

DANDEKAR, Kumudini Employment Guarantee Scheme: An Employment Opportunity for Women. (Gokhale Institute Studies, 67). Orient Longman on behalf of Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Bombay, 1983. 76p., Rs. 25. (Paper).

The study assesses the extent to which the Employment Guarantee Scheme had an impact on the rural employment situation in Maharashtra and the extent to which female workers participate in and benefit from such a programme. It is based on statistical data compiled by the concerned government agencies relating to the scheme and a sample survey in 60 Employment Guarantee Scheme works in 12 districts of Maharashtra.

GALBRAITH, John Kenneth Essays from the Poor to the Rich. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1983, vi, 88p, Rs. 30.

The former United States Ambassador to India and world renowned economist in the Rajaji Lectures (1982), given under the auspices of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, discusses about what advice the poor nations ought to render the more fortunate countries. He begins by pointing out the general neglect of historical process in considering the path by which the rich lands have moved to their present state of affluence, a process that is relevant for poor countries as they seek political, cultural and industrial development. Next, he discusses the political and military relationships between the great powers and the newly independent states pointing out the dangers of cold war and the dangers of the arms race and arms supply for world peace, as well as for social and economic development. Finally he criticizes the United States and other industrial countries for their lack of restraint in fiscal policy, their excessive faith in monetary magic, their refusal to deal rationally with the interacting spiral of incomes and prices, and their blind insistence on economic theologies from the past that no longer accord with reality, no longer offer viable solutions.

JOSHI, Barbara R. Democracy in Search of Equality: Untouchable Politics and Indian Social Change (Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology). Hindustan Publishing Corporation (India), Delhi, 1982, xiv, 200p.

The book deals with the problems of protection of long suppressed minorities from continuing majority oppression in the democratic nations in which leaders and public policies are chosen by majority vote. It discusses India's experience which offers an opportunity to explore the impact of reform strategies currently debated in a number of societies. It further seeks to find genuineness of long-term economic change aimed at ensuring equality for minorities and, effectiveness of specific protective policies designed to push the pace of change for low status minorities. The author examines the existing Indian policies against a backdrop of constraints and options posed by

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prevailing social values and economic structures, and finds strong arguments for the value of policies that have guaranteed this minority at least limited access to the political arena and thus helped to sustain the struggle for equality.

KAMATH, M.V. The Innovative Banker: T.A. Pai, His Life and Times. T.A. Pai Memorial Committee, Manipal, 1983, x, 247p., Rs. 55.

Well-known journalist and life-long friend of T.A. Pai presents a portrait and assessment of his life. He discusses the contribution made by Pai in his capacity as Managing Director of the Syndicate Bank, Custodian of the nationalized Syndicate Bank, Chairman of the Food Corporation of India and Life Insurance Corporation of India, Member of the Union Cabinet—holding several important portfolios, Railways, Industry, Heavy Industry, Steel and Mines, and his contribution to the welfare and upliftment of the common man, especially the farmer. The author, in the last chapter discusses the political events leading to the declaration of emergency and the post emergency events which ended Pai's political career.

KHAN, M.Z. Dacoity in Chambal Valley. National Publishing House, New Delhi 1981, vii, 216 p., Rs. 70.

The study brings out various personal, geographical and socio-cultural factors which are responsible for the rise and persistence of the problem of dacoity and dacoit-gang formation among the ravines of Chambal Valley. It is based on information collected from rural communities within the region of the Chambal Valley, individual village respondents of the said communities including former dacoits, the inmates of various jails who are ordinarily the inhabitants of the valley and who have been convicted for dacoity, police officials who have had administrative experience within the region, and information from secondary data and historical records. The author argues that it is not a simple law and order problem, and suggests social, economic and police remedial measures to combat it effectively.

KHAN, Rasheeduddin (Ed.), Perspectives on Non-alignment. Kalamkar, New Delhi, 1981, xvi, 339p., Rs. 100.

An anthology of essays by political scientists, area specialists, economists, experts in operational science and defence studies and former diplomats and journalists. This collection focuses attention on certain aspects of non-alignment under the three headings arranged in sequence: "The Ambience," "The Concerns" and "The Variations," and aims at highlighting the perspectives in which the movement is growing and operating. In Part I, the context and dimensions of non-alignment are examined in order to provide a normative framework for valuating the role, achievements and stresses of the movement. Part II deals with concerns of development and security as perceived within the environment of the world economy dominated by the MNCs and vital aspects of the national security conditioned by the arms-race and militarisation of the oceans. Regional and normative variations have been indicated to underline the wider ramifications of the movement in Part III. Part IV contains policy documents adopted at formal meetings of the non-aligned from 1961 to 1979. The essays have been selected from the following journals: Man and Development, Secular Democracy, Mainstream and World Focus.

News Agencies Pool of Non-aligned Countries: A Perspective. Indian Institute of Mass Communication on behalf of Pool Co-ordinating Committee, New Dolhi, 1983, 303p., Rs. 100

The volume brings together all the documents, declarations and decisions relating to the Pool and sets out in clear terms the role that the Pool plays in building a New International Information and Communication Order. The book covers the period upto the end of 1981—the 20th anniversary of the non-aligned movement. The English edition is edited by M. Chalapathi Rau.

RAJAYYAN, K. History of Tamil Nadu 1565-1982. Raj Publishers, Madurai, 1982. 432p., Rs. 140

Based on archival data, press reports and published works, the author presents the first book on the modern history of the state beginning from the rule of the Telugu

Nayaks upto British rule and post-independence developments. The author also discusses the administrative system during the period, progress in learning, issue of Untouchables. Nadar Movement, rise of political parties, Tamil Integration movement, etc.

RAJSHEKAR, V.T. Ambedkar and His Conversion. (2nd. rev. edition) Dalit Sahitya

Akademy, Bangalore, 1983. 128p., Rs. 10. (Paper).

Issue of the conversion of Dalits and Ambedkar's philosophy on the subject is discussed by the author whose article in the Illustrated Weekly of India entitled, "Has Neo-Buddhism Lost Relevance?" evoked lot of criticism from some Ambedkarites and reaction from the RSS, scholars of Dalit problems, etc. The author by way of explaining his views on Buddhism and Ambedkar's conversion to Buddhism, discusse's the religious solution to the problems of Untouchables, relevance of Buddhism and the reasons for Ambedkar embracing Buddhism and rejecting Islam or Christianity, and the reaction of the Hindus to the mass conversion of Untouchables to Islam at Meenakshipuram.

ROY, A. Compilation: India and Soviet Union: A Chronology of Political and Diplomatic Cooperation. Firma KLM (Pvt.) Ltd, Calcutta, 1982, xvi, 194p., Rs. 30. (Paper)

Chronicle of friendship and co-operation between India and the Soviet Union covering period from 1945 to 1982, with an introduction tracing the roots of the relations. The important documents relevant for the main theme of the book are given in the Appendices. SINHA, Sachchidananda The Consumerist Culture. Samata Sanghatan, Delhi, 1983, 24p...

Rs. 2.50. (Paper)

SRIVASTAVA, G.D. Judicial Panorama: Judges-Their Appointments, Transfers and Role, Law Book Co., Allahabad, 1981, 48p., Rs. 10.

Theme discussed in this book has already been debated both in the Legislature and various symposiums. It provides a philosophical analysis of the essential purpose of the judicial institutions and the basic goals and values to be served by a legal order. It views contemporary events through the spectacles of such philosophical analysis. Foreword is by former Chief Justice of India, M.H. Beg.

VARADARAJAN, A. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Popular Sovereignty. (Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Memorial Publications, 1). Department of Political Science, Karnataka

University, Dharwad, 1982, vi, 24p., Rs. 4. (Paper)

Under the auspices of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Chair of Political Science, Karnataka University, the lectures delivered by the Judge of the Supreme Court of India present an account of Ambedkar's life and thought and examines the constitutional implications of accepting the principle of social justice and popular sovereignty.

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Perspective

R. P. Kaushik

October

International Sea-Bed Regime

Versus Consortia

Rama Puri

November EEC and India: Economic Rela-

tions in Third World Perspective

Veena Raaikumar

December Towards a Framework of South Asian Regional Co-operation:

Colombo to Kathmandu

Pramod Kumar Mishra

1983

January Change of Leadership in Japan P.A. Narasimha

Murthy

February

Iraq: Challenges to Saddam's

Regime

Christopher S. Raj

March-April

The Non-Aligned As A Pressure

Group in Oil Diplomacy: India's Role

Asha Hans

May

India-Pakistan Relations: Problems

and Prospects

Partha S. Ghosh

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INDIA QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

October-Decer	nber 1983	1	No. 4
ME POLICY IMPLICA	ATIONS FOR	India	
WE TODICT 2		•••	393
THE UNITED NAT	TIONS : PAT	TERNS	
			408:
	ent in the		
DE A STUDY OF	EARLY CUL	TURAL	
KED. II BIODI OZ			
	V . 1/2		423
		SN 19 791	
OMMONWEALTH		ALAP WAS	432.
and Maria			
NOTES AND V	TEWS		
NOTES TAND			
D			4.453
al	•••	1	447'
DOOK DEWE	W.C		
BOOK REVIE	WD	and William	
STRUGGLE—A Rev	iew Article		
	e#1	•	4631
••	• •	•••	477"
n the History of		ohacen Sing	h
	Dai	ignasch bi-b	
The Origin and			
		ushirul Haq	
of Southeast Asia	u −D	ilip Chandra	
	THE UNITED NATE OF THE UNITED NA	THE UNITED NATIONS: PAT RLD: A STUDY OF EARLY CULT OMMONWEALTH NOTES AND VIEWS D al BOOK REVIEWS STRUGGLE—A Review Article The Origin and —Ma	ME POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA THE UNITED NATIONS: PATTERNS RLD: A STUDY OF EARLY CULTURAL OMMONWEALTH NOTES AND VIEWS D al BOOK REVIEWS STRUGGLE—A Review Article The History of —Sanghasen Sing The Origin and —Mushirul Haq

RI

	391
POLITICS	
K.P. MISRA and S.C. GANGAL: Gandhi and the Contemporary World: Studies in Peace and War —G. Ramachandran	
T.S. MURTY: Paths of Peace: Studies on Sino-Indian Border Dispute —Parshotam Mehra	
OM PRIE SRIVASTAVA: Municipal Government and Administration in India —D.D. Malhotra	
KIRAN KAPUR DATAR: Malaysia—Quest for a Politics of Consensus —V. Suryanarayan	
ECONOMICS	492
ASHOK S. GUHA: An Evolutionary View of Economic Growth —Dhires Bhattacharyya	
B.S. BAVISKAR: The Politics of Development: Sugar Cooperatives in Maharashtra —R.S. Morkhandikar	
S.L.N. SIMHA: Financial Wisdom from the Bank for International Settlements —S.R. Sen	
RICHARD BLACKHURST and JAN TUMLIR: Trade Relations Under Flexible Exchange Relations Under Flexible	
Exchange Rates: GATT Studies in International Trade, No. 8 —R.L. Varshney	
GERARD J. MANGONE: Energy Policies of the World: India, Japan, Taiwan —Soumya K. Mitra	
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW	505

D.C. WADHWA: Re-Promulgation of Ordinances:
A Fraud on the Constitution of India —Gobida nMukhoty

T.B. SMITH: Basic Enforcement	Rights ar	d Their	—Upendr	a Baxi	
PRESS LAW					511
BADDEPUDI RADHAK Press Laws	RISHNAMURTI	: Indian	v.K. N	arasimhan	
Indian Books of a By Ashok Jambh					513

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WORLD OIL OUTLOOK: SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

By PARTHA S. GHOSH*

The year 1973 was a watershed in the history of energy. That year the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) took the momentous decision to raise the price of crude oil multifold resulting in the worst energy crunch in recorded history. The trend which the OPEC decision set in motion continued unabated and by 1980-81 oil was sold at a price about five times as that of 1972. The unprecedented rise in the price of oil resulted in a world-wide search for alternate sources of energy and for knowledge to conserve the non-renewable sources of energy that were heading slowly but steadily towards depletion. But although research is under way for an alternate cheap source, oil is likely to remain one of the most important sources of energy during the foreseeable future, and its high cost, in spite of the latest indications pointing at a sustained glut in the oil market, would continue to constrain the economic development in a major part of the world. It is against this background that the present paper purports to analyse the world oil outlook, assess the possible repercussions of the current oil glut on the Indian economy and gauge its implications for India's foreign and energy policies.

Since the beginnings of the nineteenth century the chief sources of world's industrial energy have been fossil fuels, mainly coal, oil and gas, all of which are non-renewable. For centuries coal had provided the most popular source of energy, but since the Second World War the trend started changing and by 1960, coal on the one side and oil and gas on the other emerged as almost equally sought after sources of energy. Ever since oil and gas steadily replaced coal the former occupied 62 per cent and coal

TABLE I

Growth of Total Primary Energy Demand Versus Oil, Gas and Coal

(In per cent),

Personal Conf.	1950-60	1960-70	1970-77
Total Demand	5.2	- 4.9	3. 3
on and Gae	8.1	8.3	3.55
Coal	3.5	1.0 -	2.00

Source : OPEC statistics

Dr Ghosh is Assistant Director in the Indian Council for Social Science Research, New Delhi.

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. 30 per cent of world's total energy supply. Table I would illustrate the point. The reasons why oil and gas emerged as chief sources of energy was its cheapness, easy availability and the vastness of its utility.

There have been sustained efforts, particularly after the 1973 oil crisis, to discover alternate sources of energy. For decades it has been considered by many that nuclear energy would replace oil. But the proliferation of nuclear reactors are raising questions whether proper safeguards are being maintained or not. In addition, costs are also prohibitive. Save a few industrially developed countries, in no third world country has nuclear energy become a major input for electricity generation. Even India which has a fairly long record of nuclear research gets only two per cent of its electrical power from nuclear energy.3 Similarly, solar energy as a source has yet to be a commercially viable proposition. However, it is expected that countries with technological capabilities and financial resources will be able sooner or later to make a significant breakthrough in these fields. But while it is important to explore possibilities for the development of energy substitutes, it is probably important to conserve oil so as to have a secure energy source during the transition period. This means increased energy efficiency which has been called "productive conservation."4

Although growth of conservation is not as satisfactory as it should have been, considering the magnitude of the problem, yet it is increasingly gaining in importance and consequently emerging as a specialised field of research and training. In many segments of American industry, a new profession of "energy manager" is growing in status and importance. But while the United States and other developed countries of the West appear to be making significant progress towards conservation, it has been alleged by the OPEC that many of their measures are directed towards conservation of their indigenous supplies and not foreign ones.

From the foregoing discussion it appears that oil is and will continue to remain a very important source of energy. Hence it is imperative to assess the word oil situation so as to enable one to gauge its implication for the Third World in general and India in particular.

WORLD OIL OUTLOOK

Since oil is an exhaustible source of energy one is faced naturally with the question—How much longer will oil rule the world? Before speculating on an answer to this question it must be borne in mind that there has never been a fool-proof scientific method of assessing world's oil reserves. Actually proven oil reserves have never exceeded twenty to thirty years' consumption. New discoveries have always come to man's rescue. It was as early as 1920, when oil consumption was miniscule compared with that of today, that it was projected that by 1940 world oil reserves would be depleted. One need not spend time to prove the short-sightedness of the

prediction.

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With new oil discoveries coming every day and the possibility of ever new scientific and technological breakthrough it is not possible to predict with arithmetical precision about the future of oil availability. Once this limitation is accepted one can hazard guesses depending on the available data and scientific expertise. According to one such analysis, the present estimate of world's proven oil reserves is 650 billion barrels. If the present rate of consumption of 22 billion barrels a year continués, oil reserves will dry up within the next three decades. The condition of gas reserve, is no better. With the present rate of consumption the reserves of 71 trillion cubic metres will last for about another 45 years.

Of the proven oil reserves mentioned above the OPEC has 450 billion barrels. If its present production rate of 30 million barrels per day continues then its output would start declining by the end of this century, and by 2025, it would reach a situation of total depletion. One can, however, optimistically argue that with the estimated availability of additional conventional sources and the variety of unconventional sources of petroleum and gas, the age of petroleum could be considerably extended providing enough cushion for transition to renewable sources of energy at a future date. The conditions under which such a transition would take place are the ones that today's energy debate is primarily concerned with.

There have been various projections about OPEC's share in the future oil supply of the world. One such projection forecast that the OPEC would be required to supply 35-40 million barrels per day by 1985 and 46-50 million barrels per day by 1990. This analysis raised doubts whether these demands could be met. In addition to an ever increasing demand from outside there was a similar demand in the OPEC states themselves rising at the rate of 15-20 per cent a year. It has projected that by 1990 they would consume six million barrels per day. Hence it was feared that by the turn of the century the OPEC countries would probably cease to be exporters.

Another study also predicted a grim outlook for the OPEC having relied on a different set of data. Pioneers of this study, Henry L Wojtyla of the New York brokerage firm Rosenkrantz, Ehren Lrantz and Lyon, invoking the demand and supply paradigm predicted one and a half years before the 1981-82 oil glut that the steep rise in oil prices would slash consumption so sharply that there would be a glut. Now that the spot Price of oil has been showing a downward trend (from \$ 34 a barrel to \$ 31 barrel), Wojtyla predicts that if the demand for OPEC does not reduce it to \$ 26 a barrel the demand for OPEC oil would fall to a mere 9 million barrels per day by 1987, eventually ceasing to be an exporter. 10

Areas other than OPEC, such as the USSR, China, Alaska, North Sea. (UK and Norway), Latin America (mainly Mexico), and South and Southeast Asia contribute significantly to the total world oil and gas supply.

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Ever since the oil crisis of 1973 substantial effort has been made in various parts of the world resulting in considerable increase in oil and gas production. The present problem faced by the OPEC is partly attributable to the growth in oil production in the non-OPEC (NOPEC) countries.

At one time, the world's top oil exporters were all members of the OPEC which is not the case any more. Barely seven years after the first "oil crisis", Mexico has vaulted into fourth place (the top three being the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and the United States) among oil producers. It accounts for 73 per cent oil and 44 per cent gas production of the entire Latin America. Mexico, however, wants to follow the policy of a "cautious producer" stretching production well into the next decades. 12

There are other NOPEC countries which are also showing remarkable promise. Britain and Norway are both self-sufficient in oil and are exporting sizeable amounts from their North Sea oil wells. They satisfied the oil requirements of Western Europe by 20.5 per cent in 1980. It is estimated that it would increase to 21.4 per cent in 1985 and then fall to 17 per cent in 1990. In the case of gas, the North Sea contribution to the demand in Western Europe was 32 per cent in 1980. This however would decrease, according to estimates, to 30.2 per cent in 1985 and 20.7 per cent in 1990. ¹³

So far the Communist bloc countries are concerned they are self-sufficient in oil. Though the Soviet Union is the largest producer in the world its exports are primarily to the CMEA countries. 14 Its gas exports plan to the Western European countries in recent years has, however, opened up new prospect of its emergence as an energy supplier to the Western world.

Though self-sufficient, China's outlook as an oil exporter is rather uncertain. Those who had foreseen China as an oil power are having their second thoughts. China's oil industry suffers from various problems such as capital shortage, technological limitations and political interference. Besides, the growing domestic need is further making it difficult for China to play an important role in the international oil supply market. During recent years it had to reduce its exports by 44 per cent in order to maintain its industrialization programme. A substantial part of this cut was of course attributable to an unanticipated slow growth of oil production during 1970s. As is expected of the present Chinese leadership, they have attributed these failures on the oil front to the Gang of Four's exaggerated claim about China's oil potential.¹⁵

OPEC Still Holds the Key

Though the non-OPEC countries are fast emerging as exporters, the amount of exportable oil outside OPEC is not large enough to undermine the market clout of OPEC's largest producers. Saudi Arabia still has the potential to substantially influence the world oil market by shifting its oil production up or down. Moreover, since the NOPE c Countries

by and large align their market rates with those charged by the OPEC producers, the latter continues to dictate the global oil trade. One fundamental change from 1973 of course has taken place and that is that the NOPEC countries have now put the world market in a better balance.

Oil Crisis and the Developing World

The oil crisis has severely affected the economic development of the non-oil developing world. In 1980 they spent almost \$ 50 billion on importing oil. If the domestic production does not pick up sufficiently in these countries then it is estimated that by 1990 the oil import bill would rise to 110 billion (in constant 1980 US dollars). The World Bank is however hopeful that if serious efforts are made towards conservation and maximization of energy production the import bill of 1990 could be slashed by \$ 25-30 billion (1980 dollars). To achieve the target, however, an investment of \$ 450-500 million would be required spread over the current decade. This would make heavy demands on domestic savings and external capital, including World Bank aid. 16

Although energy consumption in the developing countries is much less compared to the industrial world (see Table II),¹⁷ it is systematically growing. During the 1980s commercial energy consumption in the developing countries is projected to grow at 6.2 per cent a year.¹⁸

TABLE II

World Commercial Energy Consumption 1975-90
(million barrels a day of oil equivalent)

					Average Annual Growth (%)		
	1975	1980	1985	1990	1950-75	1975-80	1980-90
World	122,1	137.8	166.0	201.5	5.0	2.5	3.9
Developing World Oil Importing Deve	13.9	16.7	22.3	30.6	6.9	3.7	6.2
loping Countries	10.4	12.4	16.8	22.8	6.9	3.6	6.2

It is, however, wrong to club all developing countries together. Among developing countries there are also the oil exporting ones. Again, the oil importing developing countries may also be broadly divided into two categories. First, the poor developing countries which include not only most of sub-Saharan Africa but also the most populous countries of Asia, including India, Bangladesh and Pakistan; and second, the so-called middle income countries which include such rapidly developing and fast industrializing countries as Singapore, Hong Kong, South Ko rea and

Taiwan. 19 Since India belongs to the first category it will be in order to see its energy problem in the perspective of the problems generally faced by the poor oil importing countries.

The primary problem facing these countries is that their per capita income is extremely low and a substantial part of their population live below the poverty line. Table III will show this. Besides, what is more depressing is that these countries registered the slowest growth in the per capita real incomes—during the sixties it increased by only 1.6 per cent annually and during the seventies by 0.9 per cent only. As these countries have a low standard of living their per capita consumption of energy is also low—as low as 161 kg. coal equivalent compared to that of 7,060 kg. in industrialized countries. As a consequence it is not possible to reducethes

TABLE III

Average Per Capita Income by Region (1978)

Industrialized Countries	\$ 8070	
Capital Surplus Oil Exporting Countries	\$ 3340	
Oil Importing Middle Income Countries	\$ 1250	
Oil Importing Poor Countries	\$ 200	

consumption which is already at its lowest. In fact they have to increase their oil imports at least five to six per cent a year to sustain their economic growth. These factors have made the oil crisis more devastating for these countries. According to The World Economic Survey 1983, prepared by the office of Development Research and Policy Analysis of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, the impact of foreign exchange shortage caused by the rising oil bill is going to affect the economics of the oil importing countries at least for a few years to come. While foreign exchange shortages have reduced the availability of primary and intermediate inputs, their effects have been most pronounced for capital equipment, which may impair growth in the medium term. 22

To salvage the economy from the problems caused by the oil crunch the poor countries would need huge finances from international bodies like the IMF, World Bank, etc., at low interest rates. This can be done by the expediency of a subsidy account, not only through voluntary contributions but also through the use of a part of the IMF's gold (as was done in the past) by reserving a small portion of SDR allocation for this purpose. It is expected that in after about 5/10 years many of these countries would be in a position to pay the market rates of interest.²³

Secondly, the oil surplus countries and the industrially developed countries are required to increase their official development assistance (ODA)

to the poor countries. Even of whatever ODA is available, 38 per cent only goes to the poor countries; 52 per cent goes to middle income countries as they are more important for donor countries for security reasons. It may be noted that the poor countries constitute 2/3 of the total population of the developing world. If only the poorer countries get at least 2/3rd of ODA instead of about a third as at present and if ODA increases from year to year in real terms by even a modest amount of, say, 5 per cent, a major part of the problems of the poorer countries could be tackled.²⁴

Thirdly, the poor countries would have to increase their export trade. The first oil shock did not cause that much worry because the industrialised world as a whole maintained a 4.4 per cent growth rate and as such the exports to these countries from the poor ones did not fall, rather increased. But now the growing danger of protectionism, caused by stagflation, is causing serious problem for export trade of the poor countries. Everything should be done to roll back all these factors for they would be mutually advantageous.

INDIA AND THE OIL CRISIS

Like the other poor oil importing countries the Indian economy too has been subjected to severe strain by the oil crisis. Though its crude import has remained more or less static since 1970-71—within the range of 15-17 million tons—the import bill has increased 42 times, from \$146 million in 1970-71 to \$2.3 billion in 1978-79 and then following the second oil shock to \$6.3 billion in 1980-81. The current account which was in surplus by some \$1 billion swung into a large deficit in 1980 of \$3.5 billion—an adverse swing of \$4.5 billion on an export base of some \$9 billion. As even without the oil crisis India's energy sector, particularly that of coal and electricity, was producing less than the capacity resulting in a not too good export outlook, the oil crisis further deteriorated the condition. So much so that India had to take a huge loan of 5 billion SDRs from the IMF to cushion its foreign exchange deficits.

Policy Implications

What could be the possible policy response to meet the energy problem? We have mentioned above a few remedies which can salvage the non-oil poor countries from their energy deficit syndrome. But while the above policy remedies are desirable and theoretically feasible there are serious bottlenecks in their implementation. The twin problem—the crisis in the capitalist economy and the deteriorating East-West relations—have been increasingly crippling the sense of global inter-dependence and leading the world to a politico-economic crisis which if it culminates in the collapse of

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the world order would be unprecedented in its scale and dimension. Against this background it is not much that India can do unilaterally to salvage itself from the energy crunch. Much would depend on extraneous factors. Once this limitation is accepted Indian decision makers would be called upon to countenance the energy challenge at both domestic and external policy levels. While on the domestic front, efforts have to be revamped aiming at more efficient production and conservation of energy as well as tapping new sources, at the external level, political and economic diplomacy would have to be tailored so as to ensure a smooth flow of energy sources from the energy surplus countries and to seek financial and technological resources to support India's energy development plans. Since all these issues, as noted above, are inter-meshed with global political and strategic issues they have to be viewed from a holistic angle of public policy.

The challenge being enormous it is not possible to discuss every aspect of this within the span of the present analysis. For the purpose of this paper only a few aspects of India's energy policy and those of foreign policy which have a bearing on the energy situation have been taken into consideration without of course undermining the importance of others. Hence the present paper would address itself, on the one hand, to the prospects and problems of India's domestic oil production and exploitation and, on the other, to India's West Asia policy in so far as it is dictated by the former's energy needs.

Oil being one of the most important sources of energy for which Indiahas to depend to a large extent on external supply, India's energy policy would have to be integrated with its Persian Gulf policy, for this region is and likely to continue as India's major oil supply area.

Domestic Oil Outlook

Ever since the oil crisis of 1978, massive projects have been undertakent to boost up domestic oil production. These efforts have started paying in dividends. From nothing in 1975-76, the production of crude from the Bombay High is likely to jump to 17 million tons during the current year. At the present international prices, this would be worth \$3.5 billion. It is expected that by 1984 the output would rise up to 20 million tons and then further to 22 million tons by 1985-86. Pecent improvements in India's foreign exchange position has been largely due to the growth of domestic oil production. India would require to borrow during the next twelve months only 1200 million SDRs from the IMF against the earlier plan of 1500 million SDRs. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission is confident that with the explorations now in hand, and to be taken up soon, onshore and offshore, production of crude would rise to 35 million tons within the present decade, thereby making India less dependent on the outside world for an essential energy resource which in 1981 consumed.

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80 per cent of the country's exports earnings. Boosted by oil strikes and an upsurge in crude production, India is now visualizing a petroleum haul of 100 million tons by the end of the century.²⁹

But while it is encouraging to note the bright future ahead on the oil production front there is still need to encourage conservation of oil energy particularly by its efficient use. It is regrettable that while the developed world has been able to launch ever new devices to conserve energy India has done practically nothing toward this end. The magnitude of the energy drain in Indian industry has been variouly estimated at between Rs 1,500 crores and Rs 2,500 crores a year in value. To put if differently, India's industrial sector burns 10 to 25 per cent more fossil fuel and consumes 15 to 20 per cent more electricity than it needs to.30 It is, therefore, suggested that vigorous efforts should be made to increase the fuel efficiency of Indian industry and that of commercial vehicles, diesel locomotives and also agricultural pumpsets and tractors. It is a fact that Indian motor vehicles are as efficient as machines designed more than twenty years ago in other countries. Let us hope that the Maruti-Suzuki collaboration would be the harbinger of a new generation of fuel efficiency.31

Since oil exploration and production is highly capital and technology intensive it has to be seen that our diplomacy, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels, ensures a constant flow of these vital inputs. Although there is less possibility of its getting bogged down for want of vital spare parts or knowhow as has been the case with nuclear energy development still our policy should be one of diversification of dependence so as not to be vulnerable to the policies of one country or the other.

Indirectly related to offshore oil explorations is the question of India's security. It has been feared that since the foreign oil companies involved in offshore oil exploration and exploitation keep in touch with the Department of the Navy in their home governments there is possibility of their passing information of vital strategic importance to their governments. It should be appreciated that offshore exploration rights give scope for certain intensive studies and hence collection of strategic information which are not otherwise available, neither through satellites nor international oceanographic expeditions or submarine movements. 32 As there is no way out other than depending to a certain extent on large foreign companies, it can merely be suggested that the Government of India should also take into account the credentials of the companies in this regard before contracting them for exploration and exploitation iobs. Recently, P. Shiv Shankar, the Minister of Energy, allayed the fears of Members of Parliament by saying that indigenous capabilities for processing of seismic data were being increased by acquiring sophisticated computers which would be installed in 1985. He further assured the members that at present whenever seismic data was sent for processing, an officer of the ONGC, duly briefied by the defence authorities, was deputed to the computer centre where data was processed. Defence authorities also decided whether a naval officer should be sent along with the ONGC officer.³³

Oil as Foreign Policy Factor

Notwithstanding the good news from domestic oil industry and the talk of India becoming self-sufficient in oil it is still unlikely that India would cease to be an oil importer. It must be realised, as it appears from the present reckoning, that after Bombay High and related offshore structures we have yet no established source of additional crude and all increases in consumption after 1987-88 would have to be met by imports. It is feared that even by the turn of the century oil imports might well absorb 75 per cent of India's export earnings.34 Views have also been expressed that the present slump in the price of oil may not last long. At the second international energy workshop held in Vienna in June 1983, about 100 experts from international organisations, oil companies, research institutes and universities were of the opinion that by the end of the century the forces leading to price rises would be stronger than those exerting a downward pressure on prices. The experts believed that the view that "the current oil glut" was a "structural" phenomenon and that low prices would persist indefinitely was not correct.35 It is in the shadow of these anxieties that India's diplomacy has to be tailored; in the first place, to ensure a smooth supply of oil from external sources and secondly, to develop viable economic links with oil exporters so as to make both the partners mutually dependent on each other thereby reducing the vulnerability of the Indian economy to the whims and fancies of the oil exporting countries. To effect these, India's dependence on external supply has to be diversified and viable economic relations have to be built up with the Persian Gulf Middle East countries, who are India's largest suppliers.

So far as diversification of oil imports is concerned India's efforts have been commendable. Table IV will show the trend. Although Persian Gulf Middle East countries continue to be India's major exporters, yet since 1980 we have on our list of suppliers such countries as Mexico, Venezuela, Malaysia, Algeria and Nigeria. Kuwait which was previously not our supplier has emerged as one. The Soviet Union which was a relatively small supplier in 1977 has over the years become a major one.

But in spite of these diversifications India's dependence on the Middle East oil is still enormous. So it is imperative that India's energy diplomacy take serious note of the development in the Middle Eastern region and tailor its policy so as not to jeopardize its economic growth

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which a cut in the oil supply from the region might lead to. It is still in Indian memory that following the oil crisis of 1973 the oil-exporting Arab countries had included India in the list of countries selected for oil embargo as well as oil squeeze.

In the initial phase of the oil crisis Indian economy became so vulnerable to the dictates of the oil-exporting Arab countries that some apprehended that India might even intervene in the Middle East to safeguard its vital interests. In March 1975, speaking at Iran's Institute of International Political and Economic Studies, Christoph Bertrum, Director

TABLE IV
India's Oil Imports 1977-78—1981-82 (Country-Wise Break-up)

(in 000 tons)

	1977-78	1978-79	1979-80	1980-81	1981-82*
Iran	6191	3601	3714	5901	4800@
Iraq	3349	5381	5696	3629	3500
Qatar	E STORY		217	19	**
Saudi Arabia	2941	2410	3017	2520	6800
UAE	872	1117	1417	1553	1300
Egypt	192			50	
Algeria			_	196	**
Kuwait				418	**
Malaysia				51	4.0
Mexico	100 m	L HIZON		129	**
USSR	962	1548	2060	1782	1700
Venezuela		_			500
Nigeria	To the Total		_	D. William	500

^{*} Based on Lok Sabha Questions/Answers Nos. 2772 and 2610 (1983). @Upto June 1983

of London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, startled his audience when he said:

... if one considers the fact that India is paying out everything she earns in balance of payment accounts to acquire energy, and further considers that India has very considerable armed forces, we perhaps need not look to the United States as a possible intervener in the Persian Gulf area. Is it not possible that India, who is likely to feel

^{**}Not available.

Source: Government of India, Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Calcutta, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, Vol. 2, March 1981, pp. 99, 607; Lok Sabha Debates, 1983 (Question Nos. 2610 and 2772).

ractual strangulation in the not too distant future, might find that it's worth her while to try to exert pressure within the Persian Gulf region? She would doubtless not try to take on Iran, but she might try to exert pressure on one or a number of countries in the area which have small populations and more oil then they need for their own use.³⁶

It need not be emphasized that Bertum's analysis smacked of a typical Western imperialistic solution of a given economic contingency. But what his fear underscored was the fact that India had vital stakes in Arab oil

for its economic development.

It would not be worthwhile to discuss at length here the development of India's West Asia policy. It will suffice to mention the main plank on which it has come to stand. In the Arab-Israeli conflict India's policy has been one of expressing solidarity with the cause of the Arabs. That this policy has paid some dividends is evident from the fact that by forceful support to the Arab demand that Israel withdraw from all territory occupied during the War of 1967, India got the oil exporting Arab countries to promptly delete its name from the list of countries selected for the oil embargo and the oil squeeze.³⁷ Alongside wooing the Arabs politically, India also made efforts to develop economic relations with those which had overnight become rich. Since 1974 India has been projecting to the Persian Gulf countries its image as a nation that is eminently in a position to meet a streable portion of the goods and services they need for their dazzlingly ambitious modernization and development projects at rates considerably cheaper than those available in the developed capitalist countries. By the late seventies, India's vigourous economic diplomacy was rewarded with promising returns. Iran came up with an offer of investments totalling \$ 1 billion. Indian public and private sector companies built railroads, airports, townships, housing projects, an electric power supply plant, a water filteration plant, a sponge iron plant and a fertilizer factory in countries located in the Persian Gulf region.38 India also became the second largest supplier of manpower to the region, after Pakistan.

Now that there is a glut in the world oil market and price of oil is falling India has an opportunity to strengthen its solidarity with the Arab countries by not exploiting their predicament. The recent development in Indo-Iran economic relations have indicated the usefulness of this strategy. It is believed that the Indian gesture of not demanding discounts when the prices of oil were falling have contributed to the setting up of the Indo-Iran joint commission. Among the important items that have been negotiated is that the imbalance in trade, which favoured Iran ten to one, should be corrected to the extent possible and that Iran should supply oil to India against payment but give it sixty days time to pay as stipulated by the

eight-member Asian Clearing Union (ACU).39

India's Arab strategy with the ostensible object of obtaining deferred payment facility for its oil imports and getting as large a share as possible

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of the enormous aid pie of Arab petrodollars for its developmental projects should also include a relatively accommodating approach towards Pakistan without of course compromising the basic tenets on which its Pakistan policy rests. Policy towards Pakistan is indeed much more central to India's foreign policy than its relations with the Arabs, and hence the latter cannot determine the former; still efforts at normalisation of Indo-Pak relations can contribute to India's building credibility with the Arabs. To come closer to the Arabs India might consider making some readjustments, even if cosmetic, in the relationship with Pakistan. When Mrs. Indira Gandhi visited Saudi Arabia in April 1982 she found that the Saudis aaw India hostile to Pakistan, inhospitable to its own large Muslim minority, and pro-Soviet. She took pains to persuade the Saudis that India had major differences with the Soviet Union over Afghanistan and certainly desired withdrawal of Soviet troops as quickly as possible and that India was seriously striving to improve relations with Pakistan. Many Indians now realise that a breakthrough in India-Pakistan relations and India's ability to improve its relations with the United States are two essential conditions for its success in getting a large slice of Arab development and investment funds for Indian projects and ensuring significant Indian participation in Persian Gulf development.40

The price and availability of oil more often than not depend on political factors rather than on economic ones. The first oil crisis was sparked off by the Iran-Egypt War while the second by the collapse of the Shah of Iran followed by the Iran-Iraq War. Judging by experience it is quite likely that the current trend of falling prices—might be reversed any day following a new flare-up in the region—fuel for which has already been piling up. There also is existent the destabilising factor of undemarcated offshore boundaries in the Persian Gulf. There is no other international water of comparable size in the world surrounded by so many different political units - 13 in all. With the new discoveries of oil in the Gulf this element can be a potential ground for conflict 41 Since a sustained peace in the region ensures a low price and easy availability of oil it is desirable for India to see that peace prevails. But the politics of the region being too complicated and the superpower interest being of a high order, India's capability to influence events there is rather limited. Still taking advantage of its position as the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement India can use its good offices as far as possible to assist the forces of destabilisation and prevent a fresh outbreak of hostility. The recent despatch of Romesh Bhandari, Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, by Mrs. Gandhi to the Middle Eastern capitals was in tune with this policy. Bhandari has returned with images of a region poised for sudden, unpredictable and explosive developments. Things do not augur too well for the future in so far as India's oil imports from the Middle East Persian Gulf region is concerned. There is, however, one redeeming feature of the present situa-

tion and that is, since the world is becoming less and less dependent on the Gulf for its oil supplies there is less possibility of political turmoil in the area having the same kind of impact that it had during the last decade.

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INDIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS: PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS

By C.S.R. MURTHY*

The need to ensure effective national participation in the United Nations has never been given adequate attentian in India. Nor is any serious attempt made to analyze how far patterns and problems, if any, of national participation account for lack of sufficient political support in the United Nations to India's positions on some of the questions with a bearing on its vital interests. Such an assessment forms an integral part of the larger question of making use of the United Nations forum for the purpose of safeguarding the country's interests more satisfactorily. Accordingly, a section of this article is devoted to examine the working of India's mechanism—mainly its Permanent Mission at New York—from the personnel and functional angles and the emergent patterns and problems. The subsequent section illustrates India's interactions in a couple of important political questions, so as to facilitate a general evaluation.

I

THE UN MILIEU AND PERMANENT MISSIONS

As a former American ambassador to the United Nations aptly described, the United Nations has become the "greatest single diplomatic crossroads in the world." Designed ostensibly to promote the larger interests of the world community in the areas of maintenance of peace and security and promotion of general welfare, it has, over the years, emerged as an important instrument of national diplomacy. The diplomatic milieu in which the United Nations operates has largely contributed to this. Its headquraters (at New York) hosts each year thousands of meetings of various organs, sub-organs, committees, sub-committees to discuss almost every conceivable aspect of human life. This continuing conference system partly contributed to, and was partly promoted by, the evolution of the representational offices of member states, accredited to the United Nations. These offices, formally designated by the General Assembly in 1948 as "permanent missions" have, on the one hand become the nucleus of the mechanism of national participation of respective governments, and on the other, the lifeblood of United Nations diplomacy. This is amply testified by the fact that practically all member states, only with half a dozen exceptions, find it extremely advantageous to maintain missions.2

The activities of the missions centre round, as in the case of embassies in national capitals, the primary objective of safeguarding and promoting

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national policy aims through United Nations participation. Much of the effort concerns preparation for meetings, actual parliamentary action and supportive negotiations. All these aspects, it should be noted, are governed by the fundamental institutional character of the Organization, the provisions of the Charter and rules of procedure of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. That is, for instance, requirement of two-thirds majority in the General Assembly or likelihood of veto by a permanent member of the Security Council tends to influence speech-making, drafting of resolutions, amendments, negotiating a compromise text and other exercises.

How effectively a mission takes part in these exercises depends, indeed, on the contribution it makes to the strategy formulation process and on satisfactory co-ordination between itself and the foreign office at the national capital. It is widely believed that missions belonging to small and newly independent countries, as also those of major countries like the United States, take active part in strategy formulation. However, every mission, in general, is expected to advise its government whether and how issues could be raised and/or reacted to in the world body. The missions are well placed to do this job, particularly because it is easy for them to collect authoritative information on a wide range of issues and, also ascertain international reactions to events. With this purpose in mind, care is taken to maintain contacts with representatives of other countries4 and with officials in the Secretariat. On the basis of information collected, assesment is made and reported to respective governments so as to help the formulation of a suitable strategy on a particular question or set of questions. When it comes to pursuance of a strategy, the extent of latitude that the missions be endowed with in choosing and employing appropriate tactics is a very delicate subject. In the context of the United Nations processes, truly no member state can afford to demand what it wants: it has to bargain with member countries concerned⁵ combined with such tactics as persuasion or arm-twisting. That is how moves of representatives could decisively affect the outcome of a question.

In other words, the permanent missions aim for effective representation through parliamentary action and negotiation, maintenance of contacts with individual representatives, missions of other member countries, caucusing groups, liaison with the Secretariat and world media and contribution to strategy formulation. These obviously interrelated activities focus on in Inis Claude's characterization, "collective legitimization" by the United Nations of policies, actions and claims of member states.

Again, the day-to-day operations at the United Nations can be understood in terms of twin streams of diplomacy: parliamentary and corridor. Parliamentary diplomacy is characterized, as Dean Rusk notes, by public debate, a set of rules of procedure subject to tactical manipulation to advance or oppose a particular point of view and formal conclusions

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ordinarily expressed in the form of resolutions which are adopted by majority vote of some description. Corridor diplomacy, often overlooked by critics of United Nations political processes, represents intense interactions at informal places like corridors, lounges, ante-chambers and social get-togethers.8

Now, the complex diplomatic framework underlines the need for special care that the member governments ought to take while manning respective permanent missions. The participants should be, inter alia, experienced in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, familiar with questions under consideration and with rules of procedure. It is, therefore, important that not only the right kind of personnel are posted to the missions, but also appropriate functional arrangements are worked out with a view to ensuring effective participation in United Nations forums. It is from this perspective that an analysis is made in the following section about personnel placements and functional arrangements involving the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations at New York.

II INDIA'S PARTICIPATION AT THE UN

Indian Mission: Personnel and Working Methods

Permanent missions are organized roughly on comparable lines, and India's Mission is no exception. The diplomatic officials in it hold ranks/designations identical to their colleagues attached to Indian embassies at national capitals, viz. attache, secretary, counsellor, minister and ambassador.

As the head of the Mission, the Permanent Representative, with a rank of ambassador, is responsible for its diplomatic as well as administrative work. The incumbents, so far, have been senlor members of the prestigious Indian Foreign Service. The information contained in the UN Blue Books (a UN periodical publication, listing diplomatic personnel in permanent missions) reveals that the average tenure of the Indian Permanent Representative varied over the years. It was three years during 1950-68, except in the case of Arthur Lall who held the position for five years during 1954-59. However, in the subsequent years, the tenure stabilized at five years, again except for Brajesh Mishra (1979-81) who was replaced in less than two years.

As regards the rest of the Mission's personnel, it should be observed, postings and overall strength seemed to be guided by unclear considerations. For instance, a military adviser was posted during 1957-67. Incidentally, this was the period when India took active part in several UN peace-keeping operations. Likewise, since 1967 a qualified official was posted to attend to legal questions, obviously in recognition of the growing

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volume and importance of the area. On the contrary, the number of officials bearing the designation of first secretary fluctuated between 3-4 in 1950s, 4-6 in 1960s, 2-6 in 1970's, showing however an overall increase.

On the basis of available information, part of which is referred to above, some notable patterns in respect of personnel placements are worthmentioning. The total strength of officials with diplomatic rank in the Mission registered a steady increase—from 6 in 1951 to 10 in 1961, 11 in 1971 and 17 in 1981. The Mission rarely enjoyed assured strength, and creation or continuation of different categories of posts seemed to depend on the seniority and grade of the officers likely to be and/or actually posted. The Permanent Representative, it is gathered, is not consulted on matters of postings and transfers. Therefore, as an analyst pointed out, India's personnel policy, unlike most of the major/medium countries, follows no pattern of continuity and change. It is hard to hope that such a state of affairs will help strengthening of national representation at the United Nations.

Relatively little is known about the working methods followed by the Mission. It would seem that, while the Permanent Representative and his deputy are concerned with the overall activity, junior officials deal mostly with their counterparts in other missions and concerned officials in the Secretariat. The Permanent Representative, it is gathered, assigns work at his discretion and makes himself available for consultation and guidance whenever required. At times, group meetings, the frequency of which is greater during the General Assembly sessions, are also held.

Again, the Mission acts as the most important link between the Foreign Ministry in New Delhi and the UN Secretariat. It keeps the ministry informed of developments on various questions and seeks instructions. Sometimes, tactical situation changes so unexpectedly that it leaves little time for seeking/receiving instructions; in that contingency, the Mission's responses are guided by existing policies and precedents. But in the case of those questions which may have serious implications for domestic/foreign policies, the Mission may not act without instructions. The Mission presents an assessment of its own on a situation while requesting for instructions. Divergence, if any, of assessment (one does not know the frequency, but only rarely such occurrence comes to the surface), it is claimed, never puts in risk the perfect working relationship between the Mission and the Foreign Ministry.

Team spirit becomes difficult to achieve especially when the mechanism of national participation becomes wider and more diverse. For instance, the delegations sent to regular sessions of the General Assembly are known for diversity in the backgrounds of delegates. Usually led by a foreign minister or a person with a similar status, they compose officials from the missions at New York and Geneva, as also those from the foreign and other ministries. In addition, they accommodate non-officials belonging to

various walks of life—legislators, lawyers, academicians, jurists and journalists. But it should be noted that the personal standing or professional details of a delegate are less important than the political considerations underlying a nomination.

As a corollary to the above situation, the usefulness of a delegate would appear to be proportionate to not merely his interest in and familiarity with national and international questions, but more importantly political and personal connections with the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. In fact, some of the delegates in the early years were, besides their personal stature, known to enjoy such privileged relationship.¹² Reminiscing his experience, a widely known and much respected (or despised by the West?) delegate Krishna Menon, once proudly observed thus:

In the absence of a particular instruction I voted according to my discretion......When I wanted instructions I sent a telegram to the Prime Minister setting out the case suggesting how and what should be done; in fact more or less informing him what our instructions should be. He [Nehru] would usually send a telegram back and say, 'I generally agree with your analysis. You must use your discretion.'13

Obviously, Menon's shoes are too big to fit the delegates of recent years. It is an acknowledged fact that the Indian delegation in the 1950s was one of the most effective at the United Nations.¹⁴

Legacy of Past Decades

Indeed, those years are considered the golden period of Indian diplomacy at the United Nations for more than one good reason. Foremost, the abiding interest shown by Jawaharlal Nehru-in a concurrent capacity as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister-in world problems and the usefulness of the United Nations in relaxing tensions was at the root of policies and supplementary positions.15 But no less important was the contributive assistance rendered by such of his lieutenants as Krishna Menon and Arthur Lall. Consequently, India's policy characterized by mediation and moderation in the thick of the East-West Cold War could help defuse crisis situations in different parts of the world-Korea, the Suez and the Congo. Nevertheless, it should be noted, India lacked a well-trained body of officials; at the time of independence in 1947 only a handful like Ramaswami Mudaliar and Girija Sankar Bajpai were experienced in conducting foreign relations, strategy formulation and workable procedures of coordination. In the absence of these, presentation of policy positions for wider international endorsement and use of appropriate tactics to counter manoeuvres of adversaries were bound to prove increasingly difficult. The case in point was the Kashmir dispute in

which India's national interests were deeply involved, but its actions and responses remained far from satisfactory. 16

The inadequacies were more clearly discernible in the 1960s. The admission of several new members following the decolonization process, the decline, if not the end, of bipolarity and other factors transformed the scenario at the United Nations as also outside it.¹⁷ The complexity of issues which confronted India both at the bilateral and multilateral levels called for a sophisticated approach. Therefore, a policy marked by exercise of mediation and moderation could not be a substitute for the conduct of diplomacy in a professionally realistic manner. A well-organized body of diplomatic personnel and suitable machinery for strategy formulation became necessary. It should be noted here that, despite some efforts in this direction, that need has yet to be effectively met.¹⁸

It is true that by the beginning of 1970, India's Foreign Affairs Ministry comprised well-trained and experienced personnel. There was evidently more realistic understanding of the implications and intricacies involved in various international problems as well as bilateral questions. Moreover, the 1970s signified, if one may like to say, resurgence of India's power and prestige as exemplified in the developments leading to the "liberation" of Bangladesh in 1971 and its surprise entry into the nuclear club (1974). Interestingly both the issues prompted extensive deliberations at the United Nations. How did India react? To what extent were Indian representatives skilful in making use of the forum to safeguard the interests at stake? The following discussion attempts to go into these and associated questions.

The Bangladesh War, 1971

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The developments in the Indian sub-continent in 1971, culminating in a war between India and Pakistan and the emergence of a new state-Bangladesh—were of great significance. 10 India adopted a cautious approach to the crisis situation in East Pakistan. The flow of ten million refugees from East Pakistan to India and the growing public opinion for a speedy solution had put a tremendous strain on India's approach. Accordingly, efforts were made to impress the international community on the need for an early political settlement between the then military regime in Pakistan and the elected representatives of East Pakistan. But the response was not too encouraging. The international community was not willing, so it seemed, to go beyond expressions of sympathy and providing token humanitarian assistance for the refugees. This meant that India was likely to be burdened with the refugee problem for an indefinite period. Such a development was also likely to put a severe strain on India's economy as well as its security.21 Further, the American bid for rapprochement with China, and Pakistan's involvement in it, added new dimensions to the situation forcing India to review its policy. In the fast changing syndrome of what appeared to be the lining-up of Washington-Peking-Rawalpindi, the Soviet strategy also gave indications of exploring new initiatives. Obviously, there seemed a meeting of minds between New Delhi and Moscow, and the result was the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty was important in the light of India's preference to keep all its options—including military ones—open. Should military action be necessary, it was desirable that India prepare itself to face adverse reactions that were likely to follow, especially at the United Nations. India was obliged to ensure that in case its actions or claims failed to obtain "collective legitimization" by the United Nations it could at least prevent condemnation of its action. This meant support by a veto-bearing power, which is why the treaty with Moscow was useful.

Despite this calculated move, when events unfolded into a full-scale armed conflict between India and Pakistan in December 1971, Indian participation in United Nation deliberations indicated a lack of adequate preparedness. Given the realities of international politics, as also the political processes of the United Nations, it was true that India's success or failure was largely to be determined in the battlefield. Pending an outcome, what could be done at the United Nations was to minimise adverse reaction especially from small and non-aligned countries from Africa and Asia. This called for skilful use of corridor diplomocy much before the war broke out. Unfortunately, no serious effort seemed to have been made in that direction. Also, it appears that India could not make effective use of rules of procedure and other parliamentary devices. Then, one may ask, what did India do in the United Nations forums?

Following the outbreak of the war, India insisted in the Security Council that the discussion should not be confined merely to the war, but the developments that led to the war should also be considered. Further, the Indian side refused to accept any resolution which did not recognize the "realities of the situation" and which did not provide for an immediate political settlement in accordance with the wishes of the East Pakistanis. Supplementing these views of India, the Soviet Union employed necessary to enable informal consultations and a number of draft resolutions were introduced one after another. Faced with the procedural stalemate result-bers—sympathising with Pakistan's position—made use of the circumvention device under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution 1950 to get the

It was here that India was caught off guard. Clearly, the Indian strategy planners did not seem to take into account this possibility and the need to undertake necessary diplomatic groundwork. The wide membership of the Assembly and the variety of interests represented therein required

effective participation in parliamentary and corridor techniques of diplomacy to safeguard the vital interest India put at stake. To this end, the expertise and experience of the entire diplomatic personnel needed to be pressed into service. Indian representatives were expected to seek endorsement of India's position, or, failing it to prevent endorsement of Pakistan's views. It should be noted that the Permanent Mission of India in New York could not foot the bill in that regard. After a day-long debate on the conflict situation, the Assembly adopted a cease-fire resolution (Resolution 2793/XXVI, 7 December 1971), with 104 members voting in favour ignoring India's objections.²³ It was, of course, true that most member states, especially smaller ones, gave precedence to upholding the Charter principles governing territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states. However, the failure of the Indian diplomats to contain the adverse reaction was too glaring to be brushed away. If India had done its preparatory work, it might have been able to reduce the number of votes cast, apparently in opposition to India's stance. Also, it should be noted that the Indian side failed to seek a prolongation of the Assembly's consideration of the question. Only Afghanistan made an attempt in that direction, but without success. If successful, it would have been possible to establish last minute contacts both in the national capitals and in New York to persuade or pressurize member states, particularly those who expressed a high degree of understanding of India's position. The poor record of the Indian Permanent Mission could perhaps be attributed, also, to the personnel changes effected in 1971. These changes brought in four new faces, while the remaining were not much experienced in the United Nations milieu.24

Still wider is the question of coordination in regard to military operations, planning, and implementation received. The same could not be said about the efforts at the diplomatic level. Interventions by India's representatives during the debates demonstrated exuberance rather than discretion. For instance, the Indian Permanent Representative, while taking part in the Council's debate, once made a statement, without realizing its implications, that the Indian troops crossed the international border on the eastern front much before the commencement of war.25 Not surprisingly, Pakistan made use of this faux pas to gain political advantage and to malign India for preplanned aggression. The shortcomings of India's representation and diplomatic interactions obviously prompted New Delhi to despatch a high powered delegation, after the adoption of the General Assembly's resolution. But there was little left for this kind of diplomatic offensive. Military developments in East Pakistan presented a fait accompli, which could not be ignored by the Security Council. The reality of the Pakistani surrender and the emergence of Bangladesh had to be accounted for in the resolution (Resolution 307 of 21 December 1971) the Council ultimately adopted.

Now, we turn to the second illustrative question that continues to figure in the General Assembly's agenda. That is, the fall-out of India's unexpected but "peaceful" underground nuclear explosion in May 1974.²⁶

Nuclear India in Tangle at the United Nations

International reaction to the development was expectedly unfavourable.27 India's neighbours were understandably alarmed; but all, excepting Pakistan, welcomed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assurance that the experiment was meant for peaceful purposes only. To Pakistan, however, a more grave event had not taken place before in its strained relations with the tall neighbour. Therefore it sought to project the Indian action not only as a potential threat in the South Asian region, but also, more significantly, as an affront to the international order sought to be created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (to which Pakistan was not a signatory!)28 For mobilizing opinion against India and support to its perceptions, the United Nations was the most appropriate forum open to Pakistan. It formally raised the matter in the General Assembly in 1974 and sought a declaration and establishment of a nuclear free zone in South Asia.29 This Pakistani initiative left roughly two months' time for India to prepare its strategy and also parliamentary action at various stages of the Assembly's deliberations. It is instructive to examine India's responses to the diplomatic offensive that Pakistan launched.

The objective of the Pakistani initiative was, obviously, to force India to make commitments on giving up its nuclear options, or, in case they were not forthcoming, to "expose" its adversary and mobilize moral and political pressure against recalcitrant India. India's representatives stated (and restated in the years since 1974) that the consideration of the Pakistani proposal by the United Nations should follow, rather than precede prior consultations and agreement among the countries concerned. Further, India maintained that the move to establish a nuclear-weaponfree zone in a secluded sub-region of South Asia might ignore the presence of nuclear weapons and military bases (operated by outside Powers in the context of great Power rivalry) in the larger region of Asia.30 It was also asserted that the proposal could not effectively check the vertical proliferration of nuclear weapons which posed a more serious threat to the human civilization. All these arguments were quite valid, when seen from India's perspective. Clearly, India did not wish to make any commitment and wanted to keep its nuclear options open.

While reviewing the interactions in perspective, it should be noted that more than one option was open to India to safeguard its interests involved in the matter. Support to the proposal, by any stretch of imagination, was ruled out. Any resolution the General Assembly would adopt would not be effective unless it was acceptable to all countries of the area and to the

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nuclear-weapon powers. As such one could argue that the best course for India would possibly be to soft-pedal the proposal by settingits views on record in unequivocal terms (and in this regard the statements of the Indian representatives went well) and having done so, it could merely have abstained in the voting. Such a tactic was likely to take away much steam from the Pakistani initiative.

What has actually been the Indian voting behaviour? It underlined its opposition to the proposal not only by voting against it, but also by presenting a counter-proposal stating merely that prior consultations and agreement were necessary before a move was initiated at the United Nations. Some analysts saw no wisdom in this tactical step.³¹ Defending it, on the other hand, Indian officials (in the course of conversations the present author had sometime in 1981) explained that the counter-draft secured much more support than the one sponsored by Pakistan. Besides this, according to them, the Indian negative vote in fact helped limit the numerical support Pakistan could muster.

However, from what transpired at the United Nations in the years since 1974, it could be argued that India's actions and reactions were marked by notable inconsistency. The inconsistencies indicated an absence of a wellthought out strategy. In 1974 and 1975, India sponsored a counter-draft. but from 1976 onwards it chose not to do so. No explanation was forthcoming in defense of the change of tactics. Again, India reversed its earlier negative vote by abstaining on Pakistan's draft in 1977. 32 By doing so, could it be interpreted, did India realize the need of giving sympathetic consideration, though belatedly, to Pakistan's move? Or was it because of the change of government in India in early 1977 resulting in a re-orientation of the country's foreign policy, in general, and the policy towards neighbouring countries in particular? Where does the shocking statement of Prime Minister Morarji Desai, which disapproved of peaceful nuclear experiments, amounting thereby to a new twist in India's nuclear policy, figure in the decision to abstain? No clear-cut answers are available, except that the decision was taken at the highest level ignoring the reportedly persistent suggestion by the Permanent Mission at New York that the diplomatic cost of the abstention would be unacceptably heavy. However, one should not hasten to reach a conclusion, on the basis of the 1977 abstention, that India saw reason in soft-pedalling the Pakistani proposal. For, the Desai Government gave instructions for a negative vote in the very next year (1978), which pattern remains unchanged till date.

Granting for aw hile that the political leadership was responsible for the above inconsistency in voting responses, it should be noted that the diplomatic personnel both in the Foreign Ministry at New Delhi and in the Permanent Mission at New York did not deal with certain aspects of the tactical situation with adequate adroitness. There is evidence to contend that the Indian Mission could not take political advantage from

Pakistan's shifting stances on the question. For instance, Pakistan's draft which was adopted as Resolution 3265B (XXIX) contained an operative paragraph requesting nuclear-weapon states to cooperate for the effective realization of the objectives of the proposal. This key paragraph disappeared from the drafts Pakistan presented in 1975 and 1976. It was, however, restored in 1977 and later. What Indian representatives should have done was to highlight this inconsistency in order to substantiate India's contention that Pakistan was not motivated by a genuine desire for a nuclear-weapon-free South Asia.³³

In sum, with a little more planning of strategy and adroitness, India's mechanism would have done much better than what it could in safeguarding the country's image and interests in the context of this question.

III

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The foregoing analysis is a pointer to some serious shortcomings of the mechanism of India's participation in the United Nations. Suggestions can be made keeping in view not only the two illustrative case studies but also some of the wider issues.

In recent times, foreign policy planning and administration, in all its facets, has become a complex and highly specialized field requiring a specific set of intellectual and professional abilities. An effective roie in the United Nations political processes demands of participants not only traditional skill in diplomacy but something more; debating skill, experience and related personal traits could make much difference. It is on account of this that member states are obliged to choose personnel with great care. As for India, in the case of the Permanent Representative, all the occupants of the office (from B.N. Rau to N. Krishnan) were well versed in United Nations diplomacy. But in the case of junior officials, no due consideration seems to have been given to the special requirements of multilateral diplomacy. By and large, considerations of eligibility of officials for posting to different categories of stations—classified in terms of climate and comforts provided appear to weigh excessively. Thus, a person with a rank of consul, say in Kuwait, is considered good enough to handle the work at the Mission at New York, provided he/she obtains eligibility for a posting at New York.34 The Pillai Committee, which was set up to go into various aspects of the working of the Indian Foreign Service, reinforces the criticism. In its view,

The theory that all officers who have been promoted to, say, Grade V, are equal in all respects and will do equally well in all assignments is facile and fallacious. Each may have his forte, and it should be the task of the administration to identify this special talent and employ it to best advantage.³⁵

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Moreover, these officials are overburdened with too many responsibilities. In so far as the delegations are concerned, persons without prior experience in United Nations work have been included as non-officials. This holds true specifically for the period since mid-1960s. Non-officials thus chosen are not included in subsequent delegations—a practice that was common during the 1950s. In other words, experience acquired by a delegate during his/her first participation is not utilized in subsequent years. Obviously, the choice of an individual as a non-official delegate is considered basically a matter of granting political patronage rather than an attempt to utilize the services of experienced and knowledgeable persons.

Again, the aspect of coordination remains largely undefined.³⁷ No definite procedure seems to govern this increasingly important aspect. Despite the claims that ideal working relationship exists between the Foreign Office and the Permanent Mission, omissions and commissions do occur (as noted in the two illustrative studies)! Strategy formulation regarding important questions that may come up at the United Nations is another area that has been neglected for long. To what extent the Mission at New York partakes in the process is a question that invariably eludes any clear answer.

The situation, in short, calls for immediate attention followed by remedial action. For this purpose, it is suggested here that a high-powered team of officials and experts be set up to examine in depth the problems that afflict the tenuous mechanism of national particiption, some of which are briefly touched upon in the article. Retired officials (some of whom are still active as advisers to important functionaries), former delegates and politicians could be invited to make suggestions for improvement. Views could also be sought from the press, scholars and other sections of national life. Interestingly, the National Press is one section which should have played a pioneering role in this regard, but has never made use of its sources of information for attempting an assessment of the subject under discussion; whereas academicians lacked inter alia access to such useful sources as reports of Indian delegations to the General Assembly sessions which are stamped "secret" for no understandable reason.

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¹ Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., quoted in Chadwick F. Alger, United States Representation in the United Nations. Report prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1961, p. 5.

As of 1981, 151 out of the total 157 member states have missions in New York. But they vary in size; while the Soviet Mission is the largest with a 100 diplomatic staff, the missions of Iceland and of the Seychelles are manned by only two each. UN Blue Book (ST/SG/SER.A/248, March 1981).

For a full discussion of the missions' functions, see Richard F. Pedersen, "National Representation in the United Nations," International Organisation

- (Boston), 15(2), 1961, pp. 256-66 and E. Appathurai, "Permanent Missions to the United Nations," Injernational Journal (Toronto), Vol. 25. 1970, pp. 287-301.
- 4 In these interactions, diplomatic ranks do not count. Two delegates representing two different countries—one holding the rank of Ambassador and the other of Attache-interact without hesitation.

5 John Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, How UN Decisions are M. de (Leyden, 1960). pp. 67-68.

6 The Changing United Nations (New York, N.Y., 1967), pp. 73-10°.

7 "Parliamentary Diplomacy: Debate vs. Negotiation," World Affairs Interpreter (Los Angeles, Calif.). Vol. 26, 1955, pp. 121-38.

8 Tavares De Sa, The Play Within the Play: The Inside Story of the UN (New York, N.Y.. 1966) narrates how business is quietly conducted on these occasions.

Upon arriving at a cocktail party, for example, the seasoned diplomat will first spend a few minutes standing at a point where he can survey the whole gathering. He will then single out fellow ambassadors with whom he must discuss a pending matter, extract a piece of information, or drop a hint to be conveyed to higher quarters....Although the smile and the handshake always conform to standard UN warmth, few words are wasted on greetings or social amenities. The item of business is then brought up and as soon as it is disposed of the diplomat excuses himself and sets out in search of the next person on his list.

9 The incumbents so far have been: B.N. Rau (1949-51), Rajeshwar Dayal (1952-54), Arthur Lall (1954-59), C.S. Jha (1959-62), B.N. Chakravarty (1962-65), G. Parthasarathi (1966-68), Samar Sen (1969-74), Rikhi Jaipal (1974-79), Brajesh

Mishra (1979-81), N. Krishan (since 1981).

10 This is a welcome trend because some countries, for instance Israel, now-a-days are compelled to reduce staff for reasons of economy.

- 11 K.P. Saksena, "India and Diplomacy in the United Nations," International Studies (New Delhi), Vol. 17, 1978, p. 825.
- 12 Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (Nehru's sister who led the delegations for six times) and V.K. Krishna Menon (who headed the delegation for nine consecutive years) are the most prominent examples.
- 13 Micheal Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World (London, 1968), p. 93.
- 14 Arthur Lall, Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice (New York, N.Y., 1966) reveals that a New York based journal, after a survey, concluded to this effect. p. 331.
- 15 K.P.S. Menon in his autobiography Many Worlds Revisted (London, writes that India's foreign poilcy had to necessarily rest on the "intuition" of one man, Jawaharlal Nehru. It is however added that Nehru's intuition was fortunately combined with his knowledge and wisdom. pp. 271-2.
- 16 K.P. Saksena, n. 11.

17 See Swadesh Rana, "The Changing Indian Diplomacy at the United Nations,"

International Organization, Vol. 24, 1970, pp. 48-73.

- 18 Reference could be made to the creation of the Division for Policy Planning and Review in the Ministry and the Committee for Policy Planning and Review. For a critical analysis, see K.P. Misra, "Foreign Policy Planning: Some Suggestions," International Studies, Vol. 17, 1978, pp. 827-33 and J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1980).
- 19 Stanley A. Kochanek, "India's Changing Role in the United Nations," Pacific Affairs (Vancouver, B.C.), Vol. 53(1), Spring 1980, pp. 48-68.
- 20 See K.P. Misra, The Role of the United Nations in the Indo-Pukistani Conflict,

1971 (Delhi, 1973), 9 ff, and Thomas W. Oliver, The United Nations in Bangladesh (Princeton, N.J. 1978).

- 21 Giving an assessment of the situation, Mrs. Gandhi once told Indian Parliament that "we cannot depend on the international community... to solve our problems for us...the brunt of the burden has to be borne by us and by the people of Bangladesh who have our fullest sympathy and support." Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, Vol. 2, New Delhi, n.d., pp. 293-4.
- 22 Security Council Official Records (SCOR), 26th year, 1607th mtg., 5 December 1971, pp. 4-7.
- 23 It is noteworthy that the only supporting vote obtained outside the Socialist bloc was that of Bhutan; such traditionally friendly countries as Yugoslavia and Egypt voted in support of the resolution.
- 24 These changes were extremely significant, for the Deputy Permanent Representative, a Counsellor and two First Secretaries were replaced while the remaining officials were hardly for one year at the United Nations.
- 25 SCOR, 26th year, 1606 mtg., 4 December 1971, p. 15. The way he defended by explaining that Indian troops chose to "go and silence their [troops of Pakistan] guns" did not perhaps help India's strategy of winning political support. An official in the New York Mission, who wished to remain unidentified, agreed that such statements were avoidable.
- 26 To avoid prior detection, the digging and masonry work at the site of the experiment was made to appear as part of a programme of sinking wells. Only two ministers, besides the Prime Minister and no more than half a dozeno fficials were privy to it, thus ruling out the possibility of the news about it being leaked to interested parties. See G.S. Bhargava, "India's Nuclear Policy," *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), Vol. 34, 1978. p. 135.
- 27 The UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, expressed serious concern over the development. The United States and Japan reiterated opposition to nuclear proliferation. New Zealand stated that the test ran counter to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and could only encourage others with similar capabilities. Canada, which collaborated with India in the development of nuclear technology since 1956, reacted sharply and suspended all assistance except food supplies. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), 1974, p. 26585.
- 28 For a discussion, see Brij Mohan Kaushik, "India's Nuclear Policy, "International Studies, Vol. 17, 1978, pp. 779-88.
- 29 UN Doc. A/9706 19 August 1974.
- 30 General Assembly Official Records, 29th session, First Committee, 2022nd mtg., 18 November 1974, pp. 12-15.
- 31 K. P. Saksena, n. 11.

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- 32 Times of India (New Delhi) carried a Samachar news agency report on 20 November 1977 about a comment made by a Pakistani dipiomat in the lobby that this country welcomed India's abstention regardless of the reasons.
- 33 When asked whether the omission was deliberate, an official in the Pakistani Mission at New York told the author that the paragraph in question was considered unnecessary in the light of Pakistan's separate move on negative security guarantees in 1975. The Indian side also offered the same explanation. But records do not support this contention. While it was true that Pakistan sponsored separately, as part of the larger question of disarmament, a draft resolution on negative security guarantees, it was equally true that this proposal was initiated in 1974 coinciding with the proposal on South Asia. Further, Pakistan continued to introduce draft resolutions on strengthening security of non-nuclear states even after 1977 when the missing paragraph was restored in Pakistan's draft on the

nuclear-weapon-free zone on the South Asia question.

- 34 Officials point out that it is India's policy to train its personnel in all facets of foreign policy administration including multilateral diplomacy at New York/ Geneva/Bangkok/Vienna, and also it would be costly to maintain a cell exclusively of officials meant for posting in international organizations. In that case, the grounds for following a pattern of continuity and change become stronger.
- 35 Report of the Pillai Committee, New Delhi, 1966, p. 50.
- 36 Presently, officers, assigned to various committees, are required to undertake necessary research work also. But the need for a limited staff to meet research and documentation needs of the Mission is very much felt. It may be mentioned that the past practice of engaging a few researchers was discontinued in 1970s. Further, the Historical Division which caters to the research needs of the Foreign Ministry as a whole in New Delhi is also, reportedly, being disbanded.
- 37 Pillai Committee Report, n. 35, emphasizes the need to deal with the "acute" problem of coordination and "purposive planning." p. 24.

INDIA AND THE ARAB WORLD: A STDUY OF EARLY CULTURAL CONTACTS

By P.N. CHOPRA*

There is hardly any country in the world with which we have better, warmer and more cordial relations than the Arab World. India's cultural relations with Arabia date back to prehistoric times. In India the Harappans, Dravidians and Aryans wove the webs of many cultures. In the Arab lands, Babylon, Assyria, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Egypt, Sumer and Elam were the centres of ancient civilizations. The people of the Indus Valley had intimate relations with the people of Sumer and trade relations with Egypt and Crete. The presentation on a seal of a mastless ship with a sharply upturned prow and stern, similar to the archaic representation on early Mingan seals, cylinders of Sumer and pre-dynastic pottery of Egypt testify to it. The similarity of these sculptures in fact led scholars to designate at least for some time the Indus Valley Civilization as Indo-Sumerian. The influence of the Indus Valley on Sumer is best illustrated in the fashion of hair dressing which was adopted by the Sumerian women from the Indus Valley. Recognising the importance of the Harappans, Prof. Frankfort says: "It has been established beyond a possibility of doubt, that India played a part in that early complex culture which shaped the civilized world before the advent of the Greeks." Recent excavations have further confirmed this view; the black and red ware bowls and red ware stands recently discovered in the excavations of graves near Tumas are very much similar to those found in the megalithic burials of South India. The resemblances include the corbelled arch at Tell Asmar and Mohenjodaro and the use in Sumer and the Indus of circular wells of segmental bricks. Common also is the use of stone circles in Nubia and South India.

EARLY LINKS

Two-Way Communication and Trade

From the most ancient times, India's communications with West Asia have been both along the land and sea routes. The ocean between these two great nations, touching on the one side the holy land of the Arabs and on the other the foothills of the Aryavarta, forms a long and broad highway over which have travelled from prehistoric times, "Indian ships with sails and hundreds of oares," to quote a chronicle, "and carried such Indian products as perfumes and spices, cotton and silk, shawls and muslin, pearls ard rubies, brocades of silver and gold" to Arabia and Mesopotamia.

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Arabia, on its part, sent back coral, quick silver, vermillion, lead, gold, rose water, saffron, as well as opium of superior quality. Objects found in Sumeria and Egypt indicate the traffic between these countries as far back as 3000 B.C. According to the author of the Periplus of the Erythrean Sea (composed about the middle or first half of the first Century A.D.) these voyages used to be made in small vessels kept close to the shore and following its windings. The best season for ships to sail for India from Egypt was July. Strabo, the Greek geographer and historian (born about 63 B C.), found that about 120 ships sailed from Myos-Hormos (Mussel Harbour) to India, although in the time of Ptolemies scarcely anyone would venture on this voyage. In the Buddist Baveru (Babylonian) Jataka there is a story of Indian merchants arriving at a port of the Persian Gulf and selling a crow—the bird which indicates direction at 100 pieces of silver and a peacock for 100 pieces of gold.

Direct voyages in those days were rare. Indian and Arabian traders used to meet half-way to exchange their products. The Indians sailed from the western Indian sea ports along the coast, entered the Persian Gulf and rested at Bahrain, where recent diggings by a Danish Mission have uncovered seals and other objects which show that the island's culture group ran the trade between the Indus Civilization and the Sumerian. According to Strabo, large quantities of Indian merchandise were conveyed over the Oxus to the Caspian Sea and transferred from there by the Curus and through the adjoining countries to Euxina. Hippalus was the first pilot to observe the bearings of the ports, the configuration of the sea and the direct course across the ocean. It is worthwhile to recall in this connection the story of that adventurous Indian who set out from India in search of a direct route to Egypt. He lost all and drifted for months till his companions had perished one by one due to hunger and starvation and he was found half dead near his destination. This ship-wrecked Indian gave the impetus to that famous explorer Eudoxus of Cyzious to make a voyage to India which went a long way to further closer relationships between India and the countries of West Asia. A few years later another Indian appeared in Egypt; his visit was found worthy of record as is seen from an inscription still extant in the ruins of a shrine at Redesiya on the route between Edfu on the Nile and Barenica. It will be interesting to recall in this connection that it was under the orders of famous Queen Cleopatra that Eudoxus undertook another voyage to India and brought back a rich cargo of merchandise. Unfortunately, Cleopatra had died by that time and her son who ruled stripped the explorer of all the presents he had brought from India.

Trade relations got an impetus in the subsequent centuries. Amarakosha mentions horses belonging to Arabia besides those of Parasika (Persia), Kamboja and Bhalika. The Arabian steeds In King Harsha's camp were as popular as the sword made of Indian steel—Saif-i-Hindi proverbial in Arabic literature. Daba (situated in Oman in the south-eastern corner of

Arabia) was one of the major ports of pre-Islamic Arabia. An annual fair there attracted traders from Hind, China and Greece. These early contacts led to the establishment of an Indian colony in Alexandria in the 2nd. Century B.C. The Indians built two temples containing the images of their Gods. The great riches of Arabia Felix (Aden) were largely due to the visit of Indian traders who came there in large numbers from Potana (Patiala), founded by Alexander on the river Sindhu. Our kapas was in great demand and the Arabs took it over giving it the name of qutun which became cotton throughout Europe.

Asoka's Contribution to Philosophical Links

There is also considerable evidence of the presence of Hindu philosophers in Western Asia during the time of Socrates who discussed metaphysical problems with them. Asoka, encouraged this exchange of visits and sent emissaries to Syria, Egypt, Macedon, Cyrenaica and Epirose. Al-Biruni (1000 A.D.) corroborates Asoka's claim that in former times Iraq, Mosul and the country upto the frontiers of Syria were under Buddhist influence and that Indian culture had definitely extended to these West Asian countries. The extreme empiricism of the Buddhists made a deep impression on Arab scholars, theologians, philosophers and jurists; we frequently come across references to the Indian school of thought in their discussion of epistemology and the theory of knowledge. Manichaten religion which flourished in the 3rd Century A.D. contains unmistakable traces of Buddhist influence. Dean Milburn points: "It is certain that the genuine Indian mysticism first established a permanent western settlement in the deserts of Egypt." About the Gnostics, C.W. King states that its seeds were originally of Indian growth. Plotinus the founder of neo-Platonism, was directly influenced by oriental philosophy of the Indian type, according to Dean Inge. While Christian gnosticism was gradually spreading in the Western world, syncretist sects arose in the east. Mani and Mazdak, the two most prominent propagators, were scattered all over Western Asia. Their teachings were based upon a combination of Zoroastrianism, Buddhist and Christian ideas. The fact is that Central Asia including Turkestan and Khorasan, owed allegiance to Buddhism before the rise of Islam, as the evidence of the Chinese traveller Huien Tsiang amply proves. Asoka further authorised his emissaries or dutas, as they were called, to undertake philanthropic works on his behalf in the kingdoms of the Hellenic rulers of West Asia. Thus wells at every half kos and rest houses were constructed, medicinal herbs and roots, wherever they did not exist, were imported and planted. These acts, the Emperor thought, would obtain release for him from the debt he owed to his creatures.

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P. N. CHOPRA

ADVENT OF ISLAM

Ties Strengthened

With the advent of Islam, relations between India and the Arab countries were further strengthened. Prophet Muhammed is reported to have told his companions that he "gets cool breezes from the side of Hind." Indian tribes, like the Jats, were settled in some parts of Arabia during this time. Bukhari in his work Kitabul Adabul Mufrad states that when Ayasha, the favourite wife of the Prophet, fell ill she was treated by an Indian physician who belonged to the Jat tribe. Two prominent Indians Sarmanak (said to have been the Raja of Kanau) and Ratan visited Arabia during the Prophet's time. Ratan is believed to have collected the sayings of the Prophet, still extant as Ar-Rataniyat. Ibn 'Ali Hatim relates that the valley of Hind, where Adam descended from heaven and the valley of Mecca, which had the tradition of Abraham, were the best valleys of the world (Subhat-ul-Namjan). The fourth Caliph, is reported to have said, "the land where books were first written and from where wisdom and knowledge sprang is India." According to Ghulam 'Ali Azad Bilgrami, words like taoba, sundas and ablai, which occur in the Quran, are of Sanskrit origin. Names of many Indian articles, for instance, quram phul (karan phul), kafur (camphor), ambuj (am), Harjil (Hariyal), etc., passed into the Arabic language. Arabic words too found their way into the Indian languages. Indian words-sukkan (rudder), Malumi (captain of a ship) from Arabic Malumi, kanıb.l, qutal, qurban, bandar, dost, kaghaz, etc-which are commonly used are all derived from the Arabic language. This mutual intercourse led the Arabs to take interest in our literature. Some of India's best known works, such as Panchatantra, the book of morals taught through animal and bird stories was translated from its Pehlavi version into Arabic and therefrom introduced to the western world. Hitopadesha, or good advice, selection and adaptation of tales from Panchatantra, found their way to Europe through Baghdad, Byzantine and Cairo. According to some scholars, the basis of the famous One Thousand and One Nights was a Persian work containing several stories of Indian origin. The reign of Manzur (754-776 A.D.) opened a new chapter in the cultural relations of these two regions. Manzur's zeal for learning attracted many Hindu scholars to the Abbaside court. The deputation of Sindi representatives to the court of the Caliph in 771 A.D. was memorable. One of the members of the delegation, a noted scholar, presented a copy of Siddhanta which was translated into Arabic by Ibrahim Al-Farzani.

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Contribution of Indian Medical Systems

Indian physicians and medical systems enjoyed a wide reputation even in pre-Islamic Arabia. The famous pre-Islamic Persian Academy of Gonde-Shapur invited Indian physicians to meet their counterparts and a curious blending of sciences took place there. The Syriac medicinal books, particularly Abdal-al-Adwaiya (substitute for remedies), which was written by a Persian Jew, Masarjawaih, give an idea about the blending of these two medical systems. In the 8th Century A.D. we find Arbas and Persians translating into their respective languages the thousand year-old compendia of Sushruta (on surgery) and Charaka-Samhita (on medicine). These works were fully made use of and quoted in extenso from Raazes down to Ibn al-Baiter, the pharmacologist who lived in the 13th Century. The Caliph Al-Mamun, we are told, felt so fascinated by the Indian works on medicine and philosophy that he had a scholar Al-Abbas especially put on duty to read out to him daily some passages from these works. Harun ar Rashid (786-809) imported Indian physicians to organise hospitals and schools in Baghdad. It was under his reign that the famous family of Barmecides or Barmarks came into prominance. Originally they were Buddhists and were in charge of the famous temple of Nava-Vihara in Baikh. Under their patronage Baghdad became the centre of Hindu learning. Writing about the services they rendered to the advancement of science and culture. Ibn an-Nadim said: "Yahva-ibn-Khalid, the Wazir, sent a mission to India to collect information regarding medicinal herbs and to report on their religious beliefs and practises." The Arabic historian relates how Caliph Harun suffered from a severe headache and it was Manaka, an Indian physician, who was called to treat him. In another case, Salehibn-Bahla was called to treat a member of the royal family who appeared to have died and was about to be buried. He was however restored to life. Apart from Manaka, there were two other successful Indian medical practitioners in Baghdad during the regin of Harun, Iba Dhan and Salih, and the names of 15 Indian medical works rendered into Arabic during the Abbasid Caliphate are known. From that time onward Indian physicians and Indian medicines played an important part in the scientific renaissance in Baghdad. Indian herbs and drugs were imported and the hitherto reigning Greek Materia Medica was completely revised. The new edition contained several Sanskrit names. In the famous medical work Firdaus ul-Hikmat by the court physician 'Ali-ibn-Rahhab al-Tabri, a full chapter is devoted to Indian medicines. Even the cannon of Ibn Sina has traces of Indian medicines inter-linked with the legacy of Greek physicians and the personal experience of Muslim medical practitioners. In his rare work of simple drugs, Kitab as-Saidala, al-Biruni makes the significant observation that, "On the East there are no people inclined towards the sciences except the Indians."

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Others also have paid glowing tributes to Indian science and knowledge. The well-known historian, Al-Yaqubi observes:

The Indians are men of science and thought. They surpass all other people in every science; their judgement on astronomical problems is the best. . . . In the science of medicine their ideas are highly advanced. a large number of books deal with their principles. . . and they have a large number of other books which are too many to be mentioned.

Again Abu Mashar testifies:

The Indians are the first nation, very large in number and belonging to a noble country. All the ancient peoples have acknowledged their wisdom and accepted their excellence in the various branches of knowledge... The Indians, according to all the nations throughout the ages, had been the mines of wisdom, and the fountains of justice and administration.

Exchange of Ideas-Influence on Astronomy and Mathematical Sciences

Equally important in the context of Indo-Arab relations is the influence of Indian astronomy. The celebrated Indian astronomical work Surya Sidhanta brought by the physician Kuttka to the court of the newly founded capital Baghdad was translated into Arabic under the name of As-Sind Hind. It served as a handbook till the time of al-Ma'mun when it was abridged and even improved by Mahammed-ibn-Musa, an astronomer. He also prepared a book on Indian calculations which has come down to us. There were other Indian astronomical works such as Kar Khanda Khadvaka of Brahmagupta, and Varaamihira's works on astronomy which were translated into Arabic. It is interesting to recall in this connection that the astronomical terms qubbat-ul-arin in Arabic (the supposed division of the polar axis from the meridian line) is derived from the name of the Indian city Ujjain which was believed by the Indian astronomers to be the dividing part of the earth. Such terms as jib (heart) and aug (the highest point of sky) has originated from Sanskrit jiva and uchha respectively. We may also refer here to the work produced by that great indologist al-Biruni after hard labour of six years, Jawami' al-Manjud Li-Khawatir-al-Hanud completed in 422 A.H. as a comprehensive work on Indian astronomy. He was much indebted to the earlier works of Indian astronomers especially for their solar and lunar theories and the treatment of eclipses. Thus, through al-Biruni Indian astronomy exercised a far-reaching influence on Muslim astronomical sciences of subsequent generations.

In the field of mathematics, it was the conception of Sine which contributed to and revolutionised the science of triangles. Even the famous Almagest employed chords. The Muslims learnt the principles of this science from the Hindus and taught the same to the Europeans facilitating

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the problems of trigonometry. The Greeks studied these works based on the researches and inventions of Indians. The Egyptians and Mesopotanians had carried on fresh inquiry in the field of mathematics. The Arabic numerals 1, 2, 3, as they are called in the west, were borrowed by the Arabs from India and were consequently known as Al-Arkan-al-Hindia or Indian numerals. The Indian science of music also made a deep impact on Arabic musicians. According to Ibn-al-Qifti, an important work containing the fundamental principles of Indian music was translated into Arabic. This impact helped to produce the greatest Muslim musician of medieval India Amir Khusro. It was during the reign of Alauddin Khalji that a Muslim convert Brahmin Kamrup translated the celebrated Amrit Kund into Arabic.

This exchange of ideas continued even after the advent of the Arabs in Sind in the 8th Century A.D. due to the cordial relations that prevailed between the Arabs and Hindus. While five or six Indian physicians resided at the court of Baghdad, several Indian works on medicine and philosophy were translated into Arabic by the scholars Ibn an-Nadim and Ibn-Ali-Usaybiah. Milal-i-Wa'-Nihal refers to a religious discourse between the Arabic scholars especially deputed by Harun-ar-Rashid and the renowned pandits at the court of the Raja of Sind. A young Arab resident of Mansurah, the capital of Sind even composed a poem in praise of Raja Mahrug of Alora who sent a special messenger to escort the poet to the court where he was greatly honoured and rewarded. He stayed at the Raja's court for three long years and at his behest translated the holy Quran into Hindi.

Role of Arab Travellers and Geographers

We also owe a debt of gratitude to Arab travellers and geographers whose works are important sources, though yet unexplored in the reconstruction of the history of India, particularly after the 9th Century A.D. The names of al-Biruni and Ibn-Batuta are too well known to need any introduction. While Mahmud of Ghazni was carrying out expeditions in India, this great Arabic scholar was engaged in studying the culture and civilization of our country. The bulky volume which he produced is in many respects the most rational and comprehensive account of India ever Written by a foreigner until modern times. Some of the important Arabic writers on India who deserve mention are Ibn-Khurdadben, Al-Masalik Sulaiman, the merchant Abu Zaid Sirafi, Abu Dulaf-Ibn-Muhalhil, Buzurg-Ibn-Sahryar, al-Mas'udi and Ibn-Haukal. Ibn-Haukal, al-Idrisi and al-Istakhri describe many Indian towns. Ibn-Haukal refers to Dehal as a very populous place where "ships laden with products of Uman (Oman) and the ships of China and India met." Abu Zaid and Mas'udi inform us that the costly aloe wood presented to the Sun-God at Multan was imported from distant Cambodia. Al-Ya'Cubi lavishes praise on

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Indians for their advanced knowledge in science, astronomy, medicine, philosophy and for the large number of scholarly works produced on these subjects. To quote Abu Mashar, "Indians are celebrated among the nations for their wisdom and for their advanced researches in highly specialized science." Abdul-Fazl, too in his celebrated work Ain-i-Akbari takes note of several Arabian towns, including Madina, Baghdad, Jarjaraya, Basra, etc., and has given their longitudes and latitudes.

CONCLUSION

Fellowship and amity has been the cardinal note of Indo-Arab relations since the dawn of history. We have it on the authority of Muslim historians that the Hindu Rajas gave full liberty to the Arab traders, settled on the western coast of India, to build mosques and to practise their religion without let or hindrance. Not only this, Muslim magistrates were also appointed to administer the Civil Code of Islam to their co-religionists. Masoodi and Balazuri (Futuh-as-Sind) praised the Rajas of Sind, 'Balhari and Tafil, for their just and generous treatment. The Arabs too, on their part, when they came to Sind, reciprocated by readily adopting Indian titles and Hindu names. The employment of professional performers and courtesans seemed to be a development inspired by Indian practices, for in Central Asia and even in the Arabian countries, free born professional musicians of the female sex was a rare social phenomenon. The Indian courtesan of the nachghar was not paralled by the trained jariya.

The impact of Arabic thought on Hindu religion and practices is linked with the advent of Islam and the establishment of Muslim power in India and need not be discussed here. It may, however be pointed out that "some traits of the Hindu revival such as the increasing emphasis on Monotheism, emotional worship, self-surrender, the need for devotion to a spiritual teacher," as well as the growing laxity in caste rules and indifference to rituals at least among some sects have all been held in some way or the other to be the outcome of Islamic influence.

Abu Zaid Sirafi, who flourished before 688 A.H. thus pays a tribute to India:

By my life, India is a land where, when rain falls, it turns into pearls and rubies for those who have no ornaments;
From here come musk, camphor, amber and aloes wood, and various kinds of perfumes for those who require them;
Here grow all kind of sweet-smelling

substances and nutmeg and andro-

pogonnadus; Here are found the lions, the leopards, the elephants and the bears;

India and a major portion of Arabia having come under foreign influence, during the succeeding centuries there was a setback to this process of exchange of ideas. With the dawn of independence, "It had been the task of these countries to revive and restore these old relations."

NEHRU AND THE NEW COMMONWEALTH*

By BIMAL PRASAD**

Nehru's contribution to the emergence of the new, multiracial, multinational Commonwealth is now beyond dispute. But for India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth in 1949, for which he had been primarily responsible, the Commonwealth must of course have continued, but with a limited membership confined largely to the Anglo-Saxon group of nations. It was India's example which paved the way for all parts of the British Empire emerging into freedom automatically taking their place in the Commonwealth, thereby continuously enlarging its membership and adding to its significance. Professor Nicholas Mansergh, the leading authority on Commonwealth history, succinctly sums up Nehru's contribution on the emergence of the new Commonwealth.

But for him, India almost certainly would not have become the first republic member-state of the Commonwealth and, but for Indian membership almost certainly nationalists elsewhere in Asia and, still more in Africa, would not in their turn have opted also for membership. In the consequent addition of anti-imperialist Asian and African states to a Commonwealth which had grown out of an Empire, by procedures that became so conventional as to cease to cause remark, an idea achieved its most spectacular triumph. Not Smuts, not Mackenzie King, but Nehru was the architect of that achievement.¹

The impact of Nehru's decision was not confined to merely augmenting the size and nature of the membership of the Commonwealth but, even more significantly, on its character and outlook. Though still recognising the British monarch as the symbol of its free association and as such its head, it was no longer bound together by common loyalty to the British Crown, but by that to certain common ideals. Thus from being, a club of white, Anglo-Saxon nations and a bulwark of British imperialism in various parts of the world the Commonwealth was transformed into a multiracial and multinational grouping of nations working for the promotion of peace freedom and racial equality in the world.²

[•] Reprinted from Commonwealth Today (Ed.), S.C. Parasher, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 1983, pp. 14-32.

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NEHRU'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE EVOLUTION OF CONCEPT

It is a measure of Nehru's statesmanship that he was able to play such a crucial role in the evolution of the Commonwealth in spite of his consistent opposition to India's membership of the Commonwealth for no less than twenty years before the achievement of independence. Yet, when viewed in historical perspective, Nehru's decision to continue India in the Commonwealth may not appear really surprising. The early Indian nationalists, at any rate those working under the auspices of the Indian National Congress, aspired to self-government within the British Empire. In the beginning they did not even aspire to self-government. Far from advocating such a government, the President of the first Congress session. (1885) positively affirmed deep loyalty to the British Government and declared that "there were no more thoroughly loyal and consistent wellwishers of the British Government than were himself and the friends around him." The Congress in its early years did not seek to end British rule, but only asked for the gradual introduction of economic, administrative and constitutional reforms favouring Indians. At the turn of the century there emerged a new spirit and the Congress began to look forward to the attainment of self-government. However, it was still to be self-government within the British Empire. As late as 1908 the constitution drawn up by the Congress declared its objective to be "the attainment by the people of India of a system of government similar to that enjoyed by the self-governing members of the British Empire and participation by them in the rights and responsibilities of the Empire on equal terms with those members." When after the end of the First World War, the Congress turned a new leaf under the leadership of Gandhi and began to actively struggle for freedom from British rule it was careful, while defining its goal in December 1920, to leave the door open for dominion status, by calling it "swaraj", which could be interpreted as dominion status or severence of the British connection, depending upon circumstances.5

Nehru was the most prominent among those who subsequently challenged this formulation and worked for a clear enunciation of India's goal as complete independence leaving no room for the acceptance of dominion status. As early as March 1927, he noted that the urge for a Congress declaration in favour of independence had been growing and it had only been the personal influence and pressure of influential leaders which had kept it down.⁶ At the annual session of the Congress, held in Madras in December 1927, he succeeded in getting adopted a resolution declaring "the goal of the Indian people to be complete national independence." Although it did not change the objective of the Congress as adopted in 1920, its passage foreshadowed the beginnings of a new era in the history of the Congress. It certainly paved the way for the definition of the objective of the Congress in December 1929, at its Lahore Session,

with Nehru himself as President, as complete independence. Nehru had at last won on this point.

Although the achievement of complete independence for India now became the goal of the Congress and this had the full backing of Gandhi and other leaders of the Congress, the latter soon made it clear that this did not imply a refusal to have any relationship with Britain after the achievement of independence. In this connection it is pertinent to recall that the adoption of the goal of complete independence by the Lahore Congress (1929) did not necessarily imply, as has sometimes been wrongly assumed, the severence of the British connection. Indeed, an amendment moved by Subhas Chandra Bose at that very session, expressly specifying this implication, was opposed by Gandhi and negatived.8 This point was further clarified by the utterances of the Congress leaders on subsequent occasions. Thus Vallabhbhai Patel, the most important Congress leader after Gandhi and Nehru, declared in the course of his presidentia address to the Congress Session of 1931 that independence did not exclude the possibility of equal partnership for mutual benefit and dissolvable at the will of either party.9 The meaning of equal partnership was explained by Gandhi, though he sometimes contradicted himself on this subject. This contradiction arose from the difference between his own views and those of the younger elements of the Congress represented by such leaders as Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose. Gandhi himself does not seem to have attached much importance to the difference between dominion status and complete independence so long as India won the reality of political freedom. In any case he did not relish the idea of a complete break with Britain. If such a break did become necessary, he wanted the onus for it to lie on Britain not on India. It was largely as a result of his insistence that the goal of the Congress had remained ambiguous on this point between 1920 and 1929. The younger leaders of the Congress, however, detested dominion status and looked upon it as meaning something less than complete independence and not in keeping with India's dignity. Gandhi not only allowed them to have their way by 1929, but himself moved the resolution at the Lahore Session of the Congress which removed the ambiguity in the Congress goal and defined it as complete independence. Although he seems to have remained unconvinced of any fundamental difference between the two even after 1929, as a spokesman of the Congress he had to adhere to the new goal, or rather the new definition of the goal, adopted in that year. Probably he also saw an advantage in keeping himself flexible on this point for the purpose of negotiation with

1929 Luhore Congress Calls for India-Britain Partnership After Independence

Thus before going to attend the Round Table Conference in London

in 1931, Gandhi stated that there could be a partnership between India and Britain which he defined rather vaguely, perhaps deliberately, as an arrangement between them in many things and for reciprocal obligations. Asked if it meant a status similar to that of the members of the British Commonwealth, he replied in the negative. The nations of the British Commonwealth, he said, were essentially British or identified with British ideas and culture, a fact not applicable to India. Nevertheless he affirmed that if at the Round Table Conference he were persuaded that dominion status was suitable for India, he would advise the Congress to accept it.10 In his first speech before the Round Table Conference in September 1931, he again declared that though a rebel against British rule, he still aspired to be a citizen "not in the Empire, but in a Commonwealth, in a partnership if possible, if God wills it, an indissoluble partnership, but not a partnership superimposed upon one nation by an other." At the same time, he again declared during his stay in Britain that dominion status was not suitable for India. For the dominions were daughter-states of Britain in a sense that India was not.12 On another occassion, however, he declared that so long as India acquired real political power he did not care whether it was described as "dominion status" or "independence." "Call it by any name you like," he observed, "a rose will smell as sweet by another name, but it must be the rose of liberty that I want and not the artificial product."13

The attitude of Nehru, with his emphasis on complete independence, in contrast to Gandhi's preparedness to accept dominion status, was not fundamentally different from Gandhi's so far as the future of Indo-British relations were concerned. For once India's independence was achieved and Britain was able to shed its imperialism. Nehru too was in favour of continuing Indo-British cooperation, including association with the Commonwealth. This should be clear from what he said in course of his presidential address to the Lahore Congress (1929). Having proclaimed himself "a socialist and a republican," he observed:

Independence for us means complete freedom from British domination and British imperialism. Having attained our freedom I have no doubt that India will welcome all attempts at world cooperation and federation and will even agree to give up part of her independence to a larger group of which she is an equal member—India could never be an equal member of the Commonwealth unless imperialism and all that it implies is discarded.¹⁴

Again, elucidating the meaning of the term "complete independence" in course of a discussion with the India Conciliation Group (London) in February 1936, Nehru observed:

That does not mean necessarily that we lay stress on an isolation of India or a breaking away of India from such associations as might exist with England or with other countries, but 'independence' is used especially to lay stress on the fact that we want to break the imperialist connection with Britain. If imperialism survives in England, we must part from England, because so long as imperialism survives in England, the only connection between England and India is likely to be the connection of an imperialist domination in India in some form or other.... Therefore in terms of imperialist Britain the independence of India means the separation of India from England. Personally I can conceive and welcome the idea of a close association between India and England on terms other than those of imperialism.¹⁵

Again, in the course of an interview with Edward Thompson, published in *The News Chronicle* (London) on 2 January 1937, Nehru rejected the possibility of India enjoying genuine independence within the British Empire even to the extent enjoyed by the British Dominions and saw no parallel between the two, but proceeded to remark: "I can conceive of a free India coming to a friendly arrangement with Britain." This remained his position right till 1947.

Nehru Reiterates Mechanics of an Independent India in the Commonwealth

As freedom drew near, Nehru stuck to this position. As soon as the Constituent Assembly met in December 1946 he moved his famous Objectives Resolution declaring, among other things, its "firm and solemn resolve to proclaim India as an Independent Sovereign Republic," and got it adopted by 22 January 1947, thereby clearly ruling out dominion status as the solution of the Indian constitutional problem. Since, till that time it was inconceivable to think of any country remaining in the Commonwealth without accepting dominion status, Nehru naturally did not envisage India doing so and firmly held the view that, "Under no conceivable circumstances is India going to remain in the British Commonwealth whatever the consequences."

At the same time, however, Nehru also took steps to make it abundantly clear that he was deeply interested in maintaining friendly relations with Britain and the Commonwealth. Thus broadcasting as Vice-President of the Interim National Government on 7 September 1946, he declared: "In spite of our past history of conflict, we hope that an independent India will have friendly and cooperative relations with England and the countries of the British Commonwealth." Again, on 22 January 1947, while replying to the debate in the Constituent Assembly, on the Objectives Resolution providing for the proclamation of India as a republic, Nehru observed:

Now, what relation will that republic bear to the other countries of the world, to England and to the British Commonwealth and the rest? For a long time past we have taken a pledge on Independence Day that India must sever her connection with Great Britain, because that connection had become an emblem of British domination. At no time have we ever thought in terms of isolating ourselves in this part of the world from other countries or of being hostile to countries which have dominated over us. On the eve of this great occasion, when we stand on the threshold of freedom, we do not wish to carry a trail of hostility with us against any other country. We want to be friendly to all. We want to be friendly with the British people and the British Commonwealth of Nations.²⁰

1948 Commonwealth Conference Reinforces Nehru's Decision

Besides, under the force of circumstances and as a means of expediting the transfer of power from British to Indian hands, Nehru had to agree to India achieving independence on the basis of Dominion Status in 1947, though with the clear proviso that India would be free to decide later whether to remain in the Commonwealth or not-a position which the British had consistently maintained since the Cripps Offer of 1942.21 This certainly facilitated Nehru's final decision to keep India in the Commonwealth. For he had now a first hand experience of its working and realised that membership of the Commonwealth did not mean any reduction of independence, but actually some addition to it, 2 for it provided India, on the morrow of its independence, with the goodwill and materials as well as moral support from the important group of nations and did so absolutely without any crippling conditions. The warm welcome which Nehru. along with the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Ceylon, received from their counterparts in the old Commonwealth countries at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in London in October 1948 must have helped to reinforce this impression. The communique issued at the end of the conference on 22 October, truly expressed the feeling there when it declared that the presence of the three Asian Prime Ministers "symbolised the extension of the bonds of democratic freedom which reflect the spirit and steadfast purpose of the Commonwealth."3

Nehru himself was highly impressed by the atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding at that Conference. "We may not agree about everything," he remarked in course of a broadcast from London on 26 October, "but it was surprising what a large measure of unanimity there was, not only in the objectives to be aimed at, but also in the methods to be pursued." The deep impression created on his mind by the proceedings of the Conference and his estimate of the nature and potentialities of the Commonwealth as an institution came out more clearly in the following lines of the broadcast:

After all, the objectives of the Commonwealth can only be the objectives so nobly stated in the Charter of the United Nations—that is, the establishment of peace, the prevention of conflict and the establishment of human rights all over the world. If the Commonwealth cannot only succeed in doing that in its own sphere, but help to do that in the larger sphere of the world, then the Commonwealth will have given the best possible lead to the world.

This meeting has shown me that there is great scope for the Commonwealth to function in this way, and not only to help itself but to help others also.²⁴

This showed an enthusiasm in Nehru's mind for the Commonwealth which had not existed before. Apparently, he saw an advantage in India's association with such a body. There was also the important fact that once India had become a dominion in August 1947 and thereby a member of the Commonwealth, the nature of the decision to be taken changed from one of joining to that of continuing or leaving. That naturally made a substantial difference to the process of decision-making and finally to the decision itself. As V.K. Krishna Menon who, as Nehru's confidant, was closely associated with that process, later remarked: "India having been made a Dominion, the question became transformed." 15

National Congress Endorses Nehru's Decision

Nehru was, of course, not prepared to try to make India go back on its resolve to proclaim itself a republic, as enshrined in the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly at his own suggestion on 22 January 1947 and implicit in the history of the Indian nationalist movement since the Lahore Session of the Congress (1929), if not earlier. If however, a formula could be worked out to enable India to be associated with the Commonwealth while remaining a republic he would gladly welcome it. The paragraph regarding India's association with the Commonwealth in the resolution on foreign policy adopted by the Indian National Congress at its annual session at Jaipur in December 1948 clearly revealed this trend in Nehru's thinking:

In view of the attainment of complete independence and the establishment of the Republic of India, which will symbolise that independence and give to India the status among the nations of the world that is her rightful due, her present association with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth of Nations will necessarily have to change. India, however, desires to maintain all such links with other countries as do not come in the way of her freedom of action and independence, and the Congress would welcome her free association with the independent nations of the Commonwealth for their common weal and the promotion of world peace.²⁶

REPUBLICAN INDIA RETAINS MEMBERSHIP

The negotiations with a view to devising a suitable formula in order to enable India to remain a member of the Commonwealth followed a rather tortuous course and need not be recounted here. With Attlee emphasising the value of having the British King as the head of the state in India in line with the practice in the dominions, and Nehru determined not to accord any position to the King in the Indian Constitution and to retain its republican character in all its purity, the gap seemed really unbridgable.²⁷ The issue was finally settled at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in April 1949,²⁸ and it was agreed that India would remain a republic and at the same time also a member of the British Commonwealth, which now came to be described as just Commonwealth, by recognizing the King as the symbol of the free association of its members and as such its head. This was incorporated in the Communique of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference issued on 27 April 1949:

The Government of India have informed the other governments of the Commonwealth of the intention of the Indian people that, under the new constitution which is about to be adopted, India shall become a sovereign independent republic. The Government of India have, however, declared and affirmed India's desire to continue her full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of the King as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth.

The Governments of the other countries of the Commonwealth, the basis of whose membership of the Commonwealth is not hereby changed, accept and recognise India's continuing membership in accordance with the terms of this declaration.²⁹

While a number of statesmen played their parts in bringing about this happy solution to the problem of a republican India continuing a a member of the Commonwealth—something unprecedented in its long and chequered history—the chief credit for it must be shared by Nehru on the Indian side and Attlee on the side of Britain and the dominions. In Britain the King also played a helpful role, and so did Churchill, at that time leader of the Opposition. He had in the past been a stubborn opponent of Indian nationalism, but was quite touched by Nehru's decision to keep India in the Commonwealth in spite of all the past history of conflict between British imperialism and Indian nationalism and did not think it proper to object to it being there as a republic. When the South African statesmen, Smuts, called on him against that decision Churchill replied: "When I asked myself the question, 'Would I rather have them in, even on

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these terms, or let them go altogether, my heart gave the answer, I want them in.' Nehru has certainly shown magnanimity." On the Indian side, there is no doubt that the burden of decision lay mainly on Nehru and it was his statesmanship and determination which won the day and made history. He correctly described the situation in the course of his speech in the Constituent Assembly on 16 May 1949, while moving the motion for the ratification of the decision arrived at in London:

For many months past we had often consulted one another, consulted great and representative organisations, consulted many members of this House. Nevertheless, when I went, I carried this great responsibility and I felt the burden of it. I had able colleagues to advise me, but I was the sole representative of India and in a sense the future of India for the moment was in my keeping....I went there guided and controlled by all our past pledges, ultimately guided by the resolution of this Honourable House, by the Objectives Resolution and all that had happened subsequently; also by the mandate given to me by the All India Congress Committee. And I stand before you to say with all humility that I have fulfilled the mandate to the letter.³¹

It must however be added that in this, as in so many other endeavours, the support of Patel, whom he (Nehru) kept constantly informed of all developments in London, must have proved to be a great source of strength to him during his delicate negotiations with the British and Dominions' statesmen. How steadfastly Patel stood by him comes out vividly in the following cable—a masterly analysis of the strong points o the terms negotiated by Nehru—sent to him on 23 April 1949 as the negotiations were nearing conclusion:

Our position throughout has been and should be that by our association with Commonwealth our status as sovereign republic must not be affected. I feel that by recognition of the King as Head of Commonwealth, as a symbol of free association of its members we do not derogate from that status. Headship of Commonwealth with this restriction does not involve any allegiance to kingship. Indeed, formula evolved acknowledges distinction between King as head of an individual state wherein he would be the constitutional repository of authority and King as Head of Commonwealth wherein he would be a mere symbol of our free association. We can also emphasise that Commonwealth under our declaration, in terms of which our membership is being accepted, would subsist not by allegiance to King but by exercise of free will of its member peoples, thereby accentuating mere symbolic character of King. On the whole, therefore, I feel we can justify acceptance of such headship as consistent with our objectives and past commitments and in no sense derogatory to our republic sovereign status.32

Advantages of Membership

As for the factors responsible for the retention of India's membership of the Commonwealth, provided it could be done without in any way compromising its sovereignty or republican status, it is safe to surmise that Nehru was moved mainly by the consideration of the advantages which would accrue to India by close association with Britain at a time when it had just emerged into freedom and was still to find its feet in the world. Nehru did admit that he had in the past spoken against India remaining in the Commonwealth, but went on to emphasise, that the situation had changed and so attitudes also must change accordingly. It would not do to remain a prisoner of one's own past. As he put it in his speech in the Constituent Assembly on 10 May 1949:

Some members of the House who have opposed this motion (relating to India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth) and some others who are not in this House, who have opposed it, I have felt, have been totally unable to come out of the cage of the past in which all of us lived, even though the door was open for them to come out mentally. They have reminded us (of), and some of our friends have been good enough to quote, my speeches which I have delivered fifteen or twenty years ago. Well, if they attach so much value to my speeches, they might listen to my present speeches a little more carefully. The world has changed... England has changed; Europe has changed; India has changed; everything has changed and is changing. 38

The decision to remain in the Commonwealth appeared particularly desirable in view of the rather cold attitude of the Soviet Union at that time and the need to avoid too close an embrace with the United States in accordance with Nehru's determination to keep India uninvolved in the Cold War.34 The Commonwealth tie appealed to him as it was free from the rigidity of an alliance and still carried with it an implied assurance of mutual cooperation and support. Our ties with Britain were in any case quite close, much closer than that with any other country. Apart from the bonds created by the long historical association, the use of the English language and the nature of political and military institutions and procedures, which largely followed the British pattern, Britain was at that time our largest trading partner, and the main source of our foreign investments as well as defence supplies. In such a situation continuity of friendly ties with Britain was likely to contribute to our stability and security without in any way coming in the path of our developing other desired international contacts. Indeed, by providing us with a feeling of stability and security, without imposing any irksome burden which an alliance usually does, the Commonwealth tie was likely to facilitate the development of further international contacts. As Nehru explained in his speech in the Constituent Assembly on 16 May 1949:

Some people have thought that by our joining or continuing to remain in the Commonwealth of Nations we are drifting away from our neighbours in Asia, or that it has become more difficult for us to cooperate with other great countries of the world. But I think it is easier for us to develop closer relations with other countries while we are in the Commonwealth than it might have been otherwise. This is rather a peculiar thing to say. Nevertheless I say it, and I have given a great deal of thought to this matter.... If we dissociate ourselves completely from the Commonwealth, then for the moment we are completely isolated. We cannot remain completely isolated, and so inevitably by stress of circumstances, we have to incline in some direction or other.³⁵

Special Relationship with Britain

While Nehru emphasized that there were no commitments involved on either side in India's relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth, in the earlier phase of this relationship there certainly existed some commitments though, of course, unwritten. There was, for instance, the commitment, not always but very often followed, to consult each other on important international issues before taking a public stand on them. Nehru, for instance, acknowledged in Parliament in 1950 that his government did "hardly anything without consulting the countries of the Commonwealth."36 There was also a tacit understanding of mutual support on important matters. This led India to extend moral support, in general terms, even to Western defence efforts in the earlier period. Thus Nehru was a party to the communique issued after the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in 1951, which, while emphasizing the need for a negotiated settlement between the two sides of the Cold War, reiterated the resolve of the members, so long as the threat of aggression remained, to strengthen their defence "with all speed and diligence." The same was true of the communique in 1953, which, while emphasizing that no opportunity should be lost to compose the differences then dividing the world, recognized that "the democracies must maintain their strength and exercise unceasing vigilance to preserve their rights and liberties." That same year Nehru stated in Parliament that the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had "every right to defend themselves" and "to fight against any aggression" provided that they did not seek to defend colonialism.37

Even in Asia there was a good deal of effort on India's part to co-ordinate its policies with those of Britain, though of course these policies were not always identical and sometimes even quite contradictory. A good example of such an effort is provided by Nehru's desire to synchronize India's recognition of the People's Republic of China with that by Britain.

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gradu wealt this in the C We are informed by a fairly high authority that this was primarily responsible for the delay in the announcement of this recognition, which came at the end of December 1949. "The only reason for delay," recalls V.K. Krishna Menon, "was that we thought that as a Commonwealth country with particular relations with the United Kingdom, and with a Labour Government there, we should be patient and act together." 38

This was, of course, not a one-way affair. Britain also extended support to India whenever possible and took note of its susceptibilities on particular issues. It is, for instance, widely known that while cooperating with the United States in Korea, Britain generally supported the Indian mediatory efforts there, sometimes even to the annoyance of the United States. The same was true of Indo-China.³⁹ In another instance, when in 1950 King Tribhuvan of Nepal took shelter in the Indian Embassy at Kathmandu and his second son was set up as king by his Rana Prime Minister, the British were inclined to recognize the infant prince, but desisted from doing so because of Nehru's firm opposition to this move and his clear warning that if they interfered in any way in Nepal's internal affairs, that might jeopardize India's continuance in the Commonwealth.⁴⁰

While India continued to remain in the Commonwealth, its special relationship with Britain did not last long. As the diplomacy of non-alignment gradually unfolded itself and Nehru began to play a world role as a peacemaker between the major warring camps, the type of consultation and coordination with Britain which had taken place just after the attainment of independence seemed more and more incongruous. Besides, British policy towards Kashmir indicated a strong prediliction for Pakistan and seemed to be a continuation of the earlier, imperialist policy of encouraging the Muslim League in its anti-Congress stance. This created serious misgivings in the Indian mind regarding long-term British objectives with which they seemed to be broadly intertwined, in spite of continuing differences on details here and there. Both seemed to be moving to limit India's influence in Asia by encouraging Pakistan. This made the continuance of a special relationship with Britain incompatible with the pursuit of India's vital interests in South Asia. The widening of international contacts, inherent in the policy of non-alignment, now became an imperative necessity.

Appraisal

Even though the special relationship with Britain may be said to have gradually tapered off by the late fifties. Nehru's interest in the Commonwealth never ceased. Indeed, it can be said that with the passing of years this interest actually increased. In .949, when deciding to continue India in the Commonwealth Nehru does not seem to have been influenced very much by calculations regarding the long-term advantages of that associa-

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tion. In reply to Jayaprakash Narayan's criticism that the decision to continue in the Commonwealth showed lack of self-confidence and an implicit attachment to one of the power blocs, Nehru emphasised that such membership would be of great practical help to India for at least two or three years. India could later walk out of the Commonwealth whenever it wished.41 Gradually, however, Nehru developed quite an attachment to the Commonwealth and whenever demands were made in favour of India leaving that body—and this was quite often—he strongly opposed them and did not see any advantage in India leaving that organization. 42 He in fact. continued to cherish friendship for Britain and did his best to retain the Commonwealth link because of the opportunity it provided to India to interact in a friendly way with a large, multiracial, multinational grouping of nations cooperating among themselves and contributing their mite to the cause of world peace. He indeed looked upon it as an ideal grouping of nations and as an antidote to bloc politics which otherwise dominated the world scene. He explained his thinking in course of an interview published in 1960:

The Commonwealth is certainly a form of free, uncommitted and nonbinding association with the spirit of peaceful co-existence, a link or bridge which helps in bringing together nations for the purpose of cooperation and consolidation. Such associations are preferable to the more binding kind of alliances or blocs. We, of course, consider the problem of our association with the Commonwealth in terms of independent nations coming together without any military or other commitments. There are no conditions attached except this desire to cooperate so far as it is consistent with the independence and sovereignty of each nation. One important factor about the Commonwealth association is that it reverses the other process of military or economic blocking together for what might be called the purposes of the 'Cold War'. It has a certain warmth of approach about it, regardless of the problems that beset any such association. There may be differences. There are. Nevertheless the overall approach to such controversies is a friendly one which helps to tone down friction and difficulties.

Thus Nehru was not merely one of the founders of the new Commonwealth, but also its consistent promoter and defender; he has left an idelible mark on it. Although all nations in it have contributed to make what the Commonwealth is today, there is no doubt that Nehru played a crucial role in giving a new shape to it after the end of the Second World War. When the British aggression against Egypt (1956) had brought it to the verge of disintegration, his refusal to countenance India's withdrawal from it proved equally crucial in saving it from that fate. His faith in it was fully vindicated when after so many Asian and African nations had joined it, the white racist regime in South Africa found itself impossible to

continue there (1961). As far as India is concerned, the membership of the Commonwealth has become a part of the imperishable legacy of Nehru.

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decision to stay in the Commonwealth. As far as is known, Nehru had never attached any importance to India's participation in such bodies as the Imperial Conference.

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NOTES AND VIEWS

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INDIA AND THE UNCTAD

This paper examines the extent to which the meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) serve India's self-interest. The first part studies the reasons behind the establishment of UNCTAD and the main issues discussed at the Conferences. The second part analyzes the problems of the Indian economy and the extent to which the issues discussed at UNCTAD would help in overcoming these problems. The final conclusion is that even acceptance and implementation of the proposals put forth by the developing countries (LDCs) would make only a small contribution towards resolving Indian economic problems.

THE EVOLVING UNCTAD

THE post-war years have seen an unprecedented pre-occupation with economic performance. Governments in developed countries (DCs) have attempted to combine achievements of full employment with their more traditional concern of price stability and balance in their external accounts; governments in the LDCs have tried to accelerate the process of economic growth as well as to achieve various social objectives such as better income distribution and elimination of poverty. Government intervention was needed because the desired objectives, it was thought, could not be achieved through the market mechanism. While Keynes had demonstrated that a state of considerable unemployment was not an exceptional feature of market economies, he also pointed that full-employment could be achieved by varying the level of government expenditures.1 At the same time, economists such as Myrdal, Nurkse, Rosenstein-Rodan, Prebisch and Singer indicated the various facets of the working of the market which would hinder economic growth and actually result in these economies being trapped in a low income cycle.2

While accepting the need for a strong government role in economic management, economists, concerned with economic development, differed from their colleagues dealing with policy-making in DCs in their attitude to international trade. Policy-makers in the developed countries were convinced that a smoothly functioning international economy was essential to achieve prosperity. The beggar-my-neighbour policies of the depression years had contributed to the sharp contraction in world trade in the prewar years and had made achievement of full employment harder. The negotiators at Bretton Woods had believed in the beneficial effects of freer trade and so had tried to frame an institutional structure which would be conducive to a smoother flow of goods and capital between countries. A major instrument to achieve a larger volume of trade was elimination of quantitative restrictions except in some special circumstances, and lowering

of tariffs. This became the responsibility of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) after the charter for the International Trade Organization was not ratified by the necessary number of countries. GATT has been quite successful in achieving its goal of tariff reductions and partly because of this, world trade expanded rapidly till recent years.⁴

Development economists were much more pessimistic about the contribution that the international economy could make to economic development. Some economists, basing themselves on the experience of the depression years and the structure of trade of LDCs believed that the latter's export earnings could increase only very gradually. 5 LDCs specialised in exports of primary commodities, demand for which was inelastic because of the low income elasticity of demand in DCs for such commodities, increasing competition from synthetics and the declining share of raw materials in the value of final output. During the process of development LDCs have had to import capital and intermediate goods and needed larger amounts of foreign exchange than could be provided by exports. Therefore, LDCs had to follow a policy of import substitution. But despite import substitution foreign aid would be needed to supplement their export earnings to enable them to finance the required imports of capital goods. Foreign aid would also supplement their inadequate domestic savings to maintain the high rates of investment needed to accelerate the rate of growth of their economies. The prices of their primary exports fluctuated considerably and the resulting variations in their foreign exchange earnings disrupted their investment programmes. Therefore, schemes for the stabilization of commodity prices were required.

Other economists point out even more serious problems concerning the role of the international economy in economic development. In contrast to the neo-classical economists who stressed the equalizing effects of international trade, these economists stressed its inequalizing effects. They argued that the economic structure of the LDCs prevented them from taking advantage of the beneficial effects of international commerce and actually resulted in increasing the gap between the developed and the developing countries. The differential gains were partly due to the inequality in economic power between the developing and developed countries, and the market system reflected these inequalities. They also recommended, therefore, that LDCs follow a policy of distancing themselves somewhat from the international markets.

The international institutions established after the Second World War did not directly address themselves to the problems mentioned above, but in the fifties and sixties they responded to the problems of the LDCs. The workings of the World Bank were adjusted so that it concentrated much more on providing capital for development than had been originally envisaged, and its affiliate, the International Development Association, provided loans at concessional rates. The trade problems of LDCs

NOTES AND VIEWS 449

identified above, were relatively neglected by GATT which concerned itself mainly with trade liberalization through tariff reduction. UNCTAD was therefore established to deal with these trade problems of LDC's.⁷

Initial Concentration on Trade Issues

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Though UNCTAD has been concerned mainly with the trade problems of developing countries, it also discusses other problems afflicting the international economy which have repercussions on the LDCs. As can be expected the nature of international problems has varied over the years. The focus of the first conference held at Geneva in 1964 was on the foreign exchange requirements of the LDCs.8 The sixties had just been declared a development decade by the United Nations. But the imports needed to meet the target of a 5 per cent per annum growth rate could not be financed by the export earnings of the LDCs. The conference, therefore, considered ways to increase the foreign exchange resources of the LDCs. It sought to reverse the trend of their having a decreasing share of world trade by removing the constraints to higher export earnings. It recommended that revenues from primary exports be made more certain by instituting price stabilization schemes for commodities of interest to LDCs, discriminatory practices against exports of LDCs be removed both in the case of primary and manufactured commodities, QRs be removed wherever possible, or at least not be intensified. The LDCs also wanted that their exports of manufactures receive tariff preferences from developed countries to improve their competitiveness in the markets of the developed countries.

Trade measures, however, would not generate the required amount of foreign exchange so larger capital flows to LDCs would be needed. Capital flows from DCs of 1 per cent of their GNP, with 0.7 per cent of GNP being provided as official assistance were set as targets. The problems of shortfalls in export earnings because of a decline in the price of a commodity could be met through compensatory financing by the IMF. These were the main areas of concern which were discussed extensively in the committees established at the conference. Some of the other problems dealt at the conference were the problems created by DC control of shipping lines and possibilities of expanding trade among LDCs through regional groupings.

However, the response of the Developed Countries to these requirements of the LDCs was quite muted. Though the United States and West Germany opposed quite strongly these changes, the attitude of the other Western countries, particularly Britain and Sweden, was not so negative. As the *Economist*, for instance, commented: "Dr. Prebisch and the developing countries' delegations at Geneva have an array of affirmations, if not definite commitments from most of the developed countries."

The conference decided to commission a number of studies to examine some of the more controversial points. It was also expected that negotiations in other fora would continue to deal with the problems identified by the conference. However, till the meeting of the second conference at New Delhi in 1968 little progress had been achieved. Furthermore, some of the actions of the developed countries were at odds with the spirit of the first conference. For instance, the British Government, which had appeared to be quite sympathetic to the proposals of the LDCs, announced shortly after the Geneva Conference, "in future all imports of cotton textiles to Britain will need specific licences except for those from certain traditional suppliers." As the *Economist* commented "this move accords oddly with Heath's plea at Geneva to the industrialised Western countries to extend preferences to manufactured goods from underdeveloped countries."

The New Delhi Conference concerned itself basically with the same problems as were dealt with earlier at the Geneva Conference, and the story at the third conference held in Chile in 1973 was similar. 11 The New Delhi Conference strongly stressed the need for tariff preferences for the manufactured exports of the LDCs. Before the Chile meetings the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) had been negotiated lo give effect to this proposal. But even in this case the positive achievements were somewhat nullified by the long time taken to bring the schemes of the various countries to the implementation stage. In addition, a number of restrictions were placed on commodities which would qualify for preferential entry to countries which could benefit from the schemes. restrictions reduced the benefits that the LDCs would derive from the GSP. Meanwhile, the restrictions on export of manufactures by LDCs were being intensified.12 The cotton textile agreement had become a permanent feature and textiles accounted for a large percentage of the manufactures exported by LDCs. 13 QRs on other labour-intensive products exported by LDCs were also being instituted.

Till the mid-seventies the benefits that the LDCs had derived from UNCTAD were quite limited; even the benefits derived from GSP were limited. A number of studies suggested that the LDCs would have done better for themselves by negotiating for general tariff reductions for products of interest to them than using up their bargaining leverage in getting harder to reject general tariff reduction which was supported by their own ideological position of freer trade, than for them to reject the call of the on exports of manufactures by LDCs casts doubt on whether the developed countries would actually have found it more difficult to reject such an restrictive trade practices.

NOTES AND VIEWS 451

Changing Concerns of the Seventies

The focus of problems shifted in the mid-seventies to reflect the changing international scene; monetary problems became much more acute. The developed countries beset by a stubborn inflationary situation now gave a higher priority to tackling it. The International Monetary System which had been established at Bretton Woods collapsed as countries were unable to maintain fixed exchange rates and yet achieve full-employment and price stability. The imbalances in the external accounts of the different industrialised countries persisted. The balance of payments problems were further aggravated by the oil price rise in 1973-74; the oil price increase also raised the deficits of the LDCs beyond what could be financed from aid, so the question of financing these deficits became critical to maintain their rates of growth, as also to enable them to repay the loans already contracted by them. 16

The issues of major importance at the Fourth and Fifth UNCTAD held at Nairobi and Manila respectively, reflected these changing concerns.17 More time was devoted to international monetary issues. But apart from the question of larger quotas of the Fund or a link between SDR allocations and aid, so that LDCs would get a larger share of new SDR allocations, it was difficult to derive precise policy measures that would help the LDCs. The LDCs initially argued for a return to a system of fixed exchange rates saying that the fluctuating exchange rates increased uncertainty of exporting and would harm their exports. 18 By relying on forward markets or by tying their currencies to a basket of currencies of their important trading partners, individual LDCs could only partially offset the effect of fluctuating exchange rates. But it was not obvious that the fluctuating exchange rates hurt the LDCs. Furthermore, fixed exchange rates would have aggravated the balance of payments problems of the DCs, and this would probably have hurt the international markets more than the additional uncertainty created by the floating exchange rates. The developed countries have also been reluctant to have larger overall quotas at the Fund; they fear that larger stocks of international money would further fuel world inflation. Also, the surplus countries have always tried to discipline the deficit countries by restricting the resources of the IMF and imposing harsh conditions on the use of such resources. Though many reasons have been given for rejection of the link, ultimately it arises from the reluctance of DCs to provide larger resources to the LDCs.19

In the trade field efforts have been concentrated to control the proliferation of restrictive practices by DCs. While the LDCs also wanted an extension of the GSP, it was not quite clear what this would imply, as later in the seventies attempts were initiated to reduce tariffs in general which would reduce the benefits from any preferential tariff scheme.²⁰ The other major area was that of commodity schemes. The objective of the LDCs

was twofold—to reduce fluctuations in prices of primary products and to undertake measures to reverse the shrinking market for these primary products. The DCs who were the major importers were interested in achieving a security of supplies as the action of the OPEC in raising the price of oil had raised the spectre of unruly markets in primary products. The situation, therefore seemed propitious to negotiate commodity schemes. The idea of commodity schemes seemed to have been accepted by the major participants,²¹ and it seemed that the technical problems, including that of financing the buffer stocks, remained to be resolved. It was proposed to fund the buffer stocks through a Common Fund (CF), which would benefit from the economies of diversification. Some commodities would be bought by the CF at any point of time while others were being sold so that the total funds required by the CF would be less than if each commodity had a separate fund.²²

A major issue which had become important in the seventies was the interrelated one of appropriate technology, transfer of technology and control of transnational corporations (TNCs). Part of the desire to control TNCs arose from political reasons. The LDC governments wanted to limit the interference by the transnational corporations in their domestic affairs. Interference by these latter was important as it was supported by the home governments. An extreme case was the role of ITT in the overthrow of the Allende Government in Chile. LDCs had also faced opposition from the transnational corporations on a number of economic matters; they dominated the area of exploitation of mineral resources and the LDCs received only a small part of the price of the final product as their compensation for the primary material. The fabrication stages which accounted for most of the value added were located in the DCs.23 LDCs could not bargain effectively for the prices they received for their raw materials because of their lack of knowledge of all the factors which governed the market. These industries were vertically integrated and most of the transactions were conducted at the internal accounting prices of the firms so that it was difficult to establish a market price about which negotiations could be conducted.24 Even when the LDCs sought to overcome these problems by nationalizing the operations of the transnational corporations, they were often thwarted by political pressures brought to bear by the home government of the TNC, or by the control by the latter of the marketing channel for the commodity so that it had ultimately to be sold to the TNC itself.25

Technology was naturally of critical importance to the less developed countries to raise productivity in their economies. In fact, it was of partipromotion, as without up-to-date technology they could not compete in the international market. But the market for technology was dominated by the corporations which were developing the modern technologies.

The LDCs did not always have sufficient knowledge to judge what they were buying and in the process paid a very high price for the import of the technology. In addition, restrictions were often placed on the use of the imported technology and the TNCs did not provide sufficient training to LDC nationals, so that the LDCs could not effectively use the imported technology.26 The requirement of the LDCs was that modern technology be made available to them more cheaply than had been the practice till then, and that restrictions on the use of the technology be removed. In addition, the more advanced among the LDCs wanted that the technology transfer should be affected in a manner that their nationals could become fully competent to further use that technology. This required that all the designs and blue-prints should be given to them. Also, that the transnanational corporation should assist in training their nationals to become fully conversant with that technology. But an additional step is still required if the LDCs are to become more independent technologically than they are currently. Their capability to carry out technological improvements needs to be improved. This requires strengthening of their technical and scientific education and improved facilities for research. As the TNCs. are already in the field of research the LDCs want that some of this research be conducted in their own countries using their personnel, who would thus get on-the-job training in research.

Little progress was achieved in any of these areas at the Fourth and Fifth UNCTADs. The DCs argued that their increasing economic crisis prevented them from increasing their aid flows. As far as commodity schemes were concerned the DCs remained opposed to extensive interference in the markets for commodities. Only a small common fund has been agreed to, one so small that it could not effectively serve the function originally envisaged for it by the less developed countries. In addition it was decided to proceed on a commodity by commodity basis so that first agreement had to be reached to operate a stabilization scheme for a particular commodity and consumers and producers would contribute to the financing of the scheme. A part of these funds would then be transferred to the CF and against that the individual buffer stock could borrow from the Common Fund. Its weak financial position would restrict its ability to borrow in international financial markets. Under these circumstances the resources of the Common Fund would be too small for it to provide funds necessary to effectively manage the market and there would be little incentive for individual schemes to transfer a part of their resources to the fund. As regards control of the transnational corporations, there were deep-seated differences of opinion. Given this it was difficult to see how the corporations could be made to part with their technology. Also, it is still not clear how to improve the capacities of LDCs to develop their own technologies.27

At the most recent meeting of UNCTAD, held earlier this year at Bel-

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grade, the focus of attention had shifted again. One of the major reasons given by DCs for their inability to respond to the demands of the LDCs has been the very bad economic situation in their countries with high rates of unemployment and inflation and large deficits in the government budgets. These governments have been giving priority to tackling these problems. A number of analysts, including partly the Brandt Commission, have argued that reforming the international economy along the lines suggested by the LDCs would help the DCs to recover from the stagflation afflicting their economies. 28 In particular, it has been argued that economic activity in the DCs and LDCs is linked. Greater foreign exchange earnings by LDCs, through aid or larger export revenue, would be spent on imports from DCs encouraging recovery in the DCs and this would also expand the market for exports of LDCs, and so the interaction would benefit both the LDCs and the DCs. Also, all countries have an interest in preventing the collapse of the international monetary system, which is threatened by the increasing debt of the LDCs. Debt relief to the LDCs would directly assist them and the result of an healthier monetary system would be beneficial to all countries. 29

UNCTAD, however, has been unable to make any progress in reaching agreement on measures which would lead the world to recovery. Nor was the proposal of a world monetary conference acceptable to the DCs. This lack of agreement reflects partly the current state of economies. There is no agreement about the causes of the stagflation or the policies needed to solve it. The predominant opinion in the West is that the problem has been caused by policies which generated excess demand; adding further demand would only aggravate the problem. The present policies are the most appropriate to restore health to these economies. Healthy Western economies would provide good markets for the LDC products, both as the size of the market would have increased and protectionist tendencies would have decreased. The Western spokesmen, therefore, seem to be accepting only one part of the interdependence argument—recovery of the Western economies would benefit the LDCs, but there is little that they themselves would gain by helping the LDCs.

II INDIA'S ROLE

India's interest in the negotiations for the New International Economic Order stems both from political and economic motives. Also, as Chairman of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), it has an additional responsibility to articulate the viewpoint of the movement. At the same time nevertheless, its role as Chairman of NAM may conflict with its ability to pursue its own economic interests which lie in supporting reforms that would lead to a better economic performance in the eighties and nineties.

The major problems currently facing the economy are slackening rates of growth of productivity in agriculture and industry, a substantial balance of payments deficit, difficulty in generating sufficient resources for investment by the public sector and infrastructural constraints. It is argued below that even if the reforms proposed under the NIEO are accepted they would only make a small contribution towards resolving India's economic problems, so that India does not have a great stake in the proposed reforms.

India has successfully diversified its export structure during the past two to three decades and no longer depends on a few primary commodities for a large part of its export earnings. Therefore, fluctuations in the prices of India's primary exports no longer have a very large destabilizing effect on its balance of payments and through it on the conomy. Furthermore, the problems facing two of India's important primary exports—tea and jute—are more of a structural nature than those arising merely from sharp price variations. Exports of tea and jute have been stagnant because of a low elasticity of demand for these products in the developed countries, competition from other countries or substitute products and inability to face competition because of low productivity due to old shrubs in the case of tea and obsolete technology, and machinery in the case of jute. Operation of a price stabilization fund is unlikely to bring much benefit in the case of tea and jute. 32 Even the operation of the second window which is supposed to improve the market for primary products is likely to have only limited benefit. The installation of new machinery in the jute industry and replantings on the tea estates can be handled by domestic policy.

A matter of somewhat greater interest to India than the Common Fund is the operation of a food security programme (FSP). When the harvest is poor India needs to import foodgrains to meet the domestic consumption requirements, particularly to meet the demands of the public distribution system. If a situation of shortfall in domestic production coincides with that of international scarcity, the imports of foodgrains can be a serious drain on India's foreign exchange resources. For instance, in 1974 such a situation arose and the import of foodgrains at high prices from the international market had as much impact on the balance of payments as the increased oil prices. Furthermore, imports of foodgrains at high prices raised the budget deficit. Unlike in the case of higher oil prices, the cost of foodgrain imports could not be passed on to the consumers as this would have priced food beyond the reach of the poorer sections of the population.

A food security programme can tackle two different kinds of problems.³³ It can be used to supply food to poor countries facing chronic food deficit or it can meet severe, but temporary shortfalls, in production. The latter problem itself can be tackled by operating a buffer stock to stabilize prices

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or to meet the requirements of some countries at prices lower than those prevailing in the open market. Countries having access to the supplies at lower prices could be either poor countries or those facing a particularly severe shortfall below normal production levels. The above description itself indicates that a food security programme would have different characteristics depending on the objective it was designed to serve and that different countries would vary in the characteristics that they would like a programme to have.

A food security programme was thought to be necessary because there was widespread fear in the mid-seventies that the world was headed for a period, perhaps a perpetual period, of food shortages.³⁴ Then special provision would have to be made for the consumption needs of the poorer LDCs since they would not be able to purchase food in the international market. This fear of widespread food shortage has been belied by recent developments. The increase in production of foodgrains has been so large that large stocks have been accumulated and to stop further accumulation a substantial amount of the land in the United States has been withdrawn from cultivation. Furthermore, large harvests despite reduced use of fertilizers, have been achieved. These bumper harvests have reduced the prices of foodgrains and made it uneconomic to apply the recommended dosages of fertilizers. Therefore, for the next few years at least, there seems little likelihood of a worldwide shortage of food and high prices. The main problem is lack of purchasing power either with governments of countries or with their people to purchase the food. Under such conditions the main purpose of an international foodgrain stock might be to provide food aid.

If the current stagnation in agricultural output continues India will require large imports of foodgrains. But the difficulties India is having in getting aid allocations, particularly of soft aid, suggests that in the current international political environment India cannot rely on a regular inflow of substantial quantities of foodgrains, Therefore, in these circumstances India's gains from a food aid programme are likely to be limited. Also countinued stagnation in foodgrain output will disrupt the entire development strategy which cannot be corrected by merely increasing imports of foodgrains, and so cannot be tackled by a FSP.35 Of course, if food imports were available at reduced prices and without political strings they could provide a breathing space while corrective measures were adopted. If the import requirements remains small, as they have been in recent years, India could afford to meet them from the commercial market without serious adverse effects on the balance of payments. It is, then, unlikely that India would have access to an FSP though such access would be of some help. For an occasional large shortfall in production, which would require large imports an FSP would be useful. But the objective of financing imports can be achieved by an improvement of the current compenNOTES AND VIEWS 457

satory financing scheme, under which countries can borrow from the IMF when there are sudden large increases in their payments for cereal imports, whereas earlier borrowings were restricted to situations when there were severe shortfalls in export earnings.

The main problem from India's viewpoint is to reverse the recent stagnation of productivity in agricultural production. This requires broadening of the green revolution which has to date been concentrated in wheat production and in rice cultivation in some areas.³⁶ Assistance is, therefore, required in basic plant research and in dissemination of the results of the research, neither of which are to be the responsibility of the proposed food security programme.

Removal of the infrastructural constraints facing the Indian economy requires better management of existing capacity, larger investments for developing new capacity and improved project design and implementation to reduce the time required for capacity creation. Of course, to the extent that management of existing and ongoing projects improves the requirement for additional capacity would be reduced. Investments in creation of new capacity are constrained by a shortage of financial resources. The long time-lags in commissioning infrastructure projects may perhaps make recourse to commercial borrowing unwise. Because of a tight domestic resource situation and of the debt service implications of commercial borrowing, investment in infrastructure could be more easily increased if aid funds were available, particularly if they were available on soft terms. Consequently, India has a strong interest in larger aid flows.

Larger aid flows will also help in managing the balance of payments in the coming years. But a healthy balance of payments position requires increased export earnings. Because of the small size of the export sector compared to the size of the economy, larger exports are unlikely to have the same stimulating effect on the Indian economy as they have had on economies such as these of Korea and Taiwan. The experience of quota restrictions being placed on Indian commodities whose exports start to grow as in the case of scooters, manhole covers, etc., suggest that it might be difficult forIndia to expand its exports at a significantly higher rate than growth of the world economy. To the extent that restrictions on Indian exports reflect unhappiness, with its foreign policy stance, they are likely to continue. Therefore, though the excessive bias against exports displayed by India's trade policy earlier should be eliminated; it is unlikely that exports can be a leading sector. 37 In these circumstances a policy of import substitution will have to be continued. But it should be stressed that even though an export-led growth strategy may not be viable for India a more open trade policy might be needed to generate the exports necessary to keep the balance of payments deficit under control. Further, a more open economic policy might discourage very inefficient import substitution that has bedevilled Indian industry. The experience with the restrictive

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trade policies of the developing countries suggests that an important objective for India is to try to maintain openness of markets in the advanced countries as well as to make restrictive arrangements more predictable and orderly so that uncertainly regarding them does not inhibit export activity on the part of Indian entrepreneurs.³⁸ Investment in creation of additional capacity to service the export market is the most vulnerable to such uncertainty. And if such investment is not undertaken exports would merely provide a vent for surplus production which cannot be sold in the domestic market.³⁹

To accelerate the rate of growth in India it is imperative to hasten the technological change in industry and in agriculture. In the latter sector, as we noted above, it is largely a question of improving India's capacity to use modern genetic theory to generate new high yielding varieties, dissemination of the results of such research, and of improved management of the country's water resources. It is more difficult to improve productivity in the industries sector; the obsolete machinery and techniques used in many branches of industry make it difficult for their products to compete in international markets. Also, there has been little improvement in productivity through learning by doing and improvements in operation of existing technology.

Higher rates of growth of productivity in Indian industry requires adoption of more modern technology, which would involve substantial imports of technology. But, as argued above, technological upgrading involves not only establishment of modern plants but also the transfer of ability to design and construct additional plants using the same technology and to make improvements in these plants. In the past, technology had been available mainly from the transnational corporations (TNCs) and they were reluctant to transfer this technology. In more recent years the TNCs have been more willing to permit LDCs to use the imported technology in constructing additional plants and in modifying their obsolete technology. They have even been willing to provide the process designs and engineering blue-prints and to train nationals in utilising this technology. Of course more could be done in making transfer of technology easier and cheap, and this is one area where India has considerable interest.

Getting modern technology is, however, only part of the solution. Unless India develops the ability to further improve on the imported technology it would become relatively backward again after a short period of time as the rest of the world continues to improve. India has the advantage of a large body of scientific and technical personnel, but logy or in adapting the imported technology. This lack of success probably reflects the lack of appropriate facilities for research and the brain drain which deprives the country of some of the best scientists. Success in developing new technology will depend mainly on domestic efforts,

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Development of the local milieu for research would also encourage TNCs to conduct more basic research in the country.⁴²

III

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, India's main interests in the international negotiations is for larger aid flows, access to markets in the developed countries or at least more clearly defined rules as to when such access can be limited. and a change in the rules regarding technology transfer. While all of these are covered in the proposals of a NIEO, a large part of UNCTAD's efforts have been spent on negotiating the Common Fund for commodity price stabilization which is only of marginal interest to India. In the latest gathering of UNCTAD steps for recovery of the international economy from the current stagflationary conditions received considerable attention. But the stress on world recovery seems a dead-end to us. As argued above, the current state of economic theory does not support the reflationary policies recommended by the LDCs. Nor does the current political environment in Western countries support such policies. Even if recovery of the Western economies is achieved by the policies currently being adopted it would have very little effect on the Indian economy as exports to these countries play only a small role in the Indian economy. Therefore, though Indian exports might increase somewhat, a substantial balance of payments problem would remain. A major difficulty in expanding India's exports is in generating an exportable surplus, as increases in production are constrained by infrastructure bottlenecks. Furthermore, the recovery of the Western economies night lead to higher petroleum prices with adverse effects on the Indian balance of payments (though the adverse effect will be somewhat softened because of decreasing dependence on imported oil). Faster growth in Western economies would also not contribute towards raising productivity in agriculture or industry or removing the infrastructural constraints. Consequently, India should attempt to refocus attention on the areas of interest to it namely larger capital flows on easier terms and access to Western markets for its manufactures. In this it has a substantial community of interest with the newly industrializing countries of East Asia and Latin America.

Indian interest in larger aid flows would be served either through larger aid allocations through the World Bank and IDA or by some of the proposals advanced earlier to build an independent fund for providing aid. Such a fund would be independent of governmental budget allocation procedures and could be formed by taxing mining of sea-bed resources and earnings of non-residents.⁴³ These interests will, however, only be indirectly served by the more recent proposals that the first priority is to have a world recovery programme and a monetary conference to deal with

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the debt problems of LDCs. Debt renegotiation unless coupled with larger financial transfer night merely mean a diversion of current flows towards those countries facing a debt problem. Such a divension is more likely to hurt the Indian interest.

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NOTES AND VIEWS 461

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INDIAN REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE

A Review Article

INTRODUCTION

India* regarding the dedication and sacrifices of the Indian revolutionaries in the pursuit of national liberation has remained by and large half-told. The basic focus of the chroniclers of the Indian freedom movement has been the Gandhian non-violent struggle under the Indian National Congress. This seems to have created an imbalance in the writings of India's struggle for emancipation. Evidently, this apparent distortion may be adduced to the overwhelming success of the Gandhian movement in ending the British Raj in India. Much less has been known or written about the role of the foreign-based Indian revolutionaries in India's fight for freedom. No wonder then, any publication on the subject of Indian revolutionary struggle is likely to generate absorbing interest for the specialists as well as for the lay reader.

Indian revolutionaries were at the forefront of India's struggle for national emancipation. At the outset, they looked for inspiration not only from India's rich religio-cultural heritage but also from sources outside. While they received guidance and inspiration from different quarters they also readily adjusted their action techniques in accordance with the circumtances. In this context, T.R. Sareen's Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad and Buddhadeva Bhattacharya's edited anthology on Freedom Struggle and the Anushilan Samiti provide a balanced picture of the Indian revolutionary movement at home and abroad. Before one goes into their basic themes, some introductory remarks would be in order at this point. What was the basic purpose and rationale behind the activities of the revolutionaries? Generally speaking, their whole aim was to achieve India's national emancipation. To this end, they were prepared to subvert by violent means the British Raj in India, to assassinate as many government officials, to secure necessary possible help from the Indian Armed Forces as well as external sources. They also intended to make use of propaganda and other political organizational methods in pursuance of their aim.

In many ways, the Indian revolutionary movement was characterised by a dual, interlinked, simultaneous process, though varying in the sources of action (either directed from within or outside). Since the turn of the century Indian revolutionaries had been looking for direct or indirect help from abroad to achieve India's independence. Initially, their attempts were

^{*} Tilak Raj Sareen, Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad, 1905-1921 (Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1979), xx, 300p., Rs. 80. Buddhadeva Bhatta charyya (Ed.), Freedom Struggle and the Anushilan Samiti, Vol. I (Anushilan Samiti, Calcutta, 1979), xxiv, 335 p., Rs. 25.

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designed to influence political developments through some Western countries. During the period prior to World War I these Indian revolutionaries largely operated from the United Kingdom, France, USA, Canada and some Southeast Asian countries. Following the outbreak of World War I their activities tended to be concentrated in Germany which was at war with Britain and France, and later the United States. Their main efforts were to send arms and ammunition through these countries. With the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, Indian revolutionaries sought to secure moral and material sustenance from them.

Any way, the prospects of a successful revolution with outside help were not so bright after the war. Britain was at peace with the world. Soviet Union was a discontented nation but trying to come to terms with the world outside. Indeed, there were obvious contexual constraints which did not permit the Indian revolutionaries to operate effectively in pursuance of their goal of India's independence. First, there were numerical limitations; only a small segment of the Indian bourgeoisie actively participated in their endeavour, or morally supported them. Neither the peasants nor the workers had as yet joined the ongoing struggle. At the same time, the feudal and capitalist elements by and large remained aloof from them. From this perspective they seemed to be in a less enviable position than the Irish Sinn Finns or the Russian Nihilists. Secondly, the Indian revolutionaries' bases of operation abroad were quite far off from the Indian borders. Needless to say in contrast to most Western revolutionaries or the laterday national revolutionaries in Asia, Africa or Latin America, Indian armed activists did not have many friends abroad who could be depended upon for moral if not more tangible support to their cause.

If Britain ruled the high seas with its mighty navy-that inhibited any likely external assistance to the Indian revolutionaries-there was also absence of any broadbased popular support within India for the revolutionary cause. Revolutionaries could secure only ill-coordinated, half-hearted sympathy and help from limited external sources. As if this was not bad enough, the Indian activists' efforts for help at home and abroad were complicated by personal and group rivalires; they not only lacked proper discipline and organization but also the requisite training to maintain secrecy about their activities. It is however undeniable that the activities of revolutionaries did have certain symbolic significance, especially in generating an electrifying effect on the Indian political scene.

However, revolutionary methods were abandoned subsequently because of several factors. By the end of the 20's, it may be recalled, the Indian people were involved in a different form of political action. On paper, revolutionary parties were wound up; the Jugantar group incidentally, was dissolved in July 1937. Many of the Jugantar group members joined the Congress, because it became quite revolutionary in its political demands. The entry of Gandhi on the Indian political scene after World War I

presaged the gradual decline of armed revolution as a mechanism for achieving independence. Henceforth more and more Indians began to rely on novel techniques of satyagraha or non-violent movement as propounded by Gandhi.

SALIENT FEATURES OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Here an attempt is being made to highlight some salient features of the Indian revolutionary movement abroad and the birth and evolution of one important revolutionary party in India—the legendary Anushilan Samiti of Bengal. Starting with the last point first, it is not definitively known as to when the Anushilan Samiti started. There have however been no two opinions about its close-knit organizational effectiveness and its highly selective recruitment procedures. In contrast, the Jugantar Party of Bengal remained largely a loose federation of revolutionary groups. With the exception of a limited period (1914-19; 1925-28) the two revolutionary organizations seldom worked together. In some ways, this may be adduced to the personality clashes or rivalry for leadership.

Revolutionary violence reached its peak between 1910-1915. The British colonial rulers in response mobilised all the resources at their disposal to crush it. It was not till December 1919 that the government felt secure enough to declare a royal amnesty. The early months of 1923 again saw renewed political violence. In eastern India there was a resurgence of revolutionary activities. This invited the imposition of the infamous Bengal Ordinance in 1924. A reign of terror was virtually let loose on the people; it led to political harassment and large-scale arrests in suppression of the revolutionary upsurge.

It is worth noting that even among the adherents of the politics of non-violence (connected with the Congress) there were some, as in Bengal, who believed in the use of violence under certain circumstances. What is however ironic, if the revolutionary groups were struggling for a free India, they were at the same time feuding among themselves regarding the proper course of action. Be that as it may, of these groups the Anushulian Samiti of Bengal seems to have had maintained the most well-knit organisation with a committed cadre of action squads.

Indian Revolutionaries Abroad

All these varied facets, among other related issues, concerning the Anushilan Samiti have been well brought out in the volume edited by Buddhadeva Bhattacharyya. We will talk more on this later. Sareen's publication, in contrast, is a balanced narrative of the activities of the Indian revolutionaries outside India. In the first four chapters he has focused on the evolution of the Indian revolutionary movement abroad with reference to Britain, France and the United States. This phase—

ending with the establishment of the Ghadr Party by Lala Har Dayal-was marked by the efforts of the Indian revolutionaries to drive the British out from India without any external assistance. In the next three chapters. Sareen's focus is on the activities of the revolutionaries abroad in the backdrop of their unending search for arms assistance from Imperial Germany with a view to bringing about political change in India. Here the author unfolds the story of the logistics of an Indian armed revolution with reference to the schemes for the procurement and shipment of arms and ammunition for armed action against the British in India.

In the following pages, aside from studying the episode of the Indo-German connection and the American persecution of the Indian revolutionaries, Sareen has also highlighted the futile Indian efforts to secure Soviet help. In a sense, this was their bid for an armed overthrow of British rule in India. Winding up this study, Sareen provides a sort of an overview of his basic theme in the concluding chapter as to how Indian revolutionaries abroad sought to achieve a gigantic task such as the attainment of India's independence with limited resources at their disposal.

Methodologically Sareen's approach is historical; he has based his research on authentic archival materials and official records. Admittedly, the attempts of the foreign-based revolutionaries had often been countered by the policies pursued by the British colonial rulers. Nevertheless, their struggle against heavy cdds had been a source of great excitement to those who carried on their struggle within India.

THE ANUSHILAN SAMITI

Using a differentunit of analysis, Buddhadeva Bhattacharyya has brought out a well-edited volume on the Anushilan Samiti's role in the fight for India's freedom. This publication comprises contributions from both participant observers as well as interested analysts. The anthology brings out some exciting facets of the heroic story of the Indian revolutionary movement. The framework of this volume has been spelt out by Tridib Chaudhuri-a RSP member of the Lok Sabha-in an introductory note. While there is no need to overstress the point, the sacrifice of the revolutionaries in India's struggle for independence has been recognised somewhat belatedly. Even to this day, it is not widely known in this country that like Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose's attempts to free India from abroad during the Second World War (through the formation of the Azad Hind Government in Southeast Asia), similar efforts had been made earlier by others such as Jatin Mukherjee, Savarkar, Madam Cama, Krishnavarma, Hardayal, M.N. Roy, Abinash Mukherjee, Raja Mahendra Pratap, Barkatulla, Surya Sen, Bhagat Singh, etc.

In many ways, the Indian Independence Committee in Berlin, the Ghadr Party in the United States and Canada, provisional Indian government at Kabul, etc., were symbolic of the extent of India's armed revolutionary

struggle. Admittedly, revolutionaries were unable to directly influence the course of negotiated transfer of power in 1947, but the fact remains that their activities during the five decades did hasten the pace of the transfer of power after World War II. It is in this context that Chaudhuri finds the relevance of the Anushilan Samiti's role in the India's anti-imperialist struggle. The Samiti was instrumental in bringing together similar groups in Punjab, Bengal, UP, Bihar, Maharashtra and Madras for a common revolutionary cause.

While the focus of Bhattacharyya's volume is on the Anushilan Samiti, contributors to this publication also make references to other revolutionary groups which often, in active cooperation or sometimes in rivalry with it, played a significant role in the Indian revolutionary upsurge. Organizations such as Jugantar, Ghadr Party, Hindustan Republican Association, Hindustan Socialist Republican Army and other fraternal revolutionary groups in their own way served the cause of India's freedom. Even though there is no need to overemphasize the importance of the Samiti's role during the five decades of India's freedom struggle, it is difficult to ignore its emergence as the nursing ground for several leftist marxist groups in the subsequent period. But then this was also true of the Jugantar Party which proved to be a recruiting ground for the Communist Party of India.

Birth and Evolution

Of the four contributors, Professor Nihar Ranjan Ray (now decessed) spells out in the opening chapter the wider religio-social implications of the genesis of militant nationalism in India. These elements proved to be the basis of the Anushilan Samiti and other political organizations especially in Bengal and Maharashtra. The interactions between British colonial economy and the traditional Indian socio-economic structure seemed to have generated two differing cultural trends that had an impact on the subsequent evolution of militant nationalism in India. British colonial rule produced a western educated, new professional Hindu elite that was paradoxically characterised by two contrary trends; if there were elements who looked to India's past and repeated with an emotional overtone outdated socio-religious thoughts reflecting a particular pattern of life, symbolic of a new consciousness of self-identity, there were others who were opposed to this trend and believed in more rational, broad-based forwardlooking ideas. Despite this contradiction Indian society under British colonial rule reflected, certain trends of territorial-cum-cultural unity of the Indian sub-continent amidst its manifold diversities.

Secret societies started forming in India by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. They were committed to the use of violence in their pursuit to end colonial rule. The writings of Bankimchandra, the rituals of the Shivaji festival and Ganesh Puja, the inspiring exploits of the Irish and Russian secret societies, the electrifying effect of the Japanese victory

over the Russians in 1904-5 (that marked the defeat of an European power by an Asian country), cumulatively went on to strengthen the bases of Indian militant nationalism. The main stands of the militant nationalists were Swadeshi and Boycott movements. More tangible manifestations of this militancy were the use of arms.

In some ways militant nationalism was a reaction to the moderate policy then pursued by the Indian National Congress. It was one P. Mitra, a barrister, who seemed to have laid the foundations of the Anushilan Samiti of Bengal. The Samiti's advocacy of open revolt and armed action, along with indulgence in political assessinations, underlined the growing spirit of militant nationalism. A similar line of action was endorsed by the Jugantar Party. One however finds Ray's essay concluding on a rather abrupt note.

Militant nationalism evolved slowly in India as if to integrate within itself the traditional traits of Indian culture. The tempo of militancy of the revolutionaries went on increasing with the gradual discovery of India's splendid past; to them the past became the motive force for radical political change. They were imbued with a pride about India's history and

It produced a psyche of an aggressive nationalist posture vis-a-vis British colonial rule. The struggle for freedom for the revolutionaries became what may be called the manifestations of Indian vigour and manhood in thought and deed. For one thing, this led to the development of a growing spirit of self-assertion and self-identity among various social groups. And for another, repressive measures (e.g. 1905 Bengal Partition, etc.) of the Raj in particular produced in reaction a brand of militant nationalism, especially in Bengal that resulted in Swadeshi and Boycott movements along with political assasinations and robbery. Needless to add, it had tremendous appeal among the educated middle/lower middle class that threw up most of the radical elements.

It is important to note that the radical elements had an overlapping class character. This constitutes the broad reference frame of Saral Chatterjee's treatment in Chapter II about the Anushilan Party's evolution as a revolutionary party. The Samiti was the principal architect of the politics of violence since the early years of this century. Chatterjee's contribution covers a period from 1905 to 1913. It was the failure of the moderates to prevent the Bengal partition (1905) that seemed to have encouraged the spread of the cult of violence in eastern India. The Samiti revolutionaries made effective use of the media for developing revolutionary consciousness. In this context, the vernacular press played an important role in rousing the spirit of nationalism; organs such as Sandhya and Jugantar gave a tremendous boost to the revolutionary upsurge. The Samiti had its headquarters in Dacca with branches in the remotest parts of the country. These latter were expected to expand the base of its activities. The Samiti was functionally divided into several units dealing

with arms procurement, armed action, publicity, etc. Only trusted members were put in charge of these units; in fact, recruitment of members was highly selectie and recruits had to undergo a thorough ritual of initiation and pledges before the selection committee. Regimentation aside, the Samiti also suffered from certain pitfalls. While the series of political assassinations and dacoities did generate a revolutionary atmosphere, nonetheless they were also responsible for provoking punitive measures by the British Government.

With the annulment of the Bengal partition a serious debate started within the Samiti as to whether there was any further need for political violence. There were some key members who wanted to convert the Samiti into a purely socio-cultural organisation. Ultimately however, the hardliners won their point; by 1913 the Anushilan Samiti had entered into cooperative relations with other political groups. In a certain sense, there had already been an interrelationship between the militant nationalism (as represented by political groups such as the Anushilan Samiti, Jugantar Party, Ghadr Party, Hindustan Republican Party, etc.) and the Gandhian Passive Resistance Movement. In fact many of the revolutionaries were using the Indian National Congress as a legitimate forum for establishing or maintaining mutual contacts amongst themselves for working out a common programme on an all India basis. Hence, there was a growing apprehension within the British administration that perhaps non-violence was a cover for covert political violence. The Quit India Movement seems to have been perceived in this light, though the subject calls for a separate study.

Despite the internal crisis following the annulment of the Bengal partition, the Samiti as a group remained one of the most organized of all secret societies. By 1912, compulsions for revolution saw the spread of its activities outside Bengal, such as Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar and other provinces of British India. Also, about this time Germany was perceived as a major source of supply of arms for revolutionary activities in India. The Samiti conceived a countrywide revolution for the overthrow of British rule in India. As political dacoities and assasinations went on unabated the British Government imprisoned several key Samiti members and also instituted a number of conspiracy cases against them. Between 1912 and 1914 the Anushilan Samiti went through a phase of reorganisation and expansion. This constitutes the broad theme of Pradyut K. Ghosh's essay.

The period also marks the establishment of the Jugantar Party—which was essentially a federation of several political factions, the Samiti apart. Under the leadership of Jatin Mukherjee, the Jugantar Party kept itself available for cooperation and help in joint revolutionary activities. There was one key difference between the Jugantar Party and the Anushilan Samiti; the activities of the former were more or less confined to Bengal, that of the latter were extended to other parts of India,

especially in the north and northwestern parts. The Samiti had comparatively an all-India base because of its merger with the Benares group, Chandernagore group and later with the Ghadr Party. Some of these subthemes come up again and again as one goes through the anthology. For understandable reasons there is a concerted attempt to highlight the significance of the Anushilan Samiti in India's armed revolutionary struggle. Perhaps, a more balanced presentation of these themes would have added to the value of this anthology as a research reference tool on the subject of armed revolutionary struggle in India.

Thematically, the essay by Ghosh which follows, is a continuation of Chapter III. By 1915 the revolutionary movement in India had reached great heights, but unfortunately certain differences emerged between the Anushilan Samiti and the Jugantar Party. While the Samiti sought to launch an all-India armed uprising in February 1915 under the leadership of Rashbehary Bose, the Jugantar Chief, Jatin Mukherjee, wanted to have it in Bengal not before June that year. An additional difficulty was that the Jugantar Party was rather hesitant to accept the Samiti's offer of cooperation in the projected venture.

The basic problem of the Indian revolutionaries was that even though their enthusiasm was high they lacked the requisite supply of arms and the necessary supportive popular base for an armed action. Thus from the outset many of the revolutionaries had tried to establish contacts abroad with a view to procure arms and financial resources for their cause. It may be recalled that since 1908 certain members of the revolutionary groups, as well as others, who went abroad for higher education came into contact with persons such as Shyamji Krishnavarma, Madam Cama, etc., who were organising revolutionary activities in India from outside. As the war broke out in Europe it was planned to smuggle arms into India from Germany. One Raja Mahendra Pratap was sent by the Imperial German Government to Kabul to announce the formation of provisional government of free India under his presidentship. In the backdrop of these developments, while Jatin Mukherjee eagerly awaited the German arms supply, Rashbehary Bose prepared for the execution of a plan of an all-India armed uprising on 21 February 1915. The scheme ended in a fiasco because of the machinations of a British intelligence agent who had managed to get into the party and thereby divulge the plan of its activities. This led to the institution of about nine conspiracy cases which ended in the hanging and imprisonment of more than fifty persons. A reign of terror was let loose especially in the Punjab. Rashbehary Bose, the Anushilan leader fled to Japan.

A notable incident of the period was the successful removal of 50 German mauser pistols and a huge quantity of ammunition from the stock of Roda Co. in Calcutta in 1914. These pistols were used for armed action by the Bengal revolutionaries. On the other hand, Jatin Mukherjee and

his associates hiding in Balasore (Orissa), near the Bay of Bengal, were encountered by a police party. The resultant clash ended in the death of Jatin and his four associates. Later two of them were hanged and one sentenced to transportation of life. Here, Ghosh does not accept the more commonly known thesis about the encounter at Balasore where Jatin and his associates were reportedly waiting in anticipation of the arrival of arms from a German ship. This assertion is based on supportive evidences.

Though the rebellion of 1914 ended in a fiasco as a result of harsh governmental measures, the Anushilan Samiti was able to reactivate itself by 1916. Paradoxically, even though younger elements were drawn into the party, it did not lead to a corresponding increase in political extremism. The Samiti-police clashes at Gauhati in 1917 and at Dacca in 1918 were exceptions rather than the general pattern of the day. The brutal repressions perpetrated by the police against the revolutionaries indicated the extent of the price paid by militant nationalists in their struggle for India's freedom.

As a result of British repressive measures and false promises the post-World War I decade was marked by growing political turbulence. But unlike the Indian National Congress of the pre-Gandhian era the Indian revolutionaries did not believe that India could attain its independence through a policy of gradualism, i.e. through the politics of appeals and prayers. However, the announcement of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms scheme in June 1918 belied the expectations of even the moderates and the constitutionalists. The British scheme hardly satisfied the Indian urge for self-rule. It started the phase of a more broad-based mass movement which ultimately paved the way to India's independence. The activities of the revolutionary groups in this context were not contrary but supplementary to these movements.

The enactment of the infamous Rowlatt Act—that violated the civil rights of the people of India—made the Indians more angry against the British Government. The chain of protests and demonstrations that this act triggered off ultimately led to the Jallianwala Bagh massacre on 13 April 1919. The reign of terror in Punjab brought to an end the era of limited constitutional agitation and petitions. It led to the demand for full independence. In the background of these dramatic developments, Lahiri deals with the politically eventful period between 1920 to 1929 in his paper (Chapter V).

As the call for non-cooperation was given by Gandhi in conjunction with the Khilafat agitation — over the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey—the Anushilan Samiti was apparently confronted by a difficult policy problem. There was apprehension among some Samiti members that Gandhian stress on non-violence or peaceful struggle could retard revolutionary activities. After several rounds of discussions the Samiti members decided to struggle irrespective of the mode of its operation (though some

sources contend that Samiti members had decided to opt out of this movement). Incidentally the Jugantar group had also joined the non-cooperation movement unhesitatingly. No wonder then, the suspension of the non-cooperation movement by Gandhi after the Chauri Chaura incident—in which 20 policemen were burnt alive—only dampened the spirit of militant nationalism.

Despite the non-cooperation movement's setback, it should be viewed as a part of the wider struggle carried on by the Indian freedom fighters on multiple fronts to dislodge British rule from India. The euphoria of mass struggle that it generated all over India had a bearing on the subsequent political developments in India. What is more important, the Indian National Congress increasingly became the major platform of anti-imperialist struggle in India. It underwent a major transformation in its character; the Congress no longer remained a mere deliberating or petitioning body-looking for British goodwill and grace-as initially conceived by the founding fathers. Under these circumstances the Congress call for boycott of British goods and educationai institutions evoked an enthusiastic public response. Also the Bolshevik Revolution, which overthrew the authoritarian Czarist regime in Russia, had its own tremendous impact on the Indian political scene. Here Lahiri's point is well taken, but then would it be a lack of perspective to overstress the impact of the Lenin-Roy political debate on the development of the Indian revolutionary movement. The author himself has noted how Roy's analysis was based on bookish knowledge. In the process Roy rather mechanistically projected a rather exaggerated revolutionary situation in India. He sought to raise a liberation army of Muhajirs (who left India during the Kilafat Movement). The project failed to take off because of the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement (1921); the Agreement had inhibited Moscow from engaging in anti-British activities especially relating to India. Roy's control over communist activities declined after the Fifth Congress of the Comintern. It in fact marked the introduction of the Communist Party of Great Britain as the chief political consultant to the Indian Communist Party. Here one also comes up with the names of personalities such as Abani Mukherjee and Virendra Chattopadhayaya; both of them contested Roy's views and made a different projection about the communist movement in

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Neither the British Governments institution of conspiracy cases, northeir repressive measures could curb the activities of the Indian nationalists. The Non-cooperation Movement was followed by a period of intermittent mass movements such as the Simon Commission Boycott Movement (1927), Civil Disobedience Movement (1930 and 1931), the left-oriented class movements of 1937-41, the Quit India Movement and finally, the Azad Hind Movement (1944-46). Needless to add, these were indicative of the growing ferment within Indian policies for emancipation

from British rule.

Going back to the Anushilan Samiti, one is puzzled by Lahiri's remark that the idea of revolutionary action, based on mass participation, was to an extent influenced by communist philosophy and activities. One however fails to understand the reasons behind the Anushilan Samiti's inability to enter into closer relationship with the Communist Party on a common platform. The author answers that circumstances prevented the Samiti from pursuing a policy in line with the cummunists. In fact a realistic assessment of the balance of forces had evidently convinced the Samiti leadership regarding the dangers inherent in any attempt to delink themselves from the Indian National Congress. More importantly, most of the Samiti members suffered from traditional socio-religious hang-ups. In fact, militant nationalism in India developed autonomously-looking for inspiration from India's past. In the initial stages it was inspired more by the struggles of Garibaldi and Mazzini in Italy or the Sinn Finn in Ireland than by the ideas of communist revolution. But for obvious reasons any how, in view of the pressures and pulls of conflicting ideologies of nationalism and communism, the Samiti in later years tended to suffer from an indecisiveness.

It is difficult to say if organizationally the Hindustan Republican Association (HRA) was one of the constituent units of the Samiti. The HRA was subsequently renamed Hindustan Socialist Republican Army (under Bhagat Singh and Chandrasekhar Azad), claims Lahiri. While in specific cases there might have been operational links between these groups, there are no reasons to believe that organizationally HRA or HSRA operated under the guidance of the Samiti. It would be a claim quite out of proportion to the Samiti's actual strength or organizational base.

Still then, the much publicised Kakori Mail Van Robbery Case (1925) underlined the growing cooperation between various revolutionary groups for joint action. One significant development of the period was the unity forged between the Anushilan Samiti and the Jugantar Party, thanks to the initiative taken by Subhash Bose (though he did not belong to any revolutionary group). A high water-mark of the period was the massive labour rally in support of India's independence staged in Calcutta in 1928. After the Kakori episode the British Government was determined to crush the HRA. Senior members of the party were arrested; the leadership of the association was now assumed by Bhagat Singh of the Punjab and Chandrasekhar Azad of UP. They propagated socialist philosophy amongst the HRA.

In passing, it is worth noting here that due to the lack of a mass base, the Communist Party did not play any important role in the labour movement till the early 1930's. Prior to that the Communist Party tended to remain more or less on paper. It was the historic Meerut Conspiracy Case (1929) that highlighted the Communist Party's role in political activism.

In contrast, where did the Anushilan Samiti stand at that point? And what was the pattern of mass contacts of the revolutionaries in general, and that of the Samiti in particular? In some ways, during the pre-noncooperation era revolutionaries were the only ones who had contacts with the broad masses. But then, it is easy to overstress this point. For one thing most of these revolutionaries had a middle class background that generally inhibited them from playing a more meaningful role outside the context of their class interests. And for another, they tended to function more as secret societies rather than as well established political parties trying to involve the people in mass movements.

There are however no reasons to doubt that the Anushilan Samiti was a party of dedicated revolutionaries who had not only acquired knowledge of mass struggles but also the ability to jointly work with similar groups elsewhere in the country. Even their religious orientations did not come in the way of pursuing socialist economic programmes. But then lacking in a systematic comprehension of marxism, the Samiti revolutionaries seemed to have been attracted more by its ideals of equality and justice then by its utility as a rigourous ideology for a political change based on class warfare. This aspect naturally generated a certain ambivalence in the attitude of the Samiti revolutionaires.

True, the Samiti believed in socialism; it did not support M.N. Roy's opposition to the nationalist movement or accept his rejection of the Indian National Congress. It may be recalled that the National Congress had by then emerged as the only all-India based anti-imperialist platform. It is significant, while the Fifth Congress of the Comintern had instructed the communists to cooperate with the Indian National Congress and the left wing of the Swarajya Party, the Sixth Congress (under Stalin) was opposed to national liberation movements under the leadership of the National Congress. Obviously, this must have posed a dilemma for the Samiti revolutionaries. They could either start a communist party outside the orbit of the Comintern or could announce its endorsement of the communist ideology though remaining attached to the National Congress.

In many ways, an atmosphere of populism had been generated by the non-cooperation movement. In the context of this political environ, the Anushilan Samiti seems to have switched on to the concept of "mass rebellion" from its earlier strategy of sporadic violence. The British Government sought to handle the situation with repressive measures. Be that as it may, it is amazing that Lahiri should maintain that the Samiti functioned on the principles of democratic centralism. On the contrary, most non-communist revolutionary parties in India have been rather personality-oriented than well structured organizations based on the principles of accountability and a cobesive ideology. These were the basic drawbacks of most of the revolutionary groups in India.

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From the early 20's to the late 30's a majority of the Anushilan leaders remained imprisoned or detained most of the time. When these leaders were released by 1938, a complicated situation was created; while some of them formally accepted the Marxist-Leninist ideology (though remaining as an independent group), others jailed in other jails had by then decided to join the Communist Party of India.

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In the Appendix one finds some common themes for discussion with Sareen. But then the Appendix seems to have been added more as an after-thought to round off the volume by citing some instances of Anushilan connections with foreign-based Indian revolutionaries. A more compact chapter on the subject would have added to the value of this publication! Evidently, this was only of marginal interest to the contributors; or, maybe, they were constrained by the limited scope of the subject. Revolutionary groups of various shades and from different regions were only intermittently involved in foreign-based activities.

Lahiri provides only an overview of the crucial role played by foreign-based Indians in India's struggle for independence. If some of these Indians became involved in the task of liberation while studying abroad, others—sometimes with Anushilan connection—came outside for procuring arms or learning the technique of making bombs. In this drama of revolutionary activities references are made of key organisations such as India House (UK), Indian Home Rule Society (UK), Berlin Committee, and Ghadr Party (USA and Canada), etc.

Regarding the personalities, the roles of Shyamji Krishnavarma, Madam Cama, Rashbehary Bose, Abani Mukherjee, Virendra Chattopadhayaya, Lala Hardayal, Champakraman Pillai and others have been mentioned. The foreign-based revolutionaries were not only able to rouse the anti-British feelings among the Indian living abroad, but also have India's cause appreciated better in the west. Above all, they were also bent upon promoting the cause of revolution in India. A significant development of the period was the mutiny by the Indian sepoys in Singapore. It was with Japanese naval support that the British Government could suppress this mutiny. The activities of the foreign-based revolutionaries reached its greatest heights during the period of World War I. In this process, Anushilan elements were not alone; there were other groups who were also involved in a significant way.

Thus, the volume edited by Bhattacharyya with its perceptive introduction, five historical accounts on the evolution of the Anushilan Samti—in the context of the Indian struggle for freedom—and then a concluding note on the activities of the revolutionaries abroad, combine to highlight a crucial era in India's political development. While much has been written and known about India's attainment of independence through non-violence, satyagraha and the various non-cooperation and civil disobedience movements; literature on the role of the revolutionaries has been

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rather limited for understandable reasons. For one thing, the revolutionary movement in India was rather short lived. And for another, unlike the Gandhian movements its support base was limited; it lacked the adequate backing of the general mass. The revolutionaries failed to mobilize the people in the fight for India's freedom. After the sensational Chittagong Armoury Raid in the early 1930's not much is heard about armed action in pursuance of freedom – excepting political assassinations—till the episode of the Azad Hind Army in the World War II period. The Quit India Movement of 1942 was more of a spontaneous mass movement that had the backing of the Indian National Congress.

It may be noted in conclusion here that it was after the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy that one witnesses the beginnings of a new technique of mass action necessitated by the compulsions of India's march towards the long cherished goal of securing self-rule. It was Gandhi who used and perfected this technique of satyagraha or passive resistance. Earlier in South Africa he had realised its potentialities. Passive resistance was conceived as a technique for mobilising the Indian people for the purpose of ending British rule in India. Some of the specific operational manifestations of this technique were non-cooperation and non-violent civil disobedience movements and the Quit India upsurge.

Be that as it may, a more balanced perspective of the Indian freedom movement calls for understanding the relative importance of the activities of the revolutionaries in comparison to the passive resistance movement of the subsequent period. In this context, Sareen and Buddhadeva Bhattacharyaya seem to have rendered some service to other scholars interested in the subject. While their efforts may not be considered as being something pioneering, nonetheless, these publications would certainly renew interest on a fascinating subject. Howsoever symbolic or limited might have been the rule of the militant nationalists, there is evidence to suggest that in the pursuit of their task they succeeded in some ways to shake the very foundations of the British Raj in India.

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A.K. NARAIN (Ed.): Studies in the History of Buddhism. B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1980, xxxi, 421 p., Rs. 180.

THE work in hand for review, is sub-titled as "Studies in Critical Compilation of Papers Presented at the First International Conference on the History of Buddhism," University of Wisconsin, United States, 1976. The purpose of the conference was to study the course of history of Buddhism in a global perspective. The book also includes a preface and an introductory paper by the editor himself. The papers, dealing with various aspects of the history and historiography of Buddhism in India, Sri Lanka, Nepal China, Japan and other parts of the world, have been contributed by the following authorities on the subject: Harvey B. Aronson, A.L. Basham, Heinz Bechert, George D. Bond, B.G. Gokhale, Padmanabh S. Jaini, Sechin Jagchid, Minoru Kiyoto, Alexander W. Macdonald, Joanna Rogers Macey, Eleanor Zelliot, Beatrice Miller, Robert J. Miller, Gad Jin M. Nagao, Charles S. Prebisch, Theodore Riccardi, Sheng-Yen Chang, Bardwell Smith, Nathmal Tatia, Shunsho Terakawa, Robert A. Thurman, K.N. Upadhyaya, Alex Wayman, Turrell V. Wylie, Isshi Yamada, Erik Zurcher and Leonard Zwilling.

Going through the list of papers, it may be noted that area-wise, while almost fifty per cent of them deal with India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand and Nepal, the remaining fifty per cent are concerned with Tibet, Mongolia, China and Japan. So also, subject-wise, while it is difficult to make clear cut demarcations according to disciplines, one may say that seven or eight of the papers deal with the doctrines and philosophy, eight with history, eight with Sangha, social organisation, social action and ethics and the role of women. There is one on art and architecture and three or four may be taken to deal with methodologies and resources. period-wise, the papers cover Buddhism from its origin to its development and expansion in the present age.

In his introductory paper entitled "Towards A New History of Buddhism," Professor A.K. Narain has emphasized the need for an "integrated" and "total" history of Buddhism in a transnational and comparative perspective utilizing the inputs made by the various disciplines concerned. In that context, he has made very bold suggestions. For instance, he does not consider Buddhism as a dissent or reform movement of Hinduism, but as an independent tradition of indigenous origin, which anti-dated the Vedic Brahmanism and was known as "Sramana." To him the opinion of some scholars that Buddhism was a phase in the evolution of upanisadic thought is preposterous. The paper following—"Motivations to Social Action in Theravada Buddhism"—tries to show the social involvement of the monastic communities in Sri Lanka, Burna, Thailand, etc. The origin of Bud-

fairs,

dhism has been traced by an internationally known scholar, Professor A.L. Basham. The structure of the Sangha in Burma has been highlighted by Heinz Bechert. Thus a number of papers pertaining to Theravada Buddhism have been included in the volume. Two papers appearing in the volume have touched upon an altogether new field of study. These are by way of comparision and contrast with Jainism. One of them is entitled— "The Disappearance of Buddhism and the Survival of Jainism - A Study in Contrast" by Padmanabh S. Jaini and the other is -"The Interaction of Jainism and Buddhism and its Impact on the History of Buddhist Monasticism," by Nathmal Tatia. Contemporary Indian Buddhism has also come under the focus of the scholars in this volume. The traditions followed and the innovations introduced by late Dr. B.R. Ambedkar have been fully discussed and analysed. The role of women in shaping the course of the history of Buddhism has also been given its due. There is one paper entitled "Premises and Implications of Interdependence (Pratityasamutpada)" by Isshi Yamada. In this context, it seems the author has wrongly chosen the word "interdependence" to denote dependence of one Nidana on the other and so on, in the scheme of Pratityasamutpada. Thus the collection of papers has covered most of the aspects of Buddhism.

On a careful perusal of the whole volume it appears that the learned editor did not systematically plan the arrangement of papers. The papers on Theravada, Mahayana, etc. have been mixed together. Likewise, the papers dealing with the social and philosophical aspects have not been arranged discipline-wise. In their arrangement chronology has suffered a casualty. But on the whole the volume has been well edited and hence deserves all commendation from its readers. The printing and get-up is also very good.

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SANGHASEN SINGH

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ASGHAR ALI ENGINEER: The Origin and Development of Islam. Orient Longman Ltd., Bombay, 1980, 248 p., Rs. 65.

FOR scholars early Islam and especially the life of Prophet Muhammad has always been a fascinating subject. Muslims and non-Muslims both have tried to understand the personality of the Prophet whose deep and lasting impact on the course of human history can hardly be ignored. Till not too long ago most non-Muslim, especially the Western scholars were engaged in studying his life and career with the pre-conceived idea

that he was but an imposter and false prophet. For the Muslims, on the other hand, Prophet Muhammad like his predecessors was in fact the agent of God and was always acting according to His dictates. They, therefore, devoted their energy mostly in refuting the charges levelled against his bona fides by the western scholars. A new trend, however, has now emerged in the study of the subject. The orientalists of today dare not say that Prophet Muhammad was an imposter, nor can they commit themselves to the belief that he was the prophet par excellence. Because of this dilemma they are now projecting his personality as a man who was truly and sincerely engaged in reforming his contemporary people, and in the course of time left behind a well-formulated philosophy known as Islam. At the outset, this approach does not appear to be derogatory but in reality it shears the Messenger of Islam off his prophetic plumes. Watt's famous books, Muhammad at Mecca and Muhammad at Madina and also Maxime Rodinson's Muhammad are in this direction like the pacemaking works. The book under review is, to a great extent, an India version of this modern orientalism.

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After describing in the first chapter the scope and the purpose of the study, the author acquaints us with the social and economic conditions of the Arabian society in pre-Islamic times. In the third and the fourth chapters we are told how Prophet Muhammad encountered the peoples of Mecca and Madina. The stiff opposition which he faced came mainly from Mecca which was controlled by rich merchants who always exploited the poor of the town. The situation was very alarming and was ready to welcome any one who could work for their betterment. In this perspective the personality of the Prophet appears as a person sincerely committed to the welfare of his people. The last two chapters deal with the Muslims' religio-political activities in Arabia and abroad in the post-prophetic period.

Since God has no positive place in the Marxist methodology, Prophet Muhammad in this study naturally emerges almost as a parochial leader whose main concern was the upliftment of his own people, the Arabs. For this purpose in the fashion of a true national leader, in the words of the author:

Muhammad valued the unity of his people and even thought of accommodating their deities if that could achieve this objective. He wanted to unite the Arabs to enable them to stand up to the other people of the world, i.e. the Romans and the Persians. (p. 49)

Since the author is trying to study the origin and development of Islam from a set view point he at many places appears to be ignoring the Quranic weltanschaung. For instance, discussing the Quranic restrictions on extra marital sexual behaviour, he says that the Islamic laws regarding chastity were mainly formulated to safeguard the institution of private property. "In a society where the institution of private property is well developed, the chastity of women assumes great importance. In fact, with-

out this chastity the paternity of a child cannot be determined." (p. 135) How far this hypothesis is applicable to the modern world, the larger part of which is still free from the grip of the philosophy of "collective ownership," is a matter to be pondered on by the author as well as by the readers.

The book under review in fact raises a very interesting and basic question—Is the Marxist methodology good enough to explain the origin and development of Islam or any religion in which God plays the pivotal role? As an illustration, let us take the example of the Quran. A Muslim has to believe that the Quran is from God, and the Prophet was an instrument to receive it and an agent to deliver it verbatim to the people of the world. The Quran which we have today is the collection of actual divine words transmitted through the mouth of the Prophet. This is unacceptable to Marx, I believe. One is quite free to accept this proposition or to reject it, but unless one unequivocally rejects the above proposition one would indeed have a hard time to convince readers that while using the Marxist methodology one can remain honest to both, the subject as well as the methodology.

This however does not mean that the post-Prophet history of the Muslim people also cannot be studied from the Marxist point of view. It can be done mainly because it does not involve the infallible personality of Prophet Muhammad. Perhaps for this reason the last two chapters of the book, under review, which deal with the post-Prophet period make very good reading.

This is, however, naturally a matter of opinion. The present reviewer strongly feels that the personality of Prophet Muhammad and the origin of Islam, consequently, cannot be fully explained with the help of any methodology which does not recognize the supremacy of God's will. But those who think otherwise will find the book interesting, informative and coherent with the principles of the methodology adopted.

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MUSHIRUL HAQ

D.G.E. HALL: A History of Southeast Asia (Fourth Edition). The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1981, xxx, 1070 p.

PROF. Hall needs no introduction to students of Southeast Asian history. In fact, before the first edition of this book appeared in 1955, there was a great dearth of well-researched and detailed studies of Southeast Asia, a region whose economic, cultural and strategic importance was increasingly recognized by scholars, diplomats and politicians alike,

though scholars like Coedes, Kern and others had made significant contributions to the comprehensive political and socio-economic history of the countries, as well as the region, was deeply felt. So far, the countries of the region had generally received the attention of western scholars either in the context of the global, strategic and economic interests of the colonial powers or culturally as appendages of either India or China.

Hall's scholarly work, therefore, can be said to have filled a void and in that sense was a pioneering work. Moreover, it was perhaps for the first time that a scholar had recognised Southeast Asia as an area, "worthy of consideration in its own right." While acknowledging the indebtedness of the people of Southeast Asia to the Indian and Chinese civilizations, Hall qualified that terms such as "Greater India," or "Little China," often applied to this region, ought to be highly deprecated and shunned because they undermined the importance of the indigenous cultures. Hall contended that the history of the people who had built the majestic Borobudur Buddhist Complex in Central Java or the Angkor Vat in Cambodia cannot be studied from any other point of view except their own.

Hall thus set about trying to accomplish a task which was gigantic and challenging, given the vastness of the area, the diversity of its people and the vast amount of unexplored material. However, notwithstanding the shortcomings which such a work would invariably suffer from, Hall's History of Southeast Asia remains, till this day, one of the most comprehensive and illuminating volumes on the subject.

The book itself grew out of a series of lectures delivered by Prof. Hall at the Universities of London, Rangoon, Singapore and Djakarta. His first hand knowledge of the region and its people provided him with a rare insight into the complex socio-cultural life of Southeast Asians and this led him to treat them with greater understanding and sympathy. The study has been divided into four main parts, starting with the proto-history of Southeast Asia and concluding with the emergence of nationalism and challenge to European domination in the present century.

The first part begins with the early history of Southeast Asia and describes the rise and fall of the various mainland and island empires notably the Srivijaya, the Shailendras and the Majapahit empires in the Indonesian archipelago, the Khmer Kingdom of Cambodia, the pagan empire of Burma and the Kingdom of Champa. Three important outside influences which had a profound impact on the history of the region, namely the Mongol invasion, the advent and spread of Islam in the region and the coming of the Europeans, have been dealt with in great details to prove that the region was all along receptive to outside influences. In the present edition, two short sections (pp. 41-47) on Hinduism and Buddhism in the Southeast Asian context have been added in recognition of the fact that references to these important religions are inadequate without an explanation of their fundamentals. A new chapter on Javanese life in the

8th and 9th centuries (pp. 61-64), is highly informative of the cultural and economic life of the pre-medieval Javanese. Referring to an inscription in the Shiva temple at the Prambanan complex in Central Java, Hall remarks that excessive labour demands upon the village communities for the purpose of such activities was one of the main reasons for the decline of Central Java. One is tempted to draw parallels with the ancient and medieval kingdoms in India where similar demands were often made at the cost of agricultural activities. Comparisons between the early shadow play forms of Indonesia (907 A.D.) and the South Indian shadow drama provide new perspectives to students of comparative art forms.

A new section (pp. 182-84) on the early Siams, the Mons and the Tais refers to the Mon Kingdom of Dvaravati in Thailand which offers evidence of diffusion of Indian cultural influence in the region. The paper of Gordon Luce on "Dvaravati and old Burma," quoted here, throws much new light on the spread of Buddhism in Burma from this kingdom and the migration of the Mons to parts of Burma. The influence of Amravati and Ceylon, on art forms, on Dvaravati architecture and sculpture also provides evidence of deep cultural interaction between this region and the Indian sub-continent. Another valuable addition in this new edition is the section on "Monarchy and State in Southeast Asia" (pp 244-52), which enlightens us about the exalted concepts of monarchy and appropriate ceremonies introduced by Indian Brahmins in the courts of the rulers of Southeast Asia. The salient features of Kautilya's "Arthasastra" have been justifiably mentioned here since it constituted one of the basic treatises on statecraft of this era.

The second and the third part of the work deals mainly with the advent of the Europeans in the region. The initial desire of the Europeans was limited to monopolizing the spice trade, but this subsequently expanded to importing textiles, tea and other goods to Europe. Following the Industrial Revolution, their basic policy changed to finding markets for European manufactured goods. Towards the final phase of their domination the Europeans also became interested in the investment of capital. This link between the political and economic changes in Europe and the history of Southeast Asia, whose primarily agricultural economy was gradually transformed into a commercial one, has been traced with remarkable clarity and objectivity, though one wishes that certain specific issues like the ruthlessness with which the Dutch pursued their economic exploitation in the 18th century, the deprivation of legitimate profits to the producers of rice and coffee, the arbitrary reduction in the price of coffee, etc., had been treated at somewhat greater length. A completely new chapter (pp. 497-514) by Dr. M.C. Rickless deals refreshingly with a hitherto extremely neglected, but very significant, subject namely the life of the Javanese in the 18th and 19th centuries. The gradual erosion of power and authority of the Javanese elite with their increasing dependence on the Dutch colonial rulers for the

retention of their position, leading to their alienation from the disaffected rural masses and the passing of rural leadership to the Muslim religious teachers and *Hajis*, are some of the most significant features of the history of this period, which have been mentioned in this section. Hopefully more indepth research will follow on this subject; because the cleavages created within the Islamic Ummat during this period became one of the main determinants of the political process in post-independence Indonesia.

The final part of the book deals with the rise of nationalism and the challenge to the European domination in Southeast Asia. The impact of the Russo-Japanese War, the peaceful struggle launched by Gandhiji and other major international events which directly contributed to the nationalist movements in Southeast Asia have received due attention in this section. A separate section on the economic impact of the European rule draws up some kind of a balance sheet a la Dadabhai Nauroji, to which, however, many may have reservations. Similarly, reservations may also be expressed to the view that fear of China and communism led the newly independent states of Southeast Asia to maintain strong economic and cultural links with their former colonial rulers.

Notwithstanding such observations, which are often to be found in the works of non-Marxist historians, Hall's freshly revised and updated work, which runs into over a thousand pages provides an exhaustive and necessary backgrounder for an understanding of Southeast Asia's economic and strategic importance in world affairs. It is a valuable reference book with comprehensive dynastic charts, an exhaustive bibliography and maps which will be found extremely useful by all those who are seriously engaged in promoting Southeast Asian studies. For the lay reader, the book is a storehouse of information and provides ready reference, both to facts as well as readings on Southeast Asia.

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POLITICS

K.P. MISRA AND S.C. GANGAL (Eds.): Gandhi and the Contemporary World: Studies in Peace and War. Chanakya Publications, Delhi, 1981, 233 p., Rs. 70.

THIS volume of 233 pages contains a series of studies on peace and war presented at a seminar in which some leading Indian thinkers and leaders studied and discussed Gandhi's non-violence from almost every

point of view. Morarji Desai said: "I consider this seminar of great importance for the whole human society." This is a big claim to be made for any seminar held in India. Other prominent persons who took part in the long debate were some of Gandhi's contemporaries and associates - Acharya Kripalani, Diwakar, Pyarelal. Narayan Desai, Appadorai, Richard Beal. Sushila Nayar and a few others. What we have in this volume is a detailed report of the discussions at the Seminar.

Luckily for the readers the best review of this book is contained in its own "Introduction" by K.P. Misra and S.C. Gangal. The "Introduction" gives the reader, in a brief and consolidated manner, the substance of the entire debate. It is stated at the end: "This volume is primarily an exercise in promoting the understanding of Gandhian ideas and perceptions through debate and discussion." Again, the concluding para of the "Introduction" states: "There is no attempt to build a consensus or unanimity of views. This is not to say that there is no harmony or convergence of views on the various issues under discussion. There is a wide convergence of views on several questions, as for example, on Gandhi's view of a World Order, the Gandhian critic of modern civilization and on the need for programmes of studies on Gandhi, even as there is a measure of divergence on several other questions." Even though this is a volume containing only the report of a seminar, it easily assumes the dignity and the dimension of a valuable book on Gandhi's place in the contemporary world.

Those who participated in the debate are not all Gandhians. This is all to the good for a realistic assessment of Gandhian thought and life. In this connection readers will do well to take a careful look on what A.K. Saran says "On the Promotion of Gandhian Studies at a Univervity Level." Here is a striking quotation from Saran: "A sure, smooth and non-violent way to kill the spirit of Gandhian thinking is to introduce it into the university syllabi. If I am serious about Gandhian thinking, I would save it from the deadly hands of our universities, may be there are some exceptions, but most of our universities are dead and deadly places -stricken areas from which all living things have to be kept at a safe distacce. I would therefore strongly urge that all efforts of the establishment to introduce Gandhian thinking into university teaching and research should be stoutly opposed." Surely here is a very wise man out-doing his own wisdom. Curiously Saran says later that there are three ways of introducing Gandhian thought into the university syllabi. Why does he indulge in this fantasy after his blasting tirade against the universities as dead and deadly places? Evidently he wants to bring the dead back to life which he at least ought to know is impossible!

On the whole this is a volume which all those who care for Gandhi and his message should study. Adoration of the master and blind acceptance of everything which came from him will only obscure his image. The more critically we study his life, work and death the more he would grow

in stature and the more his light would illumine the world. There is plenty of evidence to prove the truth of this statement in the contributions made by others in the debate. The unacknowledged consensus of the Seminar justifies beyond a doubt that Gandhi's philosophy of truth and non-violence will stand the test of time.

Mahatma Gandhi Vidya Peedom, Neyyattinkara. R. RAMACHANDRAN

T.S. MURTY: Paths of Peace: Studies on Sino-Indian Border Dispute. ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, x, 319 p., Rs. 150.

In the by now long-simmering boundary dispute between India and China a significant development emerged at the end of the third round of talks between the officials of the two countries in New Delhi in October 1983. The two sides, it would appear, have agreed to examine each other's positions, far from mutually reconcilable as of date, with a view to finding some common meeting ground. That a solution is not around the corner may be conceded without much ado, and yet, considering how intractable the problem has become over the years, the above may pass muster as no small gain. The backlash of bad blood and mutual name-calling that preceded and, much more, followed the armed conflict of 1962 will take long to be forgotten.

The frontier dispute with China is essentially a by-product of two momentous developments in the early 1950s. The first was the "liberation" of Tibet (1950-51) by the Chinese People's Republic, not long after Mao Tse-Tung and his political supporters rose to supreme power in Peking in 1949. Apart from much else, Tibet's new masters opened up and in the process militarised the land of the lama attuned from times immemorial to the mores and ethos of its prayer wheel and all that it signified. Nor was that all.

Peking made the youthful 14th Dalai Lama, hitherto securely ensconced in the Potala, uneasy and restive. More, Tibet's southern frontier with India suddenly became live and active. For sure, even as units of the People's Liberation Army fanned out in far-flung regions bordering Ladakh and what was then called the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), New Delhi was exposed to mounting stresses and strains in its relations with a regime it had bent over backwards to woo and cultivate in its early, formative, years.

The Dalai Lama's flight from the Norhulingka, his summer palace, in March 1959 came as a climax to the widespread rebellion he and his people had mounted against their Chinese oppressors. It broke out in and

around the Kham region, spread to holy Lhasa and soon engulfed the vast empty spaces of Tibet's heartland. Ruthlessly suppressed, its aftermath was witness to an endless stream of hapless refugees who in their thousands followed in the footsteps of their god-king seeking shelter and solace, in the land of the Buddha. Understandably, Peking viewed these developments with the utmost concern and suspicion; even though New Delhi tried its best to play down their import, relations with its great neighbour worsened precipitately. One recalls the gruesome syndrome of those crowded years, 1959-62, if only to underline that a long string of bloody border encounters culminated in Peking's massive onslaught (October-November 1962) on Indian positions both in the east as well as the west.

Before it came to an open clash of arms, the officials of the two countries had engaged in three rounds of talks to examine threadbare all the relevant data-maps, treaties, administrative records and archival sources the two sides could marshal to buttress their respective claims on the frontier. The author of the book under review served as an adviser to the Indian delegation that conducted the talks. Earlier, he was posted as Political Officer in the Kameng division in which capacity he had chaperoned the Tibetan pontiff during his progress, as a political refugee, all the way from Tawang to the foothills of Assam. Murty's later career as administrator in Ladakh, Arunachal, Meghalaya and Tripura has kept him au fait with much that has passed over the Indian borderland in the last quarter of a century. It should follow that he has known and lived, at first-hand, with the subject matter of his "studies."

Murty's present book is a compendium of 13 chapters, of various sizes, ranging all the way from 9 to 39 pages. They span a period of a decade and a half (1964-80), were composed for different occasions and adapted to diverse audiences. Some took the form of lectures delivered, others as papers presented at academic forums, still others as epistolary exchanges with those engaged in similar exercises. The "studies" touch varied facets of the problem: boundaries and maps, watersheds, delimitation, Peking's claim to Arunachal, early history of the foundation of Tawang monastery, pasturage practices in the Himalayas and frontier studies in India. That for most part they are sound, expert expositions, well-researched and competently turned, goes without saying. Nor could there be any doubt that a great deal of effort went into making them both readable as well as intelligible alike to the expert and the layman. There is evidence of wideranging scholarship, of a clear grasp of fundamentals and a keen awareness of the issues at stake. And yet the work suffers from a crippling weakness and this, one is afraid, inherent in its composition. As it is, its disparate parts hang around loosely with little or nothing to hold them together. To this reviewer a feasible scheme would have been to string the theoretical pieces—"What is Delimitation," "Boundaries and Maps," "Watersheds and Boundaries," "Evidence on Traditional Boundaries,"

"Pasturage Practices on the Himalayas"-into a couple of chapters that would help map out the broad framework of reference into which the specific details of the boundary problem could later be fitted. Again, dovetailed into each other as an integral whole, the two pieces on "Understanding our Frontier Problem" and "The Frontier Problem, An Overview" would have provided a useful introductory chapter. "Chinese Claims to Arunachal," "Neville Maxwell on Tawang" and "Early Mon and the Foundation of the Tawang Monastery" could together, as a coherent whole, furnish a useful statement of what is at stake in the eastern sector. As an epilogue, "Frontier Studies in India" may, with appropriate additions and updating of available data, serve as a useful rounding off, a sum-up of the present srate of research on the frontier and the nature of difficulties a scholar encounters in undertaking it.

It should follow that the preceding exercise would entail breaking loose the bonds that inhibit the known constraints of a seminar paper, the limited purview of an audience, or the subject of the talk on which it is addressed. In plain language. by ploughing all the relevant material, one has at hand, into a new mould, the horizon could be much broadened, the scope enlarged, made more intelligible and comprehensive. A few more gains, and no mean ones at that, would be a greater precision of language; a tighter, if paradoxically, more flexible framework; a neater, less repetitious, analysis; a shorter, less padded bibliography; a more direct, less cumbersome footnoting.

It may not be out of place to pinpoint some minor blemishes. There has been a tendency among those of us with an official background to over-rate the work of Neville Maxwell: India's China War, 1970 and Alastair Lamb: The China-India Border, 1964 and The McMahon Line, 1966. A typical instance in the late sixties was G. Narayan Rao's India-China Border: A Re-appraisal, 1968, a slender volume devoted unashamedly, if exclusively to answering Lamb's McMahon Line. Not unlike him, Murty too is at pains to react to every argument advanced and every

nuance injected by these authors.

This, one is constrained to say, is a case of misplaced emphasis. The best about Neville Maxwell is that he is far from being an objective observer. He starts with an a priori assumption of New Delhi's guilt—it is, as he puts it, India's China war; his use of material is selective; his penchant for supporting all that Peking said or did, pronounced, unabashedly without qualification. The fact (which oddly finds no mention in Murty's book) that his study has become a bible by which Peking swears and has now the unique distinction of being translated into the Chinese language under an official imprimatur speaks for itself. No wonder it is not only on the Chinese case at Thagla that Maxwell waxes eloquent, even though completely out of step with what the evidence warrants, but also in underwriting all that the Chinese claim in Ladakh. Lamb is a different kettle of fish; his

base is more solid, his research more thoroughgoing.² His principal weakness, as Murty aptly points out, is a stern refusal to go beyond the limited purview of his records in London; with the Indian archives in New Delhi he is supremely unacquainted.

Some Indian authors of considerable merit do not find a mention in Murty's pages. Karunakar Gupta's Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier, 1974, provides an interesting sidelight³ and in holding New Delhi squarely blameworthy is a cut above Maxwell's. D.P. Choudhury's, The North-East Frontier of India, 1978, is at once well-researched and objective and deserves to be taken seriously into account. Two other scholars who bear mention are H.K. Barpujari: Problems of the Hill Tribes, North-east Frontier 1873-1962, 1981, M.L. Bose: British Policy in the North-east Frontier Agency and Historical and Constitutional Documents of North-east India, both published in 1979. They bring to their work a great deal of mature knowledge and understanding of the tribal problem and the ramifications on the eastern frontier of the politics of the Inner/Outer Lines in Assam. A recent article on the legal aspects of the Sino-Indian Frontier by the well known Chen Tiqiang, which appeared in the January 1983 issue of Peking's Journal of International Studies, is at once substantive as well as of some merit. It doubtless escaped Murty.

Chandigarh.

PARSHOTAM MEHRA

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REFERENCES

¹ Maxwell's more recent, "The Deadlocked Deadlock: Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute" in *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), 19 September 1981, pp. 1545-48 Both have escaped Murty's notice.

² Professor Lamb's The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh, 1973, is a slender volume but not without merit. Unfortunately it finds no mention in Murty's Studies.

³ His more recent, Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers, 1983, is no more than a compendium of earlier articles on the subject.

OM PRIE SRIVASTAVA: Muncipal Government and Administration in India. Chugh Publications, Allahabad, 1980, xvi, 420 p., Rs. 95.

IT is encouraging to observe a growing interest amongst research scholars in municipal government and administration in India at a time when there is a declining significance accorded to the role and functions of these urban local bodies. Paradoxically, this has taken place over a period of the last thirty years of municipal reforms introduced with the stated objective of improving and strengthening municipal governments. While special purpose bodies have been set up to take over some of the important municipal functions, the urban local bodies find themselves in a position where their accountability either to the state government or to the citizens do not match with the powers and resources they have.

To what extent have these changes enabled the emergence of a viable institutional base for urban development and management? Have these reforms increased the scope of policy initiative of urban local bodies and their administrative capacity for its formulation and implementation? Conversely, how far has the state bureaucratic and political power elite used municipal reforms as a means of expanding their power base by increasing their control over or by limiting the resources and thus fostering greater dependency on the state government in financial, personnel, organisational and administrative matters? How is it that despite an enormous degree of state control to ensure responsible, efficient municipal bodies, all or most of them remain superseded in some states for years together? Is the service performance of superseded local bodies better than those not superseded? What are the critical factors, related or unrelated to reforms introduced, having a bearing on better municipal performance and how far those factors are independent of the rigours of state supervision and control? Not much research effort has been devoted to these issues and any study which throws light on them is naturally a valuable contribution.

This book is the outcome of a research study undertaken by the author for a doctoral degree. The study was intended to examine and evaluate state control over municipal corporations of five KAVAL (Kanpur, Agra, Varanasi, Allahabad, Lucknow) towns in Uttar Pradesh.

After briefly tracing the evolution of municipal government in Uttar Pradesh, the author discusses the legislative and political control (Chapter 3), organisational administrative control (Chapter 4), operational administrative control (Chapter 5) and financial control (Chapter 6). The distinction between "organisational" and "operational" administrative control is obscure and no attempt is made to develop a focus for analysis. In fact, one is struck with the absence of a conceptual frame and methodology which could help in generating data for evaluating the "impact of state control over these corporations," for identifying "the impediments in the improvement of the municipal performance" and for examining the viability of the

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mechanism and instruments of state control. These were the areas the author intended to examine in depth. The approach adopted, however, largely confines itself to describing the provisions of municipal enactments relevant to the topic under discussion. It can hardly enable anyone to examine extremely important issues raised by the author in her introductory chapter. The salient features of these enactments are crisply brought out in the concluding chapter.

The study reveals the enormous expansion of powers which the state government enjoys through municipal and other legislations dealing directly or indirectly with municipal government and administration in Uttar Pradesh. It is quite informative and the author deserves high appreciation for the hard work which is apparent in the treatment of a rather difficult subject. Hopefully, she or any other researcher in the field would use the knowledge so painstakingly put together in this study for further analysis in order to throw light on the questions raised above.

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KIRAN KAPUR DATAR: Malaysia—Quest for a Politics of Consensus. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, x, 228 p., Rs. 95.

SINCE the end of the Second World War, many countries in the Third World have either abandoned or transformed the democratic form of government. Few questions naturally come to mind. Is democracy a viable form of government in countries dominated by communal cleavages? What modifications and adjustments are to be made to ensure political stability, communal harmony and rapid economic development? Does consociational democracy government by a grand coalition of political leaders of all the communities into which the society is divided—provide a solution to problems of plural societies? These and other questions are sought to be answered by the author by analysing the political developments of Malaysia, a country which is making its own innovative experiments with the Westminster form of government.

During the stewardship of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Federation of Malaya/Malaysia strove for national consensus through an inter-communal alliance by pursuing a policy of cooperation and compromise among the leaders of the three major ethnic groups. It was believed, on the eve of independence, that it would be unrealistic and impractical to ask the people to forget their differing racial origins. The best method to achieve racial harmony and political stability was the need for the leaders of the three major ethnic groups to work together. The Alliance thus was an

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intercommunal organisation in which the interests of the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians were represented. The post-independence political system, as the author points out, could be viewed as a compromise designed to achieve a rough balance between Malay political power and Chinese economic dominance. Though not explicitly stated in the Constitution, it was assumed that political power would largely remain with the Malays and economic power with the Chinese. It was fondly hoped that with the passage of time, this division would give way and a better equilibrium would develop; the Chinese and the Indians would participate more actively in politics and the Malays would enter trade, business and commerce and play a greater role in the economic life of the country. Under the benign and paternalistic leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, it was believed by many observers that Malaysia was well on its way to attain political stability and national integration; but underneath the calm waters, serious discontent was brewing both among the Malays and the non-Malays. This expressed itself in on outbrust of communal orgy and violence on 13 May 1969.

The "New Order" which came into existence after 13 May 1969, represented, in many ways, a fundamental break with the past; Malay predominance in political life was strengthened and institutionalized. Free discussion of sensitive issues and the scope for public debate and controversy was restricted. The scope for political consensus was broadbased by opening the doors of the Alliance to both Malay and non-Malay political parties, and the Barisan Nasional came into existence. The three successive Prime Ministers - Tun Abdul Razak, Datuk Hussein Onn and Dr. Mahathir have devoted maximum attention to strengthen UMNO at the grassroots and, at the same time, make sure that the volatile Chinese voters continue to support the Chinese partners of the Barisan. In order to keep the UMNO in tune with worldwide Islamic resurgence and also successfully ward-off the challenge from the extremist Partai Islam, the Malay political leadership has also been nursing and fostering the Islamic component in the making of the Malaysian nation. Malaysia today appears to be relatively stable, but as the author points out, "it would be idealistic to hope that ethnic foundaries (sic) are going to wither away or disappear in the near future." (p. 211)

Though the author has consulted a variety of primary and secondary sources and has also written in a lucid style, it is unfortunate that the book is replete with factual errors and inaccurate statements. To cite a few examples: on page 5, the author rightly points out that in 1957, when Malaya achieved independence, "the indigenous people, the Malays constituted only about half of the total population of Malaya (49.8 per cent), the rest being non-Malays." But on page 4, it is mentioned that "in 1957, when Malaya became independent, the Malays formed 40.8 per cent of the population, the Chinese 27.2 per cent and the Indians 11.3 per cent." Analysing the 1964 elections, the author states that "the Peoples Action

Party of Singapore campaigned in the 1964 General Elections, challenging the special position accorded to the Malays in Malaysia." (p. 36) On the contrary, the PAP strategy in the 1964 Elections was to create a wedge between the UMNO and the MCA, with the ultimate aim of replacing the MCA in the Alliance. The PAP, therefore, opposed the MCA and the Socialist Front in the urban areas while supporting UMNO candidates elsewhere. Describing the impact of the communist struggle for power, the author states that the *Malaysian* Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman participated in the Baling talks. (p. 150) In 1955, there was no Malaysia at all. These and other mistakes could have been easily avoided by the author with a little more care.

University of Madras, Madras. V. SURYANARAYAN

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ECONOMICS

ASHOK S. GUHA: An Evolutionary View of Economic Growth. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1981, 139 p., Rs. 60.

TN this slim, but amazingly erudite, volume Ashok Guha presents the I results of his explorations into "the delicate tracery of relationships between the economic, political, and social variables" that go to explain, in his considered judgement, the processes of economic growth. Dissatisfaction with theoretical models of economic growth, which fail without exception to go to the roots of the growth process, provides the inspiration to undertake this very complex task. The author's explorations range over development history of different societies in different periods, as well as over attempts by several theorists to look for unifying principles that can illumine historical experience relating to growth. Unable to accept that the principles enunciated in this field provide a theory of economic history that can be upheld by experience, the author proceeds to provide his own tabulation of the minimum number of basic factors that any theory of economic history will have to incorporate. Again, even these basic factors can be derived, the author persuasively argues, from the single but extremely potent urge for societal survival. As with living species, societies also manage to grow only if they are fit to survive. Economic growth, the author would have us believe, "is an extension of organic evolution."

The enchantment that biological analogies hold for political philosophers and economists is well known. The author of this volume does not rest his arguments on analogies alone. He give cogent arguments why a broad concept of "survival" has to be introduced in any explanation of the growth process, so that only narrowly economic or even techno-economic factors are put in their proper place as secondary or derived variables.

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BOOK REVIEWS

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This is the "evolutionary" view of economic growth which the author chooses to adopt, rejecting such mechanistic explanations as are provided in terms of exogenous propellers of growth like "the rise of Protestant ethic", "the bunching of innovations" or "contradictions between production relations and modes of production."

Marxian theory, says the author, does provide a unifying principle in terms of which economic history is often sought to be interprated. But the principle itself is too narrowly conceived. Economic determinism of the Marxian variety fails to do justice to the rich complexity of actual development processes. A full awareness of human instincts and motives is lacking in the Marxist interpretation of development history. Later explorations in social anthropology, biology and group psychology must be given due weight in any adequate study of the growth process in society. From this wider point of view even Hicks' Theory of Economic History (1969) can be faulted for adopting a rather narrow view of economic evolution.

The primary driving forces behind economic growth, Guha suggests, are population growth, demonstration effect of consumption (produced by exposure to other societies), increasing military pressure and the consequent need for defence preparations and growth in exports or in unilateral transfers from the rest of the world. All these factors call for adaptation of the society's demand pattern, and the changes in demand, in their turn, bring about changes in both production technology and the relations of production. To be briefer still, Guha might perhaps say that it is the desire to survive and continue the species, taken along with the almost peculiarly human urge to compete with and outshine rivals, that has produced all the social convolutions that, in modern parlance, are described as economic growth. Looked at in this way economic growth is only one of the many forms that biological evolution has taken. In fact, Guha takes an even more extreme position by defining economic growth (in the Appendix to his book), not in terms of indices of commodity production and cosumption, but in terms of extended biological existence. "Processes which we intuitively recognize as growth," he says, "produce improvements in various biological indices—notably life expectancy." (p. 126) This neatly disposes off the index number problem involved in usual measures of economic growth, but probably runs into an error by identifying a consequence with an objective. Life expectancy goes up or population growth is made possible only when the consumption level, in some sense, can be made to go up. Those who measure economic growth through some index of consumption seize upon the visible instrument. Guha rests his definition on the visible consequence of the growth process. Neither way of describing economic growth appears to hold any clue to the complex motivations that in some periods generate, and in other periods, impede the processes of economic growth.

While Guha is primarily concerned with describing the pressures that he holds responsible for setting the economy on the path towards economic "progress," and thus shows how economic growth can be regarded as an

analogue of the evolution of biological species, he underplays on the whole the role of an extension in the frontiers of knowledge or, to interpret his findings more charitably, makes technological advance a proper function of the pressures that he so elaborately describes. That the growth curve of technology has kinks and the kinks tend to coincide with periods of challenges and pressures has been known for a long time. But one can still entertain some doubts regarding any principle of one-to-one correspondence between the two processes of pressure formation and knowledge generation. Instances are not rare in which significant leaps across the technological frontier have been made by persons with no economic challenges confronting them at the moment. At a later stage certain challenges have converted unused knowledge to socially more useful knowledge and even this has not invariably been the case. Some societies, like certain species, have become extinct or debilitated for failure to draw even on the existing stock of knowledge. Guha's analysis does not throw much light on the processes that have sustained innovative effort in growing societies. It is not quite clear from his exposition whether he considers such innovative efforts as the outcome of an unstructured random process or the outgrowth of a social structure favourable for such efforts. If he inclines to the latter view. as he apparently does, he ought to have analysed in more detail the social formations that have proved beneficial to mankind as breeding grounds for widely adopted innovations.

This reviewer is, on the whole, inclined to the opposite view that random occurrences have played a significant part in moulding the evolution of economic and social processes. Even after dismissing the view that the length of Cleopatra's nose determined the course of all subsequent events in human history, there remains a lot to be attributed to exogenous events. Population growth in Western Europe, for example, was itself the by-product of a struggle for survival between grey rats and black rats! But those events notwithstanding, the temptation to search for unifying principles to "explain" economic growth will remain too strong to overcome, for much still remains to be unravelled in terms of human motivations and aspirations.

When someone undertakes this task of interpreting economic growth in terms of specific human motives and objectives, it would be manifestly unreasonable to slur over the fact that the goals that mattered were set before society by dominant groups in society rather than by some form of a "general will." Guha, in his interpretation, has sought to replace the Marxian concept of opposing social classes—in my view, rightly—by the concept of shifting coalitions. But in spite of allowing explicitly for shifts in the social structure, he does not include such shifts among his "primary driving forces" of economic growth. Apparently he regards such social formations as secondary events, arising out of society's reactions to the primary impulses. But in each such case of reaction it was the specific

¹Colin Clark: Population Growth and Land Use, 1967, p. 51.

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structure of the society that reacted which became automatically included among the primary factors that influenced the subsequent turn of events. The values of the dominant group at the moment were not easy to transgress in ancient societies and remain difficult to transgress (some would argue) even to this day. Guha has brilliantly executed his version of the "man versus nature" problem in human evolution, but he appears somewhat reluctant to enter into issues involving inter-group relations -issues that would have led him into studies of formation of social groups, of leadership and kinship networks, of value systems struggling for dominance, as well as of magic, religion, and other influences on social and cultural behaviour. In short, Guha has taken his biological lessons more seriously than he might have, if he had delved more deeply into social anthropology. If an evolutionary view of the growth process has to be taken, it must consider man in his relation to other men, and not simply as another biological species adapting itself for survival and procreation. There are good grounds to hold that, in the human species, growth has more often been ordered about than brought about, and the orders have been issued by self-seeking dominant groups who may not always have realized the full long-run consequences of their edicts. Guha has noted in places the role of particular social groups in accelerating economic change, but he has usually assumed that they were acting as agents for the entire society and their interests were not clashing with those of others.

Guha's evolutionary view of the economic growth process thus appears to this reviewer as a brushed-up version of "what happened in history" and fails to take into account many of the details of that process. Guha justifies the omission of details (p. 6) by urging the need for clarity and economy of exposition. Undoubtedly his prose is clear and virile and he has condensed his studies in world history into, perhaps, the shortest possible space. But the fare he dishes out only whets our appetite. He offers us a "view," but the blank spots in his sketch make us wish that something had been put there. His book is charming for its elegance—and for its evolutionary refrain—but its shying away from complexities is unlikely to be condoned in the academic alcoves where scholarship and wisdom are frequently placed in separate compartments. It is a scholarly book, but the scholarship is tucked away at the end of the book. The story itself is told in almost a lullaby fashion and complications are hardly permitted to butt in.

Guha's reactions to the existing theories of economic history have been fruitful. An interesting thesis has taken form. What many readers of the book will probably feel is that Guha could choose to have been less economical of words and ideas than he has been. The theme he has taken up for examination perhaps deserved a more ramified study. Instead his readers will have to be content with only a principle and a sketch.

Calcutta.

DHIRES BHATTACHARYYA

v.s. BAVISKAR: The Politics of Development: Sugar Cooperatives in Maharashtra. Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1980, viii, 241 p., Rs. 75.

INDIAN political sociologists have mostly concentrated their attention on themes like electoral behaviour, cast and kinship. It is, therefore, heartening to see a work on a structure like sugar cooperative factories, subject of the book under review. This should also prove useful to students of Maharashtra politics which happens to be the background of the subject.

The study is a result of a year's stay (1963-64) by the author in the environs of the Kopergaon Sugar Factory as a participant observer. The Kopergaon Sugar Factory is one of the pioneers in the field of the cooperative sugar industry in Maharashtra and has been a success story of cooperative enterprises in Maharashtra.

The author describes the socio-economic and political background to the establishment of the factory in Chapter Two and goes on to discuss the relationship between the factories and other structures of power (e.g. Panchayati Raj, political parties, etc.) and their impact on rural development in the Third and Fourth Chapters. The theme politics of cooperation is dealt with in the subsequent two chapters; they are, by far, the most interesting and educative for students of Indian politics.

Defining "development" as reduction of poverty, inequality and unemployment (p. 80), the author provides enough evidence of how the establishment of the Cooperative Sugar Factory in Kopergaon (Distt: Ahmedanagar) led to greater prosperity for its members and generated significant employment opportunities in the area. Therefore he feels justified in calling such factories "centres of growth" in Maharashtra. However it is conceded that these cooperative ventures have not led to reduction in inequalities (as a matter of fact the picture is otherwise), but then the author feels that the inequalities are a function of skewed land ownership. He draws comfort from the fact that life of the poor in the area has improved though, in general, he agrees that dry farmers and the landless are left out in the cold by these islands of prosperity.

The study explores the symbiotic relationship between the cooperatives and politics in Maharashtra. This involves a two-way relationship between cooperatives and other structures of power. Thus controlling factories helps leaders rise in the party and government and this in turn helps them control cooperatives. (p. 115) The controls are established by interlocking membership in cooperative banks, cooperative factories, Zilla Parishads, legislatures and the Congress—one reinforcing the other.

Politics in the cooperatives is mainly in the form of factional struggles. Each faction is cemented by ties of caste, kinship and, more importantly, patronage. There are chains of factions running from the State and dis-

tricts through tehsils down to villages. They compete with each other for capturing positions involving prestige, power and patronage at different levels. Cooperative factories serve both as an arena and as a resource base for this competition. Thus he concludes, the "party which controls the cooperative will by and large dominate politics of rural Maharashtra."

The author analyses the above themes in a lucid style which holds the interest of even a lay reader.

Nevertheless, there are three counts on which one wishes to express some reservation:

- i) Though the Kopergaon Sugar Factory and a few other factories in the area are success stories, there are many factories which are "sick" and whose contribution to rural development is questionable.
- ii) At present cooperatives are linked with the Congress Party only because that is the only party which has demonstrated its capability of controlling power. This would change, and with it the factional alignments, if two (or more) parties showed this capability.
- iii) From internal evidence in the book, governmental patronage appears more crucial in controlling the cooperatives and not vice versa.

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R.S. MORKHANDIKAR

S.L.N. SIMHA: Financial Wisdom from the Bank for International Settlements. Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1980, xiii, 222 p., Rs. 35.

THIS is basically a book of extracts from the annual reports of the BIS (Bank of International Settlements) Basle. It seems to have been published to mark two events: the 50th anniversary of BIS and the retirement of the author, S.L.N. Simha, from the post of Director, Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras. The quality of printing is commendable. One wishes one could say the same about the contents. The publication of the book must have cost a lot to the Institute. One wonders whether the funds could not have been better used for publishing some research work done in the Institute itself. If a book like this had to be published at all, it should have been done by the BIS itself.

This is not to say that the BIS is not an important institution or its annual reports do not contain useful material. But the BIS is essentially an organisation of the European Central Banks with focus on developed countries. In its first 34 annual reports it paid hardly any attention to the economic problems of less developed countries. In its 35th Report pub-

lished in 1964-65, when it made its first significant reference to them, all that it had to say was:

While the developing countries as a group have made visible progress over the past decade, it must be considered only moderate progress which has somehow missed exploiting fully the opportunity that was given by the dynamic growth of the industrial countries and by the potential of the less developed countries themselves.

Thereafter, there was hardly any quotable reference to the problems faced by the developing countries in the annual reports of the next 14 years. One is, therefore, tempted to ask what is the raison d'etre for a public institute in a developing country like the Institute for Financial Management and Research to incur the substantial expenditure which the publication of this volume must have involved.

Even as a contribution to general monetary history, it represents an incomplete record. Out of the period of 49 years, 1930-31 to 1978-79 that it covers, it omits reports of as many as 10 years. Extracts from the reports from 1930-31 to 1953-54 are extremely sketchy, sometimes not more than four or five lines. Valuable historical and economic analysis is often left out. It should not have been difficult for the author to collect the missing reports from the libraries of the Government of India, Reserve Bank of India and the BIS itself, if he was really keen on it.

This is not to deny that the extracts which the author has quoted are not interesting or useful. They are. As the author mentions, for a number of years from its inception, matters relating to gold used to receive a lot of attention in the annual reports of the BIS. Later, with the gradual decline in its monetary role, the importance given to gold in the reports diminished a great deal. On the other hand, topics like inflation and Euro currency and bond markets have received a lot of attention in the last 10-15 years. Likewise, the subjects of the persistent weakness of the dollar, international liquidity, exchange rate adjustments, International Monetary Fund, have found a prominent place in the reports for several years now.

To a student of monetary history of the last 50 years, the extracts included in the book, the record of the movements of money markets of the developed countries, the shifts in concern, the changes in approach and the interaction of the bankers, politicians and economists are certainly interesting. But this story could have perhaps been told more analytically and therefore more effectively in a paper of 20 to 30 pages than in a random collection of extracts of about 200 pages.

In any case, the 16 pages long "Introductory Essay" that the author has written could provide the bulk of this analysis. But after a promising beginning, even this main contribution by him ceases to be analytical and becomes a collection of his own obiter dicta of the following type:

(a) The United States is eminently fitted io make a vital contribution to the oil problem, not only through being wholly independent of imports, but also by offering some supplies to the rest of the world.

(b) Economic statesmanship is generally lacking in these (developing) countries.

- (c) What has happened in many countries is that there is an unholy combination of the politician, bureaucrat and businessman.
- (d) We need a Keynes each in many countries, but there seems to be none, though the world abounds in Nobel Laureates in economics.
- (e) What is called for is simple and yet radical changes in the scale of values, resulting in a marked realignment of investment priorities.
- (f) Is it rational to spend billions of dollars on growing tobacco and producing cigarettes, when it has been proved, in an abundant manner, that smoking is harmful.
- (g) It should be obvious by now that technological progress and political and economic management as now understood cannot solve the major ills of the economic system. They have to be supported by moral and spritiual values. Everyone should be imbued with a sense of trusteeship.
- (h) What we should strive for is not merely oneness of all human beings, but unity among all living beings and nature too.

Most of these sentiments may be admirable but one wonders whether the right place to express them is an "Introductory Essay" to the financial "wisdom" that flows from such a earthy institution as the BIS.

One also wonders at the wisdom of entitling stray extracts from the annual reports of a basically monetary institution like the BIS as "Wisdom." There have been no doubt books compiling words of "wisdom" of ancient prophets, like Moses, Zarathustra or Mohammed. But even the admirers of a modern prophet like Mao Dse Dong did not entitle the Red Book of his sayings as a "Book of Wisdom."

Most of the extracts quoted in the present volume do no more than describe the prevailing international economic situation. They contain no doubt some interesting general observations e.g.:

- (a) A more general employment of the gold bullion standard would appear desirable. (1932-33).
- (b) The principle of balancing the budget is subordinate to the more general rule that the money income received by the producers of all kinds should correspond to the real value of their output of goods and services. (1947-48).
- (c) Controls have not prevented the recurrence of deficits in the balance of payments. (1951-52)
- (d) The relatively lax use of the gold exchange standard has had inflationary consequences. In any event, several circumstances limit the

appeal of the gold standard. (1964-75)

- (e) Whatever goes up must come down, it is said excepting prices, wages and population. But the speed of descent of interest rates is likely to be much slower than their rocket-like rise. (1969-70)
- (f) There are complaints that prevailing rates do not reflect the "fundamental"—meaning the basic balance of payment situation. But, without full central bank commitment on intervention, movements of money have become "fundamental" too. (1974-75)
- (g) Policy should be aiming at a double objective—endeavouring, on the one hand, to keep a firm command over aggregate expenditure, so as to prevent the expansion from getting out of control, and on the other, to raise the share of investment in total spending at the expense of consumption. (1975-76)
- (h) As some cyclical disturbances are unavoidable, the authorities should refuse to be goaded into reacting immediately at the slightest sign of faltering recovery, but should rather focus their attention on the need to maintain the economy on a moderate growth path. (1976-77)

Although this is a rather small sample, it may help show how the preception changes over time, even if slowly, and how there is a general conservative bias that may be useful for some countries but not for all, and certainly not for all times.

S.R. SEN

New Delhi.

RICHARD BLACKHURST AND JAN TUMLIR: Trade Relations Under Flexible Exchange Rates: GATT Studies in International Trade., No. 8. Centre William Rappard, Geneva, 1980, 80 p., US \$ 8., SF 12.

THE book under review is one of the GATT Studies in international trade. The system of floating exchange rates was introduced in 1973. The present study examines the various problems raised by the introduction of this system. It seeks to answer the following questions:—

(1) Whether it has distorted geographical patterns of trade?

(2) Whether efforts at trade liberalisation are still meaningful in the climate of high uncertainty about exchange rates?

(3) Are the movements in exchange rates a result of conscious manipulation by countries seeking an unfair advantage in the world markets?

The study shows that: (i) Continued expansion of trade, more rapidly than production in the 70s, suggests that there was no direct adverse effect

of excange rate variability on the level of international trade. (ii) Changes in the nominal exchange rates have served in most instances to maintain, not alter, the pattern of international competitiveness and more foreign exchange transactions are made for investment purposes than for trade purposes. (iii) In a situation in which the capital process by which exchange rates are determined does not allow a single country to maintain a clearly inappropriate exchange rate long enough to produce significant trade results. Exchange rate changes are affected by inflation differentials between the countries, abnormal current account deficits or surpluses and a change in the expected future exchange rate generally causes the spot exchange rate to change as well. Moreover, the impact of any government intervention in the exchange markets is uncertain. Even if an advantage is obtained, the advantage could only be short-lived. (iv) Domestic macro economic policies have a greater influence on the trade balance of a country than a change in its exchange rates.

In the absence of a stable currency, there is no single currency capable of fulfilling for international tranactions all the functions which the national currencies fulfil for domestic transactions.

However, from the view point of individual firms in export and import competing industries, exchange rate changes did cause real difficulties. This is basically due to loss of information about relative prices on the world market. Economic growth in the developing countries is particularly hampered by the reduced accuracy of relative price information from the world market. This is corroborated by India's experience. Indian exporters lost a great deal due to changes in the value of the U.S. dollar in which currency 2/3rd of india's exports are denominated.

The authors dismiss the American complaint that an increasingly overvalued dollar was eroding American competitiveness in world markets and point out that a more plausible explanation of the shrinkage was the emergence of new exporters.

To the reviewer, it appears that the worst fears of the critics of flexible exchange rate have not materialised. The high and widely divergent inflation rates throughout the world would have made a fixed rate system increasingly vulnerable. In fact, the resort to widespread floating in 1973 was not a deliberate act in search of a better international monetary system; rather it was forced on the major countries by the mounting inflationary tendencies.

The authors rightly maintain that exchange rate changes are required in order to avoid distortions in the pattern of international price competitiveness. This is also the conclusion of independent economists like the Gottfried Habrler who concludes in one of the essays in "Contemporary Economic Problems, 1980" that, "Floating has to continue. No other system can cope with the stresses arising from divergent inflation rates, to which will probably soon be added the stresses of a global recession. It is

imperative that inflation in the United States, the leading economic power in the West, be brought down to at least the German and Swiss levels. In the longer run only a near-zero inflation rate is acceptable. If that is achieved, turbulence in the foreign exchange markets will subside, and the West would be in a better position to face disturbances arising elsewhere in the world."

However, it may not be over-emphasised that there should be one or two major currencies which should maintain their purchasing power. Unless this is achieved, the international monetary system will not be able to function satisfactorily.

It must also be emphasised that while depreciation of its currency may help a country to improve its trade balance, changes of exchange rates by themselves are no panacea. They do work if they are accompanied by sensible internal economic and fiscal policies.

Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi. R.L. VARSHNEY

GERARD J. MANGONE (Ed): Energy Policies of the World: India, Japan, Taiwan. Vol. III. Elsevier North Holland Inc., New York, 1979, xvi, 319 p., \$ 25.50.

THE book under review is Volume III of a series of studies scanning the energy policies of selected states "whose resources and economic development broadly affect international relations." (pp. xvi, 319).

The volume has been organized and edited at the Centre for the Study of Marine Policy in the Graduate College of Marine Studies at the University of Delaware. The authors are putatively those "with first-hand experience and professional acumen in analysing energy problems and issues." (p. viii)

Volume I in this series had studied Canada, China, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Venezuela and Iran, while Volume II had studied Indonesia, the North Sea Countries and the USSR. Volume III (under review) studies India, Japan and Taiwan. It is evident, therefore, that apart from the least developed countries, the organizers have attempted a selection of every other type of country: developed market economies, the eastern economies and developing economies, including those which, of the latter, are fuel exporters and newly industrializing. The omission of the United States from this company is to be formally regretted, especially since, out of those nations whose energy policies have repercussions abroad, the United States can claim a place in the first rank.

Now that we are well into the eighties, a crucial aspect of the volume

under consideration turns out to be its vintage. In precise terms, this book—with its papers—was published in 1979, the year which witnessed the second oil shock. It is well known that the entire morphology of policies, domestic as well as international, has changed in the case of every national economy since that year. And it is also true that, with this change in policies, priorities and instruments, relations also between nation-states have undergone very considerable changes—sometimes as far-reaching as to be labelled "structural."

This above is not only true of the relationship between developed market economies (DMEs) of the OECD and developing countries, but of *intra*-OECD relationships as well. Some fissures and dissonance within the OPEC cartel have been heightened in addition. These are naturally beyond the purview of this volume.

The three papers comprising this volume are written by professors of international relations in two cases (Japan: Rocco M. Paone, Taiwan: John Franklin Cooper) and a member of the Indian Administrative Service with a background of economics and chemistry while being experienced in Indian energy matters (T.L. Sankar). Evident from the onset, however, is the fact that there appears to have been little or no attempt at stylistic or thematic coordination between the papers. This is shown in their content as well as differing manners of presentation. Stylistic heterogeneity prevails.

The paper on India by Sankar notes the discrepancies which have appeared in terms of plan projections and reality partly due to a faster acceleration of demand compared to supply. It was also due to a lag in domestic investments in the power sector. The formation of competent bodies was staggered, as of the Indian Energy Survey Committee (1962) and the Fuels Policy Committee (1970). Sankar notes the divide separating the imperatives suggested by technical expertise contrasted with those of political expediency. An unfortunate aspect of Sankar's paper is that apart from Tables (not attributed) and data which are "forecast"—figures are culled mainly till 1975-76. A significant amount are of an earlier vintage. To this fairly crucial extent the reader is given a quantified account of India's early reaction to the first oil-shock which, alas, is somewhat embryonic.

It is also readily apparent from this paper that a firmly directed approach and analysis of the energy issue has only recently been emerging. We mean this not in the sense of hydrocarbon-resources exploration, or the (frequently excessively destructive) shift to firewood and allied forms, but in the sense of a heightened consciousness relating to energy conservation, distribution and a greater efficiency in utilization. One reason has been, of course, the very far-reaching effects produced by the second oil-shock (1979-80) on all three sets of countries: OECD, LDCs and OPEC.

The 12th Congress of the World Energy Conference, which met at New Delhi in September 1983 highlighted, therefore, both diversification as well

as conservation. While in advanced countries the proportion of commercial energy utilization approximates 95 per cent, our proportion is somewhat more modest. In the Sixth Five Year Plan the emphasis continues on middle to small units, like for example, biogas plants. (The target is 1 million family-size plants involving an outlay of Rs. 50 crores.) At the same time a stepping up of our nuclear generation capability is being actively and *indigenously* pursued. Already 880 MWe are in operation and a further 1410 MWe are in construction. The production of coal and of fuel oil have also increased over the past year (1982-83). Finally, the Commission for Additional Sources of Energy (CASE), to aid in the twin areas of augmentation of energy sources and waste elimination, has been established.

The Prime Minister's inaugural speech for the 12th Congress of the World Energy Conference emphasizes thus, a longer-term parspective (which is well in line with Sankar's paper) and a gradual shift to renewable—including nuclear sources of energy. It called for urgent action in the areas of:

- 1 the application of new biological advances to biomass production;
- 2 photochemical techniques to produce hydrogen to be used as fuel;
- 3 energy storage devices to make transportation less dependent on oil;
- 4 photovoltaic devices to get electricity direct from sunlight at great savings of cost; and
- 5 integrated energy systems to meet a variety of needs optimally.

Paone's analysis of the Japanese case is interesting if only for the sheer lack of degrees of freedom in this case. Currently one of the two most productive and competitive members of the OECD, Japan is also quite uniquely disadvantaged in its lack of industrial raw materials compared with its levels of development, industrialization and enterprise.

Paone provides a reasonably full picture of the Japanese economy. Policies of conservation, transformation and energy substitution are dealt with. The fact that, being dependent on extra-national sources for both raw-materials as well as markets there has had to be a cogently articulated policy towards developing countries (especially fuel producers), is well brought out in Chapter 2. The place of Japan within the OECD has also ensured that data relating to Japan is accompanied by others pertaining to some of the other major OECD member-countries for comparison. This is useful, although again the cut-off date seems to have been 1977-78.

Japanese policies relating to the future are clearly enunciated—including those which may lead to shift in emphasis within (or between) industries and also amongst suppliers of energy. A disastrous joint-venture with Iran into which Japan had entered, and from which it had to precipitately withdraw after the advent of the Ayatollah regime, might have been noted with profit in this case but has been left out. Conservation as well as the longer-term policies are, finally, discussed in detail. One useful feature of

Paone's paper is the inclusion and discussion of foreign policy parameters wherever these might lead to an additional depth in the analysis or understanding.

Similar conclusions have infused Cooper's discussion of Taiwan. Only, of course, in the instance of Taiwan the measures of dependence—on actors and states abroad—is rather greater. The economy is discussed and the two major sources of energy—petroleum and nuclear—have separate chapters devoted to them. One full chapter is also devoted to "new" sources of energy, as geothermal, marsh gas, solar and tidal. The vexed question of Taiwan's off-shore territorial claims has also a chapter devoted to it.

Overall however, the two reservations which this reviewer has relating to this book concerns (i) the mystifying obsolescence of the data included and (ii) the disparate manners of presentation of the three papers. The paper on Japan might, with benefit, have been used as a benchmark in this regard. On the other hand, however, this is a volume which has its degree of objectivity to recommend it. Objects and policies in both the North and the South have seen a degree of change after the second oil-shock. For example, the accelerated concern with inflation and currency real-values which has led to a shift of focus away from unemployment, GATT ideals of free trade (even within the OECD) and the increasing privatization of foreign LDC-debt assistance, has rendered this post second-shock scenario very different from the one admissible during the seventies.

Still, to the extent that an objective reading of earlier national situations is seen as necessary, this volume is certainly an useful addition to the literature.

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SOUMYA K. MITRA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

D.C. WADHWA: Re-Promulgation of Ordinances: A Fraud on the Constitution of India. Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, 1983, xxix, 259 p., Rs. 95.

BIHAR has many firsts to its credit. In its jails, under-trials are incarce-rated for more than 30 years without trial, when an average Indian lives only for 46 years. Eyes of the under-trials and alleged criminals have also been systematically gouged out with thick needles by the police and thereafter acid poured therein so that even the best eye surgeon could not restore the eye-sight of these hapless people.

Another instance is of a co-operative society, which has received astro-

nomical loans from a nationalised bank, after "mortaging" the Patna Railway Station and the Gandhi Maidan.

All the above would have qualified the Government of Bihar to be placed in the Guinness Book of World Records. But now Dr. Wadhwa in his book Re-Promulgation of Ordinances: A Fraud on the Constitution of India has made another startling discovery which places the Government of Bihar "head and shoulders" above any other state government in India or for that matter, any government, anywhere in the world. The learned doctor has found out, after painstaking labour of over two years, that there has been in Bihar "the unconstitutional practice of repromulgation of ordinances, which constitutes a fraud on the Constitution of India."

According to the author, not only has the power (to promulgate ordinances) been misused, its abuse in the state of Bihar has been altogether of a novel kind which was not within the contemplation of the founding fathers of the Constitution of India.

Even a child, with a nodding acquaintance with the Constitution, knows that Indian democracy depends on an honest executive, a fearless judiciary and an independent legislature. It is almost axiomatic to say that one of these three wings of democracy cannot usurp the power of the other. Neither can one infiltrate in the territory of the other. It clearly means that the executive cannot pass legislation, which is within the ambit of the legislature. It is only in rare circumstances, and because of special reasons, that the Governors of the states have been given ordinance-making powers. Members of the Constituent Assembly like Pandit Kunzru and Saxena were exercised over even this limited power given to the executive, even in times of emergency. They were persuaded by Dr. Ambedkar to fall in line on the clear assurance that this power was not going to be used and if used, would be used very sparingly. Article 213 of the Constitution gives legislative power to the Governor, when the iegislature is not in session and the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action. This article further says that where presidential instruction will be necessary such an ordinance would not be promulgated without the previous sanction of the president. It further states that such ordinances shall be placed before the legislature and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the legislature, if, of course, before that period, the legislature does not disapprove of this ordinance by a resolution.

Article 174 of the Constitution says that within six months from the last session of the legislature it has to be called again. Therefore, the maximum life of an ordinance promulgated by the Governor of a state is for seven and a half months or so unless it is replaced by an Act or disapproved by a resolution of the legislature before that period. It will, perhaps, be pertinent to remember that the Constitution does not provide for an extension of the life of an ordinance.

What is happening in Bihar is that giving a go-by to the accepted principle of the division of power, the executive is running the state with ordinances, while the legislature seems to be in blissful ignorance of its duties. To quote from Dr. Wadhwa's book at page 9: "The Bihar Legislature dusing the last cleven years (1971-1981) enacted 8 Acts in 1971, 5 Acts in 1972, 13 Acts in 1973, 16 Acts in 1974, 28 Acts in 1975, 4 Acts in 1980 and 10 Acts in 1981 while the Governor of that state during the same period promulgated, by sailing very close to the wind, 113 Ordinances in 1971, 175 Ordinances in 1972, 127 Ordinances in 1973, 184 Ordinances in 1974, 215 Ordinances in 1975, 220 Ordinances in 1976, 270 Ordinances in 1977, 114 Ordinances in 1978, 171 Ordinances in 1979, 166 Ordinances in 1980 and 203 Ordinances in 1981 under the power conferred upon him by Article 213 of the Constitution of India." It means, while the legislature, within a period of eleven years, has passed 163 Acts, the Governor has promulgated, during the same period, 1958 Ordinances.

From Table III, given by the author, it is seen that it is not uncommon for the Governor of Bihar to promulgate more than 50 Ordinances a day. As a matter of fact, he has promulgated as many as 56 Ordinances on a single day, example 18 January 1976. What is the modus operandi? The procedure followed is simple; the legislature is prorogued before completion of six weeks of its session, so that an ordinance promulgated before the session began shall not lapse when the legislature is in session. Immediately after the legislature is prorogued and a day or two before the ordinance is due to lapse, the Governor promulgates another ordinance by which the earlier ordinance is repealed and exactly the same provisions of the repealed ordinance are incorporated in the new ordinance. In all matters in which the prior consent of the President of India is necessary for promulgation of an ordinance, it is expeditiously obtained through the bureaucratic grape-vine. And this goes on and on, sometimes for as long as 15 years. Can such an exercise be called legal? In the language of Wadhwa:

It is clear that the object of the Governor in repealing an existing ordinance and re-promulgating the same, with exactly the same contents, is to disguise his collateral unlawful object of indirectly extending the life of the repealed ordinance. Not only is it highly improper to break the constitutional provisions by a course of contrivance in this way, the re-promulgation is, even ex-facie, unconstitutional because the whole scheme of re-promulgation is, in effect, such as proves, beyond an iota of doubt, that it is framed for an illegal purpose, namely to extend the life of an expiring Ordinance. To call it promulgation at all is incorrect; indeed, it is an abuse of the term. It is manipulation through re-promulgation.

When the executive is promulgating one ordinance after another or repromulgating the same ordinance, what is the Bihar Legislature doing? To quote Wadhwa: "Not only has it not resisted inroads on its rights by the Executive, it has, in fact, virtually abdicated its powers, given to it under Article 245 (1) of the Constitution of India, to make laws for the state, in favour of the Executive of the State." In Edward Mills Company Ltd., Beawar and others v. State of Ajmer and another, which was reported in A.I.R. 1955 Supreme Court 25, at page 32, the Supreme Court held that it is not open to the legislature to strip itself of its essential legislative function and vest the same in an extraneous authority. In 1960 once again, the Supreme Court said that a legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case. But, precisely, that is what is being done in Bihar for the last 13 to 14 years.

What actually is the object of the Bihar Ordinances? Is it actually a fraud on the Constitution of India?

The answer has been given by Wadhwa. To quote him:

It is true that it is not easy to impute a dishonest motive to the Governor of Bihar and hold that he is acting mala-fide in promulgating all the ordinances. It is also true that the ordinances promulgated by the Governor of Bihar may not be reaching beyond the legislative powers of the Governor of a state. The subject matter of the ordinances promulgated by the Governor of Bihar may also be within the legislative competence of the state. But the Governor is doing indirectly what he cannot do directly under the Constitution of India: he is re-promulgating ordinances. Though the recital of all the ordinances promulgated by him is in apple-pie order, the object of most of them is not what the Constitution requires. While pretending to comply with the constitutional provisions when he repeals the earlier ordinances, he, in effect produces a scheme for the continuation of these ordinances by shift or contrivance. The colourable nature of the re-promulgation of the ordinances by him lies in its device or contrivance to evade the limitation as to the duration of those ordinances imposed under Article 213 (2) (a) of the Constitution of India that every ordinance shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the re-assembly of the legislature.

The successive repeal and re-promulgation of the same ordinances by him, thus, is in truth a mere device to accomplish a bye or collateral or sinister object of extending the lives of those ordinances, an act substituted for another, mala fide substituted, an illegal act in the teeth of the Constitution. The colourable use of the repeal of earlier ordinances cannot serve to disguise the real object of the Governor of Bihar which is to keep them alive, and therefore should be unavailing to cloak the reality of the extension of the lives of those ordinances by a sham repeal and re-promulgation.

Therefore, is not the successive repeal and re-promulgation of the same ordinances by the Governor of Bihar, before their dates of expiry.

with the intention of keeping them alive, a purpose which cannot be attained directly under the provisions of the Constitution of India, not only unknown to law but also a fraudulent device to circumvent the constitutional provisions? Secondly, is not the President of India also a party to that fraud when he gives his permission to the Governor of Bihar for circuitously circumventing the provisions of the Constitution of India by re-promulgating ordinances by such invalid means?

What is happening in Bihar concerns not only Bihar, but the whole of India. As a matter of fact, the nascent Indian democracy will be in danger, if the Governor and the bureaucrats run the country with the help of ordinances, with a pliant legislature abdicating its power and duty. If it is happening in Bihar with impunity, why should it not happen in other states? Democracy is in danger and this matter should be taken before the Supreme Court immediately so that further erosion of the power of the legislature is stopped and a final and definitive pronouncement is given by the Supreme Court vis-a-vis powers of the executive to run the country through ordinances and re-promulgation of ordinances.

What Juluis Paulus said in 204 BC is extremely relevant today. One who does what a statute forbids, transgresses the statute: one who contravences the intention of a statute, without disobeying its actual words, commits fraud on it.

New Delhi.

GOBINDA MUKHOTY

T.B. SMITH: Basic Rights and their Enforcement. N.M. Tripathi Ltd., Bombay, 1979, xiii, 64 p., Rs. 30.

PROFESSOR Smith's Third B.N. Rau Memorial Lectures form a deceptively slender monograph of forty-eight pages. But the lucid wealth of provocative thought which marks almost every page makes it a book to be mulled over several readings, an otherwise forbidding prospect for a reader of memorial lectures, and that too on a legal subject. Smith's work enchants both in its style and substance.

The two lectures range over a variety of topics of common interest to India and Britain such as the so-called parliamentary sovereignty, the problem of devolution of power, the role of judges in attenuation and development of the "right" of jurisprudence, and the problem of jus standi. On the latter issue, proponents of social action litigation (miscalled "public interest litigation") would be interested to know that as early as 1953 some Scottish citizens filed a petition to interdict the Queen's Ministers and

officials from her being called "Queen Elizabeth, the Second of the United Kingdom of Great Britain" on the ground that there "had been no sovereign...named Elizabeth since the establishment of the Kingdom." (p. 41) Standing was denied by the Scottish Court on the grounds not unfamiliar to the Indian experience prior to the erosion of traditional rules of standing through the social action litigation.

Others before Smith have attacked "the Dicey myth of parliamentary sovereignty." (p. 12) But Smith demolishes it not on abstract jurisprudential or (the post-EEC) practical grounds. He points to concrete facts of history, embedded in the political culture of the United Kingdom—namely, the Union Agreement of 1707 which restricted the power of Parliament to alter "as basic rights many aspects of the Scottish establishment in the early eighteenth century," even if the Union Agreement constituted "no palladium of liberty," thus differing from many a written Constitution. (p. 9) Those legal restrictions on British parliamentary sovereignty have been consistently overlooked even by distinguished students of constitutional law, maybe because "the object of the 1707 Union was to secure the basic rights of two nations in a unitary state." (p. 13) Nevertheless, as Smith demonstrates, the problem of the vives of Parliamentary legislation on this ground remain open to scrutiny.

The Scottish perspective on British constitutionalism raises a number of important questions concerning the much vaunted English legal genius. For example, Smith notes the English have been remarkably inhospitable to ideas of federation. Indeed, "several influential and vociferous politicians" who oppose "increased self-government for Scotland" appear "anxious to repudiate the constitutional obligations" arising from Britain's accession to the European Community. There is thus a negative consistency; opposition to British accession to the EEC is significantly linked with "a policy of rejecting constitutional reform within the United Kingdom itself." (p. 15) Smith does not explore the cultural failure of English legal tradition which while rejecting the federal ideal at home vigorously promoted it in the colonies approaching liberation. In a charming, but devastating, observation he expresses his sense of outrage at all this; he says: "I fear that the distinguished constitutional lawyer whom we honour in this lecture would be unimpressed." (p. 14)

The other striking feature of the English legal culture is the ambivalence on a Bill of Rights. Unfortunately, the Scottish perspective on the issue is not fully available in this volume either, excepting that one gets the impression that Smith is not averse to the adoption in English law the text of the European Convention of Human Rights. (p. 27) Smith does regard the expression "human rights" to be "unduly emotive and imprecise." (p. 27) But in defending the Convention's open-ended provisions, permitting judicial intrusions, he rightly maintains that "precision of definition is impossible in this area of life and law." (p. 30) Smith also shares the

delicate English rectitude; he does not favour British judges adjudicating on constitutional issues in ways that "emulate the quasi-legislative role of the United States Supreme Court." (p. 31) Further, it seems that Smith shares the view that adoption of a Bill of Rights would expose Britain to an impossible attempt at regulating trade union rights (pp. 21-22), although why this should be so is not made fully clear to a reader not familiar with the tensions and contradictions in British labour policy and law.

For an Indian reader, perhaps the most pregnant point of the book is the demolition of Dicey; it deserves full reproduction.

He (Dicey) once observed: 'In every part of the world where British interests are at stake I am in favour of advancing these interests even at the cost of war.' As a rather feeble person he clearly did not envisage personal participation in such martial exploits. I contrast the personal courage of the Commonwealth Judiciary entrusted with grave and delicate issues. (p. 31)

Indian constitutional scholars who hero-worship Dicey and English forms of thought on public law have much to learn from the sturdy Scottish spirit of Smith.

Unfortunately, in his approach to Indian law, Smith (perhaps because he did not have access to Indian scholarly literature) relies heavily on the brown Englishmen of Indian law—H.W. Seervai being the foremost of these, with a worthy predecessor in Sir B.N. Rau in whose memory this lecture series was endowed.

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UPENDRA BAXI

PRESS LAW

BADDEPUDI RADHAKRISHNAMURTI: Indian Press Laws. India Law House, Guntur, 1980, xxiii, 360 p., Rs. 48.

RADHAKRISHNAMURTI'S work on Indian Press Laws, under review, is unquestionably the most comprehensive book dealing with all constitutional and legal provisions affecting the Press and journalists. It is an indispensable book of reference for those connected with the Press in one capacity or another and for lawyers, who have to deal with cases concerning the Press and journalists.

The fact that a second edition of the book has been brought out within four years of the publication of the first edition is an index of the utility of the publication and the demand for the book. While the claim that the occasion for the publication of the second edition has been utilised to

enlarge and revise the book and bring the case laws relating to the Pressup-to-date is justified, it is a great pity that the opportunity was not fully utilised to revise the language and eliminate the innumerable printing mistakes, which mar an otherwise valuable book. It must be hoped that at least in a subsequent edition, these mistakes in language and printing, would be eliminated.

In view of the experience of the Indian Press during the Emergency—1975 to 1977—a separate chapter on how the law relating to censorship was enforced should have been included, although there is a comprehensive separate book on the subject by one of our legal luminaries.

The appendices, which form a substantial part of the book, contain all the relevant provisions from the Constitution and various statutes concerning the Press. This would be invaluable for purposes of ready reference by legal practitioners and others. A useful feature of the book is an alphabetical index of all the cases cited in the book and an alphabetical list of the constitutions and statutes referred to in the publication.

Bangalore.

V.K. NARSIMHAN

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences. (Managing Editor)

ANGLE, Prabhakar S. Goa: An Economic Review (Goa Hindu Association Kala Vibhag Publication, 9). The Goa Hindu Association Kala Vibhag, Bombay, 1983. 102 p., Rs. 30.

With his wide knowledge of the various aspects of the socio-economic conditions of Goa, the author in this treatise examines the progress of agriculture, industrialisation, mining, fisheries and tourism which are the principal areas of economic development and commercial growth of the area. He also presents an overview of the financial institutions and analyses the cooperative movement and data about state revenues.

ATTARCHAND, Global Nuclear Politics: Planning Options and Prospect, A Survey 1945-1983. UDH Publishers, Delhi, 1983, XLV, 303 p., Rs. 200.

This is the first comprehensive annotated bibliography on nuclear energy covering a period from 1945-83. The wide array of aspects of nuclear energy covered by the author, who already has proved his expertise in literature survey and documentation in earlier similar works on topical and important subjects, speaks of the usefulness and quality of the work for political scientists, nuclear scientists and research scholars in the field. The various aspects covered by the author include nuclear politics, peaceful uses, arms race, arms control, energy aspects, foreign policy and diplomacy, nuclear reactors, nuclear technology and nuclear energy development and policies in various countries.

CHADDAH, Mehar Singh Are Sikhs a Nation? Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee, Delhi, 1982, 136 p., Rs. 65.

The author, a retired District and Sessions Judge who served as a member of the Sikh Gurdwaras Judicial Commission and Election Petitions Commission, and later as a member of the Inquiry Committees which probed the riots between the Akalis and Nirankaris at Kanpur and Delhi, attempts to academically establish that the Sikhs are a nation. While doing so he discusses the entire Sikh set-up, religion, race character, their ceremonies and rituals, their traditions, history and services in the cause of Indian freedom and in the defence of their motherland. The author further argues that the Sikhs have always demonstrated their loyalty to India and their faith in secularism, and that the demand for "Khalistan" is the call of only a few misguided persons. The author's thesis is based on the writings of Sikh religious scholars, history and the Gurbani. The book also contains the Sri Anandpur Sahib Resolution adopted on 16-17 October 1973 and President N. Sanjiva Reddy's Sardar Patel Memorial Lecture delivered at New Delhi on 31, October 1981.

CHAKRABORTY, Amulya Kumar Jawaharlal Nehru's Writings: A Literary Estimate. Minerva Associates, Calcutta, 1981, xiii, 238 p., Rs. 75.

Critically examines the literary content and significance of Nehru's writings.

The stress is on language and prose style, poetic elements, style of literary exposition, experience and communication, emotion, vision, humanism, epic dimension, artistic approach to and treatment of the conflicts of life. The book shows how Nehru's inner self developed, like the blossoming of a flower.

CHINNIAN, P. The First Struggle for Freedom in South India in 1806: Sporadic Events
After the Vellore Mutiny. Siva Publications, Erode, 1983, 97 p. Rs. 20. (Paper)

Describes the secret activities of freedom fighters after the Vellore Mutiny broke out on 10 July 1805 and the chain of events directed at overthrowing the alien rule which started in Wallajahbad, Hyderabad, Nundydurg, Bangalore, Pallamcottah, Quilon, Bellary and Sankary Durg. The study is based on documents and archival material available in the State Archives, Madras.

CHINNIAN, P. The Vellore Mutiny 1806: The First Uprising Against the British. The Author, Erode, 1982. 116 p., 12 Plates. Rs. 45. (Paper)

A study of the causes and circumstances leading to the outbreak of the mutiny. It also describes the Fakeer Movement and the role played by Tipu's sons. EMPLOYERS' FEDERATION OF INDIA, *The Golden Story 1933-1983*. Employers' Federation of India, Bombay 1983, xv, 150 p., Rs. 50. (Paper)

Commemorative volume of the association of autonomous organisations of industries set up with the purpose of protecting, promoting and championing the interests of industrial employers mainly in the areas of industrial relations, labour problems, etc. This book contains the story of this association, its activities, achievements and plans. It also presents the contribution made by Naval H. Tata, who remained the Federation's President for twenty four years, to improve employer-employee relations.

ENGINEER, Asghar Ali On Developing a Theory of Communal Riots. Institute of Islamic Studies, Bombay, 1984, 66 p., Rs. 15. (Paper)

Discusses the ideologically-oriented and local-issue-oriented factors involve in any communal riots. Both the factors are integrally connected with the socio-economic developments. The author views the whole problem of communalism and communal riots in the perspective of the dynamics of social change and development and discusses the role of various classes, social organizations, political parties—communal as well as secular—and the aspirations of the elites of the communities involved, presenting a broad theoretical framework for the understanding of the phenomenon.

GAITONDE, P.D. Portuguese Pioneers in India: Spotlight on Medicine. Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1983, xv, 188 p., Rs. 150.

The author, a distinguished surgeon, studies the interaction of European and Indian medicine. In developing his thesis, that in the field of medical sciences Europe was more influenced by India than India was by Europe, based on the evidence of writers of the 16th century, he goes beyond the confines of medicine and health and presents a picture of Portuguese and Indian society in the 15th and 16th centuries, of the castes, sub-castes, customs, non-violence, the great tradition of medicine, religious tolerance, etc. He also points out that medicine and physicians were a part of the political and socio-cultural scene.

GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. To the Best of My Memary. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1983, xvII, 419 p., Rs. 50.

Reminiscences of the former Chief Justice of India based on first hand accounts of events, things and persons. With the lucidity of his style, the precision of expression and the force of his logic, he presents his views on social reforms, Indian Democracy, transfer of judges, hobnobbing of judges with the members of the Bar and litigants and judges accepting dinner parties from the members of the Bar and others. At the same time, he however advocates that they should take part in social, educational and cultural activities. He further presents his experiences

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

078708 515

and work as Chief Justice of India, Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University and head of a number of commissions such as the Central Law Commission, National Commission on Labour, Dearness Allowance Commission and Bank Award Commission and illustrates his approach to the different problems through some of his important judgements. The references read out by him in the Supreme Court on the death of Jawaharlal Nehru and Lal Bahadur Shastri, and tributes paid to him after his death are included in the Appendices.

GANGULI, J.B. The Benign Hills: A Study in Tripura's Population Growth and

Problems. Tripura Darpan Prakashani, Agartala, 1983, vi, 64 p., Rs. 10.

A study of the socio-economic and political forces responsible for the large-scale immigration from Bengal, Assam, Manipur, Chittagong Hill tracts, etc. and its impact on the population growth trends, based on the results of Fopulation Census of Tripura. Focus is laid more on the demographic profile in 1931 and growth trends since 1931.

GOEL, Sita Ram Muslim Separatism: Causes and Consequences. Voice of India, New Delhi, 1983, 123 p., Rs. 12.

INDIAN MERCHANTS' CHAMBER, Platinum Jubilee Commemoration Volume 1982. Secretary-General, Indian Merchant's Chamber, Bombay, 1983.

The volume, marking the completion of seventy-five years of its existence, is divided into four sections. The first section captioned "Saga of the Chamber" recapitulates the services of the Chamber rendered against a background of rapid changes in the nation's social, political and economic conditions. It also contains quotable quotes of the Presidents of the Chamber, beginning from 1908-1982, and the tributes paid by national and industrial leaders to the Chamber for its services. The chronology of important national and international events adds to the treasure of information contained in this section. "Challenges on the Business Front," which is the caption of Section Two, provides information on Indian industry, planning, housing, role of business in promoting the arts and accountability of business, nuclear power, role of science in eradicating poverty, public enterprises, trade, chambers of commerce and management, through the papers contributed by experts in the fields. Section Three, captioned "Spotlight", contains information on the Chamber's activities, including a list of recipients of its awards, list of members of the Managing Committee and the Presidents from 1907-1982 and trustees of the Chambers' Trusts with photographs. Bombay old and new is presented in pictures in the Fourth Section.

JAIN, M.P. Outlines of Indian Legal History (4th Edition) N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1982, XXIV, 528 p., Rs. 60. (Paper)

Short, coordinated, integrated and coherent account of the important phases of the development of legal institutions in India. Since the first edition published in 1952, the author has taken care to include new and relevant topics in the subsequent editions. In the third edition, a chapter on the growth of the legal profession in India was added and development of the law including personal laws was discussed elaborately. In the present edition, the author has added a chapter on the present Law Commission and brought upto-date the chapter on Modern Judicial System. An excellent text book which is on the list of recommended books maintained by the University of London and most Indian Universities.

KASTURBHAI LALBHAI MEMORIAL VOLUME, COMMITTEE, Tribute to Ethics: Remembering Kasturbhai Lalbhai (Ed.): Niranjan Bhagat. Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Ahmedabad, 1983, xvII, 278 p.

The essays contributed to this volume by prominent persons in various walks of life, assess the personality and accomplishments of the distinguished industrialist, philanthropist and educationists. The volume also contains his writings and

speeches in English and Gujarati, reflecting the set of values and ideals to which hewas committed.

KRISHNA RAO, Y.V. Growth of Capitalism in Agriculture: A Case Study of Andhra Pradesh. Visalaandhra Publishing House, Vijaya vada, 1934, x, 62 p., Rs. 10.

(Paper)

Paper submitted at the All-India Seminar on Development of Capitalism in Agriculture and the Importance of the Price Question for the Peasants, held under the auspices of the Andhra Pradesh Ryotu Sangham in September 1982 at Hyderabad. It presents the marxist point of view on developments in the agrarian sectors; discusses the problems of growth of papitalism in agriculture, the degree of commodity production, the growing market dependency of the peasantry, and the pro-monopoly policy of the ruling bourgeois class. It spells out the way of this process which subjects millions of peasants and other rural poor to a miserable life and degradation.

KULKARNI, V. B. K.M. Munshi (Builders of Modern India). Director, Publications

Division, New Delhi, 1983, 308 p., Rs. 23. (Paper)

Biography of a patriot, lawyer, humanitarian, reformer, able administrator, educationist and man of letters who admired the antiquity and amplitude of his country's heritage and was proud of the fact that it had contributed to the civilization of one fourth of the human race. The author in this "Builders of Modern India Series," under the auspices of the Publications Division of the Government of India, describes the life, brilliant qualities and contributions of this eminent Indian in the freedom movement, states integration and framing of the Constitution, his role as Minister and Governor, his thoughts on higher education and Hindi as the national language, etc., and his achievements in various aspects of national and social life. The book contains a chapter on the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, which is the greatest monument to his vision and veneration for all that is great and noble in India.

ROY CHOWDHURY, Salil K. and SAHARAY, H.K. S.C. Ghosh on Principles and Forms of Pleading (4th Edn.) Eastern Law House, Calcutta 1984, 116 p., 1322 p.,

Rs. 175.

Discusses the origins of pleading in India and Britain with reference to the ancient Hindu and Mahommedan periods. It elaborates the principles of pleading with particular stress on parties, causes of action, jurisdiction, plaint and written statement, and includes subjects such as special defences, set off, counter claims, third party procedure, particulars, interrogatories, amendment, striking out and vertification of pleading, forms of petitions and case laws. Extensive footnotes relating to case laws are provided to make the volume useful to practising lawyers.

SAHA, A,N. Saha's Criminal Reference (3rd Edition). Eastern Law House, Calcutta,

1984, 7 P., 1040 P., Rs. 160.

Sardar Patel: (Collection of Lectures Delivered under M. B. Patel Public Charity Trust, (Prerit Sardar Patel Memorial Lectures Series). Registrar, Sardar Patel University,.

Vallabh Vidya Nagar, 1982, iv, 213 p., Rs. 26. (Paper)

Collection of Sardar Patel Memorial lectures by V. Shankar, Durga Das, H.M. Patel, R.D. Diwaker and Jagjivan Ram in English and Utsaubhai Parikh (in Gujarati)—who had the privilege to know the great leader closely. It throws new light on his personality great qualities of head and heart, achievement and contributlon to the making of the modern history of India,

R.D. Diwaker in his lecture, besides paying tribute to the golden traits of the Sardar and his role, discusses the etiology, anatomy and psychology of politics and political power. H.M. Patel analyses the Sardar's correspondence published in ten volumes, edited by Durga Das, and describes Sardar Patel's views on the Junagadh matters, civil services and administration, closeness and differences with Nehru, his outlook on public affairs, national policy regarding broadcasting, Hinduism, entry of Harijans in temples, etc. Finally his love and affection for his fellow workers at all levels is also high lighted.

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